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This book is a product of the Financial Innovations Roundtable.  Created in 2000, the 
Financial Innovations Roundtable, housed at the Carsey Institute at the University of 
New Hampshire, creates cross-sector partnerships among conventional and non-
traditional lenders, investors, and markets to provide low-income communities with 
increased access to capital and financial services. The Financial Innovations Roundtable 
(FIR) is not only a think tank, it is a “think-do” tank. Some of the most successful ideas 
developed at the FIR have been implemented, resulting in new tools, policies and 
practices that have resulted in millions of dollars being directed into investments in 
affordable housing, small and minority businesses, community facilities and other 
community development efforts. 
 
The Carsey Institute conducts policy research on vulnerable children, youth, and 
families and on sustainable community development. We give policy makers and 
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“The advent of budget surpluses does not lessen the need for more efficient and 
effective government and will continue to require difficult choices. Government 
performance and accountability need to be enhanced in order to get the most out of 
available resources and forge effective approaches to both the newly emerging and long-
standing problems facing the nation. Legislation enacted in the 1990s has provided a 
statutory framework to help resolve longstanding management problems that 
undermine the federal government’s effectiveness and efficiency, and to provide greater 
accountability for results. The reforms that have been adopted have profound 
implications for what the government does, how it is organized and how it performs. 
Nevertheless, these statutory reforms, which focused on performance, financial and 
information technology management, did not encompass all areas of government 
management. Human capital issues are the missing link in the management and 
accountability framework. To meet the challenge of the 21st century, the federal 
government will need to implement modern management practices for more efficient 
and effective delivery of government services: posses the effective management 
approaches and tools needed to develop and maintain high performing organizations; 
and implement the human capital practices needed to support a focus on performance 
based management.... 
 
I have noted previously that many mission areas—from low income housing assistance, 
to food safety to counterterrorism to economic development—are addressed by a wide 
range of mandatory and discretionary spending programs, tax expenditures, and 
regulatory approaches. Virtually all of the results that the government strives to achieve 
require the concerted and coordinated efforts of two or more agencies. Yet our work has 
repeatedly shown that mission fragmentation and overlap in the federal government are 
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widespread. In addition many federal programs were designed years ago to meet the 
needs and demands as determined at that time. It is important to periodically reexamine 
whether current programs and activities remain relevant appropriate and effective. 
Unfocused and uncoordinated programs waste taxpayer dollars, confuse and frustrate 
program customers, and limit the effectiveness of federal efforts. ... Siloed 
organizations—burdened with overlapping functions, inefficiencies and turf battles—
will need to become integrated organizations if they expect to make the most of 
knowledge, skills, and abilities of their people. Finally, internally focused agencies will 
need to focus externally in order to meet the needs and expectations of their ultimate 
clients—the American people. Our work has consistently shown that many agencies face 
long-standing and substantial challenges to further progress. The major challenges that 
agencies face in becoming high-performing organizations include:  
 
• Adopting an effective results orientation; 
• Strengthening financial management and related controls to better support 
decision-making and demonstrate accountability;  
• Improving the use of information technology to modernize services and achieve 
results; and 









ajor technological advances have also made the banking industry more 
efficient and expanded the markets they can economically serve, 
increasing access to banking services for LMI [low and moderate income] 
individuals and small businesses. ATMs are now ubiquitous, and online banking 
allows account access from most any computer. Innovations in information 
technology have made highly scalable origination production and servicing 
platforms both feasible and cost effective. Automated underwriting and credit 
scoring have led to faster decisions and better and less costly risk assessment, 
which in turn has enabled banks to make smaller loans and to vary pricing based 
on the riskiness of the borrower. (Although the recent credit crunch may be 
forcing a recalibration of the risk inherent in lending to a borrower with a given 
set of characteristics, these systems offer a way to array borrowers along a risk 
continuum and vary pricing accordingly.)1 
 
 
Should	  Community	  Development	  Financial	  Institutions	  (CDFIs)	  be	  in	  the	  Lending	  
Business	  Anymore?	  
 
A number of years ago, NeighborWorks America found that one of its better home 
mortgage lenders was routinely writing mortgages that violated key consumer-lending 
statutes, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and the Truth In Lending 
Act (TILA). About the same time, NeighborWorks found that five of six lenders in one of 
its bigger states were making home mortgages without a license. In an industry that 
holds as a basic tenet that the risk of lending to low-income people is mitigated by 
maintaining lender and borrower discipline, this was a shock. There was nothing 
malicious in either situation. Indeed, the borrowers by and large received very 
supportive forms of financing. Yet both situations point to the difficulty that small, 
nonprofit, mission-based lenders face in dedicating the time, experience, consistency, 
and cost required of the disciplined lender. In addition to providing assistance to the 
borrower, these lenders must keep up with the latest developments in regulations, 
M 
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procedures, and technologies. In the first instance, the lender had the financial and staff 
resources to quickly remedy the problem. In several of the other organizations, this was 
not the case.  
 
As important as telecommunication satellites may be, not every country has the capacity 
to put one into orbit. Lending is increasingly a form of rocket science. Although the 
credit analysis side of the process is becoming simplified through credit scoring and 
automated valuations, the pricing of the loan, funding, and portfolio management are 
becoming vastly more complex. With the advent of sophisticated methodologies for loan 
design, portfolio and asset/liability management, activity-based costing, data 
transmission and analysis, and marketing, the lender who simply makes loans and holds 
them, even if the process is highly disciplined, is at a distinct disadvantage. The 
disadvantage is particularly acute among those lenders who have small balance sheets 
and limited grant subsidy. These lenders have no margin for error, and their only hope 
is to maintain their grant subsidies and, if possible, increase them. However, even this 
prospect is no longer a guaranteed strategy for sustainability; the conventional lending 
sector has demonstrated (perhaps too well) that it can reach any borrower anywhere at 
any time, and the small lender’s target constituency can evaporate almost overnight—
along with the justification for the grants. It is now clear that a lender who lends 
prudently and works the loan to maturity is no longer guaranteed of constituent benefit, 
market relevance or sustainability.  
 
 
We are not challenging the need for disciplined lending. Quite the contrary. We need 
good lenders now more than ever. The challenge is, however, in how the disciplined 
community-lender accomplishes the mission. The process by which most CDFIs have 
operated during the past several decades has left many stranded in the current 
environment. As a group, CDFIs simply do not have the tools—the loan products, the 
technologies, the policies and funding capacity—that their constituencies, newly 
returned to their doorsteps by the credit crisis—require.  
 
How	  We	  Got	  Pushed	  Aside	  
 
As we look back over the past decade, we can see how CDFIs got pushed aside in their 
own communities. There were always some flaws in the basic CDFI model, but external 
factors made even some of the strengths appear flawed as well. Key factors include:  
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• Homogeneity of loan products. The range of loan product structures is relatively 
limited. Where the products are tailored to the needs of the borrower, they are 
often limited by the amount of available grant subsidy. Subsidy tends to be 
expended with each loan and stays with the borrower. It is lost by the lender at 
the time of origination and never returned for future use. This manufactures the 
need for additional subsidy. 
• Visibility. Like the corner dime store facing the collective weight of the “big box” 
retailers, mission-based lenders do not have the marketing budget or skill sets to 
compete with conventional lenders for the attention of their low-income 
customers.  
• Technology. The advent of the two-minute conditional approval based on credit 
scores was a key factor in generating volume in the single-family mortgage 
market over the past decade. There are similar technologies available in other 
asset classes. Many, if not most, mission-based lenders have been unable to 
deploy technologies with rapid-turnaround approvals. 
• Vertical loan delivery. The traditional approach of CDFIs is to perform all 
functions of the lending process in-house, without regard to cost. This dispersion 
of effort discourages focus of the financial and staff resources on what the 
mission-lender does uniquely and best: prudent risk taking and constituent 
assistance.  
• Staff capacity. Inadequate training resources, low salaries, limited opportunities 
for advancement, and high staff turnover often challenge the CDFI’s ability to 
maintain an up-to-date and consistent lending program. 
• Concentrated risk. The mission focuses the loan portfolio on local and often 
higher-risk customers. In insurance parlance, this is equivalent to insuring only 
the sick. This focus curtails the notion of cross-subsidization and results in a very 
high-cost and high-subsidy portfolio.  
• Variety of loan product documentation and management. The fragmented and often 
idiosyncratic nature of the documentation, tracking, and servicing of loans 
renders them difficult to pledge, sell, and even at times, value. Hence, the 
leveraging of subsidy is limited, and the exposure to interest rate and operating 
cost as well as credit risk constrain the balance sheet, and inhibit the ongoing 
achievement of mission-based lending. 
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• Limitations of the revolving loan fund structure. Revolving loan funds (RLFs) make 
new loans only as older loans are paid. Thus, the capacity of lenders who make 
long-term loans is routinely constrained. When times are good, most revolving 
loan fund lenders do not have sufficient funds to meet demand. When times are 
bad, good credits pay more slowly and bad credits do not pay at all; in turn, 
revolving loan fund lenders have even less funds to meet demand. Hence, in bad 
times, when the RLF’s loan products are needed the most, they are the least 
available.  
 
When	  the	  Going	  Gets	  Tough…	  
 
This litany of shortcomings2 brings us back to the question we asked in the first section: 
Should Community Development Financial Institutions be in the lending business? 
  
Wouldn’t it make more sense for CDFIs to concentrate their disciplined approach to 
lending on only those kinds of activities—development lending and community 
facilities, for example—for which there is clearly no competing conventional sector 
platform? Wouldn’t it make more sense for the CDFIs who lend to homebuyers and 
small businesses to focus their resources, instead, on counseling, technical assistance, 
real estate development, and/or advocacy?  
 
Based on what we have seen in the market over the past few years, the answer is a 
resounding, no!  
 
Notwithstanding all the flaws that have emerged with the CDFI model, CDFIs still have 
two assets that are not found elsewhere.  
 
• Better loans. CDFIs are disciplined traditional portfolio lenders. The primary 
objective of their mission for their borrowers to succeed; and as a consequence, 
they are called to do whatever is necessary within their capacity to assure this 
success. The same cannot be said of the conventional lender. In the largest of the 
NeighborWorks Network’s counseled, fixed-rate, low-fee first mortgage 
portfolios, for example, there has been a doubling of delinquencies and charge-
offs among the low-income, minority, single-parent, and first-time home-buying 
households they serve. Delinquencies of 90 days or more are rising from the 4 
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percent to 8 percent range. The situation is serious. However, the delinquency 
rates in subprime adjustable rate mortgages—the bulk of which have not been 
made to disadvantaged homeowners—are in the 30 percent range (small wonder 
the loans were called “toxic”). These were loans made by conventional lenders. 
While the conventional lending sector responded to the many incentives to 
engage in bad lending, and enjoyed an environment virtually free of restraint, 
CDFIs stayed with their disciplined lending practices. This was not the first 
divergence between the policies and performance of CDFIs and the conventional 
sector, nor will it be the last.  
• Commitment to the community. Although CDFIs currently have little money to 
lend to their constituencies, they are, nevertheless still in the neighborhood. The 
conventional sector can come and go. CDFIs do not have that choice. They have 
to be here: it is their mission. If they cannot serve the community, then it’s time 
to close down. The issue comes down to trust, and, because of their commitment 
to the place and the people in it, the CDFIs have that trust. Coming out of this 
debacle, the conventional lender will have to find a way to rebuild it.  
 
What to do now? To paraphrase Elyse Cherry, Chairman of Boston Community Capital, 
we are presented with an astonishing opportunity.3 Now is the time for CDFIs to be 
buying and lending. Now is the time to take a lead in demonstrating how good the 
CDFIs are at exactly what they were created to do.  
 
Some, like Boston Community Capital, are already out there doing it. Many, however, 
are stuck with rising delinquencies, high cost structures, diminishing grants, and lack of 
access to the best forms of financing. It is time to change all of that. It is time to focus less on 
trotting out the tin cup and more on strengthening the organization. It is time to revamp and 
take charge of the business of achieving the mission. This is not just talk. It is doing—and it 
does not have to be as hard as it sounds.  
 
 
Reloading	  Your	  CDFI	  
 
With the markets weak and lending activity low, now is the perfect time to step up and 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the organizations in the CDFI field. This does 
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not have to be an exhaustive and expensive process. To show how accessible this 
process is, we will illustrate right here how one kind of quick drill can proceed. 
 
We can all begin any review of the mission business with the report card on our 
business models introduced in Chapter 8 as “The Four Major Categories.”4  We can take 
a look at the following ratios: 
 
I. Revenues to Average Assets 
II. Operating Expenses to Average Assets 
III. Losses to Average Assets 
IV. Funding Cost to Average Assets 
 
Subtracting the amounts in Categories II, III, and IV from the amount in Category 1 will 
reveal how much grant funding must be raised each year. If this amount is not 
achievable, then the amounts in one or more of categories II, III, and IV will need to be 
reduced. Or, alternatively, the amount in Category I can be increased—though this tends 
to be a much more complicated item in terms of the market and the mission. With this 
simple calculation in hand, one can revisit the flaws outlined above. Examples of how 
these flaws might be addressed are outlined below, along with the category each flaw 
affects.  
 
• Homogeneity of loan products. Expand the range of loan products with an eye to 
providing only as much subsidy as is actually needed to make a prudent 
transaction, and identify the extent to which it can be recaptured for future use. 
There are many excellent examples. The aggressive management and, where 
possible, retention and active reallocation of subsidy are necessary to both 
achieve the mission and maintain sustainability. (Category 1. Revenues to 
Average Assets) 
• Visibility. The predatory lenders in the community did not buy commercial time 
during the Super Bowl. Their two-minute approvals were all they needed. The 
chief asset of the local lender is word of mouth. If the corner dime store has a 
good deal, people will know, and they will show. (Category 1. Revenues to 
Average Assets) 
• Technology. Automated underwriting, bookkeeping, and servicing are the norm 
in the lending business for most asset classes. If the organization cannot afford to 
upgrade and stay at the cutting edge in any of these categories, the work should 
be outsourced. Paring down enables the CDFI to focus on what it can and should 
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be doing, such as origination, counseling, technical assistance, and structuring 
deals that do not fit the mold. This strategy is currently being successfully used 
in the community development credit union field. (Category 2. Operating 
Expenses to Average Assets) 
• Vertical loan delivery. The same issues that apply to technology (above) apply 
here. (Category 2. Operating Expenses to Average Assets) 
• Staff capacity. If the organization cannot keep two or three lenders in place and 
provide regular training on developments in the lending business, it is time to 
find another entity to perform lending functions. This is a hard decision. There 
are exceptions, such as regulated depositories and municipal or state-funded 
loan funds. In addition, organizations that are focused on a relatively low 
volume of big-ticket loans—such as low-income housing tax credits, community 
development, and real estate development loans—can work off of very small 
lending teams. In these sectors, automation and consumer lending law are not as 
much of a factor, and often, competition is limited or nonexistent. (Category 2. 
Operating Expenses to Average Assets) 
• Concentrated risk. Simply because a lender receives subsidies does not mean the 
entire portfolio needs to be subsidized. There are more needs in the community 
than single-family mortgages or small business loans to low-income people. 
Expanding the target constituency and changing the mix of asset classes are two 
key strategies for achieving risk diversification and cross-subsidization. 
(Category 3. Losses to Average Assets) 
• Variety of loan product documentation and management. Standardization of 
documentation does not mean abandonment of the constituency or higher levels 
of risk taking. It simply means disciplined and easily accessible reporting of 
transactions. It opens up the potential for pledging and sale of the loans for the 
purposes of obtaining financing and/or reducing future exposure to interest rate, 
operating, and credit risks. It enables the asset to be properly and easily valued 
and for whatever subsidy is locked in a loan to be freed for reallocation. 
(Category 4. Funding Cost to Average Assets) 
• Limitations of the revolving loan fund structure. The revolving loan fund is a 
creature of the donor and designed to ensure proper use of donated funds. Loans 
tend to be made in response to borrower needs as they arise, and the subsidy 
tends to be expended as the loans are made. To stay relevant as well as 
sustainable, revolving loan fund lenders must establish systems for targeting and 
facilitating the flow of cash, as well as for the accurate retention and reallocation 
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of subsidy. Lenders must also establish financing platforms that enable them to 
put more externally raised funds to work with subsidized revolving loan fund 
monies. Leveraging subsidy by developing access to funding from the capital 
markets is a way of graduating from the bucket brigade to the pipeline, and 
along with it comes a significant increase in management discretion and 
authority to affect mission impact. In short, it liberates the lender. (Category 4. 
Funding Cost to Average Assets) 
 
This quick framing drill, with its examples of how the flaws might be addressed, helps 
illustrate the simplicity of the logic behind the overall self-evaluation exercise. 
Obviously, the actual exercise will involve considerably more detail. However, increased 
detail does not mean increased difficulty.  
 
In the “Sustainable Mission” course, presented at the NeighborWorks America Training 
Institutes, for example, participants are taught to reduce absolutely everything in their 
organizations to simple cash flows, and to prioritize these on the basis of how each of 
them promotes the mission and sustainability.5 This process is also discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 8. The course comes with a software program that enables participants 
to instantly view the impact of their decisions on pricing, size, term, volume, operating 
expenses, and funding to highlight the extent to which each decision affects both 
mission and financial condition. It is a tool that enables them to break the complexity 
down into assessable components, essentially providing the basic blueprint for the 
rocket they need to build. It also demonstrates the complexity of running a sustainable 
lending portfolio; clearly, good CDFI lending it is no longer simply a matter of making 
good loans to people in the neighborhood who come in the door, if, indeed, it ever was.  
 
The “Sustainable Mission” methodology is just one of many ways to approach the 
discipline of optimizing one’s CDFI. Many CDFIs may find that tools they have already 
developed to manage their organizations may put them well on the path of “building 
their own rocket.” One way or another, however, the new models must be designed and 




Where	  the	  Views	  of	  the	  CDFI	  and	  the	  Markets	  Converge	  
 
This book is directed primarily at solving for flaws in Category IV, Funding Cost. 
Solving the problem of funding CDFIs was the primary focus of the capital markets 
team that was put together at the Financial Innovations Roundtable (FIR) in November 
2000.6 It is their work that serves as the basis for the technical components and historical 
events of this book. The team worked with one primary goal in mind: to gain access for 
unsecured funding of CDFI organizational risk via the capital markets. Along the way, 
they saw increasing evidence of the importance of gaining access to the capital markets: 
Indeed, it became increasingly evident that a lender could not engineer sustainability, 
generate impact or even remain relevant without access to the external forms of capital 
and liquidity that the capital markets routinely provided. The new lending world that 
CDFIs were increasingly competing against was liquid, fee-driven, and immediately 
responsive to customer needs, precisely because of its connection to the capital markets.  
 
The primary focus of this book is on explaining how banks and capital markets work, 
and how CDFIs can improve funding costs and financing operations by improving the 
ways they are used. As part of this, we necessarily focus on what needs to be done by 
CDFIs organizationally to facilitate access to these expanded sources of funding. This 
means that we have to look at the workings of the entire organization, even as the rating 
agencies, institutional investors, and banks would. Thus, we will have to address all of 
the four major categories: the revenue, operating costs, losses, and funding. Ultimately, 
it is the balance among these fundamental components that determines not only the 
effectiveness of the mission, but the sustainability of the CDFI. It is also the active 
maintenance of this balance that assures potential external funding sources that the 
credit risk of the organization is manageable and is, in fact, being managed. Although 
the balance among these factors will necessarily differ from one organization to the next, 
the necessity of managing a balance in an ever-changing set of circumstances is equally 
urgent for every lender. Success in the effort is the hallmark of superior management.  
 
This last point leads us to one of our most important themes. As our FIR team proceeded 
down the path to the capital markets, it became evident that the interests of the rating 
agencies, banks, and investors in evaluating a CDFIs organizational risk were precisely 
the same as the interests of the staff and board in managing it; the data points and 
analytical methods needed to produce a good loan or investment to a sound 
organization were invariably shared. If the lender does not have access to the data or is 
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unsophisticated in the analysis, the cost of funds will rise along with lender 
intrusiveness – and the likelihood of default. Further, management will be unable to 
establish or maintain the balance among the various components of the four 
categories—all of which are competing for the organization’s limited resources—and the 
organization will not survive. Certainly not in the environment we face today or will 
face tomorrow.  
 
Hence, the effort to gain access to the capital markets gave us insight into this other, 
perhaps even more important component of the funding category: the effort to gain 
control of one’s funding sources, inevitably forces one to gain better control of one’s 
operating uses. The need to upgrade organizational decision-making and management 
in order to provide confidence to lenders and investors is directly aligned with the 
management’s interests in maximizing the quality and impact of the CDFI they run. This 
unintended offshoot of the access-to-capital markets assignment may, in the end, be the 
most important part of this book. It is certainly the one in which the most immediate 
benefits can—and in fact must—be achieved.  
 
Taking	  Your	  CDFI	  to	  the	  Capital	  Markets	  
 
It is a tribute to the participants of the first Financial Innovations Roundtables that they 
initiated the effort to access new sources of funding as early as they did. The question of 
how to get more money at affordable cost was defined and advanced in November 2000. 
The answer at the time was: CDFIs get more by going to the capital markets.  
 
Going to the capital markets was not an easy mission. The FIR team that took on the task 
was looking for low-cost capital based entirely on the credit risk of the CDFI itself, not 
its portfolio assets. The team was looking for the kind of unsecured short- and long-term 
credit that corporate entities enjoy at the kinds of pricing levels that high-quality 
corporations obtain. That is, they were looking for funding parity. Owing to the high 
quality of CDFI organizational credit risk, the participants on the FIR team believed they 
were entitled to no less.  
 
From November 2000, when the roundtables got under way, until April 2008, when it 
was decided to put the work on hold owing to events in the marketplace, the FIR team 
explored three major paths to the capital markets. Two of them were dead ends, and the 
third was not completed before the market collapsed. There was one major piece of good 
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news, however. In the effort to reach the capital markets, the FIR teams discovered there 
was another source of funding to access—the wholesale side of the banks. Although the 
wholesale side of the banks had also retreated as a result of the crisis, it was clear that 
the wholesale side would be an easier, and in many ways, preferable first stop for 
funding parity, once the markets recovered.  
 
As we will discuss in Chapter 1, the capital markets remain closed to CDFIs, and the 
banks remain wary. The prognosis is that there will be material changes in the way they 
operate when they revive. As a result, one might conclude that the work of the FIR team 
on this mission is history. In fact, it is history, but it’s also a guide. By the time the 
roundtables had created the Commercial Paper Co-op, the teams had an excellent 
understanding of: 
 
• How the capital markets worked 
• How the banks worked 
• Which configuration of market and bank mechanisms could get CDFIs the 
best deal at the lowest cost 
• What CDFIs needed to do to get the banks and the capital markets to work 
for them.   
 
Although a number of details have already changed in the way that the markets work, 
the most valuable findings of the FIR team involve market fundamentals that will likely 
see little change. Going forward, CDFIs will find many of the FIR team’s findings to be 
essential guideposts in gaining access to the capital markets and the wholesale bank 
portfolios. The FIR team’s findings will also be useful relative to the work that CDFIs 
must do to improve their prospects for funding: improve the sustainability of their 
mission efforts, for example, through standardization of reporting and analysis and risk 
diversification. These goals will remain top requirements well into the future regardless 
of the conditions in the financial markets.  
 
In crossing the borders that bracket the CDFI field, and forging into the vast terrain of 
the capital markets, the FIR team was able to identify the trading and lending 
mechanisms that worked well for lenders and investors, and to conclude that these same 
mechanisms could be put to good use on behalf of CDFIs and their constituencies.  For 
the most part, these were rational and efficient mechanisms, mechanisms that enabled 
investors to put vast amounts of cash to work in a wide range of activities, many 
involving far greater risk than the risks taken by CDFIs. Moreover, these mechanisms, 
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when properly used, enabled lenders and investors to lend and invest  prudently, a 
qualification that potential participants in the CDFI field would surely insist upon.  
 
Although the unmitigated abuse of these mechanisms prompted, and then promoted, 
the failure of the capital markets and the unprecedented levels of distress among 
borrowers, investors and lenders alike, these mechanisms remain valuable, if not 
essential to the free, fair, and efficient flow of money. To be sure, discipline in the 
market’s trading mechanisms is as necessary to the proper quantity of funding, as 
discipline in the market’s lending mechanisms is necessary to the quality: following their 
role in the collapse of the market we can expect that some level of discipline will be 
revived and enforced in both functions for at least some period of time. One way or 
another, however, we can also expect that most, if not all, of these trading and lending 
mechanisms will be restored in some form, and they will once again be central to both 
the capital markets and CDFI participation in them.  
 
Roadmap	  for	  the	  Book	  
 
This book takes us down these two broad avenues:  
 
1. Understanding the capital markets, the institutional participants, the lending and 
trading mechanisms they use, and how these mechanisms work.  
 
2. Understanding how standardization in specific areas of technology, reporting, 
and analysis in the CDFI field can break the barriers with rating agencies, 
institutional investors and banks, while improving CDFI sustainability and 
impact. 
 
Understanding	  the	  Capital	  Markets	  
 
Chapter 1 reviews the historical tension between the lending and trading disciplines in 
the capital markets, how the trading disciplines have effectively undercut lending 
disciplines, and how this trend increasingly isolates portfolio lenders such as CDFIs, 
leaving their constituents at the mercy of potentially irrational market forces.  
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Chapter 2 identifies the three key tasks for the FIR team: placing unsecured CDFI 
organizational debt in the capital markets, standardizing reporting and analysis, and 
improving risk management. The chapter also provides definitions for CDFIs, capital 
markets, and organizational credit risk. It goes on to show the kind of financing that 
corporations can get from their banks, and explains how the CDFI industry has “missed 
the bus” in terms of financing options.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the chief mechanisms of the capital markets that CDFIs must use to 
achieve funding parity. It outlines these mechanisms in the context of the three FIR team 
tasks. It also shows how these mechanisms failed in the current crisis. Finally, it 
illustrates why, without these or similar capital market and wholesale banking tools, it is 
unlikely that CDFIs will achieve funding parity in the future.  
 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 detail the three major efforts of the FIR team to design a CDFI 
funding structure tailored to the needs of the banks and the capital markets. Chapter 4 
presents the so-called “Mini-Fed,” which was an attempt to solve all CDFI funding 
needs (except grants). The chapter tracks how and why a series of constraints on CDFIs, 
as well as on the institutional participants in the capital markets, blocked the attempt. 
Chapter 5 outlines the next effort, the Capital Exchange, in which the FIR team was 
forced to narrow the efforts to obtain low-cost debt for CDFI organizational risk into a 
focus on short-term funding only. The chapter shows how, even with the short-term 
focus and the incorporation of the new CDFI ratings capability (CARS: the CDFI 
Assessment and Rating System), the capital markets were not ready to fund CDFI 
organizational credit risk.  Finally, Chapter 6 shows how the design of the Commercial 
Paper Co-op finally got CDFIs in a position to “get on the bus,” with access to both the 
capital markets and the wholesale side of the banks. And it describes what happened to 
the design when the markets collapsed.   
 
One of the chief values of discussing the FIR team’s three major efforts is to show how 
vital the use of capital market mechanisms can be to the CDFI mission, and why it is 
critical that CDFIs position themselves to take advantage of these mechanisms when the 
market returns to normalcy. There is another value as well. As the FIR team dug deeper 
into each effort, the needs of the banks, the rating agencies, and the institutional 
investors became much clearer. Ultimately, the team discovered that the door to the 
markets and funding parity is opened only when CDFIs address the needs of the banks 
and the investors and find a way to incorporate them into the negotiations.  
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Improving	  CDFI	  Sustainability,	  Impact,	  and	  Access	  to	  Capital	  through	  Standardization	  
of	  Technology,	  Reporting,	  and	  Analysis	  
 
Chapter 7 surfaces the issues with the rating agencies, as well as the opportunities. 
During the efforts to implement the Mini-Fed and the Capital Exchange, it became clear 
that the primary way to ensure funding parity for the CDFIs and their continued access 
to capital markets was to get good ratings from the rating agencies. This was true 
whether CDFIs actually went to the capital markets or simply made the leap to the 
wholesale side of their banking partners. Chapter 7 lays out what the rating agencies 
need in terms of standardized performance data, financial reporting, and analytical 
discipline. It focuses on the two biggest analytical obstacles the rating agencies face 
relative to CDFIs: evaluation of the grant revenue line and the cash flow dynamics of 
restricted, temporarily restricted, and unrestricted net assets.  
 
Chapter 8 proposes a range of standard corporate finance techniques used to evaluate 
organizational risk for nonprofits. These are compatible with rating agency analytical 
disciplines. The recommendations follow the logic of the rating agency perspectives 
outlined in Chapter 7. These analytical disciplines move the primary focus away from 
the balance sheet and toward the manner in which management makes decisions, 
beginning with initial design of the asset and following the decisions forward through 
the cash flow.  
 
Chapter 9 is devoted to the issue of financial reporting. It identifies some of the key 
flaws in current financial reporting for CDFIs, flaws that seriously impede sound 
management as well as institutional evaluation. The chapter also recommends data 
points and reporting protocols compatible with the rating agency focus on management 
decision making and organizational performance.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 10, we offer a brief summary of recommendations of items that the 
CDFIs should be working on now, in preparation for the return of the markets to 
normalcy. An encouraging fact is that leaders and organizations across the CDFI sector 
are already implementing a number of these recommendations. Hence, they serve more 
as support than as exhortations for advances in the field.   
 
There is no doubt that much work must be done in the areas of standardized reporting 
and analysis for CDFIs. Additional effort must be applied to the diversification and 
mitigation of unsecured CDFI organizational risk. This book outlines a number of paths 
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to achieve both. Yet arguably the most important duty of CDFIs is to continue to delve 
into ways in which banks and the other institutions of the capital markets actually think 
and work. If CDFIs can continue to follow that path along with them, they will be truly 
ready when they return under new and hopefully more prudent rules of conduct.  
 
One final note: This book guides the reader through a technically difficult and largely 
opaque terrain that, generally speaking, few in the capital markets had a financial 
incentive to help us traverse. Indeed, success in the effort could mean removing 
profitable acreage off some institutional turf. It is a remarkable irony—and one worth 
keeping in mind for future such efforts—that just as the FIR team developed something 
that worked (the Commercial Paper Co-op), it became evident that the institutions serving 
the capital markets could set up an even more effective structure with much greater ease, if they 
so desired. And they could do it without any assistance from the CDFI field.  
 
Clearly, the information we received from the institutional side of the market, 
throughout this effort, came largely from a sense of goodwill and good corporate 
citizenship. The Financial Innovations Roundtable team is deeply thankful to the banks 







he lunatic fringe we will always have with us. Whether they’re selling the 
best thing since sliced bread or starting a riot, they will always be there. 
The question is: how far have you gone before you realize you’re on the same 
road.” 
——— New England banker, 1991 
 
Did	  the	  Low-­‐Income	  Homeowner	  Do	  It?	  	  
 
On August 16, 2007, a small group of officials from NeighborWorks America and the 
Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) Fund were asked to meet with 
Robert Steel, the Under Secretary of Domestic Finance at the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury.7 The administration wanted assistance in designing and implementing the 
fairest, quickest, most informed, and least disruptive set of solutions for low-income 
homeowners facing delinquency and foreclosure. The key question was whether we 
could help the administration develop a mechanism that avoided the “hand-to-hand 
combat” of the individual mortgage workout. The issue of cost was not on the table. The 
current situation was a crisis, and the issue of cost would be dealt with once the optimal 
set of solutions was outlined. 
 
At the time, the best information available (and kudos to the Center for Responsible 
Lending for breaking the news two years previously) indicated there were about two 
million homeowners at risk of default and foreclosure, and the bulk of these were 
subprime borrowers who were thought to be mostly low income, and hence, within the 





Although the NeighborWorks and CDFI Fund assistance were successfully outlined in 
the meeting, there was one unanswered question that lingered: How could two million 
homeowners, representing less than 4 percent of the total number (and likely much less 
of the total dollar amount of mortgages outstanding), have such a negative impact on 
the markets as a whole?  
 
Two years later, with as many as nine million homeowners at risk of default and 
foreclosure, we have a much better idea of how the question can be answered.  
 
Was it greed? To be sure, there was plenty of greed to go around. Investors wanted more 
products, rating agencies and lawyers wanted more revenue, lenders wanted more fees, 
consumers wanted more house. Yes, there were low-income people who should not 
have gotten mortgages. However, we also now know that this catastrophe would have 
happened even if low-income people—those “who shouldn’t have gotten mortgages”—
never got any. This assertion is not based on policy or fantasy. The mixture that 
combines these urges and converts them to catastrophe is based on simple rules of 
corporate finance. Indeed, these rules of corporate finance, absent effective oversight, 
make catastrophe virtually inevitable.  
 
 
Why	  This	  Matters	  to	  CDFIs	  
 
This book details how this moment in history came to pass from the point of view of a 
group of CDFI practitioners who were, at the time, trying to pry open the doors to the 
very same capital markets that fueled the fiasco. For our purpose here, we can describe 
CDFIs as private, mostly nonprofit, community-based financial institutions whose 
mission is to provide capital to their mostly low-income constituents and communities. 
Many CDFIs, and much of their bank funding, derive from incentives associated with 
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA, 1978). Essentially, the CRA set up a rating 
system that encouraged banks to stop red-lining (excluding) low-income and minority 
depositors from applying for loans. Banks provided grants, loans, and other forms of 
financing to CDFIs, which enabled CDFIs to make loans the banks couldn’t make within 
the context of their regulatory safety-and-soundness constraints. A basic tenet of the 
CDFI field was that the risk of lending to nonbankable low-income individuals in low-
income neighborhoods could be substantially mitigated by attention and discipline at 
the level of the borrower and lender alike. This remains as a basic tenet for the field. 
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The CDFI practitioners who watched the boom and bust in the capital markets were 
participants in the Financial Innovations Roundtable (FIR), a project designed to bring 
together leaders of the community economic development field for projects to advance 
the capacity of CDFI practitioners and the wealth of their varied constituencies 
nationwide.8 It was under the auspices, and at the direction of the FIR, that the CDFI 
practitioners, as a team, pursued the efforts to establish CDFI access to the capital 
markets.  
 
The FIR team worked on this effort between November 2000 and 2008, when the 
markets collapsed. For at least the first year after the collapse in 2008, a voluble segment 
of the public placed the blame for the crisis squarely on low-income homeowners, and 
the allegedly perverse incentives of the Community Reinvestment Act. The irony was 
not lost on the FIR team. As one of them said:   
 
You couldn’t have made up a more perfect travesty: We, representing the low-
income homeowner, we do all the hard work, enforce all the discipline, and we 
get all of the blame—but none of the benefits! The benefits are gone—they all 
went to some mortgage broker on Main Street or some Whiz-kid on Wall Street. 
And, then, after that, there is no one left but us to pick up the pieces. We, the 
ones with all the standards and none of the money, we get the blame. Perfect. 
 
The objective here is not to place blame on the workings of the capital markets, however. 
The objective is to capture the value of the capital markets and the lessons that can be 
learned from their collapse—and to productively relate both to the improvement of 
CDFI lending and sustainability.  
 
The book focuses this objective by asking two questions:   
 
• Can CDFIs receive unlimited amounts of low-cost unsecured short- and long-term 
funding from the capital markets on the basis of their organizational credit risk? 
 
• Can CDFIs obtain the pricing, flexibility, and procedural parity (“funding 
parity”) with for-profit corporations of equivalent credit risk?   
 
After eight years of attempts, the FIR team answers both questions with a declarative 
“Not Yet!”  
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In explaining the “Not Yet!” the book describes in detail the attempts that the FIR team 
launched with the hopes of getting to a “yes.” This guidance will, hopefully, encourage 
CDFIs and others to avoid making the same mistakes when they approach the capital 
markets again in the future. As part of this discussion, the book also recommends 
additional steps that can better position CDFIs to get to a “yes” once the markets 
recover.  
 
But this is more than a guidebook for CDFIs looking to raise flexible, low-cost debt. It is 
also about comprehending the factors that make the markets move, and advancing the 
capacity of CDFIs to move with them, should they have the inclination to do so. 
Advancing this capacity means CDFIs preparing themselves to compete for funding 
from banks and investors on a conventional basis. The collateral benefit of this 
preparation is that the CDFIs will, with this expanded capacity, generate greater 
community impact as well as organizational strength.  
 
To start down this path toward understanding the capital markets and the role they may 
play for CDFIs requires we first go back to the question at the outset of this chapter: 
How can a mere two million homeowners bring down the housing market? To answer 
that question, we must first answer another question: Why did lenders make those loans 
in the first place?  
 
The facts have already dispensed with the notion that lenders were forced by the 
Community Reinvestment Act to make bad loans. First, most of the bad loans were 
made by lenders who were not governed by the CRA. Second, for those lenders who 
were, the safety and soundness of the regulatory regimen always trumps the CRA side; 
no regulator would allow a bank to put its portfolio at risk just to achieve a better CRA 
rating. Logic also dictates that, excepting charitable causes, a lender will never lend 
money unless the loan produces a profit. Investors would not allow it, and to the extent 
the lender is regulated, nor would the regulator.  
 
The fact is, the only reason there were two million bad loans in August 2007 was that 
someone was able to make money on them. The capital markets enabled this by 
accommodating a wide range of mortgage instruments that did not properly reflect the 
risks of interest rate spikes or the borrower’s true capacity to pay. As the fees were being 
collected at closing, all of these bad loans looked like good loans.  
 
How two million loans took down the economy (assuming they were the ones that did 
it) is also a product of the capital markets. Capital markets reward a highly profitable 
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enterprise with more equity investment; and capital markets are extraordinarily efficient 
at leveraging equity.  
 
For this intimately tied knot of incentives to work well, one very critical element is 
needed. Let’s call it the long-term view, prudence, responsibility, or if we wish to get 
specific, disciplined lending. The market myopia that created the two million (or five 
million or nine million) defaulted homeowners was not an accident. It was the product 
of a key trend in the banking industry, a trend that had been accelerating during the past 
two decades, and that didn’t hit the wall until a competing trend—the unprecedented 
rise in credit losses, magnified exponentially by the efficiency of the capital markets—
blew forth in 2007.  
 
What follows outlines the development of this trend in the banking industry and how 
this trend inadvertently affirmed the importance of the community development 
mission, while exposing the frailty and savaging the capacity of the CDFIs that were 
created to achieve it.  
 
 
At	  the	  Heart	  of	  the	  Crisis,	  a	  Conflict	  between	  Lending	  and	  Trading	  	  	  
 
We can start with a Wall Street ratio, in use for decades, that demonstrates the 
inevitability of the current crisis:  
 
 
We all know that the investor is keenly aware of the return on his or her equity 
investment. This return is expressed by the Return on Equity ratio: equity (net assets) 
divided by net profit, as shown at the left in the equation above. The right side of the 
equation shows the chief components of the Return on Equity ratio. What the equation 
tells us is that we can increase our return on equity by (a) increasing our leverage, (b) 
increasing our profit margins; and/or (c) increasing the speed with which our assets 
turn over on the balance sheet. For financial institutions that are constrained by 
regulators to a maximum leverage, and constrained by competitors to modest 
Return on Equity = Leverage X Return on Sales X Asset Turnover
Net Profit Total Assets Net Profit Revenues
Net Worth = Net Worth X Revenues X Total Assets
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profitability, the only way to accelerate the return on equity is by turning over the assets 
on the balance sheet faster. As we shall see, this is why, when short-term interest rates 
were driven down following 9/11, that asset-backed commercial paper exploded from 
the $600 billion range to the $1.2 trillion range within four years. It also explains why the 
creation of the Option ARM and similar exploding mortgages was necessary, and why 
the deterioration of credit quality in loan portfolios across the nation was inevitable, for 
rich and poor homeowners alike.  
 
At the heart of this acceleration of assets off the balance sheet is the unavoidable conflict 
between the lending and trading disciplines. Traditional lenders, stuck with the loans 
they make on their balance sheets and limited in the amount of capital they can leverage, 
must find ways to make higher profits in highly competitive markets. Traders, on the 
other hand, by maximizing the turnover of the assets on the balance sheet while 
charging fees for each turn, can justify higher leverage limits because of their 
demonstrable liquidity—and profitability.  
 
The conflict between lending and trading was once clear. A corporate banker and lender 
in the 1970s, for example, would never use the term “underwrite” in association with the 
loans he or she originated, booked, and monitored, nor would anyone else in the bank. 
Instead, they would use the term “credit analysis,” and the loan they made as a result 
were an “extension of credit,” essentially the bank’s credit. They extended the bank’s 
credit, and they sat with the extension of credit on their balance sheet until it was repaid. 
“Underwriting” was a term investment banks used, and it described their analyses of 
fixed-income securities and equities in preparation for sale to their client investors. They 
did not sit with the asset on their balance sheet (for the most part); their investors did. It 
was the investment bank’s job to perform sufficient due diligence to ensure the investors 
remained happy with the transaction over time. To make sure the investment bank 
performed this due diligence in a disciplined and objective manner, their investors 
looked to rating agencies to perform an independent analysis (primarily due diligence 
on fixed-income securities). Notably, the 1990s corporate lenders did not pay much 
attention to the rating agency analyses. On the one hand, they didn’t have to satisfy the 
investment banking clients, and on the other, they believed our own analyses were 
better. They had to be. After all, they had to live with the loans.   
 
Most CDFIs would likely consider themselves lenders rather than traders. From a 
mission standpoint, CDFIs mostly feel they have to be lenders, not traders. This is a good 
thing, because at present there really is no choice in the matter. CDFIs simply do not 
have the tools or the inclination to adopt the trading disciplines. Yet the entire lending 
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market, from the personal loan up through the community facility, is defined by 
lenders/investors who do have the choice, and it is their flexibility, pricing, risk, and 
size that have increasingly defined the markets the CDFIs serve, both to the good and to 
the bad. 
 
It’s worth digging further into this conflict between trading and lending. It may help 
explain the embarrassment most CDFIs feel about their collective inability to protect 
their low-income constituencies from bad loans during the recent boom or to provide 
them aid of any magnitude after the boom went bust. It may also help explain what the 
marketplace—and those in the CDFI field—can expect to see next.   
 
An	  Eyewitness	  Account	  of	  the	  Hostilities	  
 
Let’s start the investigation with a brief personal history on the subject (where statistics 
are scarce, experience can help). The traditional tension between lending and trading 
descended into open hostility in the 1980s when the $45 billion Continental Illinois 
National Bank and Trust went into a tailspin in July 1982. The largest domestic corporate 
lender at the time, Continental was, among other things, moving large portions of oil 
patch loans up and down its correspondent banking channels in the form of 
participations. (Participations are a primitive form of securitization.) Penn Square, a 
shopping center bank in Oklahoma City, originated many of the participation loans.9 
These participations turned out to be mostly toxic. Following a dramatic run on deposits 
prompted by whispers about the weakness of the bank’s portfolio, Continental Illinois 
was bailed out by the federal government in the summer of 1984. It was the first bank 
deemed “too big to fail.” Until 2008, it was also, far and away, the largest bailout of a 
bank by the federal government.10  
 
I was particularly interested in this series of events because, as group executive for the 
Bank of New York’s Midwest Group, I was responsible for missing the (many) early 
warning signs at Continental Illinois; at that time, at the Bank of New York, missing a 
failure of such magnitude generally resulted in a job search. Continental Illinois was one 
of our larger clients, and as a result of the federal bailout structure, the Bank of New 
York was forced to lend it a huge amount of money at no spread and to keep it there 
until the revised bank was deemed safe by the federal regulators. There was one 
consolation, though; the Midwest Group no longer faced the dominant competitor in the 
marketplace, and the Bank of New York’s business in the territory took off. There was a 
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positive personal outcome as well; for whatever reason, I did not have to initiate a job 
search.  
 
But here is where things get really interesting. As the federal intervention with 
Continental Illinois was underway, our first leveraged buyout, Stokely-Van Camp, 
appeared at credit committee. There is a fuller discussion in Chapter 3 of why the 
concept of the leveraged buyout (LBO) is important to CDFIs, but for now, the chief 
distinguishing feature of the LBO was that the level of corporate equity was dismissed 
as the chief measure of risk, while the dynamics of cash became the overwhelming 
focus. The LBO dramatically changed the nature of the conversations at credit 
committee. By 1986, when the Bank of New York participated in the $6.5 billion LBO for 
AAA-rated Beatrice, leveraged buyouts were the major book of business for most 
corporate bankers.  
 
Several disconcerting events, however, accompanied this massive surge in LBO activity, 
events that signaled an entirely new approach to lending. Some of the more distinct 
include: 
 
• The development of loan syndications in which one or two “lead” banks design, 
assemble, and manage a huge transaction, while dozens of smaller banks sign up 
for a portion. The loan syndication enabled companies to obtain much larger 
amounts of money in a much shorter period of time, but it also terminated the 
proprietary relationship between corporation and the lender, and effectively 
eliminated the need for bankers who could analyze credit and structure deals to 
suit the needs of the company. 
• New language in loan agreements requiring the corporate borrower to allow any 
banks in the syndicate to sell their portion of the loan to whomever they chose, 
whenever they chose. Corporate clients resisted this at first. (Indeed, for a few 
years, it was a great source of business for the Bank of New York and several 
other banks, which were willing to commit to the corporate borrower that they 
would retain whatever portion of the syndicated loan they had signed up for.) 
• A dramatic simplification in the terms of the syndicated loan, particularly in the 
area of financial covenants. This was combined with significantly less remedial 
authority in the event of default for the banks that signed on for a portion of the 
syndicated loans. This reduction in triggers and remedies opened up whole new 
vistas in risk taking for corporate lending, but it also reduced the responsibility 
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for making prudent credit decisions. Effectively, the smaller banks had to accept 
the decisions of the lead banks or risk being excluded from future deals. 
• An increased potential for conflicts of interest at the senior bank level. The lead 
management banks for the syndicated loans also provided a range of non-
lending products and services for the corporate client, domestically and 
internationally. A bank serving as a lead manager for a Eurobond offering of a 
corporation, for example, could waive financial covenants in a syndicated loan to 
assure the Eurobond holders that the corporation was not in default on any of its 
obligations. This put the syndicate banks at risk for the (short term) benefit of 
bond holders (as, in fact, happened).    
• The development of a core of lead banks that functioned as market makers and 
gatekeepers. When the Bank of New York backed out of an LBO owing to a 
material increase in the level of debt requested (just as the proposal went to 
credit committee), I was told that the bank would never be asked to participate in 
a leveraged buyout, “never, ever, ever again.” 
 
On the face of it, the large lead banks had taken the Continental Illinois loan 
participation activity to a new level and successfully transformed corporate lending to a 
less regulated form of securities trading.  
 
The expansive approach to risk-taking in the 1980s was not only for corporations. 
Shoppers, developers, small businesses, and homeowners all heard the “go-for-it” 
message. In Money of the Mind, a colorful history of the “democratization of credit” and 
the “socialization of risk” in the United States, James Grant summarizes the prevailing 
attitude toward lending discipline at the time:  
 
If, in the early decades of the century, it was impossible for a working man or 
woman to secure a loan from a legitimate lender, in the 1980s, he or she could 
hardly refuse one. The descendants of the clientele of loan sharks became the 
valued-credit-card “members” of leading banks. In the 1980s, the home-equity 
loan proliferated, and personal bankruptcy lost its stigma. Nor did the banks 
limit their search for potential borrowers to the universe of bona fide adults. 
“Like a lot of mothers, Zabau Shepard has some charge cards,” the Daily Progress, 
Charlottesville, Virginia, reported in 1990, “but she can’t use them. It’s not that 
her credit has gone to the dogs; it’s that she is a dog.”11  
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It was obvious to many at the time that the government’s bailout of Continental Illinois 
had, among other things, established a new floor for risk, with “too big to fail” as the 
foundation. When the stock market crashed in October 1987, it took the LBOs, 
commercial and residential mortgages, small business loans, and the entire savings and 
loan industry (S&Ls) down with it. It also took down several of the banks that had 
served as lead managers for the LBO business (including the one that had declared the 
Bank of New York expelled from the LBO business forever). Fortunately, the lead 
commercial banks disappeared through merger rather than bailout, but the taxpayer tab 
for the bailout of the S&Ls reached $300 billion.  
 
Meanwhile, back at the Bank of New York, my Midwest group experienced no 
delinquencies, defaults, or write-downs. We had only approved five of the twenty-six 
LBO deals offered in the territory over a period of four years. On the face of it, the bank 
had done what a lender is supposed to do: evaluate credit risk, allocate credit 
accordingly, and stay with the loan until it pays off. Yet there was a problem: although 
the bank’s deals were not among the worst, we also turned down quite a number of good 
deals. These good deals would not have been done if all the banks had been as 
conservative as the Bank of New York.  
 
There it is in a nutshell: the trade-off between the lending and trading disciplines, with 
the former enjoying higher-quality portfolios while the latter experiences lower-quality 
portfolios. The former provides less financing and the latter produces much more 
financing. Prudence versus liquidity in the marketplace. Quality versus quantity.  
 
However, before we take sides, let’s revisit the Community Reinvestment Act, which 
helped define the community development mission for CDFIs.  It is important to 
remember that the Community Reinvestment Act was created at a time when the 
prudent lender ruled the roost, and it was created precisely because the banks were not 
lending as much as they could (or should) to bank depositors who had less income or 
equity in their homes than the banks were comfortable with.  “Prudence” after all, is a 
highly subjective term, one that is very hard to quantify, and very easy to abuse.   
 
The	  New	  Normal:	  In	  Lending,	  CDFIs	  Are	  the	  New	  Conservatives	  
 
Over the past 20 years, the trading discipline has achieved dominance in the financial 
sector primarily at the expense of the lending discipline.12 Fundamental to this 
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development is that, because of technology, the cost of delivering credit from a trading 
platform has dropped dramatically, even as the ability to source cheap funding has 
grown exponentially.  
 
In a curious twist of fate, the devastating collapse of the credit markets in 2008 is a 
tribute to the magnitude of this triumph of trading over lending; the fact that a debt 
obligation could be implemented under a pooling and servicing agreement that actually 
prevents the investor from working out the best deal on a defaulted loan would astonish  
a traditional lender. Astonishing to the traditional lender as well would be a loan (for 
example, a 2/28 first mortgage, with a teaser rate for the first two years) that puts at risk 
the very credit criteria (such as the credit score) that justified making the loan in the first 
place. However, these new loans were not designed for the borrower or, long term, for 
the investor. They were designed by the trader, and they were structured simply to 
facilitate transactions and the flow of cash through the commercial paper conduits, 
mortgage-backed securities, and collateralized debt obligations—for a fee. If this sounds 
familiar, it is. 
 
Without doubt, the most striking feature of the financial era that ended in the 
autumn of 1929 was the desire of people to buy securities and the effect of this on 
values. But the increase in the number of securities to buy was hardly less 
striking. And the ingenuity and zeal with which companies were devised in 
which securities might be sold was as remarkable as anything. …  
 
The investment trust did not promote new enterprises or enlarge old ones. It 
merely arranged that people could own stock in old companies through the 
medium of new ones. Even in the United States, in the twenties, there were limits 
to the amount of real capital, which existing enterprises could use or new ones 
could be created to employ. The virtue of the investment trust was that it 
brought about an almost complete divorce of the volume of corporate securities 
outstanding from the volume of corporate assets in existence. The former could 
be twice, thrice, or any multiple of the latter. The volume of underwriting 
business and of securities available for trading on the exchanges all expanded 
accordingly. So did the securities to own, for the investment trusts sold more 
securities than they bought. The difference went into the call market, real estate, 
or the pockets of the promoters. It is hard to imagine an invention better suited to 
the time or one better designed to eliminate the anxiety about the possible 
shortage of common stocks.13 
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Nevertheless, whatever else can, should, and will be said about the quality of the 
transactions that fed the commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, and 
collateralized debt obligation markets during the past decade, the ascendant trading 
disciplines did deliver money to those who could not have received it otherwise, in 
places that had remained previously untouched by the conventional lender. Say what 
we will about the quality of the money flowing into to low-income borrowers prior to 
2007, the astonishing quantity was a direct product of the lower cost of lending in their 
neighborhoods. This lower cost, in turn, reflected the new underwriting, servicing, 
portfolio, and asset/liability management technologies adopted by the conventional 
lending sector, technologies that elevated the importance and reach of the trading 
function. And while, in the end, the low quality funding the trading disciplines 
produced wrecked whole communities, it still, like the LBOs in the 1980s, provided 
funds to many more who would not otherwise have had access to funding at all.  
 
Thus, confoundedly, the mechanisms that did the most to promote the collapse of the 
housing and credit markets are also the very same mechanisms that make it possible for 
people without net assets or high incomes to build wealth! These mechanisms can be 
best friends to the CDFI mission. Perhaps that is why so many people thought that low-
income homebuyers caused the crisis. They would be wrong: there is a balance between 
the good that these mechanisms can do and the bad; a balance which the short term 
players during the recent boom—players who, for the most part, did not intend to wreak 
the havoc they wrought—had no incentive whatsoever to build or maintain.  
 
It is not worthwhile to speculate here on what new floor for risk will emerge as a result 
of the current federal financial bailouts. History suggests we will return to prudent 
lending disciplines for a while, as we did from 1979 to 1981 (domestically), and 1991 to 
1993. Yet it also tells us that, in time, perhaps in four to five years, the market will 
pursue even higher levels of risk and these levels, driven by the appetite for trading 
profit, will become the new norm. Inevitably, there will be new investors and better 
ways to access funding for it all, and equally inevitably, there will be another crash of 
some sort.14  
 
There is another prediction we can safely make: when the next crash comes, it will not 
be caused by lax lending disciplines among CDFIs or the greed of CDFI constituencies.  
 
What can be concluded from this? One of the truly stunning facts of the new lending 
order is that CDFIs are the new conservatives! Although the objective of providing 
capital to low-income populations would normally be identified as a liberal impulse, the 
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method that CDFIs use to provide it is far, far more conservative than those employed 
by the conventional lender. Implicit in the work CDFIs do is the belief that lending to 
low-income constituencies requires more discipline not less, and that such higher 
discipline is required of both borrower and lender. It’s a level of diligence, prudence, and 
care CDFIs can enforce, and which, in fact, defines what a CDFI is.  
 
Inevitably, however, CDFIs can only engage this level of lending discipline as long as 
they can find a way to pay for it. Unfortunately, funding tends to be limited to a 
combination of grants, social investment, and ongoing improvements in efficiency. As 
the latest boom and bust in the lending business has amply demonstrated, the level of 
discipline CDFIs insist on, is not a level that the conventional market-based platform is 
willing, or perhaps, able, to support.  
 
Conventional	  Lenders	  and	  Low-­‐Income	  Clients	  Will	  Force	  a	  Choice	  on	  CDFIs	  	  
 
In a recent Federal Reserve Board publication, Bob Schall, president of Self-Help 
Ventures Fund is quoted as saying, “In reality, …we’re being pushed into securitization 
because of a lack of success on the portfolio side.”15 
 
This conflict between lending and trading is of such critical importance for CDFIs 
because despite what CDFIs would prefer, it is no longer possible to stay strictly on the 
lending side of the aisle. There are two fundamental pressures forcing CDFIs to adopt 
some combination of trading disciplines:  
 
• Competition for the constituent’s future. Currently, the trading mentality exerts an 
irresistible impact on both sides of every lender’s balance sheet. It was the 
trading disciplines that enabled conventional (and predatory) lenders to reach 
low-income constituents in the mortgage market at an exponentially greater 
magnitude than CDFIs could provide, with products that assumed greater risk at 
often lower interest rates. CDFIs have witnessed the results and are there to pick 
up the pieces. In many communities, CDFIs are starting all over again. To 
present the constituents with a better option the next time around, CDFIs will 
have to adopt some of the tools that conventional lenders used and will use to 
deliver products and services at scale.  
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• Sustainability. There has never been a proportional balance between the demand 
for prudent lending among low-income constituencies and the amount of grant 
and social investment available to support it. If anything, the gap between the 
two continues to rise. The only alternative for CDFIs is to improve the cost-
benefit ratio. Trading platforms enabled conventional lenders to obtain market-
based financing at lower rates than CDFIs could obtain, often lower than even 
social investors could provide. The technology of the trading platforms enabled 
the conventional lenders to dramatically reduce the cost of “underwriting,” 
closing, and servicing loans. To make better use of what subsidy CDFIs have, 
they will have to adopt some of the technologies and access some of the markets 
that fueled the lenders who swept through their low-income communities.  
 
Adopting trading disciplines is not without risk. Making any kind of transition will 
involve challenges. One thing we do know, however. The conventional lender will be 
back in the mortgage market, the small business market, and indeed all of the markets to 
which CDFIs lend. It’s only a matter of time.  
 
Why is it only a matter of time? As we shall see, it is not credit risk that they fear. It is 
the size of the deal and the idiosyncrasy of the credit. Inevitably, it is only a matter of 
time before they solve both, once again. Although CDFIs welcome the conventional 
lender and the volume of capital it brings to low-income communities, they must always 
be aware of the tipping point: that is, the point at which rational expectations of the 
conventional lender disappear and the loan is transformed into a trade, to the ultimate 
distress of borrower, lender, and investor alike. There is no known antidote for it. Hence, 
the community development sector must find ways to prepare the CDFI model for 
competing with the conventional lender for the low-income constituent. To remain 
entirely on the lending side, the CDFI is choosing to limit its mission, ration its benefits, 
and remain on the margins of lending in its community. Conversely, by making the 
choice to incorporate trading disciplines into its model, while keeping its commitment to 
prudent lending, the CDFI is stepping up to protect the constituent and maintain growth 




The	  Landscape	  Post-­‐Reckoning	  
 
In July 2009, almost two years since the meeting at the Treasury Department, a small 
team from NeighborWorks America, the Community Reinvestment Fund, members of 
the Fair Mortgage Collaborative, a securities lawyer, and a ratings specialist paid a visit 
to two of the rating agencies. Their purpose was to obtain an outline of the information 
needed to rate a collateral trust platform that would be set up to fund first and second 
mortgages for new low-income homebuyers. The team was working with a large 
investor who was willing to invest in first and second mortgages as long as they were, 
collectively, rated AAA.  
 
The reason for the effort: the disarray among mortgage insurers, combined with wide-
ranging reductions in the maximum allowable levels of loan-to-value and debt-to-
income ratios had priced new homebuyers with limited savings out of the home 
purchase market. This squeeze affected not only the low-income homebuyer with a 
credit score under 680, but any low-income homebuyer who did not have at least 5 
percent of the purchase price on hand. This massive reduction in access to credit came at 
a time when new low-income homebuyers with decent credit scores were needed the 
most—to purchase the houses that were falling so relentlessly into the national dustbin 
of other “real estate owned.”  
 
This disarray of the market was reflected in the interest rates. AAA-rated tranches of 
securities backed by second mortgages were running north of 12 percent, at a time when 
the 30-year mortgage rate was 5.64 percent, Ginnie Maes were 4.47 percent, the 20-year 
Treasury rate was 4.37 percent, the 10-year Treasury rate was 3.63 percent, the prime 
rate was 3.25 percent, 30-day LIBOR (London Interbank Borrowing Rate) was 0.31 
percent, 30-day commercial paper was 0.19 percent, and the federal funds rate was 0.17 
percent.16 Were AAA-rated second mortgages really that bad? Not for the community 
development sector. Delinquencies (60 days past due or more) on second mortgages 
held by Neighborhood Housing Services of America were running under 9 percent at 
the time, and at the Federation of Appalachian Housing Enterprises, the delinquencies 
were running under 2 percent.  These were lower than the rates on conventional first-
mortgage ARMs. The major investor the team was working with knew this and had 
offered upward of $100 million to fund the second mortgages—if they could, with 
appropriate credit enhancement, achieve an AAA rating.  
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The team was also had an eye on the bigger picture. Obtaining a rating was not only 
essential for gaining access to the capital markets via the proposed collateral trust 
platform, it was also essential to opening up the wholesale side of the banks. CDFI 
industry access to the wholesale side of the banking industry had been virtually nil. Yet 
it was the wholesale side of the bank that provided the lowest cost credit facilities often 
through the most sophisticated credit structures, using either the capital markets or its 
own balance sheet. Perhaps the best evidence of the triumph of underwriting and 
trading over credit analysis and lending was the fact that the bank regulators had made 
rating agency criteria the fulcrum of risk-based capital allocation for the banks (as we 
show in the chapters that follow, essentially CDFIs need the same imprimatur from the 
rating agencies, whether assets are placed with institutional investors or with the 
wholesale side of their banking partners). 
 
The team knew that nothing immediate would be forthcoming in their trip to the rating 
agencies. One of the agencies had not responded to the request for a visit. A second 
agency had acceded to a visit, but was not familiar with CDFIs. The third rating agency 
had just promulgated a proposal on how it should evaluate mortgage-backed securities 
that were funding pools of first mortgages. The proposal was out for comment. The 
rating agency had not begun to consider new rules for second mortgages.  
 
The responses of the two rating agencies the team visited were strikingly different. One 
of the agencies indicated, quite emphatically, that it would view any second mortgages 
the team assembled as it viewed affordable home mortgages generated by the state 
housing finance agencies (HFAs). This would be a positive development in one way: it 
would save the team from having to develop extensive data on the performance of first 
and second mortgages originated and serviced by the CDFIs participating in the 
collateral trust platform.  
 
However, such a position was negative in several other ways. There was, for example, 
no interest in studying the factors that make CDFI loans perform better than the HFAs; 
investors, under current conditions, were distinctly unenthusiastic about HFA bonds; 
and furthermore, there were very few HFA bonds that the agency had rated, which 
included large aggregations of second mortgages. The response from the other rating 
agency was much more encouraging. Over a period of several hours, they asked 
penetrating questions about the CDFI mission, the CDFI field, the manner in which 
CDFIs originate and service loans, and the size and structure of the proposed collateral 
trust platform. They made some suggestions for how the trusts could be structured to 
achieve the best rating. Finally, they asked for the performance data, indicating the size 
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of the sample and the specific lines of data they would need in order to arrive at a 
conclusion about credit quality. 
 
The team, surprised by the opportunity to move forward, quickly got to work. Over the 
ensuing weeks, the data points were disseminated and inquiries made to a number of 
CDFIs and CDFI groups. The result: the data that the rating agency would need to prove 
the higher-quality performance of first and second mortgages originated by CDFIs was 
simply not available. The initial cost estimates to develop the data ranged from $35,000 
to more than $500,000, with the time frame for capturing and cleaning the data 
stretching out over a year. In short, what the CDFIs knew to be true anecdotally could 
not be proven without an extensive effort. Given the cost and the likelihood that the 
mortgage market would continue to be weak, the effort was put on hold.  
 
The conclusion? To gain access to the capital markets and the wholesale side of the 
banks, there must be a headset change not only for the rating agencies and institutional 
investors, but also for the CDFI field itself. At the very least, CDFIs must start being 
attentive to capturing market-compatible data on the work they do. However, there is a 
lot more to it. To achieve the kind of funding parity CDFIs warrant, they must also 
demonstrate their capacity to sustain their model and to continue providing their 
services with the quality their mission embraces.  
 
This book is designed to address the ways in which both headsets can be changed for 











ne of the repeated frustrations among community development lenders 
is that their assets perform well (loan losses are rare) but are priced as 
though they are risky. As Annie Donovan asked, how can we “get closer to true 
capital markets pricing for the credit enhancement that is being put in those 
deals? We believe we have something tantamount to a AA risk and we’re not 
necessarily getting AA pricing right now.” Nancy Andrews also commented on 
this point: “We’ve done something on the order of half a billion dollars of 
lending in 20 years and we’ve lost $190,000. So, you get some kind of sense of the 
underlying quality of the credits.” 
—— David Erikson, Federal Reserve Board, San Francisco17  
 
The	  Mission	  for	  Obtaining	  Capital	  and	  Liquidity	  for	  CDFIs:	  Funding	  Parity	  	  
 
How do we structure a funding vehicle that enables Community Development Financial 
Institutions (CDFIs) to gain access to the kinds of financing that for-profit corporations 
of equivalent credit quality enjoy in the normal course of business? Corporate treasurers 
managing the finances of much less creditworthy entities enjoy far more flexibility and 
get far better pricing. Why can’t CDFIs get the same deal? It certainly can’t be because 
the field is mission driven.  
 
Almost from the inception of the Financial Innovations Roundtable (FIR) in November 
2000, the participants knew that the CDFI field had to address three imperatives to get to 
scale and generate meaningful impact:  
 
• Place CDFI debt with the capital markets 
• Standardize CDFI financial reporting and analysis  




The second two were necessarily predicates of the first. The FIR team arrived almost 
immediately at a conclusion: if CDFIs were going to get more money, they were going to 
get it from the capital markets on terms that were compatible with the markets’ needs as 
well as their own. That was the mission. 
 
The efforts of the FIR team to achieve this mission started in earnest in May 2001, with 
the concept of a “Mini-Fed” (see chapter 4). These efforts were put on hold in April 2008, 
as the team was putting together the Commercial Paper Co-op (see chapter 6). At that 
point the team recognized that  the financing mechanisms required to implement the 
Co-op had essentially ceased to exist. The team’s primary objective—placing debt based 
on organizational credit risk with the capital markets—had become impossible to 
achieve.  
 
However, the collapse of the FIR beachhead was not the end of the mission. If CDFIs 
were to get back into the forefront of assisting their constituencies now and in the future,  
they would need access to the stream of low-cost, long-term funds found in the capital 
markets. The mission had to be pursued in whatever way possible, even while the 
markets were paralyzed. Without moving forward, the room for CDFIs in the lending 
business when the markets recovered would be little to none. Therefore, the FIR team 
stepped back and identified the steps CDFIs could do to prepare themselves while 
awaiting the market recovery. 
 
This, then, was the revised mission for achieving funding parity for CDFIs following the 
collapse of the markets: standardize financial reporting and analysis, and improve risk 
management to position CDFIs for eventual market recovery. In the process, CDFIs 
would become much more conversant with what is “under the hood” in the wholesale 
side of the banks as well as the capital markets. They would pursue this objective not 
only because funding parity requires a “win-win” structure with partners in the 
institutional sector, but because CDFIs will need to know where, when, and why the 
next threat to their constituents is likely to appear, and how to meet the challenge when 
it does.  
 
Before we continue, let’s take a quick look at what we mean by the three items in the 





Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) are community-based and 
staffed entities whose mission is to provide capital to individuals, businesses, and 
projects that do not otherwise have access to financing. To be certified by the CDFI Fund 
at the U.S. Department of Treasury, an entity must meet all of the following 
requirements: 
  
• Be a legal entity at the time of application 
• Have a primary mission of promoting community development 
• Be a financing entity 
• Primarily serve one or more target markets 
• Provide development services in conjunction with its financing activities 
• Maintain accountability to its defined target market18 
 
According to Opportunity Finance Network, approximately 1,250 CDFIs currently 
operate in the United States, including: 
 
• More than 500 community development loan funds 
• More than 80 venture capital funds 
• More than 290 community development credit unions 
• More than 350 community development banks19 
 
According the CDFI Data Project, which collects statistics on 505 of these entities, CDFIs’ 
total assets at the end of 2006 were approximately $21.3 billion, and loan volume was 
$4.75 billion.  According to the CDFI Data Project:  
 
The benefits CDFIs bring to communities range from job creation and increased 
homeownership rates to helping individuals open their first bank account, to 
improved financial literacy and enterprise skills, and to ready access to fairly 




The CDFI Data Project identifies the CDFI client characteristics as follows:  
 
CDFIs are successful in reaching customer groups that others overlook—low-
income families, minorities, and women, in particular. Seventy percent of CDFI 
clients are low income, 58 percent are minorities, and 51 percent are women. 
Credit unions and loan funds served the highest percentage of low-income 
clients (74 percent). Credit unions also had the highest percentage of minority 
and female clients, showing their reach and accessibility to a broad spectrum of 
typically underserved populations.21 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, a fundamental tenet of the CDFI field is that the risks (real or 
perceived) of lending to low income constituencies in low income communities can be 
substantially mitigated by care and discipline at both the borrower and lender levels. 
The cost of this attention, which often translates into counseling, technical assistance or 
one or another of many forms of support, is high relative to what conventional lenders 
provide. Hence, the cost of delivery of loan products, when all costs are considered, 
tends to be higher, often much higher, than that in the conventional sector. The result is 
that most of CDFIs require some level of subsidy to pursue their mission.  
 
Subsidy is derived in the form of grants and low-cost debt from banks, foundations, 
social investors, local agencies, and a range of federal agencies, including the CDFI 
Fund, the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Economic Development 
Administration (at the Department of Commerce), the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, the Small Business Administration, the Department of Education, 
the Office of Community Services (at Health and Human Services), and the Department 
of Agriculture (USDA). The Federal Home Loan Banks, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac 
have also been involved in providing various forms of subsidy. Over the past 15 years, 
banks in particular have participated with CDFIs in expanding financing and other 
services to the targeted low-income constituencies and communities. While much of the 
initial participation was in response to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1978, 
banks have also found ways to provide credit and services to the sector profitably and 
prudently on a direct basis.  
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The	  Capital	  Markets	  	  
In their widely used textbook Corporate Finance, Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe distinguish 
two kinds of financial markets: money markets and capital markets. Money markets 
offer debt securities that will pay off in the short term (usually less than a year). Capital 
markets are for long-term debt (with a maturity at greater than one year) and for equity 
shares. 
 
The chief benefit of obtaining funds in the capital markets is that the relationship 
between borrower need and investor appetite is simple and nearly direct. As a result, the 
intermediary cost can be relatively low while the availability of funds can be 
exceptionally high; indeed, the investment capacity of the capital markets is measured in 
the trillions.  
 
For the purposes of this book, money market and money market instruments will be 
included as a subset of the general term capital markets. The reason for including the 
money market as part of the capital markets is that many of the assets funded in the 
money market are, in fact, long-term assets. Moreover, vehicles in the money and capital 
markets are structured to move assets from one vehicle to another with relative ease. 
Interest rate swaps and other derivatives have facilitated this interchangeability. As with 
the capital market, the cost of borrowing in the money market can be extraordinarily 
low (some instruments are currently priced at around zero percent), while the 
availability of funding can also be measured in the trillions of dollars.  
 
CDFIs have not had access to the money or capital markets in any way other than 
through the sale of specific asset classes. But even these sales have been privately, rather 
than publicly, placed, and are modest in scale at best. Essentially, to date, there has been 
no ability to access these markets for the purpose of obtaining unsecured debt based on 
CDFI organizational credit risk.  
 
To the extent that CDFIs have been able to source unsecured funding based on their 
organizational credit risk, it has come primarily from the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) departments within their relationship banks. These banks can and do provide 
short- and medium-term financing of CDFI working capital needs. However, the CRA 
bank financing is neither as cheap nor as flexible as either the bank facilities on the 
wholesale side of the bank or the other instruments in the money market that 
conventional lenders and other for-profit entities can obtain.  
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As we shall see, because of the close existing relationships with the banks—the major 
players in the money markets as well as the CDFI field—the route for CDFIs to gain 
access to the capital markets for organizational credit risk is likely first by moving from 
the CRA side of the banks to the wholesale side.  
Securitization	  
While on the subject of the capital markets, another term needs to be defined: 
securitization. According to the book Securitization of Credit Inside the New Technology of 
Finance, securitization is:  
 
“Credit securitization is the carefully structured process whereby loans and other 
receivables are packaged, underwritten and sold in the form of securities 
(instruments commonly known as asset-backed securities).” 
  
“Credit securitization isolates the loans from the originator’s balance sheet.” 
 
“Credit securitization typically splits the credit risk into three or more “vertical” 
tranches and places it with institutions that are in the best position to absorb it.” 
 
“Credit securitization also segments interest rate risk so that it can be tailored 
and placed among the most appropriate investors.”22 
 
Structured	  Finance	  
Another term that will be encountered is structured finance. According to Moody’s 
Investors Service:  
 
Structured finance is a term that evolved in the 1980s to refer to a wide variety of 
debt and related securities whose promise to repay investors is backed by a) the 
value of some form of financial asset or b) the credit support from a third party 
to the transaction. Very often, both types of backing are used to achieve a desired 
credit rating. Structured financings are offshoots of traditional secured debt 
instruments, whose credit standing is supported by a lien on specific assets, by a 
defeasance provision, or by other forms of enhancement. With conventional 
secured issues, however, it is generally the issuer’s earning power that remains 
the primary source of repayment. With structured financings, by contrast, the 
39	  
burden of repayment on a specified security is shifted away from the issuer to a 
pool of assets or to a third party.  
 
Securities supported wholly or mainly by pools of assets are generally referred to 
as either mortgage-backed securities (mortgages were the first types of assets to 
be widely securitized) or asset-backed securities, whose collateral backing may 
include virtually any other asset with a relatively predicable payment stream, 
ranging from credit card receivables or insurance policies to speculative-grade 
bonds or even stock.”23 
 
Asset-­‐Backed	  Commercial	  Paper	  
This book will also discuss the form of funding that came to dominate the capital 
markets during the five years leading up to 2007: asset-backed commercial paper. 
According to Fitch’s Report:  
 
An asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) program is composed of a 
bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicle, or conduit, that issues commercial 
paper (CP) and uses the proceeds of such issuance primarily to obtain interests in 
various types of assets, either through asset purchase or secured lending 
transactions. An ABCP program includes key parties that perform various 
services for the conduit, credit enhancement that provides loss protection, and 
liquidity facilities that assist in the timely repayment of CP. The repayment of CP 
issued by a conduit depends primarily on the cash collections received from the 
conduit’s underlying asset portfolio and a conduit’s ability to issue new CP.  
 
The main risks faced by ABCP investors are asset deterioration in the conduit’s 
underlying portfolio, potential timing mismatches between the cash flows of the 
underlying asset interests and the repayment obligations of maturing CP, a 
conduit’s inability to issue new CP, and risks associated with asset servicers. To 
protect investors from these risks, ABCP programs and the asset interests 
financed through them are structured with various protections, such as credit 
enhancement, liquidity support, and CP stop-issuance and wind-down triggers.24 
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Loan-­‐Backed	  Commercial	  Paper	  
Finally, because the FIR team’s initial efforts in the capital markets envisioned a 
platform that obtained funding for unsecured loans to CDFIs, a quick commentary on 
the key attractions of loan-backed commercial paper is necessary: 
 
Loan-backed commercial paper programs satisfy many important participant 
needs. The sponsoring bank that will be referring its customers to the program 
sets up a commercial paper program with an unaffiliated special-purpose 
corporation as the issuer. As a result, the bank can continue to originate loans 
and offer a competitive funding source to eligible clients. 
 
Loan-backed commercial paper programs allowed A-3 and A-2 issuers to fund 
through A-1+ or A-1 rated programs eligible for money market funds… 
amendments to Rule 2a-7 have prompted major changes to the original match-
funded concept of these programs. The new proposals would require treating 
borrowers whose loans represent 10 percent or more of a conduit’s assets as 
issuers of a commensurate share of the conduit’s debt. Each such conduit and 
borrower would have to be tracked as issuers by money market fund investors 
already limited to investing no more than 5 percent of their total assets in 
securities of any one issuer. In order to manage these new limitations, a number 
of strategies are increasingly being employed by conduits to grow the conduit 
borrower base in ways that can dilute individual borrower concentrations to 
levels below the proposed 10 percent hurdle.25  
 
Organizational	  Credit	  Risk	  	  
A good place to go for a definition of credit risk is the federal depository regulatory 
agencies. One of the more compelling sections of the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) Report to Congressional Requesters in 2000 provides several definitions, including 
these from the Federal Reserve26: 
 
• Credit risk arises from the potential that a borrower or counterparty will fail to 
perform on an obligation. 
• Market risk is the risk to a financial institution’s condition resulting from adverse 
movements in market rates or prices such as interest rates, foreign exchange 
rates, or equity prices. 
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• Liquidity risk arises from the potential that an institution will be unable to meet its 
obligations as they come due because of an inability to liquidate assets or obtain 
adequate funding (referred to as “funding liquidity risk” or that it cannot easily 
unwind or offset specific exposures without significantly lowering market prices 
because of inadequate market depth or market disruptions (“market liquidity 
risk”). 
• Operational risk arises from the potential that inadequate information systems, 
operational problems, breaches in internal controls, fraud, or unforeseen 
catastrophes will result in unexpected losses.  
• Legal risk arises from the potential that unenforceable contracts, lawsuits, or 
adverse judgments can disrupt or otherwise negatively affect the operations or 
condition of a banking organization.  
• Reputational risk arises from the potential that negative publicity regarding an 
institution’s business practices, whether true or not, will cause a decline in the 
customer base, costly litigation, or revenue reductions.27 
 
Our interest is in the first level of risk—credit risk—and the capacity to “perform on an 
obligation.” An old-fashioned banker would say that the capacity to perform on an 
obligation would be determined by the strength of at least two sources of cash: income 
or revenue generated in the normal course of business and sale of assets in liquidation. 
Both sources of repayment are readily verifiable; cash from income or revenue can be 
confirmed in the individual’s tax filing or the operating statement of the business, and 
cash from liquidation can derive from the value of the net assets on the balance sheet.  
 
What’s missing in the old-fashioned banker’s approach, though, is an analysis of the 
actual flows of cash; that is, what the individual or the business has actually done with 
cash in the past, and what it intends to do with it in the future. This can be a fatal 
omission. In fact, the essence of creditworthiness begins not with repayment of 
obligations, but rather with the decisions and actions that prompt the borrower to incur 
the obligations in the first place. Is the borrower doing something worthwhile? Is the 
risk reasonable? Is the amount appropriate? Is the borrower able to achieve the 
objectives more or less as originally intended? If not, is the new set of objectives 
worthwhile? Is the new level of risk reasonable? These are questions that go to the issues 
of asset quality, flexibility, liquidity, management capacity, and the other critical 
components that define credit risk. The old-fashioned banker could make up for the 
potentially fatal omission of this kind of analysis by simply restricting loan approvals to 
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borrowers with high levels of income and collateral—and that’s what the old-fashioned 
banker did, prompting the once-common adage that “bankers lend only to those who 
don’t need it.” It’s a tradition that also helped prompt the Community Reinvestment 
Act. 
This book addresses organizational credit risk for CDFIs.  Organizational risk is very 
different from asset-specific risk. With asset-specific financing, investors look to the 
liquidation of the secured asset for repayment. Although the CDFIs’ assets are a critical 
part of our analysis, they are not our primary focus. Our primary focus is on funding the 
operation of the organization, which often involves decisions and actions that are not 
associated with a hard asset.  
Major strides have already been made by the community development sector in getting 
assets, both financial and real estate, into the capital markets; for example, business 
loans aggregated by the Community Reinvestment Fund, mortgages aggregated by 
Neighborhood Housing Services of America, mortgages made by state housing finance 
agencies, and loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration. Asset-specific 
funding is typically the way in which organizations that are either weak (such as 
receivables factoring) and/or in higher-risk industries (such as equipment leasing) 
receive funding.  
However, the focus here is on funding the organization at the organizational level; more 
specifically, on the conversion of assets into cash and the conversion of that cash back 
into new assets with money to spare for the sustainable operation of the business. The 
key to credit risk in this process rests with the organization’s management. It is 
management that defines the assets and the operational activity associated with them, 
determines the timing and magnitude of their delivery, and arranges the funding that 
makes it all possible. The organizational credit risk is all wrapped up in how 
management performs these essential tasks. With organizational risk, investors look to 
the capacity of management to operate their business (regardless of asset class) in a 
prudent, effective, and successful manner.  
The essence of credit analysis, then, is to identify the decisions that management makes and assess 
the quality of the implementation of these decisions in the context of organizational objectives and 
market conditions. The issue of repayment of obligations incurred is secondary to—and derivative 
of—the evaluation of these factors. Hence, the best form of credit analysis is a mirror of 
management intentions, decisions, and actions. There is a logical corollary to this: the best form 
of credit analysis incorporates the same metrics used by the organization to manage the business 
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of its mission. Therefore, for the manager and the investor, organizational credit risk is one and 
the same.  
 
For most sectors, the connectivity of the metrics that management uses to run the 
operations and the metrics used by lenders and investors (and rating agencies) to 
evaluate organizational credit risk is a given. Indeed, for those in the single-family 
mortgage business—where a borrower’s credit is summarized in a credit score that 
interprets the borrower’s behavior with cash—it is a rule. However, such is not the case 
in the CDFI sector, where there is a separation between the metrics that management 
uses to make and implement decisions and the metrics available to the credit analyst 
who must interpret them for the investor.   
 
With these brief definitions set forth, we can see the mission. The intent is to drive CDFIs 
more widely into the money  markets and introduce them to the capital markets by 
elevating and standardizing the manner in which their organizational credit risk is 
captured and quantified, as well as devising vehicles that obtain unsecured low-cost, 
flexible funding for the organization’s needs.    
	  
What	  the	  Corporate	  Treasurer	  Gets	  from	  the	  Wholesale	  Side	  of	  the	  Bank	  
 
A Treasurer of a midwestern Fortune 500 company offered this in response to a 
presentation on interest-rate swaps in 1984.  “Listen, you can devise all the fancy new 
debt instruments you want, with all the bells and whistles and whatever else, but if I do 
nothing else except borrow short term for the rest of my career, I will come out ahead of 
whatever you make up— probably way ahead!”28 
 
If the treasurer of a Fortune 500 company can borrow short-term forever, why can’t 
CDFIs? For an understanding of the challenge of funding parity, it’s necessary to examine 
the wholesale side of CDFIs’ banking partners. For an instructive example, consider an 
actual unsecured bank credit facility provided to an A-rated nonbank lender, Brand X, 
25 years ago (before the widespread use of special-purpose vehicles and the 
securitization of assets): 
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Type   Line of credit 
Purpose  Support the issuance of commercial paper 
Rate Prime, LIBOR plus 50 basis points, CDs plus 62.5 basis points, Fed 
Funds plus 75 basis points as available 
Fee  .25 percent  
Maturity Annually renewable 
Amount $25,000,000 
 
The $25 million facility was one of a number of similar facilities that Brand X arranged to 
support its commercial paper issuance. The treasurer of Brand X had no intention of 
borrowing under this particular line of credit or any other. The intention was to borrow 
in the commercial paper market. (See Appendix A for a discussion of commercial 
paper.) The treasurer could borrow for up to 270 days at a time, but typically borrowed 
for 30 days and rolled the paper over (refinanced) at maturity. As we can see from 
Figure 2.1, the reason for borrowing in the commercial paper market was that it was 
cheaper by at least 50 basis points—and often more—than most of the pricing 
alternatives provided even by the wholesale side of the bank. The reasons include:  
 
• Generally speaking (until the last 24 months), the commercial paper rate tracks 
with the federal funds rate and LIBOR (London Interbank Borrowing Rate), with 
LIBOR coming in at 10–15 basis points higher (over the past decade) than 
commercial paper. 
• The bank lending to Brand X at federal funds rate or LIBOR charges a spread on 
top of this base rate—often in the 50 basis-point range—to generate income. 




By borrowing for 30 days instead of 90 or 270, the treasurer of Brand X was able to 
reduce the commercial paper cost even further. Given the 50 basis points the banks 
charged as a spread over LIBOR, Brand X was saving a minimum of $125,000 a year vis-
à-vis the other bank options, and as noted, the savings over the LIBOR alternative were 
another $25,000 to $37,500 higher than that, owing to the average 10 to 15 basis point 
difference between commercial paper and the LIBOR rate. 
 
By providing the line of credit, the bank essentially guaranteed to the commercial paper 
investors that they would be paid under all circumstances. In return for providing its 
credit standing to the Brand X commercial paper, the bank received a fee of .25 percent. 
In the event of a collapse of the commercial paper market, as happened in the late 1960s, 
the mid 1970s, and 2008, Brand X could turn around and borrow from the bank at one of 
the rate options (federal funds and LIBOR) provided by the wholesale side of the bank  
 
The increased use of commercial paper was not only about rates. Treasurers found the 
commercial paper market more responsive and more flexible. In addition, they did not 
have to rely on a relationship with a small circle of banks for their funding. They had 
access to a much wider market that tended to be less intrusive, if not more objective, 
precisely because there was no ongoing relationship. Large sums could be raised almost 
instantaneously. Disclosure was focused and standardized. And, of course, the financing 
was unsecured.  
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The unsecured feature led to two other significant cost benefits: legal and 
administrative. The documentation for this kind of facility consisted of an offering letter 
from the bank and a promissory note signed by the corporate customer. The bank letter 
consisted of two or three paragraphs outlining the purpose of the facility and the ability 
of the bank to cancel the facility at any time. The promissory note referenced the 
amount, the borrowing procedures, the interest rates, and the fact that the facility could 
be terminated on demand. Renewal of the facility required no change in legal or 
administrative handling.  
 
Because of these attractions, the banks themselves issued commercial paper to fund 
operating needs and other purposes for which domestic deposits, LIBOR, and federal 
funds financing were not aligned. They borrowed through their bank holding 
companies.   
 
The use of bank credit facilities to support issuance of paper to investors was not 
confined to the short term, however. Banks also provided credit support to longer-term 
debt and bond issues through a range of revolving credits and term letters of credit. 
Projects were financed, municipal and revenue bonds were funded, and long-term 
corporate expansion was supported through this mechanism. To be sure, banks were 
not—and are not—by nature of their deposits and leverage disposed to carry extensive 
amounts of long-term credit risk exposure. As a result, these longer-term credit 
enhancements could get expensive. However, using the bank’s credit rating was a very 
attractive alternative to corporations, particularly those that did not have sufficient size 
or credit quality to obtain their own investment grade rating. (CDFI executive directors: 
take note!) 
 
One of the more intriguing features of the Brand X commercial paper program was that 
its assets consisted of a variety of consumer loans—new car loans, used car loans, second 
mortgages, as well as personal loans. This meant that the average life of the assets was 
well in excess of the 270-day limit for commercial paper as well as the 30-day term of its 
regular rollover of borrowings. Although Brand X did issue bonds to finance a portion 
of its assets, it did not choose to match-fund all of them. Effectively, they were exposed 
to repaying their capital market obligations before the loans were repaid (commercial 
paper and bond liabilities on a weighted average maturity basis). Fortunately, the bank 
line of credit, which was renewed annually well in advance of maturity, assured the 
commercial paper investors that this mismatch would not be a problem. The bank 




There is another intriguing fact associated with Brand X, one in which CDFIs should 
take particular note: at one point in recent history, Brand X had to pay a significant 
settlement as a result of litigation over alleged predatory lending activity.  
 
The commercial paper market and the capital markets have become much more 
sophisticated in the past 25 years. For one thing, banks separated the credit 
enhancement from the liquidity guarantee and priced accordingly. For the corporate 
treasurer, the mechanisms for squeezing additional cost savings out of the borrowing 
function expanded dramatically. Indeed, as we shall show in subsequent chapters, the 
benefits of aggressive treasury management became so attractive—on the basis of 
arithmetic alone—that they became the key driver of the boom that produced the current 
bust.  
 
What	  the	  CDFI	  Treasurer	  Gets	  from	  the	  CRA	  Side	  of	  the	  Bank	  
 
We have just seen what the treasurer of a for-profit corporation, Brand X, can get in the 
way of a funding facility from the wholesale side of the bank. It was a lot cheaper and 
much more flexible than any facility any CDFI has seen. And Brand X was a for-profit 
corporation that engaged in predatory lending activity. 
 
CDFIs are different from Brand X in more than just mission. When it comes to financing 
working capital needs and operational growth, CDFIs are still relying almost entirely on 
banks, and almost exclusively from the CRA, rather than the wholesale side of the 
banks. In these bank relationships, they still do not have access to a line of credit to 
support commercial paper or the line of credit pricing that their corporate counterparts 
receive when they borrow on an unsecured basis. There is no available evidence they 
can borrow at a 50 basis-point spread or arrange credit facilities at a 25 basis-point fee as 
Brand X did (albeit pre-crisis). For the CDFI participants in the FIR team efforts, their 
pre-crisis margins over the cost of funds were about 75 to 100 basis points over LIBOR 
for secured facilities (there was one exception with a lower spread), and about 125 to 200 
basis points over LIBOR for unsecured facilities. Several also had facilities at prime minus 
100 to 150 basis points. None had a federal funds–based option. These FIR participants 
were among the largest and most advanced in the CDFI field, yet they had not caught 
up to where Brand X had been 25 years before.  
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Granted, the funding cost is not the most pressing expense in the CDFI model. The most 
pressing expense in the CDFI model is personnel cost (see Chapters 7 and 8). 
Nevertheless, from a simplistic standpoint—for example, by adding up the 75–150 basis 
point differential on the unsecured facilities—the CDFI is at a $187,500 to $350,000 
disadvantage per year to Brand X per $25 million in outstanding debt. That is a lot of 
grant subsidy to burn through.  
 
Why the discrepancy? Is CDFI organizational credit risk greater than that of a predatory 
lender?  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the reason that CDFIs cannot access the capital markets for 
unsecured working capital financing such as Brand X received has little to do with 
actual credit risk. In its report on 2006 performance, the CDFI Data Project calculated the 
following loan portfolio performance for CDFIs:29  
 
    Banks  Credit Unions  Loan Funds 
 
Delinquency > 60 days NA   1.7%   NA 
Delinquency > 90 days .3%   NA   2.9% 
Net Loan Loss   .2%   .7%   .7% 
 
Overall, among the 480 CDFIs reporting this data, the net loss rate was .46 percent, not 
appreciably higher than the charge-off rate for prime mortgages in the conventional 
sector for the same period. Yet the figures above also include the performance of much 
riskier assets—personal loans, microloans, small business loans, and construction loans, 
to name only a few.  
 
The low risk of these CDFI loan portfolios is paralleled by the low risk of unsecured 
loans to CDFI organizations. While it is true that unsecured lending is typically 
restricted to the upper third of the entities in the CDFI field in terms of size, 
sophistication, and longevity, their results are equally impressive.   
 
• National Cooperative Bank Capital Impact has run a form of short-term debt 
exchange among CDFIs since the late 1980s with only one failure, representing 
about .65 percent of the total volume of more than $300 million.  
• Neighborhood Housing Services of America has been running a rehab second-
mortgage secondary market with recourse to the originating community 
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development corporations since the early 1980s. Less than 0.5 percent of the more 
than  $1 billion in loan purchase activity has been written off due to failure of a 
participating community lender.   
• One of the major national banks has experienced no losses on its CDFI portfolio 
in more than 20 years of lending.  
 
Other entities such as the Opportunity Finance Network and the Calvert Foundation 
have seen similar exemplary performance for loans based on organizational credit risk 
in their respective CDFI lending programs.  
 
As the recessionary conditions continue, we can expect to see greater delinquencies and 
yes, greater losses in portfolios exposed to CDFI organizational credit risk. However, 
there is no indication whatsoever that these losses will equal anything close to the loss 
rates and bankruptcies the conventional lenders are experiencing in most, if not all, of 
their other asset classes. Although Brand X remains in business, many of its 
conventional lending counterparts are closing down, filing for bankruptcy, or struggling 
to stay open with the aid of federal subsidy--proof positive that it is not high credit risk 
that prevents CDFIs from obtaining unsecured funding for organizational needs in the 
capital markets.  
 
To be sure, there is, as yet, no consistent detailed collection of statistics on this CDFI 
organizational risk performance, an issue we will take up in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. But 
one way or another, credit risk is not the key reason that debt based on unsecured CDFI 
organizational risk remains blocked from the wholesale side of the banks and the capital 
markets. The reasons lie elsewhere.   
 
For those reasons, we turn to Mark Willis, former head of the JP Morgan Chase 
community development division. Willis’s article, “It’s the Rating Stupid,” provides the 
most penetrating insight into the reasons for the plight of CDFI organizational funding: 
 
Since we often focus on the benefits of the CRA [Community Reinvestment Act], 
it is too easy to forget its costs. We have already seen that the CRA can lead to 
below-market pricing, to extra production costs, and to unexpected and 
unintended consequences. Another set of costs that is not often appreciated is the 
expense incurred by the administration of the compliance process itself. Banks 
must assign special staff to oversee their compliance programs, including the 
gathering, processing, and publication of the required data. While these activities 
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may sound routine, they can be expensive, particularly when additional fact 
checkers are needed to re-review thousands of loans to check the validity of data 
that, while they may be collected, are not critical to the approval process.  
 
A different type of cost results from the creation or reinforcement of negative 
perceptions of the viability of serving LMI [low- and moderate-income] markets. 
For example, the lack of profitability at many LMI branches that banks have felt a 
need to open and the need to subsidize LMI mortgages have reinforced and 
perpetuated the impression that serving the LMI community can never be 
profitable for banks.30 
 
The following are the two most compelling reasons for the isolation, and ultimately the 
higher cost of CDFI organizational financing:  
 
• Size: The costs associated with the origination, analysis, monitoring, and 
compliance for loans based on CDFI organizational credit risk are substantial 
relative to the size of the loans the banks make. The bank may have to expend 
more time, effort, and money on a $5 million loan to a CDFI than it does on a 
$100 million facility to a for-profit corporation.  
• The Expectation of Subsidy: There is an expectation at both banks and CDFIs that 
pricing on loans to CDFIs must carry below-market rates. There are good reasons 
for this: to accommodate the higher costs that the CDFI incurs in the pursuit of 
the mission; the limited amount of unrestricted cash that the CDFIs typically 
have, which reduces the amount available for interest; and the banks’ need for 
credit toward a higher CRA rating. This expectation of subsidy has produced a 
considerable flow of below-market-rate funding into the CDFI sector, but, as the 
FIR team found, it has also left the CDFI field vulnerable to several adverse 
developments. These include a bank retreat from lending to the CDFI field; 
higher interest rates on the loans that are made; continuation of the specialized, 
time-consuming, and often inflexible terms and conditions on the loans that are 
made; and immobility relative to getting to know and benefit from other parts of 
the bank.  
 
The obstacles presented by the expectation of subsidy were apparent in a meeting in fall 
2009 among five banks and a national CDFI attempting to assemble a Real Estate 
Investment Trust (REIT). The CDFI was seeking more than $30 million in equity and 
more than $100 million in debt. Representatives of four of the five banks came from the 
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CRA departments, and the fifth was from the REIT (wholesale) side of his bank.  A chief 
sticking point in lining up both the debt and the equity was that the CDFI’s activity 
covered fifty states, not just the specific areas in the CRA footprint of the potentially 
participating banks. The banks were properly concerned that they would get no CRA 
credit for the funds they provided in states that fell outside their footprint. Moreover, 
they were not enthusiastic about having to set up and monitor a system that would track 
every loan to ensure its location and corresponding compliance with the regulations. All 
four CRA bankers agreed this was a serious impediment.  
 
They also agreed that the size of the transaction would require participation of a number 
of banks, which would make the equations on geographies more difficult. It was 
unlikely that the drafters of the CRA regulations intended to inhibit credit to low-
income communities across the country by limiting credit to certain geographies or by 
adding a large burden of allocating and monitoring funds. However, that was where the 
discussion was heading.  
 
For the fifth banker, however, the geography of the transaction wasn’t a problem. He 
was from the wholesale side of the bank and had no concern about where the money 
was spent geographically, so long as it didn’t involve large concentrations in any one 
region. He was also pretty sure that his bank could do the debt on the whole deal. For 
the CDFI, it was a ray of sunlight.  
 
The discussion then turned to the issue of whether the rate on a non-CRA facility would 
be higher than on a CRA facility. One of the CRA bankers indicated that a CRA-
compliant loan would carry a lower cost because of the potential for CRA credit. 
Although there were no specifics on how much the differential would be, the CDFI 
recognized a breakthrough was in the making. If it could avoid the geographical 
constraints of the CRA loan, it would be free to manage portfolio risk much more 
effectively, while saving considerable time and money on the process of allocating and 
monitoring compliance. If the non-CRA facility cost more, it would just mean raising an 
additional million or two of equity and/or reducing the amount of debt for the facility. 
For the CDFI, this presented a whole new set of opportunities.  
 
In the end, the CDFI chose not to proceed with the REIT at that time owing to the 




1) The CRA facility came with a whole set of costs and a likely set of portfolio 
concentrations that may or may not be justified or supported by a lower rate on 
the debt;  
 
2) At the right size, these costs could be avoided by doing the deal with the 
wholesale side of the bank.  
 
Both observations convinced the CDFI that, going forward, it had to engage both sides 
of the bank. 
 
Maintaining	  the	  Status	  Quo:	  But	  at	  What	  Cost?	  	  
 
There is a logical reason that the treasurer at Brand X could borrow more cheaply and 
enjoy greater flexibility 25 years ago than the treasurer at the best CDFI can borrow 
today. Brand X long-term debt was rated A by the rating agencies; that is, Standard and 
Poor’s and Moody’s, rated the Brand X commercial paper (with the benefit of the bank 
lines of credit) A-1/P-1.  
 
Today’s CDFIs have neither a long-term nor a short-term rating. Today’s CDFIs cannot 
“get on the bus” because they simply cannot get a ticket from the rating agencies. They 
don’t have the size, or the experience with conventional financing; or the detailed track 
record of their performance from the standpoint of organizational credit risk. And even 
if they had all of these, there would still be a learning curve that the rating agencies, the 
wholesale bankers and investors in the capital markets generally, would have to climb in 
order to gain comfort. But stepping back because of these challenges is not an option. 
 
A review of what happened to interest rates in October 2008 shows why. In October 
2008, the federal government stepped in to save the mutual fund and commercial paper 
markets by backing them up with various forms of guarantees (the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility). These were likely necessary steps; they dramatically reduced the cost 
to borrow for banks and for corporations.  
 
However, these steps did not help CDFIs, because CDFIs do not borrow in the 
commercial paper market. Nor do they borrow at spreads over the federal funds rate. 
Brand X still does, and so does just about everyone else in the corporate and institutional 
sectors. Consequently, while the Brand X borrowings benefited from these federal 
interventions, the borrowings of the CDFIs did not. CDFIs borrow primarily at prime or 
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a spread over LIBOR. As noted above, LIBOR had closely tracked commercial paper and 
federal funds for about 15 years. But in October 2008, that all came to an abrupt halt. In 
October 2008, LIBOR was left hanging, with the result that it was running at 40, 60, 80, 
and at times 100 basis points over both commercial paper and federal funds.  
 
Remember the $187,500–$350,000 cost advantage Brand X had over CDFIs (per $25 
million in borrowing)? It was calculated based on the 75–150 basis point advantage that 
Brand X enjoyed over CDFIs when borrowing on an unsecured basis. With Brand X 
borrowing at a spread over the federal funds or commercial paper rates, that differential 
grew to a range of $287,500–$600,000 in October of 2008—and that was before 
considering any adjustments the banks made to increase the margin CDFIs paid over 
LIBOR.  
 
Since October 2008, the LIBOR rates have come back down and now are back in the 
range of 10–15 basis points over federal funds and commercial paper. But CDFIs are still 
stuck by the side of the road. Quite aside from the issue that it was the Brand Xs of the 
world that helped precipitate the current crisis, the funding cost advantages they enjoy 
should help CDFIs to redouble their efforts to gain access to similar kinds of funding at 
the banks and in the capital markets.  
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CHAPTER	  3	  	  	  





hile those borrowers who achieved homeownership through NHS of Chicago 
are in good shape,” Bruce Gottschall, executive director of NHS Chicago was 
quoted as saying in The Coming Storm,  “the wave of foreclosures hitting neighborhoods 
has the potential to undo in a few years the progress in community revitalization that it 
has taken us decades to achieve.”31 
 
In coordination with the MacArthur Foundation, the City of Chicago, and several banks 
with a commitment to Chicago, NHS Chicago was able to launch a $100 million rescue 
loan program in 2008 even as the housing sector, banks, and economy slid further into 
the dark. Everyone knew it was just a finger in the dike against overwhelming Katrina-
like tides. But it was unique, it was courageous, and it demonstrated great faith in NHS 
Chicago, the community, and the low-income constituencies that the NHS Chicago 
served. What could NHS Chicago have done if it had five or ten times the $100 million 
amount? What could NHS Chicago have done if it had such amounts to lend in the years 
leading up to the crash?  
 
Those are the questions that CDFIs should be asking. The questions invariably lead to 
the conclusion, once again, that the status quo in financing the CDFI sector is no longer a 
meaningful option.  One of the few silver linings in the crisis is that it is now obvious 
that the community development sector as a whole cannot be detached from events in 
the conventional sector, and that, on the contrary, CDFIs must be working full-time to 
offset the impact if and when the conventional sector goes feral.  
 
To get an idea of what that preparation entails, here is again the question that was posed 




“How could two million homeowners, representing less than 4 percent of the total number [and 
likely much less of the total dollar amount of mortgages outstanding], have such a negative 
impact on the markets as a whole?”  
 
How	  to	  Become	  Too	  Big	  to	  Fail	  
 
To begin to answer that question from a technical standpoint requires examining the 
impact of a significant increase in delinquencies and losses on four differently sized 
lending institutions, each of which uses different methodologies for financing loans. 
Assessing the impact of delinquencies and losses in each offers a strong hint to the 
answer to the question and the tools CDFI’s must learn to master.  
 
The scenario we apply to each of the four types of financial entities is this: the loss rate in 
the lending business suddenly jumps from .50 percent to 3 percent of total loans 
outstanding. An increase in losses of this magnitude is similar to what happened to 
many housing lenders in 2008 and 2009.  
 
Case	  I.	  A	  $10	  million	  nonprofit	  revolving	  loan	  fund	  entirely	  funded	  by	  grants	  	  
 
As a result of the sharp rise in losses, rather than taking a $50,000 write-off against net 
assets, the institution must now take a $300,000 write-off. If the institution wants to get 
back on sound footing by getting its capital ratio in line, it must either raise the rate on 
its loans to cover the additional $250,000 in losses, or raise an additional $250,000 in 
grants. To put it another way: $250,000 in grants will keep the $10 million revolving loan 
fund revolving in much the same way as it had been. However, there is no appreciable 
effect on the community if the institution is unable to raise the full $250,000.  
 
Case	  II.	  A	  $1	  billion	  savings	  bank	  funded	  by	  $100	  million	  in	  capital	  and	  $900	  million	  in	  
deposits	  	  
 
With the increase in losses from .50 percent to 3.0 percent of its loans outstanding, what 
was once a $5 million write-off against net assets becomes a $30 million write-off. If the 
savings bank wants to get its capital ratio back in line, it must either raise the rate on its 
56	  
loans or raise an additional $25 million in equity. Raising rates may be hard because 
banking is so competitive. Raising equity would be a good solution; essentially for $25 
million the institution can keep a billion-dollar portfolio actively investing in the 
community. If it cannot raise the $25 million from its equity investors, however, it may 
be forced to cut lending activity and reduce size to align its capital ratios. This doesn’t 
always work, though, because reductions in size often produce additional losses. The 
federal regulators may take over the savings bank in the end. There is no effect on 
depositors if the government does so, however, because for the most part, deposits are 
guaranteed. Thus, the depositors generally keep their money in place. The bottom line is 
if the institution can find $25 million in equity, it’s fine. If not, except for the 
inconvenience of finding another lender, there is no measurable effect on the community 
(although there could be a significant inconvenience if the community is rural).  
 
The only big concern in this scenario is if a number of institutions experience this level of 
loss at the same time, as happened in 1989 and 1990 with the nationwide failure of 
savings banks, S&Ls, and commercial banks.  Depositors were fine in that case, but 
lending and, consequently, asset values declined dramatically across the country. 
Perhaps the biggest complaint to emerge from the S&L crisis was that regulators were 
too quick and too merciless with their valuation of assets and consequent demands for 
new capital. The S&Ls had ample liquidity, and if the regulators had been more patient 
about equity, some say everything would have turned out fine. (The current argument 
about marking assets to market and what it does to discourage long-term investment is 
another version of this argument.)  
 
Case	  III.	  A	  $100	  billion	  commercial	  bank	  funded	  by	  $10	  billion	  in	  capital	  and	  $90	  billion	  
in	  deposits	  
 
In this case, the rising delinquencies force a $3 billion write-off rather than a $500 million 
write-off against net assets. If the institution wants to get its capital ratios back in line, it 
must either raise the rate on its loans or raise an additional $2.5 billion in equity. Once 
again, raising rates may be difficult because banking is so competitive. As with Case II, 
raising the equity would be an efficient use of cash. Essentially for $2.5 billion in new 
equity, the institution can keep a $100 billion portfolio actively investing in the economy.  
 
If it cannot raise sufficient equity, of course, the federal regulators may take over the 
bank. Unlike the savings bank in Case II, however, depositors may feel the effect if this 
57	  
happens. There is a limit (increased in 2008) on how much of each deposit is guaranteed, 
and banks of this size often have deposits that exceed the guarantee limit. The loss of 
these large depositors can force regulators to raise much more than just equity; they 
might be forced to raise new deposits to replace the (nonguaranteed) ones that 
disappear as well. Thus, rather than $3 billion in equity necessary to keep the doors 
open, the institution may need to raise an additional $20, $30, or $50 billion in short-term 
funds. This can come from a variety of sources, such as other banks or the federal 
discount window.  
 
The bottom line is that the amount of cash the institution needs to return to normal 
can—and likely will—exceed the level of capital. And the effect on the community? The 
big banks are the big players in the economy; moreover, they tend to pursue the same 
kinds of business in the same manner at the same order of magnitude. Hence, if a large 
bank is experiencing a deterioration in one or more of its lines of business, it is likely that 
a number of other banks are facing the same challenge. The effect on the community can 
be substantial, as deposits go elsewhere, lending dries up, asset values decline, and 
economic activity goes flat.  
 
We have witnessed this situation before. As we discussed in Chapter 1, when the 
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust failed in June 1982—the largest bank 
bailout in U.S. history until the credit crisis in 2008—a large portion of its deposits were 
sourced from foreign investors (primarily Japan) on a 90-day basis. When the regulators 
stepped in, the bank was forced to find new cash to replace the cash that disappeared 
when depositors stopped renewing their 90-day notes. Many of the banks that provided 
credit lines to Continental Illinois were forced to keep their exposure intact, and to 
continue to lend money to Continental at the federal funds rate to keep the bank liquid 
during its restructuring. Although bad lending was the major cause of the problem, the 
biggest part of the solution was not replenishing the equity that made up for the losses, 
but rather, the liquidity that funded the bulk of the business.32 
 
58	  
Case	  IV.	  A	  $100	  billion	  commercial	  bank	  funded	  by	  $13	  billion	  in	  capital	  and	  $87	  billion	  
in	  deposits,	  with	  $300	  billion	  in	  letters	  of	  credit	  supporting	  commercial	  paper	  issuance.	  
The	  commercial	  paper	  is	  issued	  by	  special-­‐purpose	  vehicles	  that	  hold	  credit	  card,	  car	  
loan,	  and	  home	  mortgage	  obligations;	  $3	  billion	  of	  the	  $13	  billion	  in	  capital	  backs	  the	  
letters	  of	  credit.	  	  
 
In this case, rather than taking a $500 million write-off against net assets, the institution 
must now take a $3 billion write-off, plus a $9 billion write-off on the credit card, car 
loan, and home mortgage obligations for which it is contingently liable. The need to 
write off the additional $9 billion is because the bank, through its letters of credit, has 
essentially guaranteed it will make good on any losses that occur in these additional 
obligations held by SPVs. That is, the bank will make sure that the investors who bought 
the commercial paper issued by the special-purpose vehicles will not lose a dime.  
 
However, there’s an even bigger problem: the investors in those special-purpose 
vehicles do not like loans that carry 3 percent loss rates. They don’t like these loans 
because they thought they were buying commercial paper that funded loans with a .5 
percent loss rate. When they see the change in loss rates, they get very upset. It means 
that, among other things, their original assumptions about the quality of the investment 
were wrong. Some may choose to conduct the analysis all over again. But analysis is 
very expensive, and if a market is moving, their research may not be able to catch up 
with the new values, particularly if the market is moving downward. Thus, regardless 
whether the credit card, car loan, and home mortgage loans may very well pay off in full 
over the years it takes for the loans to mature, the investors will not reinvest in the 
commercial paper when their special-purpose-vehicle commercial paper matures, and 
they mature every 30 days. After 30 days, all those long-term assets suddenly will be 
booked to the bank’s balance sheet—all $300 billion of them (less the amount that has 
been written off).  
 
If the bank wants to get its capital ratio back in line, it must not only raise $12 billion in 
equity, but also find $300 billion of short-term investments—federally guaranteed 
deposits, short-term loans, borrowings from the Federal Reserve, or anything else they 
can find to finance the $300 billion in loans that have just been dumped on the bank’s 
balance sheet. Plus, it must still plug whatever hole develops in its existing deposit base 
(as in Case III) due to the limits on FDIC insurance and depositor fears about the bank’s 
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ability to survive. Bottom line: The amount of cash the institution must raise is likely 
somewhere north of $350 billion. And this is only one institution.  
 
One can imagine what former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson was looking at when, 
on top of the collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper market, and the imminent 
demise of several investment banks, most banks in the country were facing dramatic 
increases in loan losses.  
 
The cases above are all greatly simplified. In the end, however, when all the statistics 
and studies are done and documented, it will likely be determined that the housing and 
credit crises in 2006–2008 were the result of a loss of investor confidence brought on by 
unexpectedly high default rates on assets that were poorly underwritten and badly 
disclosed. Nevertheless, the crisis was not simply the byproduct of loans to people who 
should not have owned a home. Had that been the case, the damage could have been 
confined to situations as in Cases II and III, and the proportions of the crisis could have 
been contained within the balance sheets of the participating institutions.  
 
The mechanisms that had been created to accommodate and promote conventional 
lending were remarkably efficient in delivering benefits to borrower, lender, and 
investor alike. There was no reason for any of the parties to cease and desist from the 
genuinely thrilling level of lending they were able to generate, given the equally thrilling 
prospect of gain. Borrowers wanted more house (and more cash out), lenders wanted 
more fees, and investors wanted more yield—and they got them. Leverage ballooned 
both on and off the balance sheet, and the velocity of deals performed on the same dollar 
of lender equity ensured satisfaction of all three wants. The result was not the product of 
evil intentions. As we will demonstrate in Chapter 8, it was a product of simple 
arithmetic.  
 
The scenario in Case IV unfolded in 2008. It was not simply a loss of equity; the entire 
liability side of the bank balance sheets went up in smoke. When the top-rated tranches 
of collateralized mortgage obligations rose to the LIBOR swap rate plus 500 basis points 
(with the bottom-rated tranches reaching LIBOR swaps plus 5,500 basis points), a fairly 
clear message from investors emerged: no new money was going to shift to the bank 
balance sheet any time soon. When trillions of dollars of financing evaporate virtually 
overnight, everything comes to a standstill. Then things begin to accelerate in reverse: 
the loss of liquidity reduces overall economic activity as well as asset values, and the 
loss of incomes drives mortgage losses up ever higher. The result is a massive negative 
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impact on the community, which the private sector has no capacity to mitigate or 
reverse, short of hitting the bottom—whatever the bottom is.  
 
Does	  the	  Baby	  Get	  Thrown	  Out	  with	  the	  Bathwater?	  	  
 
Next to keeping people in homes, the biggest challenge in the community development 
field today is finding ways to keep money coming into the neighborhood for productive 
activity. Those in the CDFI field are not in a position to get their arms around all the 
technical and policy issues that produced the collapse of the housing and credit markets, 
nor to present a complete and convincing set of remedies for the problem. After all, 
CDFIs are not specialists in the mechanisms that make the financial markets work; 
indeed, they had barely made it into the capital markets (with loan sales) before the 
markets collapsed.  
 
Nevertheless, CDFIs have a critical duty. The biggest danger CDFIs face now is that the 
capital markets, having lost their tools, will retreat from providing credit to the low-
income community. In short, they will throw the baby out with the bath water. There is 
no question that the cost has risen from the standpoint of losses. But that is the case 
across the board for borrowers at all income levels. The loss rates will stabilize and drop 
over time. The more critical issue for CDFIs  is lowering the cost of delivering credit to 
low-income borrowers: without credit scoring, securitization and off-balance sheet 
funding options, the cost of providing capital to low-income communities can become 
prohibitive for any lender, including CDFIs. It is absolutely essential that CDFIs identify 
the mechanisms that worked well for the conventional sector and could work well for 
them—and distinguish the abuse of these mechanisms from their appropriate use and 
benefits. 
 
Capital market mechanisms like credit scoring, securitization, and off-balance sheet 
funding were highly effective in bringing money to low-income neighborhoods. That the 
quality of the money was bad—that is, it had a tendency to explode—is not reason 
enough to eliminate the mechanisms that proved so efficient. Indeed, it is in the lenders’ 
collective interest—community development and conventional lenders alike—to retain 
the mechanisms that worked well, rebuild credibility, and improve the manner in which 
they are used going forward. This is not an idle invocation. The fact remains that there 
tens of trillions of private investment dollars still circling the globe looking for a safe 
place to land. The continued low long-term rates tell us that. The problem is that there 
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are no nongovernmental mechanisms that fund our residential, business, and 
community assets that investors are willing to buy. These must be rebuilt, and prudent 
community-based assets must be in the forefront.  
 
How	  the	  Mechanisms	  We	  Need	  Failed	  
 
Earlier, we stated that the mission of the FIR team in 2001 was to: 
 
• Place CDFI debt with the capital markets; 
• Standardize CDFI financial reporting and analysis; and  
• Improve CDFI risk management.  
 
As we explore the work of the FIR team, we will see how specific mechanical failures in 
each of these three broad categories caused or accelerated the collapse of the markets. 
Granted, it is hard, as bystanders in the capital markets, to get overly specific about the 
mechanisms that failed; it is difficult to properly judge which ones should be prohibited 
and which should be retained and improved. Therefore, we will keep to generalities. In 
a highly simplified nutshell, the reasons we will likely trace the causes of failure to these 
three broad categories are the following. 
 
• Placing debt in the capital markets. From the standpoint of default, the debt 
obligations that collateralized the securities did not perform as expected.33 Too 
many securities were written so tightly around default expectations for the 
underlying mortgages that there was simply no margin of error. Diamond and 
Rajan state the problem quite succinctly: 
The problems in valuing these securities were not obvious when house 
prices were rising and defaults were few. But as the house prices stopped 
rising and defaults started increasing, the valuation of these securities 
became very complicated.34  
• Remediation impediments arose. The contractual terms and conditions of the 
securities, which were crafted on the assumption of a narrow band of asset 
performance, proved to be impediments to remediation. The wide distribution of 
the securities further eroded the potential for solution.35 
• Standardization of financial reporting and assessment. The magnitude of the 
deviation from expected performance caused the investing public to lose 
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confidence in the ability of the rating agencies, banks, and other gatekeepers to 
properly assess risk. At the heart of this was the inability to anticipate, capture, 
or model the impact on credit scores of a raft of floating rate mortgage products 
in a rapidly rising interest rate environment. Confidence in credit scores as 
predictive of risk also took a steep dive.  
• Risk management. Incentives were insufficient among the key parties—borrowers, 
lenders, investors, and gatekeepers—to ensure quality on the asset side of the 
balance sheet. The returns that could be captured through high asset turnover 
and aggressive asset-liability mismatches were sufficiently attractive to 
encourage imprudence on the liability and asset sides of the balance sheet.  
 
In the following sections, we take a closer look at the mechanisms in each of the three 
broad categories above, and provide some general observations about why and how 
they failed, why they will come back, and in what form they are likely to reappear. We 
also enumerate the reasons these mechanisms are good for the community development 
sector and why CDFIs should be preparing to take advantage of them when they do 
reappear. Our presumption, of course, is that when they do reappear, they will be 
governed by rational and authoritative rules that incorporate the lessons learned from 
the current debacle. We should also presume that the community development sector 
can be among those who will be setting the standards.  
 
Placing	  Debt	  in	  the	  Capital	  Markets	  
 
In introducing his lectures on securitization, Judd Levy, former CEO of the Community 
Development Trust, would say that the inventor of securitization was not Lew Ranieri, 
Lew Glucksman, Pete Peterson, or John Gutfreund. It was none other than Frank 
Perdue, the purveyor of a wide variety of chicken parts. Chicken parts are an apt 
metaphor for securitization. Securitization of chicken is so pleasing to all parties 
involved because it attracts many more buyers owing to the variety of packages (such as 
thighs, breasts, wings) and ease of use; makes middle men happier because of ease of 
transport, storage, and quality control; and generates higher profits for the provider, 
Frank Perdue, due to lower cost processing and higher revenues paid by consumers 
who were able to purchase exactly the chicken parts that they wanted.  
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The same concept drives securitization in the capital markets. Assets are broken down 
into discreet streams of cash that serve a wide range of investor appetites. By 
aggregating like assets in a separate package—such as a bond or special-purpose 
vehicle—and then letting them perform as expected, there is much greater clarity on the 
features of risk for the investor, much more effective quality control, and more direct 
proximity to the specific collateral in case of default. For many investors, this is 
preferable to investing, for example, in a bank or insurance company security, which 
includes exposure to risks associated with a much wider range of assets as well as a 
more complex organizational structure. With securitization, the sum of the parts is 
almost always much greater than the whole. As a result, securitization can produce 
lower rates to the borrower, creating a win-win all the way around. As James Rosenthal 
and Juan Ocampo put it:  
 
Although credit securitization is sensitive to the regulatory guidelines and other 
arbitrary limits, it draws its lifeblood not from regulatory arbitrage but from the 
way it handles risk. In this respect, it is fundamentally more efficient than 
conventional lending. ... Asset-backed securitization can provide borrowers with 
cheaper sources of funds. This benefit is already evident in residential 
mortgages. Homebuyers are now paying approximately 100 basis points less in 
interest (versus U.S. Treasury yields) on fixed-rate mortgagees than they were a 
decade ago when mortgage securitization was much less pervasive. ...  
 
Credit securitization enables a strong loan originator or servicer to expand its 
volume of business without expanding its capital base in the same proportion. 
Conventional balance sheet lenders lack this freedom. Their growth rate is 
limited by their ability to expand their capital base through retained earnings or 
new issues.36 
 
Over the past two decades the markets have demonstrated tremendous success in 
bringing new money to a much wider range of consumers with securitization—until 
2008, that is, when the markets collapsed. Indeed, the expansion of the subprime market 
is perhaps the most likely poster child for the efficiency of securitization in matching 
borrowing needs with surplus cash.  
 
To be sure, the markets collapsed in the same way that a company securitizing chicken 
would collapse if it conducted its business poorly.  
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• The absence of quality control produces higher levels of spoilage, then  
• Spoilage costs the company and the middle men more, then  
• The company tries to make up the increased cost by increasing the volume, then   
• A few people eat chicken wings and get sick with salmonella, then 
• People stop buying chicken from the company, and then 
• Everyone stops buying chicken altogether.  
 
However, do we abandon the concept of eating chicken—or packaging it—forever?  No. 
Chicken is not bad, and neither is packaging it in different sizes and types. Robert Shiller 
makes this very point: 
 
The current financial crisis is often viewed as a reason to sound retreat—to 
return to yesterday’s simpler methods of financial dealing. This would be a 
mistake. On the contrary, the current situation is really an opportunity to 
redouble our efforts to rethink and improve our risk-management institutions. … 
Despite the present crisis, modern finance has produced historic achievements in 
recent decades and serves as a powerful engine of economic growth, from 
underwriting new businesses in the private sector to supporting vital research in 
the universities to building schools and hospitals in the public sector.37 
 
The	  Case	  for	  Securitization	  of	  CDFI	  Assets	  and	  Liabilities	  
The benefits of securitization are particularly significant for CDFIs. Serving low-income 
local markets with limited resources means that, almost by definition, CDFIs cannot 
over time carry the uncertainties and the costs of credit risk, interest rate risk, servicing, 
and other operating costs. With their smaller balance sheets and limited supplies of 
grant subsidy, CDFIs must place assets with entities that have the balance sheets, 
longevity, and efficiencies to produce the lowest interest rates available. In addition to 
being exposed to these costs and uncertainties, retaining assets on the CDFI balance 
sheet is also a poor use of grant subsidy. Essentially, when CDFIs keep these assets on 
the balance sheet, they are consuming grant subsidy that would otherwise be passed on 
to their constituencies. The alternative, securitization, results in more efficient use of 
limited capital, and enables the CDFI to put a much greater amount of subsidy to work 
for the constituent. 
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At the same time, CDFIs also need to use the securitization process to sell their 
liabilities—specifically, their unsecured long- and short-term organizational debt 
obligations. The benefits of securitization are the same for funding liabilities as well as 
assets, and the reasons are the same: reducing costs and uncertainties. In short, access to 
the capital markets through securitization is exactly what the community development 
field is looking for—low rates on unlimited amounts of funding.  
 
How	  to	  Assemble	  a	  CDFI	  Securitization	  
Two general kinds of vehicles are appropriate for securitizing: bonds, which would 
generally be used for long-term assets or liabilities, and bankruptcy-remote special 
purpose vehicles, which would be created to securitize shorter-term assets or liabilities. 
 
In either case, the basic procedure for assembling a securitization for CDFIs would be 
the following: 
 
• Identification of CDFI assets or liabilities. Ideally, these would be assets or liabilities 
that meet standard definitions and whose performance can be tracked using 
conventional measures.  
• Aggregation of CDFI assets or liabilities to achieve scale. As noted in Chapter 1, one 
of the two chief impediments to CDFIs’ entry into the capital markets is size (the 
other one is market unfamiliarity). To get into the markets, CDFI assets or 
liabilities must be aggregated to achieve the requisite economies of scale. 
• Determination of vehicle (bond or special-purpose vehicle). Generally speaking, CDFIs 
need to determine whether they want short (SPV) or long (bond) maturities, and 
whether the need is on a flow (SPV) or bulk (bond) basis.  
• Determination of the amount of credit enhancement required. Credit enhancement is 
provided to assure investors that they will be repaid their principal. This is 
generally the largest and most expensive mechanism in the overall effort to gain 
access to the capital markets. Determination ultimately rests with the rating 
agencies. 
• Determination of the amount of liquidity support. Liquidity support is provided to 
ensure that investors get paid in a timely manner. This is primarily a 
consideration for the special-purpose vehicle, and as with the credit 
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enhancement, it is determined by the rating agencies. Liquidity support is 
generally pegged at 100 percent.  
• Arrangement of the key functions. In addition to credit enhancement and liquidity 
functions, there are other third-party functions including legal, administration, 
management, compliance, and distribution.  
The	  Credit	  Enhancement	  
As noted, the biggest challenge for CDFIs is the credit enhancement. The key questions 
are the likely loss rate on the assets or liabilities in the bond or SPV, and the amount 
required to cover it to achieve the highest rating from the rating agencies.   
 
Because the assets and liabilities of CDFIs are unfamiliar to the marketplace, and 
because the data on losses across the spectrum of CDFI activity are largely fragmented 
and anecdotal, the traditional approach to answering the question is to over-
collateralize. For example, Neighborhood Housing Services of America (NHSA) began 
purchasing rehab loans from community development corporations in the 1970s, and 
then placed them in collateral trusts with insurance companies. At first, the loss 
reserves—or credit enhancements—were established at 100 percent of the loan’s face 
value. Over time, with the benefit of stellar loss performance, the NHSA worked these 
reserves down to 5 percent. The primary shortcoming in these secondary market 
purchases, however, was that they were private transactions and did not require ratings.  
 
Notwithstanding the similar loss performance experienced by many CDFIs and their 
funders, the absence of persuasive data means that over-collateralization will continue 
to be a feature of CDFI securitization until loss performance can be captured in a 
standardized framework on a large sample and assessed in the context of rating agency 
criteria. 
 
The role of the rating agencies cannot be overstated in the context of both bonds and 
SPVs. Most investment policies, whether for pension funds, bond funds, money market 
mutual funds, bank treasury portfolios, or even CDFI investments, involve restrictions 
that prohibit investment in securities that are deemed not investment grade. This means 
they are rated at BBB or Baa or better. Most funds prefer the top grade, or AAA/Aaa, 
and of course the borrowers prefer that level as well, as it means they can obtain the 
lowest borrowing rates. Thus, any CDFI securitization should be credit enhanced to at 
least the investment-grade level, and preferably to the AAA/Aaa level.  
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Although it is unlikely that the rating agencies would require a 100 percent reserve on a 
bond vehicle backed by high-quality CDFI assets or liabilities, the CDFI sector will need 
to be prepared for a reserve level that would be much higher than the loss rates they 
have experienced would warrant. There are many ways to approach this higher hurdle, 
including the structure that the Community Reinvestment Fund used in its 2004 CRF 
USA Community Reinvestment Revenue Notes, Series 17 (CRF-17). In that transaction, 
the cash flows from small business loan assets were divided into a series of tranches, 
with the Community Reinvestment Fund holding the higher-risk tranches, and the 
lower-risk tranches placed with investors.  
 
The Calvert Foundation explored another kind of bond in 2003 and 2004, in partnership 
with Opportunity Finance Network and First Albany. The notion was that CDFI 
obligations would be commingled with high-quality Government Sponsored Enterprise 
(GSE), such as Fannie Mae or Ginnie Mae paper in a bond vehicle. The major challenge 
to this concept was that investors would still end up pricing the bond around the 
uncertainty of the credit risk of the CDFI exposure, essentially negating the value of 
including the bond’s high-quality component. Although this structure was not pursued, 
it did introduce a way to improve the credit picture by diversifying the perceived risk 
and reducing the proportion of unknown risk in the portfolio of debt instruments 
(promissory notes) backing the vehicle.  
 
An alternative to putting up additional cash, assets, and/or liabilities is to obtain credit 
enhancement from highly rated institutions in the form of a letter of credit or similar 
commitment. This has been a significant line of business for banks and insurers. To be 
sure, the longer the term of the bond, the harder this is to arrange—and the more 
expensive, as well. Yet there is one critical advantage: a number of the large banks that 
have actively assisted the CDFI field over the years are well acquainted with the low and 
relatively predictable level of CDFI organizational credit risk. Given proper structure 
and incentives (and market conditions), this could be the key channel for CDFIs into the 
capital markets in the future.  
 
Why	  Banks	  Have	  Been	  Ambivalent	  about	  Securitizing	  CDFI	  Assets	  
However, to date, the structures and incentives have not been adequate to establish this 
kind of arrangement, even when market conditions are good. As Mark Willis indicated 
in Chapter 2, there are several reasons for this. The chief challenge is scale: the 
participants in a securitization simply cannot make enough on a small securitization to 
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cover their costs, let alone make a reasonable profit. But there is another big challenge as 
well: banks (specifically the larger banks) generally like having CDFI obligations on 
their balance sheet, at the very least for the purpose of satisfying Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements.  Notwithstanding the challenges Willis refers to, 
these CDFI obligations do produce revenue and generate few losses. These assets would 
disappear from the bank’s balance sheet if the CDFIs went to the capital markets, taking 
their earnings and likely their CRA benefit along with them.  
 
A	  Solution	  to	  the	  Bank	  Preference	  for	  On-­‐Balance	  Sheet	  CDFI	  Assets	  
As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, the FIR team’s Commercial Paper Co-op 
overcame this challenge by pioneering a way to make the credit support of off-balance 
sheet CDFI obligations much more profitable for the banks than retaining the obligations 
on balance sheet. The key to this breakthrough lay in the way in which bank regulators 
looked at the risk assets in relation to bank capital at the time. Simply put, the regulators 
recognized that an asset that is not carried on a bank’s books could have, under certain 
circumstances, a lower claim on bank capital than an asset that is carried on the bank’s 
books.  
 
The reasoning and procedures for the distinct handling of on- and off-balance sheet 
assets for the purposes of risk-based allocation of capital were set forth in a November 
2001 Federal Reserve Supervisory Letter.38 (A more detailed discussion of its logic, the 
procedures, and the implications are discussed in Appendix D.) The simplified issue 
was this: if the asset that was carried off the bank balance sheet was a high-quality 
asset—that is, rating agencies could rate it at investment grade or above—the amount of 
capital allocated to support it could be a fraction of what was required of balance sheet 
assets. A further refinement of how the transfer of assets to off balance sheet vehicles 
worked, and the logic behind them was included in a second letter from July 2004 in 
which, among other things, the regulators distinguished bank support through credit 
enhancement versus bank support through liquidity facilities, and proceeded to 
establish credit conversion ratios for the liquidity facilities based on the credit quality of 
the assets supported.39  
 
This credit conversion was central to the breakthrough for the FIR team’s design concept 
of the Commercial Paper Co-op (Chapter 6). The co-op credit enhanced the off-balance 
sheet vehicle—the special-purpose vehicle—with grant funding, and then approached 
only banks that already had credit risk exposure to the kinds of assets that would be in 
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the SPV. It was a lock. Essentially, the banks could move the assets off their balance 
sheets by putting them into an SPV that was entirely credit-supported by foundations. 
This eliminated the need to allocate capital for credit-enhancing assets. However, the 
banks still would provide credit in the form of a liquidity facility—a facility that 
committed the banks to fund investors in the event of payment interruption.  
 
The credit conversion factor that could be used to establish the allocation of capital for 
this liquidity facility was very attractive; it essentially reduced the amount of capital the 
banks had to allocate to these assets by 90 percent. Conversely, as we shall show in 
Chapter 6, the credit conversion factor significantly increased the banks’ return on 
capital. The result was that the Co-op could produce a significantly higher return on 
bank capital even on a substantially lower level of (dollar) profit for the bank; 
specifically, the bank could produce a much higher return on capital, earning just 62.5 
basis points on a liquidity facility for supporting the same assets off balance sheet than it 
could earning 200 basis points with the assets on balance sheet. At this point, a financial 
incentive to move the CDFI assets into the capital markets had been established.  
 
The	  Door	  to	  the	  Capital	  Markets	  Slams	  Shut	  	  
The recent turmoil in the credit markets has made the path offered by the Commercial 
Paper Co-op impassable. As a result of the failure to properly assess the risks of assets in 
the SPVs, many in the financial sector as well as regulators are looking at the credit 
conversion process as a way for banks to get around prudent capital rules. Initial 
indications are that the Basel Committee, which is responsible for developing, among 
other things, capital rules for the conduct of banking activity globally, will seek not only 
to require a higher level of capital allocated to risk, but also to require the same level of 
capital allocation for off-balance sheet assets as on-balance sheet assets.  
 
Domestically, this same impulse is reflected in the various efforts to ensure that 
originators and securitizers retain “some skin in the game.” That is to say, regulators 
and rating agencies will assume that every package of chicken parts carries the same risk 
as a whole chicken, and Frank Perdue must retain some piece of each package of chicken 
he sells. This kind of remedy amounts to a tacit acknowledgement that regulatory bodies 
worldwide are incapable of preventing the kind of carelessness and myopia that 
poisoned the markets during the last several years. As such, we can agree that strong 
measures must be taken. There is no question that having skin in the game will 
significantly reduce the kinds of excesses the market engaged in. But there is also no 
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question that Frank Perdue would sell a lot less chicken if he had to keep a piece of 
everything he sold. There would be a lot less chicken, and what there was of it would 
cost a lot more. Clearly such measures can and must be crafted in both a creative and 
effective manner. The alternative will be to block low-income constituencies with good 
credit from the flow of capital.  
 
To be sure, it is unlikely that the credit conversion—or similar process that distinguishes 
between risk capital allocated to on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet assets—will be 
eliminated entirely. The logic of taking assets off-balance sheet in self-contained, 
transparent, sustainable vehicles is simply too compelling; the clarity and simplicity are 
not only profitable but also fundamental in facilitating the efficient flow of money. The 
big challenge that the CDFI sector needs to prepare for is the likelihood that the grant 
funding it must bring to the table to credit enhance whatever structure it creates will be 
forced to increase.   
 
The	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicle	  versus	  the	  Bond	  Decision	  
Notably, in this discussion of the process for accessing the capital markets, we find 
ourselves talking about the SPV (special-purpose vehicle)—as opposed to the asset sale 
or pledging—option. We are not addressing how accessing the capital markets might 
work by using the bond mechanism. In the following chapters, we show how the efforts 
the FIR teams initiated—the Mini-Fed, Capital Exchange, and Commercial Paper Co-
op—were effectively forced to go the SPV route. There are three reasons: 
 
• Working Capital. The proceeds of unsecured loans based on organizational credit 
risk are typically, if not always, used to support a wide range of organizational 
needs on a revolving basis. Thus, an SPV that functions on a flow basis, taking 
obligations and funding them as they arise, is preferable to a one-time sale of a 
fixed obligation. 
• Interest Rates. An SPV with a revolving set of assets and liabilities could obtain 
lower interest rates, assuming a normal yield curve. 
• Preparedness of the CDFI Field. The kinds of data and analytical disciplines that 
investors in fixed long-term obligations require are simply not available in the 




On this note, there is one final point. Even within the framework of a bank-supported 
transaction, the analytical perspective of the rating agencies holds considerable sway. 
This point is illustrated in the following excerpt from the Federal Reserve Supervisory 
Letter of March 30, 2005: 
 
The Securitization Capital Rule permits a banking organization with a qualifying 
internal risk rating system to use that system to apply the internal ratings 
approach to its unrated direct credit substitutes provided to ABCP programs that 
it sponsors by mapping its internal risk ratings to external ratings equivalents. 
The external credit rating equivalents are organized into three ratings categories: 
investment-grade credit risk, e.g., BBB– and above; high non-investment grade 
credit risk, e.g., BB+ through BB; and low non-investment grade credit risk, e.g., 
below BB–. The rating categories are used to determine the appropriate risk-
weight category or categories to which banking organizations should assign 
either the entire notional amount, or portions thereof, of their direct credit 
substitutes.40 
 
There is no doubt that the regulatory agencies, along with the capital markets as a 
whole, are presently stepping back from this extraordinary reliance on the rating 
agencies. The failure of the rating agencies to anticipate the magnitude and speed of the 
housing and credit market collapse has, appropriately, given everyone pause. How 
could the agencies not identify what variable rate and payment instruments (like 2/28 
Adjustable Rate Mortgages) could do to a credit score? What happens to these 
instruments when interest rates rise? Why is a rapid rate of asset growth the most 
reliable early indicator of failure? Or what happens to asset values when too much 
money is chasing them? The sudden, sweeping downgrades of highly rated assets 
during the past 24 months has only heightened the anxiety.  Yet the question arises: who 
else is in a position to opine? At present, no one. Thus, for CDFIs, the way to the capital 
markets and the wholesale side of the banks continues to be through the rating agencies.  
 
Standardization	  of	  Reporting	  and	  Assessment	  	  
 
In his 1999 report on how new private-sector lending technologies could threaten or 
benefit federal credit agencies, Thomas H. Stanton summarizes the threats:  
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The report concludes that information-based technologies create both 
opportunities and risks for federal credit programs. On the one hand, federal 
direct loan and loan guarantee programs can adopt some of the new technologies 
to improve their own credit administration. On the other hand, in today’s 
environment the government will lag the private sector in resources and general 
capacity to adopt new information-based systems. This increases the prospect for 
adverse selection as private lenders use credit scoring and loan scoring to serve 
an increasing number of creditworthy borrowers who formerly would have been 
borrowers in a federal program. In other words, the waves of new information-
based systems have created a sort of arms race. Federal credit programs cannot 
rest upon the status quo: they must adopt new technologies and approaches 
merely to protect their current positions.  
 
Stanton also summarizes the benefits that go right to the heart of the CDFI mission:  
 
Perhaps most important, [credit] scoring can permit federal credit agencies to 
develop new diagnostic and analytical capabilities. A federal credit agency could 
construct a financial early warning system to assure that adverse selection by 
private lenders was not creating unacceptable levels of financial risk in the new 
loans being originated for its programs. Another use would be to help federal 
agencies to monitor the performance of lenders with respect to the credit quality 
of loans that they originate or service for federal guarantee programs. For some 
programs, credit scoring can improve cost-effectiveness by helping to target 
underserved but creditworthy borrowers who are most likely to benefit from 
access to federal credit.41 
 
Credit scoring is not about how much a person or a business earns. It is not about how 
much a person owns or owes at any point in time. For better or worse, credit scoring 
attempts to evaluate the manner in which a consumer or a small business behaves with 
cash. The credit score not only provides an indication of a person’s resources. It also 
signals on how prudent he or she is with money over time.  
 
After years of building credibility as a predictive measure, credit scoring’s failure to 
anticipate default rates in the housing market has led many to question its validity. 




The	  Failure	  of	  Credit	  Scoring	  in	  the	  Housing	  Crisis	  
The credit score is based on an examination of the borrower’s past behavior for the 
purposes of establishing predictability; the more volatile the past performance, the lower 
the score, the more stable the performance, the greater the score. Stability is the key to 
predictability. However, in the interests of generating higher loan volume as well as 
protecting themselves from interest-rate risk, lenders developed loan products that 
would enable borrowers to appear capable of making payments on a mortgage. Lenders 
introduced novel structures, such as the 2/28s (2 years of a 30-year mortgage at a low 
rate, with the remaining 28 years at a yet-to-be-determined rate) and 3/27s, in which the 
borrower was exposed to a potentially higher payment within 24–36 months. Other 
novel structures included interest-only loans in which principal did not have to be paid, 
for a limited period; stated-income loans, in which the income was often a fiction; and 
Option ARMs, in which the principal would likely keep rising. These were just a few of 
the loan products that did the damage.  
 
The late Ned Gramlich, a former Federal Reserve Board Governor, described the growth 
of these novel instruments in the first few years of the new century, with the resulting 
explosion of subprime lending.42 Here was the essential problem: by contract, monthly 
payments under each of these loan structures were subject to an adjustment—possibly 
(and as it turned out, in fact) an unaffordable adjustment. By introducing an entirely 
unpredictable adjustment into a system based on predictability, lenders debased the 
value of the credit score. Essentially, they burned down their own house around them. 
This is not simply conjecture. In October 2008, for example, defaults (90-day 
delinquencies) on subprime fixed-rate loans were at 6.8 percent, while defaults on 
subprime ARMS (floating-rate loans, often with resets) were an astonishing 26.8 percent. 
The difference? The structure of the loans. As defaults rise, the divergence continues. 
 
Investor confidence in credit scoring is one of the chief victims of the collapse of the 
credit markets. It would be a tragedy, however, to abandon this mechanism. It would 
also likely be impossible. Credit scoring is a much more effective form of evaluating 
credit risk (as we shall discuss below) than the traditional combination of income and 
loan to value. It is also much less expensive to employ—so much less expensive that it 
was a key motive in the willingness of the conventional sector to bring money to low-
income constituencies during the past decade. Inevitably there are flaws and inequities 
in any scoring system. However, the combination of increased accuracy, lower cost, and 
greater inclusivity vis-à-vis traditional underwriting makes credit scoring a desirable 
technology for the community development as well as the conventional lender.  
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These views are likely controversial given the inequities experienced during the past 
decade as well as the failures of the last 24 to 36 months. We will not address the 
inequities here, but we will examine the failures. Before we do, however, we should look 
at several key developments in the evolution of credit analysis during the past 
generation. The perspective is anecdotal and from 30,000 feet, but an understanding of 
the financial underpinnings is crucial to the issue of access to capital going forward for 
both the CDFI constituencies and the CDFIs themselves.  
 
A	  View	  on	  the	  Evolution	  of	  Credit	  Analysis	  
Thirty years ago, the corporate banker operated on the notion that creditworthiness was 
based on the borrower’s capacity to repay debt based on income generation and, in the 
event of interruption of income, through the sale of assets in liquidation. The greater the 
net assets, the less one had to worry about the volatility of income. This view was a 
natural byproduct of the historical approach to lending: the lender was secured by the 
assets of the borrower. Because the corporate banker was typically lending to corporate 
borrowers on an unsecured basis, the value of net assets (equity) was particularly 
important. The level of net assets on the balance sheet was the corporate banker’s way of 
judging how much the assets would have to shrink in value before the bank lost money. 
By lending only to companies that had a high level of net assets relative to debt (that is, 
low leverage), the corporate banker had a shorthand way of assessing credit risk without 
having to study company assets, operations, management, or the company’s market in 
detail (although these were certainly encouraged as long as the loan production 
guidelines could be met).  
 
For the banks, all that changed in the mid-1980s with the advent of the leveraged buyout 
(LBO). We discussed the 1980s and LBOs earlier in this book when discussing how the 
trading function came to dominate the lending function in commercial banking, and 
how this change produced the first and biggest federal bailout of a financial institution 
prior to 2008. Let’s take one more look at this period in finance to show a positive 
product of the change: a significant improvement in the way that credit risk is analyzed. 
As we shall see, it is an absolutely critical step forward for CDFIs and the constituencies 
we serve.  
 
So let’s revisit Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham Lambert; Henry Kravis of Kohlberg, 
Kravis; and Roberts and others leaders of the leveraged buyout field. These figures, and 
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the others who worked in the field, adopted an analytical framework based on tracking 
and evaluating the strength of both past and forecasted cash flows. The deals these 
investment bankers made demonstrated convincingly that the manner in which assets 
generated cash flow—and the manner in which management configured these assets—
was a much better indicator of credit strength than the amount the corporation held in 
net assets. In other words, the strength of the credit was much more a function of how 
the corporation behaved as a going concern than how much could be captured in the 
event of the liquidation of assets.  
 
There was an ironclad logic to this breakthrough approach; when concentrating on cash 
flow, the new lender effectively had to address the manner in which all of the assets 
behaved, staff and management included. This contrasted with the old form of credit 
analysis, which, in focusing primarily on liquidation, addressed only a small fraction of 
the bank’s assets—the tiny fraction that goes bad and does not recover. The new lender 
focused on management and how management made decisions about the configuration 
and conversion of assets. From this point of view, the liquidation approach appeared 
positively lazy, as well as inaccurate. Under the circumstances, it was hard to see why 
anyone would see liquidation as a superior indicator to cash flow—assuming, of course, 
that the lender had the capacity to comprehend the behavior of management and all of 
the company assets.  
 
As discussed in the Chapter 1, a major consequence of moving away from the 
liquidation-based evaluation was that banks found themselves happily funding a much 
larger range of smaller, less wealthy companies, private as well as public. The increased 
volume and higher margins that could be assessed on these new borrowers justified the 
cost of the additional diligence associated with cash-flow analysis. A new loan-
syndication process made the cost easier to absorb. This enabled one bank (the lead 
bank) to perform the in-depth analytical work while the rest of the banks that 
participated in the syndicate relied (in varying degrees) on the lead bank’s work. 
However, this breakthrough had much greater implications: essentially the more 
detailed and accurate form of analysis leveled the playing field for the small guy.  
 
This leveling had a significant impact on the corporate sector in the mid-1980s, 
accelerating the earnings multiples associated with the purchase of corporate assets, 
boosting stock prices, and generally expanding economic activity. Essentially, the big 
leveraged buyout and private equity firms that were the chief beneficiaries of this new 
approach were established on the basis of democratizing credit in the corporate sector 
from 1982 to 1986. 
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To be sure, as with any new technology, things got out of hand. The dramatic departure 
from reliance on the balance sheet produced the kind of boom that produces busts—and 
bust the stock market did, in 1987. In simple terms, there was too much money chasing 
too few cash-generating assets and too few management teams with the capacity to 
optimize them. Many of the bonds issued to investors for financing leveraged buyouts of 
weaker businesses (called junk bonds)  defaulted, and overleveraged companies went 
under.43 As we noted in the Chapter 1, during the following two years, the bust also 
played a role in the collapse of the savings and loan industry. Many savings and loans, 
impressed with the apparent accuracy and predictability of the new cash flow analytics 
(and their high returns), had invested in junk bonds. They paid the price, and so did the 
U.S. taxpayer: $300 billion.44 
 
Yet here is the remarkable fact: the banks never went back to lending decisions based 
primarily on equity and the strength of the balance sheet. They stayed with cash-flow 
analytics—trying to fathom the capacity of management and the viability of the 
company by tracking the sources and uses of cash. Following the recession of the early 
1990s, the banks redoubled their efforts to leverage assets based on predictable flows 
from cash-generating assets and management capability, not only in leveraged buyouts 
and private equity, but now also in the capital markets, where new financing vehicles 
were formed and new forms of assets were created and securitized. Indeed, what is 
referred to as “structured finance” is simply prioritizing a series of cash streams to be 
paid to various classes of investors (together with various legal rights), based on the 
analysis and predictability of the flows from properly managed cash-generating assets.  
 
Cash	  Flow	  Analysis	  Goes	  Retail	  
During the past 15 years, we have seen a similar development in housing and small 
business finance. Over this period, lenders came to view the credit score—which focused 
on the homebuyer’s or entrepreneur’s capacity and willingness to pay—as an excellent 
indicator of credit quality. This preference for credit scores (over loan to value, equity, or 
leverage) was evident in several conventional mortgage programs. A borrower with a 
high credit score and high loan-to-value ratio (higher leverage) attained a lower interest 
rate than a borrower with a lower credit score and lower loan to value. This would have 
stunned a traditional banker.  
 
77	  
Not surprisingly, the immediate consequences for mortgage and small business lenders 
were the same as for corporate bankers in the 1980s. Once they moved away from a 
focus on the borrower’s balance sheet and the minimum amount of equity the borrower 
had to maintain, they opened up lending to a vast new market of lower-income 
households and entrepreneurs with limited cash or equity. As such, the credit score— 
the analytical methodology that evaluates how the borrower behaves with cash—
functionally democratized credit in the home mortgage and small business markets the 
same way that cash-flow analysis democratized credit for corporations in the 1980s.  
 
There was another facet to credit scoring that also prompted the expansion of credit in 
residential lending: cost. Unlike cash-flow analysis for corporations, which required 
increased due diligence and analytical discipline, credit scoring was automated and 
actually reduced costs for the lenders. With credit scoring, lenders were able to reduce 
the cost of origination, underwriting, and other lending functions by 60, 70, 80, or 90 
percent. One major lender said it was able to reduce operating costs in its origination 
and underwriting activity by 97 percent. Because operating costs can be the highest 
expense component for a lender in the conventional sector (depending on the interest 
rate level), this transition to credit scoring opened up tremendous space on the operating 
statement for expansion. The lender could reduce interest rates, take more credit risk, or 
do both. And lenders did. When combined with up-front fees, low short-term interest 
rates, and an aggressive asset-liability mismatch, the return on investment on a credit 
scored portfolio could become simply astonishing. (The Commercial Paper Co-op 
demonstrated how quickly a return for the participating banks could escalate.) 
 
Of course, as had happened with the LBOs in the 1980s, the reliance on credit scores got 
out of hand in the first few years of the new century. In addition to the risk of funding 
long-term assets with short-term liabilities (that is, aggressive asset-liability 
management; see below) and securitizing the assets in pools based on rigid contracts 
that inhibited remediation, the floating rate mortgages effectively and efficiently 
sabotaged the fundamental underpinnings of the whole system of borrower cash-flow-
based assessment. When the lenders burned down their own house, taking the credit 
score discipline with them, they took out the gatekeepers, too.  
 
Risk assessment, largely the bailiwick of the rating agencies, but also in theory of 
originators and investors, generally tests assets in the context of the worst possible 
scenarios (such as the Great Depression). With the benefit of hindsight, we can conclude 
that the tests administered on the assets that went into securitized pools did not include 
such bigger-picture adversities as a boom-bust in real estate prices, a rise in short-term 
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interest rates and gas prices, or mandated increases in credit card principal payments. 
Nor did they not combine these considerations with such technical factors as the impact 
of ARMs and the contractual ARM resets on borrower behavior. Alternatively, we could 
conclude that these tests combined all these big-picture and technical factors but lenders 
failed to properly weight the adverse results in the final assessment of risk. One way or 
another, faith in the credit score as a sound predictive indicator of credit risk has been 
seriously compromised.  
 
With the collapse of the housing market, banks, GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, all returned to the notion of loan-to-value as a principal guide to credit risk, along 
with the level of delinquent payments. Effectively, credit scoring took a back seat. 
However, there was a problem with this effort to return to the balance sheet: housing 
prices, always difficult to accurately appraise, were falling faster than lender 
expectations, which meant that the focus on loan-to-value only served to accelerate the 
collapse of liquidity and prices. The ongoing volume of foreclosures has become a 
testament not only to the paralysis of securitization, but also to the inability of the banks, 
GSEs, and agencies (the FDIC excepted) to comprehend one salient fact: in a down 
market, the only knowable value of a single-family residence is either the amount the 
owner has the capacity and willingness to pay, or the price that a known buyer is willing 
to pay, less the cost of foreclosure. The rest is simply expensive guesswork.45 
 
The primacy of cash-flow analytics and the borrower’s behavior with cash will return as 
the prime indicator of credit risk. The reason is simple: whether made by a homeowner 
or a corporate CEO, decisions are made on the basis of cash. Very few people, for 
example, can instantly tell you how much their house is worth or even how much debt 
they have on it. However, almost everyone knows the exact amount of their mortgage 
payment. The same goes for companies. The balance sheet is a remarkable abstraction 
and has great uses, but only in the context of the operating statement and cash flow. The 
structure of the asset that generates it and how the asset is managed comes first. 
Everyone—except those in the process of liquidation or sale—manages for cash. Hence, 
it makes sense to use cash-flow methodologies for evaluating the borrower’s capacity or 
willingness to pay, whether it is a consumer or the management of an organization. 
 
For the community development sector, there is an additional imperative to focus on 
cash-flow analysis. Balance sheet methodology, with its emphasis on equity in 
liquidation, militates against the company or individual who has less wealth. To the 
extent that the community development sector continues to focus its attention on those 
traditional “bias-toward-wealth” balance sheet guideposts, it impedes its mission; the 
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sector ends up raising barriers for itself and its constituents, and occasionally raising 
them higher than conventional lenders do. Perversely, CDFIs end up not capturing—or 
undervaluing—the quality of its managers and how its constituents perform as 
borrowers. So long as the gap persists between the borrower’s performance and the 
interpretation of the same, accurate credit analysis is difficult, and access to capital—
particularly for the low-wealth entity—is compromised.  
 
The reason this discussion is so important is not that we are trying to make the case for 
credit scoring CDFI borrowers, or eschewing the impediments that balance sheet 
analysis erects for those with less income or wealth. The reason this is important is that 
CDFIs must master cash flow analysis if they wish to obtain financing from the capital 
markets and the wholesale side of the banks. The rating agencies will not be looking just 
to the performance of CDFI loan portfolios or to the net assets on the CDFI balance 
sheet. They will be seeking to establish the quality of CDFI management, making the 
right decisions about how to pursue the mission, and establishing consistency in the 
handling of cash and other resources. This kind of analysis will require not only a 
different analytical framework, but also a more detailed set of financial data and more 
accurate and complete financial reporting. These challenges will be taken up in Chapters 




On the subject of managing risk, there are two areas in particular that pertain to both the 
needs of CDFIs and the recent failures in securitization: diversification of risk, and asset-
liability management. We examine how mismanagement of these helped fuel the current 
housing and credit crises, how CDFIs can benefit from both, and why it is important to 
bring the tools back.  
 
The	  Benefits	  of	  Risk	  Diversification	  	  
Securitization helps diversify risk by providing the investor limited exposure to a 
security that is backed by a wide range of cash streams and sources of cash. With 
securitization, the investor’s dollar can fund a much wider range of readily assessable 
asset classes with diverse geographies, maturities, rates, and credit risks. At the same 
time, by assembling large numbers of comparable assets into pools, the process of 
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securitization produces transactions that diversify risk by expanding the number of 
obligors; that is, sources of repayment. This expansion of size also serves to reduce the 
transaction cost per dollar of funds raised. Another benefit of this form of diversification 
is its relative transparency.  Although there are a many different obligors, the assets 
backing the security are similar and easy to assess, measure, and monitor. In addition, 
the pooled assets are effectively “quarantined”; because they are segregated into a 
separate pool, they are free of the influences that could cause them to perform 
differently, for example, if they were competing for space on a bank balance sheet. In 
short, the investor can put all of his or her “eggs” in a number of “baskets” all in the 
same transaction, and simultaneously reduce the likelihood of a material loss.  
 
Together, these benefits allow for a lower yield, some portion of which can pass on to 
the borrower in the form of a lower interest rate. Reducing the cost to the borrower is, of 
course, one of the chief objectives of the CDFI mission.  
 
All the following features are essential to CDFIs in their efforts to access the capital 
markets. 
 
• Range of assets. CDFIs make loans for a wide variety of community development 
purposes, including construction, home purchase, home rehab, small business, 
microloans, charter schools, and other community facilities. Combining these 
types of assets into discreet securities by asset class can facilitate the collaborative 
effort that CDFIs need to aggregate the data, analytics, and assets for capital 
markets access.  
• Size. As noted previously, one of the chief objectives of the CDFI field is to gain 
access to a lot more money. Very few CDFIs are individually large enough to 
seek funding from the capital markets at a scale that makes economic sense. 
Developing a securitization among a group of CDFIs is the only way to do so, 
and securitization is a vehicle designed specifically for this purpose. 
• Cost. The cost for a CDFI to “go it alone” is prohibitive even when the market is 
functioning well. A collective effort, which the securitization process facilitates, 
can substantially eliminate this an impediment.   
• Comparability of assets. Because CDFIs and the loans they originate are largely 
unfamiliar to the rating agencies as well as the investing public, the process of 
isolating them by asset class for the purposes of simplification and transparency 
is an imperative.  
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• Protection of the assets. At present, CDFI assets are mostly on CDFI balance sheets, 
and CDFI debt is mostly on bank balance sheets. By taking these off of those 
balance sheets and putting them in discreet securities designed specifically to 
hold them, the investor does not have to be concerned about other factors that 
affect CDFIs and banks.  
• Reducing the cost to the borrower. This is one of the chief objectives of the CDFI 
mission, which securitization can accomplish.  
 
In short, securitization remains an ideal mechanism for enabling CDFIs to achieve their 
funding objectives, and hence their ability to deliver to their mission. 
 
From	  Diversification	  to	  Disposal	  of	  Risk	  
What led to the current crisis and the negative view of securitization had little to do with 
the processes and benefits listed above. The key flaw in securitization vehicles was that 
originators had every incentive to generate volume and no incentive to assure quality. 
Because they had “no skin in the game,” they ended up, as anyone with the same 
mandate would, originating to the level of available investor cash. The investors had no 
incentive to assure quality, either, as they assumed the rating agencies had ensured 
quality. As we know, the rating agencies missed some things. Robert Shiller describes 
the pressures on rating agencies that encouraged them to miss what could happen. 
 
The rating agencies that pass judgment on securitized mortgages persisted in 
giving AAA ratings to mortgage securities that ultimately were vulnerable 
because they too believed that there would be no bursting of the bubble. Even 
if they did harbor some doubts about the continuation of the boom, they were 
not about to take the drastic step of cutting ratings on securitized mortgage 
products on the basis of the theory, not widely held, that home prices might 
actually fall. That would have been an unusually courageous step—and one 
that was all too easily postponed in favor of other business decisions that were 
easier to make, until it was too late.46 
 
In addition, the fact that infinitesimal portions of the projected cash streams from these 
securitized assets were fanned out to the marketplace in swarms of opaque and rigidly 
framed securities made true risk management impossible. When performance 
deteriorated, it became difficult to find, let alone value, all the parts.  
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Can adjustments be made to the securitization process to restrict, if not prevent, these 
kinds of failures? Yes, and adjustments will be made. Again, the securitization process is 
too logical, too efficient, and too profitable to be relegated to the waste bin. When the 
markets stabilize, securitization in these kinds of assets will also revive. Although 
the same immediate returns may not be achievable, that may very possibly be a good 
thing for all, given the recent abuses.  
 
Asset-­‐Liability	  Management	  
Another form of risk management also played a role in the collapse of securitization: 
aggressive asset-liability operations. Diamond and Rajan describe these risks as follows: 
 
With global savings pouring in, and with the Federal Reserve emphasizing 
its willingness to pump in liquidity and cut interest rates dramatically in case 
of a sharp downturn (the so-called “Greenspan Put”), it is not surprising that 
banks were willing to take illiquidity risk. The more general point is that in 
good times, short-term debt seems relatively cheap compared to long-term 
capital and the costs of illiquidity seem remote. Markets favor a bank capital 
structure that is heavy on short-term leverage. In bad times, though, the costs 
of illiquidity seem to be more salient, while risk-averse (and burnt) bankers 
are unlikely to take on excessive risk. The markets then encourage a capital 
structure that is heavy on capital.47 
 
 
The traditional approach to asset-liability management is simply stated: the average 
term of one’s liabilities should match the average term of one’s assets. It is a conservative 
approach to funding one’s assets and operations. Following this policy reduces interest-
rate risk and, all things being equal, generally ensures adequate cash for debt 
repayment. Most, if not all, CDFIs still adhere to this policy. Most, if not all, 
conventional institutions do not, and have not for decades. The same is true of most, if 
not all, large corporations. Many special-purpose vehicles did not follow the traditional 
approach either, as it happens, and with devastating results.  
 
There are a number of reasons for deviating from a conservative approach to an asset-
liability mix, but perhaps the most obvious and compelling is what is known as the yield 
curve. Over time, short-term interest rates have tended to be lower than long-term 
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interest rates. On June 30, 2009, for example, the federal funds rate was at 0.17 percent, 
30-day commercial paper was 0.19 percent, 30-day LIBOR was 0.31 percent, 10-year 
Treasury bonds were 3.63 percent, and 20-year Treasury bond rates were 4.37 percent.48 
The yield curve would refer to the upward swing of the line that connects, for example, 
the overnight federal funds rate, the one-month interest rate, the 10-year Treasury rate, 
and finally the 20-year Treasury rate. As we enter 2010, the upward swing in the yield 
curve remains. The reason that the yield curve exists is that investors generally want to 
be compensated more for taking a longer-term, less-certain risk than for taking a shorter-
term, more visible risk.  
 
There is also a distinction between a “steep” yield curve and a “flat” yield curve. Steep 
yield curves occur when the interest rates rise dramatically the farther out in time. Flat 
yield curves occur when there is very little difference between short-term rates and long-
term rates. However, the yield curve does not always curve upward. Sometimes it is 
“inverted” and short-term rates exceed long-term rates. This typically occurs in times of 
market crisis (as we saw in 2000–2001 and again in 2007–2008) when conditions in the 
short-term are considered more distressing than what is expected over the longer term.  
 
By contrast, in times of relative stability, pressure is on to take advantage of the rising 
yield curve. During these periods, firms can fund their long-term assets with lower-cost 
short-term funds and can increase, sometimes dramatically, the profits they generate. 
All banks, GSEs, and most corporations engage in this kind of asset-liability mismatch in 
the normal course of business and use a range of tools (including derivatives) to protect 
their interest rate position from adverse interest rate moves in the market. As noted 
above, CDFIs, by and large, do not engage in this kind of risk taking. They prefer instead 
to match the term of their liabilities with the term of assets and lock in the rates 
accordingly. Thus, effectively, while conventional lenders take advantage of the low 
short-term interest rates to fund their longer-term assets, CDFIs do not—whether there 
is a steep yield curve or not. Hence, CDFIs are at a distinct cost of funds disadvantage—
until market instability leads to a falling or flat yield curve. This difference in policy 
explains to a large degree why, during the subprime boom, conventional lenders paying 
market rates on their liabilities could lend at lower rates than CDFIs, despite the low cost 
of the CDFI-sourced social investments and the high cost of conventional equity. 
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The	  Lure	  of	  an	  Aggressive	  Asset-­‐Liability	  Policy	  
Let’s briefly examine how the use of an aggressive asset-liability policy first profited and 
then bankrupted the conventional lenders who used it.  Most special-purpose vehicles 
were funded by commercial paper. Commercial paper is a form of short-term borrowing 
(an unsecured promissory note) used by many corporations to finance a wide range of 
assets with diverse maturities and varying levels of risk. Assets financed include credit 
card debt, used car loans, home mortgages, and small business loans. Although the 
maximum maturity of commercial paper is 270 days, most commercial paper issuers, 
including the SPVs, roll over their notes at maturity, effectively borrowing long-term at 
short-term rates. They are able to do this because the combination of liquidity and credit 
enhancement from banks and other large financial institutions protect the commercial 
paper investor from any losses due to the inherent asset-liability mismatch. Commercial 
paper is also exempt from SEC registration, which keeps the issuance costs low. For 
most institutions, particularly in the financial sector, commercial paper provides the 
least expensive form of (non-deposit) financing over time. (See Appendix A for a fuller 
discussion.) 
 
The rating agencies were well aware of the risk of the asset-liability mismatch. One of 
the key criteria they used for establishing ratings of SPVs was in fact the extent to which 
the term of the liabilities matched the term of the assets. For an SPV using commercial 
paper to fund short-term assets, the rating was higher; for an SPV funding longer-term 
assets, the rating was lower. The criteria were sensitive to the range of issues: longer-
term assets being held for resale, for example, were rated higher than those held in the 
SPV but lower than short-term assets of the same asset class. Higher or lower, the 
lenders and securitizers of home mortgages, business loans, credit cards, car loans, and 
other asset classes chose commercial paper funding when they saw the yield curve 
going their way.  
 
Let’s take another look Figure 2.1 from Chapter 2. The figure compares LIBOR and 
commercial paper rates with 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds. The Treasuries are used 
because the average life of a mortgage is 7 to 9 years; the 10-year Treasury bond rate is a 
fairly decent indicator of where a lender’s cost will be if he or she wishes to fund the 
loans (not including the inevitable spread over the Treasury rate that would be charged). 
 
GW
There are two relevant indicators here. First, the short-term rates (LIBOR and Financial 
Commercial Paper) are in the same basic 4.5–6.5 percent bracket with 10-year Treasury 
bonds from the end of 1997 through the first quarter of 2001. Beginning in late 2001 
(following 9/11), short-term rates dropped precipitously relative to the 10-year Treasury 
bond. Suddenly, the yield curve becomes extraordinarily steep, and the advantage of 
using short-term funding balloons from a few basis points to more than 300. In a 
business where a 50-basis-point spread over cost of funds is pretty nice and 100 basis 
points is a grand slam, 300 basis points is breathtaking. Needless to say, there were a lot 
of takers.  
 
Where are the CDFIs in all of this? On the sidelines with their match-funded fixed-rate 
loan products, unable to compete with conventional rates. 
 
Not that the special-purpose vehicles were taking as much interest-rate risk as might be 
gathered from the chart. Indeed, they often passed along the benefits of the low short-
term cost of funds to the borrowers in the form of front-end teaser rates with scheduled 
adjustments based on LIBOR, prime, or other cost of funds indices. Effectively, the 
lenders, passed the interest rate risk—that is, the risk that short-term rates would rise—
to the borrower through the SPVs. This also made it easier to line up the requisite 
liquidity and credit enhancements from the banks. If the SPV were to fail or the 
commercial paper market dry up, the supporting banks would be forced take all the 
loans of the SPV back on their own balance sheets. The banks wanted to make sure that, 
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should they be forced to do this, the loans would carry rates that were compatible with 
their floating rate cost of funds (such as LIBOR and CDs). 
 
As the figure shows, the window of opportunity for the aggressive asset/liability 
manager began to close in late 2004. By the end of 2005, the short-term rates were 
equivalent to 10-year Treasury bonds, 300 to 400 basis points over where they had been 
in the previous years. This produced a virtually flat yield curve. This radical increase in 
short-term rates did not force the SPVs to rethink their aggressive approach to asset-
liability management because they were passing the increased costs to the borrowers 
through rate resets. Also, the long-term rates were holding steady. Thus, the SPVs could 
continue to buy loans, hold them for resale, and fund them with commercial paper, their 
interest rates effectively protected.  
 
Having said that, the rise in short-term rates did, in fact, cause the SPVs to make changes 
to their strategies. Once the short-term rates neared the level of the long-term rates, the 
SPVs saw their gross margins decline; instead of looking at 300 basis points, they might 
be looking at 75. Because participating institutions had, by 2004, established fairly 
expensive platforms to capture market activity and because these platforms had to be 
supported, many of the participating institutions were left with only one solution: “to 
make it up on volume”; that is, do whatever was necessary to make and sell more loans. 
Of course, as in any boom, there are only so many quality assets to go around. After the 
quality assets are accounted for, new assets must be found. If they cannot be found, they 
must be created. When professionals in the business of trading create assets, the quality 
of the asset declines in a process that economists call “diminishing returns.” Historically 
and inevitably.  
 
The one overlooked item in this process: the impact of this yield play on the borrowers. 
As discussed above, several other factors were squeezing borrowers in 2005, but the 
300–400 basis point rise in short-term rates was a killer. The increase hit the borrower in 
two ways:  
 
• It increased the borrower’s monthly payment, and  
• It reduced the value of the borrower’s house, making it harder to refinance 
(There is an inverse relationship between interest rates and house prices. 
Generally speaking, the higher interest rates go, the lower the housing price 
drops because of the amount of debt that is typically involved in the purchase of 
a house.)  
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Because for many, cash-out refinancing had been the method of choice for covering 
expenses from 2000 to 2005, in 2006, engineering a successful cash-out refinancing had 
become more difficult. Moreover, other events, such as rising gas prices and less 
generous credit card conditions, coincided with the rise in short-term interest rates that 
would have a material negative impact on the borrower’s ability to pay. This wreaked 
havoc not only with the debt-to-income ratios that lenders had traditionally relied on, 
but also on credit scores. Defaults began to rise and investors got nervous. Figure 2.1 
(above) shows what happened next.   
 
At the start of 2006, an inverted yield curve emerges as investors start worrying more 
about what will happen tomorrow than what will happen five years from now. There it 
is! Case IV is unfolding before our eyes: the commercial paper market collapses as 
investors head for the exits. 
 
Behind this inverted yield curve, we can see the relentless rise of the one threat the SPVs 
and supporting banks were entirely unprepared for—loss of investor confidence and 
virtual abandonment of the market. We can also see an equally troubling feature—the 
loss of confidence in the banks themselves as reflected in the separation of LIBOR and 
commercial paper rates during 2008. This separation was a function not only of the loss 
of confidence in the banks, but also a loss of confidence in the LIBOR index itself, as the 
integrity of the banks’ reporting of their actual costs was called into question. Michael 
MacKenzie of the Financial Times puts it like this: 
 
At the heart of the elevation in LIBOR are concerns over the health of bank 
balance sheets, where weakness can spill over to the broader economy because it 
limits the availability of credit to companies and consumers. ... Another issue for 
LIBOR was raised this summer. Some analysts said the problems with LIBOR 
reflected the way the measure was being calculated ... Initially, there was some 
confusion that LIBOR itself was the problem, with talk of the rate being 
manipulated and not representative of the true cost of borrowing. Quick fixes are 
now no longer part of the discussion. 
 
As a result: 
 
The three-month dollar London interbank offered rate reached 2.81 percent, a 
level not seen since mid-June. LIBOR remains particularly elevated when 
compared with the official overnight rate—the federal funds rate—of 2 percent. 
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The difference of 81 basis points between LIBOR and the Fed funds rate 
compares with an average spread of about 12 basis points that prevailed before 
the onset of the credit squeeze last year. 49 
 
In the end, no reasonable amount of interest rate protection could help the institutions 
(and the SPVs) that engaged in aggressive asset-liability management when investors 
abandoned the sector as a whole. If investors did not step up to fund the asset when the 
notes matured after 30, 60, or 90 days, rate protection did not mean very much. There 
simply was not any cash available. Aggressive asset-liability management was not the 
cause of the crisis, but it certainly was a contributing factor in at least two key respects: 
the SPV framework required the passing along of increased interest rates to the 
borrowers, which compromised their ability to pay and eroded the quality of the 
underlying assets, and the collapse of the commercial paper market forced longer-term 
assets back on the balance sheets of the supporting banks. This occurred at exactly the 
same time that the banks were already worrying about lack of capital due to the losses 
they were starting to take on the loans they already had on their balance sheets.   
 
Meanwhile, CDFIs remained on the sidelines with their little buckets of capital. The 
concern was not that they were going to be swamped by new low-income homebuyers 
unable to obtain capital from anyone else. Instead, the concern was that they now would 
have to reserve against the likelihood of increased defaults, the product of the weakened 
economy and the credit crisis in the conventional sector. On top of which, CDFIs would 
have to fight for survival at a distinct disadvantage to other participants in the market.  
 
As noted, LIBOR is the index used for lending to the best CDFIs. In 2008, as the federal 
government stepped in to lower the federal funds rate and to support the commercial 
paper market, LIBOR continued at a high spread over alternative borrowing rates. In 
2010, as the banks stabilized, the differential returned more or less to the traditional 
level, to about 15 to 20 basis points above federal funds and commercial paper. 
 
For those CDFIs that lack access to the higher-quality LIBOR pricing—and are, instead, 
borrowing at the prime rate—the challenge is even greater. As we can see from Figure 
2.1, the prime rate, which is traditionally based on the 90-day certificate of deposit, has 
spent the bulk of the past two decades 100 basis points or so above the 10-year Treasury 
bond rate, far and away more expensive than either the LIBOR or commercial paper 
options. This may explain why many CDFIs are not familiar with the opportunity that a 
steep yield curve can offer.  
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We might step back for a moment and wonder why these interest rate differentials are 
so important to CDFIs. After all, CDFIs are not as leveraged as brokers or banks, so the 
movement of rates has less impact. Moreover, the big costs at a CDFI tend to be 
operating expenses, not interest expenses. This is a question worthy of an answer. For 
CDFIs that are small and wish to remain so, or that have more than adequate funding 
from social investors and foundations, there is little reason to get exercised about 
borrowing at 50-100 basis points more than others in the market. On the other hand, as a 
group, CDFIs are keenly aware of the slightest differences in the loan costs they make to 
their constituents; as a matter of principle they do their best to minimize those costs in 
the effort to ensure a successful borrower. Why they would not apply the same diligence 
in borrowing for themselves is a good question, particularly given that the benefits of 
lower-cost funds can be passed along to their borrowers.  
 
When	  Travel	  Resumes	  
 
In a contribution to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s 2009 assessment of the 
impact of the economic crisis on community development, Nancy Andrews made the 
following points:  
 
From a series of 11 interviews with leading CDFIs across the country, we find that 
the economic crisis has created the following conditions for CDFIs: 
 
• Heightened risk in portfolios. The risk is evident in delinquency rates, 
extensions of loans, or loss reserves set-asides. 
 
• The need for significant patience among community development partners. 
More time is needed for projects to come together, and lender patience is now 
crucial for success in struggling neighborhoods. 
 
• Heightened liquidity problems. CDFI liquidity is strained. Many leaders are 
worried about the availability of new capital, as well as capital renewals from 
their investors, both private financial institutions and philanthropic partners.  
 
• Severely strained housing portfolios. For-sale housing or early-stage loans 
with Low Income Housing Tax Credits as part of the project financing plan 
are particularly hard hit. 
 
• Increasingly fragile borrowers. The future strength of CDFIs is bound to the 
future of its customers, and the trends are negative. ...50 
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An old adage says that the low-income community is the last to benefit from an upswing 
and the first to get hurt in a downswing. Certain low-income communities served by 
CDFIs (parts of Appalachia, for example) never got to the downswing because they were 
too late for the upswing. Regardless of how disciplined and prudent, CDFIs must deal 
with the greatest distress when the markets crash, a level of distress that necessarily 
affects their own condition and prospects. Because the fortunes of the primary sources of 
CDFI funding generally flow with the economy, CDFIs tend to have fewer resources just 
when resources are needed the most (the revolving loan fund story all over again!). This 
crisis comes as a reminder that CDFIs will be at the mercy of the markets even when 
they have virtually no access to them. And by not having access, they absorb the full 
force of the downside while enjoying not a bit of the upside. Gaining access to the 
markets when the markets return to normal can change that habit. 
 
Clearly, the markets have not yet returned to normal. At the annual American Securitization 
Forum conference in February 2009, while the markets were still paralyzed as a result of the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the findings seemed grim. Monoline insurers, issuers of asset-
backed commercial paper, issuers of mortgage-backed securities, issuers of covered bonds, 
banks, rating agencies, and, of course, investors all reported entire sectors as  “dead,” “getting 
worse,” or “reorienting their focus.” Some mechanisms would not be coming back ever, 
including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) of subordinate tranches of mortgage-backed 
securities and credit default swaps on CDOs of subordinated tranches of mortgage-backed 
securities. It was unlikely there would be any AAA/Aaa-rated tranches on any new securitized 
mortgage assets any time soon. Intervention by the federal government would be the only way 
to get the sectors—and the market as a whole—moving again, and everyone was looking for 
clarity on what form the intervention would likely take. There was also the suspicion that, 
whatever the intervention, it was likely to be performed with blunt instruments.  
 
One year later, at the American Securitization Forum conference in February 2010, most of the 
players were still in the room, and while not thriving, there was hope that growth was around 
the corner. The need was no longer for “life-support,” but rather for clarity on the big question: 
How much skin in the game is needed and what will it look like? 
 
Markets, inevitably, decline after a rise, and rise after a decline. Yet borrower needs remain, no 
matter what, and so does the investor cash. Both market forces and government assistance are 
recalibrating the mechanisms that bring the two together in the most efficient and effective 
manner. These mechanisms will, necessarily, be improved by the next cycle. The CDFI sector 
must focus on the elements of the capital markets generally and the securitization mechanisms 
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specifically so that it does not miss the bus the next time around. To parse which functions and 
mechanisms CDFIs will need, let’s revisit the three imperatives for the FIR team’s mission: 
• Place CDFI debt with the capital markets 
• Standardize CDFI financial reporting and analysis  
• Improve CDFI risk management  
 
At present, the prospects for each appear as follows. 
Placing	  Debt	  with	  the	  Capital	  Markets	  
Richard Green, in a Federal Reserve Board journal, put it this way: 
 
For investors to be comfortable with something new and unusual, they would 
need to have confidence in the evaluation of a rating agency. It is an 
understatement to say that the investment community lacks that confidence at 
the moment. Moreover, the recent subprime crisis produces an interesting 
question: can investors a long distance away from a deal invest in heterogeneous 
products? Banks, who would have a better ability to evaluate an unusual deal, 
would have every reason to finance those that they find better than average 
while passing on those that they find worse than average. This means that the 
only deals that would be left for the securities markets would be those with 
difficult-to-measure unfavorable characteristics.51 
 
Early indications appear to confirm the suspicion that federal intervention will involve blunt 
instruments in at least one “vital organ” of the market: minimum requirements for regulatory 
capital at the banks. Papers by the Bank of International Settlements indicate two critical 
changes that may be forthcoming: 
• Regulatory capital. Resecuritized assets like asset-backed securities and CDOs will 
see a significant increase of the capital that must be maintained against them.52 
• Market risk rule. Assets in the “trading book” will be treated the same as assets 
held in the “banking book” for the purposes of allocating capital.53 
 
Although at this writing, these proposals are in the early forms, they are in the process 
of being adopted internationally. Thus, some form of these may be well on the way to 
being formally adopted in the United States. Absent the creation of an alternative source 
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of credit enhancement or liquidity support—that is, absent a source other than regulated 
depositories—restrictions of this magnitude could effectively end securitization 
altogether. The reason: there would be no financial incentive for banks to move the 
assets off their balance sheet. If capital requirements for off-balance-sheet assets are the 
same as for assets on the balance sheet, then the bank effectively must earn the same 
return on each set of assets. To do this, they must substantially raise the fees they charge 
for the credit enhancement and liquidity facilities, which would greatly reduce their 
attraction to the investor and the borrower. Thus, although all the advantages of the off-
balance sheet securitization would remain for borrower and investor alike, the higher 
cost occasioned by tighter capital requirements could effectively close down the option. 
It might be easier and cheaper to borrow straight from the bank.  
 
In short, returning to the Frank Perdue analogy of securitizing chickens—we return to 
buying the whole chicken. The underlying presumption of restriction is that the market 
is simply incapable of slicing, dicing, and distributing chicken parts properly, or as 
suggested above, the regulatory agencies are tacitly admitting their incapacity to ensure 
that no tainted chicken parts are distributed in the future. If the latter, then it would 
appear that regulatory authorities feel more comfortable regulating whole chickens, 
though indeed some of the whole chickens—the big banks—did not perform well in the 
run-up to the crisis.  One way or another, the process is being blamed rather than the 
tainted chicken. 
 
Slated for later this year (2010), the implementation of the Basel “blunt instrument” rules 
would not necessarily have an immediate impact. At present, the banks are generally in 
no position to ramp up securitization activity in any event. Nor will they have room on 
the balance sheets until such time as the impaired assets are resolved and the capital 
ratios stabilized. By all appearances, this could take several years. Is this a message to 
the CDFI sector, if not the market as a whole? Perhaps the banks are not the right 
institutions to provide the kinds of credit and liquidity support that the securitized 
bonds and SPVs require. Maybe there is simply too much baggage at this point to return 
to where they were two, four, or even ten years ago with securitization. Maybe the right 
way to go for CDFIs is a new monoline insurer with federal liquidity support, or a GSE 
run as a “public utility” expressly to ensure that the risks in the credit enhancements and 
liquidity supports are properly sized, diversified, backed, and otherwise prudently 
managed. Maybe CDFIs get their chicken thighs, breasts, wings, and drumsticks sliced, 
diced, and distributed by another vendor.  
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It would be unfortunate for the CDFI field, however, if it bypassed the banks on the way 
back to a healthy securitization business; at present, they are the only capital market 
players with a comprehensive and compelling understanding of CDFI performance and 
the collective data to support CDFIs’ claims of low credit risk. It is a body of knowledge 
at least a quarter century in the making. CDFIs have a vested interest in enabling the 
banks to get back into securitization to capitalize on this knowledge through the kinds of 
risk structuring outlined, for example, in the Commercial Paper Co-op.  
 
The need for securitization is not going away. CDFIs, small, dispersed, and variable as 
they are, will need aggregation, structured finance, and sophisticated distribution. The 
CDFIs’ only alternative to securitization is going to the market directly without the 
benefit of credit support from the banks. It will be a long time before this happens, for 
two reasons: the data is insufficient on the performance of unsecured obligations based 
on CDFI organizational credit risk, and the rating agencies have no platform for 
evaluating it. Hence, the extent to which the Basel Committee recommendations are 
implemented will have a significant impact on whether the CDFI field can proceed to 
the capital markets—or alternatively remain on the bank balance sheets with the higher 
costs, lower flexibility, and everything else that entails.  
 
Standardizing	  CDFI	  Financial	  Reporting	  and	  Analysis	  
 
The principal risk with which rating agencies are concerned is impairment or 
interruption of cash flows. Such impairment or interruption may, depending on 
the structure of the transaction, cause liquidity risks (if cash flows are not 
sufficient to cover debt service on the securities on a timely basis) or losses (if 
cash flows are not sufficient to retire the securities).54 
 
Notwithstanding the flaws that the present crisis has revealed, credit scoring—and, in a 
greater sense, cash-flow analysis—is a genie that simply cannot be put back into the 
bottle. One of the primary themes at the American Securitization Forum conference was 
the need to rely less on the rating agencies for assessment of risk. This in effect elevated 
the importance of transparency, specifically comprehensive data collection, detailed 
analysis, predictability under a wide range of stresses, and disclosure of risk. 
Representatives of issuer, investor, and regulatory entities—as well as the rating 
agencies—all promoted this theme. Far from throwing credit scoring out the window, 
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they responded to this crisis with an even greater commitment to the importance of 
evaluating the borrower’s behavior with cash—that is, credit scoring.  
 
Some of the ways in which this commitment to credit scoring is being demonstrated by the 
various industry participants include:  
 
• Expanding the data fields on a borrower’s behavior with cash 
• Distinguishing how individual borrowers behave with different kinds of debt 
instruments 
• Developing early alerts that automatically change the rating of a loan 
• Predicting behavior under differing economic conditions 
• Developing up-to-date changes in the risk of a security based on the individual 
predictions and changes in economic conditions 
• Sourcing regular updates of credit scores while the loan is outstanding 
• Evaluating the performance of originators  
 
A collateral benefit of this emphasis on transparency of risk is increased standardization 
of the data points and the evaluation protocols that comprehend the underlying risk of 
the securities.  
 
It is not the job of the CDFI lender to mimic the conclusions of the conventional lender 
about whether to lend to a borrower once the borrower’s credit is scored. Quite the 
reverse. It is the CDFI’s job to fill the gap the conventional lender will not touch. 
However, at the same time, it is essential that CDFIs adopt the standardized assessment 
tools, data capture, and financial reporting that the conventional sector uses in its 
lending activity. It enables the CDFI to fill the gap with much greater specificity and 
impact, and with much less waste of scarce resources. Adopting standardized 
assessment tools ensures that data capture financial reporting relative to the operations 
of the CDFI itself will also be essential. In the same way that standardization will 
facilitate funding for loan portfolio assets, it will facilitate funding for the debt 
obligations issued by the CDFI. It will be a key factor in gaining access to flexible low-
cost funding. Yes, a higher-risk portfolio of loans or a more volatile CDFI may receive 
higher rates on the securities that fund them (depending on what other factors the CDFI 
brings to the transaction), but the key is that the market will be able to define the 
difference—and so will the CDFI. In addition to enabling the CDFI to attract funding 
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from the capital markets for the loans, adopting these systems will enable management 
to justify grant funding from foundations and agencies. 
 
Improving	  CDFI	  Risk	  Management	  	  
Douglass Winn, in a Federal Reserve Board publication, argues that training sessions 
could help CDFIs prepare for the market.  
 
We believe that a targeted series of trainings on these skills for CDFIs would be 
valuable to the industry, and could play an important role in increasing the 
number of organizations ready for the capital markets. A series of such training 
sessions might include: 
 
• A session on building financial infrastructure (tracking loans, 
decreasing cycle times, developing a system to manage liquidity). ... 
• A session on interest rate risk management. ... 
• A session on loan pricing. ... 
• A session on the basics of securitization.55 
 
Winn has been in the forefront of several efforts, including CRF-17, to assist CDFIs in 
gaining access to the capital markets. Here, he identifies items that CDFIs must become 
fluent in if they are to grow. Three of these are necessary for gaining access to the capital 
markets: risk diversification (securitization), managing liquidity, and managing interest 
rate risk (asset-liability management). 
 
	   Risk	  Diversification. Because CDFIs cannot get to the capital markets individually, 
they must do so collectively. Hence, their greatest selling point (other than mission) is 
the diversification of assets. When securitization returns, certain mechanisms that 
“diversify risk” will not be returning, such as CDOs of tranches of mortgage-backed 
securities and the credit default swaps that supported them. The focus is likely to return 
to fewer and simpler tranches. The CDFI field will not be affected by the loss of CDOs or 
credit default swaps. It will absolutely benefit from fewer and simpler tranches when 
the loans are securitized. The inherent flexibility of the simpler structure also makes 
remediation simpler, which will be a crucial factor in determining the type and amount 
of assets to be securitized.  
 
While waiting for the markets to revive, CDFIs should be evaluating portfolios of assets 
by asset class for future securitization. Evaluation is not just about delinquency, default, 
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loss, and loss mitigation. It is also about the flows of cash for each asset and the ability of 
the originator and servicer to maximize them. This evaluation should include the 
experience of conventional lenders (that is, banks) and CDFI lenders who have managed 
portfolios of unsecured obligations based on organizational credit risk.  
 
	   Asset-­‐liability	  management. In terms of risk management, we must also examine 
asset-liability matching. Culturally, for the CDFI field, asset-liability mismatching is both 
unfamiliar and speculative. Yet most of the time, there is a steep yield curve that slopes 
upward. This translates into ample opportunity for lenders to generate profit, reduce 
rates, or do both by funding longer-term financial assets with shorter-term liabilities.  
 
Yes, there will always be risk. The regulators and the rating agencies, indeed the market 
as a whole, recognize the risk. Even prior to the current crisis, securitizations of asset-
liability mismatching risked lower ratings and higher costs than securitizations of assets 
and liabilities that were match-funded. It is likely that the ratings on mismatched assets 
and liabilities will be lower and the incremental costs higher the next time around. Yet 
most assuredly, there will be a next time around.  
 
Indeed, we are in the “next time” right now. Currently (in February 2010), short-term 
rates are lower than they were in 2008 or between 2001 and 2004 when the conventional 
sector took aggressive asset-liability mismatching to new extremes. So the window for 
aggressive asset-liability management is back. Will lenders take advantage of the 
opportunity again? Provoking lender interest in lending is precisely one of the results 
that the Federal Reserve and the Treasury hope to achieve. Are they setting the stage for 
a repeat of the subprime debacle? No. The aggressive mismatching of assets and 
liabilities was a major driver of the crises in the housing and the credit markets, but it did 
not cause them. Bad credit decisions, the loss of investor confidence, and the consequent 
abandonment of the consumer debt markets were the causes.  
 
The question for the community development field is: if the conventional sector jumps 
in once again, where will CDFIs, with their 30-year fixed-rate match-funded mortgages, 
be? Under the bus, once again? Clearly, one of the functions the CDFI industry needs to 
create is the management of prudent asset-liability mismatches. Whether it is the 
creation of a cooperative entity that engineers the platform or a collaborative effort with 
existing institutions, such as the Federal Home Loan Banks, the CDFI field will need to 
get on  the bus on this issue if it wishes to continue serving our constituents and 
generating surpluses together. 
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It is only a matter of time before the pain of the recent failures in discipline produces the 
kinds of institutional behavior that promote stability, profitability, and investment. 
Inevitably we will see most of the mechanisms of securitization return. We will once 
again see the credit scoring, the tranching, and the asset-liability mismatch. We will even 
see a return of the leveraging function (albeit more modest) that the Basel papers are 
attempting to curtail. The reason is, again, simple: these mechanisms are too logical and 
too profitable to be jettisoned. When these mechanisms are working, they work pretty 
well, and they work well when the market has faith in the discipline of the lenders and 
the rationality and authority of the gatekeepers. Indeed, before the “lunatic fringe” took 
the wheel, the conventional sector had effectively penetrated further into the low-
income communities and constituencies than many in the CDFI sector had, and certainly 
on a much vaster scale. They did so with a range of financial and technological 
mechanisms that enabled them to spread the wealth and make money at it.  
 
The CDFI field needs to adopt these mechanisms and put them to use in the context of 
its mission. Even though the markets remain in disarray, there is much that can and 
should be done to assure a position at the front of the bus when the markets—and the 
mechanisms that drive them—revive. The first thing CDFIs can do is take a much 
harder, more disciplined look at what they themselves do—and how they must present 
their work and their successes. It’s not about just surviving the current economic 
downturn, but also about staking out a place for the community development mission 










n this chapter, we describe the structure and the final financial scenario that the FIR 
team developed for the Mini-Fed. It was the team’s first effort to gain access to the 
capital markets. This phase of gaining access to the capital markets for unsecured 
obligations (based on organizational credit risk) was initiated in May 2001 and extended 
through June 2003.56  
 
The	  Mini-­‐Fed	  Proposal	  
 
Community Development Financial Institutions frequently have surplus cash for 
specific periods of time, which they invest in treasuries and other high-quality market 
rate instruments. Other CDFIs need short- or long-term funds, which they would like to 
borrow at a low cost. The Mini-Fed was designed to enable CDFIs with cash surpluses to 
invest in CDFIs with cash needs. Because it would be managed by CDFIs for CDFIs, 
investment and borrowing rates would be set according to their respective needs. 
Generally speaking, the surplus cash would be invested in deposits with high-quality 
ratings at market rates in order to attract outside institutional investors as well as CDFIs. 
The borrowing needs would involve debt instruments with rates below what the CDFIs 
could get from banks or the capital markets.  
 
The following is a summary of the key features of the Mini-Fed.  
Purpose	  
The Mini-Fed brings CDFIs closer to funding parity with their corporate counterparts in 
terms of the range of flexible, low-cost liquidity and capital solutions. The liquidity 
solutions include prudent money market investments, affordable short- and long-term 
debt, capital markets vehicles, corporate finance expertise, and technical assistance. The 
Mini-Fed provides this by pooling CDFI industry management and cash resources in a 
centralized CDFI-managed entity.  
I 
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Summary	  of	  the	  Proposal	  
The Mini-Fed consists of a $50 million loan pool, with $10 million in equity and up to 
$40 million in credit-enhanced, short-term funding. The short-term funding is drawn 
primarily from surplus cash in the CDFI industry. Foundations and social investors 
provide the $10 million in equity. The pool is governed by participating CDFIs and 
managed by a bank partner. Like most private-sector financial institutions, the Mini-Fed 
has a structural asset/liability mismatch, which enables it to pay market rates on short-
term investment instruments and charge lower rates on longer-term debt instruments. 
The bank partner manages the asset/liability mismatch. Using the CDFI Assessment and 
Rating System (CARS) and other industry-sourced benchmarks, management is 
responsible for maintaining a high-quality portfolio of borrowers. Management is also 
responsible for assisting participating CDFIs in accessing federal agency funding 
programs, and developing capital market vehicles and contacts for expanding the range 
of financial solutions.  
Summary	  of	  the	  Benefits	  	  
	  
• Expanding CDFI investment options to include a CDFI-specific instrument that 
is safe, liquid, easy to use, and competitive in risk and yield. 
• Expanding CDFI borrowing options to include unsecured short- and long-term 
funding sources at below-market rates.  
• Expanding data on evolving money and capital market needs (both use and size) 
in the CDFI sector.  
• Providing a performance platform that facilitates positive evaluation of CDFIs by 
the rating agencies. 
• Helping to establish a common underwriting and monitoring system for the 
CDFI industry that is compatible with best practices and assures social investors, 
institutional investors, and rating agencies that investments in the pool represent 
a sound and prudently managed risk.  
• Assisting CDFIs in becoming more sophisticated in asset/liability management 
and in improving the level of self-funding of their lending activity. 
• Assisting CDFIs in tailoring their products more precisely to the needs of their 
constituents. 
100	  
• Tailoring financing instruments to better leverage programs at HUD, the CDFI 
Fund, the EDA, the SBA, the FHLBs, and the USDA to facilitate better and more 
widespread use by CDFIs.  
• Helping to develop pools and alternative structures to facilitate direct investment 
in CDFI lending assets.  
• Structuring the various financing instruments to suit CRA tests in a more 
compelling, higher-impact manner.  
• Expanding the benefits to all credit-worthy CDFIs over time. 
• Achieving self-sufficiency (e.g., no need for further grant support). 
Potential	  Participants	  
To ensure a low cost for the bank credit enhancement and the rating of the short-term 
investments, the initial borrowers from the Mini-Fed are restricted to larger, more 
established CDFIs, with high performance measures. These could include CDFI loan 
funds, community development credit unions, and community development banks. It is 
anticipated that the ranks of the borrowers will expand to smaller, newer CDFIs as the 
rating agencies and banks providing the credit enhancement experience a consistently 
low default rate on the loans the Mini-Fed makes. 
Investors include CDFIs with surplus cash, including regulated community 
development depositories and CDFI secondary market entities. It is anticipated that the 
major secondary market entities will also occasionally borrow from the Mini-Fed.  
Products	  
The Mini-Fed offers CDFIs investment products at market rates for the lowest possible 
corporate risk, and borrowing options at or below those offered to top-quality corporate 
treasurers in terms of rate, maturity, and flexibility. The low rates on the investment 
products are justified by the top rating afforded to the investment securities by the bank 
credit enhancement. The low rates on the borrowing options allow the Mini-Fed to use 
short-term funding of longer-term assets and to ensure quality gate-keeping in terms of 
evaluating borrower risk.  
The Mini-Fed provides borrowers and investors the following products: 
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• High-quality investments. CDFIs can currently invest in federally insured CDs, 
treasuries, and agencies. Some CDFIs can also invest in high-quality marketable 
private-sector paper (e.g., AAA/aaa bonds, or A-1/P-1 commercial paper). The 
Mini-Fed provides an additional high-quality investment, but with the added 
advantage that the proceeds are deployed for the CDFI mission. 
(i) Credit quality (via credit enhancement) that enables the CDFI to adhere to 
the constraints of its investment policy. 
(ii) Push-button simplicity: The transactional procedures must equate to the 
normal conduct of CDFI cash management. 
(iii) Transparency. Comparative rates are posted to assure investor CDFIs they 
are on target with comparable rates of return. 
• Short-term notes. The Mini-Fed makes unsecured loans to CDFIs for periods of up 
to 270 days at the lowest rates available to the best borrowers in the market. One 
of the platforms is a “discount window” that enables investors to bid on short-
term notes to be issued by CDFI borrowers.  
• Medium-term notes. Unsecured market-rate amortizing loans for periods of up to 
10 years, but averaging 7 years, at the lowest rates available to the best borrowers 
in the market. 
• Advisory. Mini-Fed staff advise CDFI clients on the full range of financing options 
available at the agencies and in the capital markets. Staff serve as a clearinghouse 
on organizational financing programs at the federal agencies and for competitive 
vehicles in the capital markets. Agency programs include the CDFI Fund, 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Small Business 
Administration, Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, U.S. Department of Education, Federal Housing 
Administration, Veterans Administration, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. 
Competitive vehicles in the capital markets that the Mini-Fed staff tracks include 
asset placement in the form of whole loan sales, collateralized debt obligations 
and participations, and a range of fixed- and floating-rate options tied to 
individual CDFI cash flow needs in partnership with the Federal Home Loan 
Banks (FHLBs). A key purpose of the advisory function is to develop a range of 
financing instruments designed to suit CDFI organizational risk and to enhance 
the sophistication of CDFI financial management techniques.  
• Agency for asset placement. Mini-Fed staff help aggregate and bundle assets and 
liabilities generated by CDFIs and help place them with participants in the 
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capital markets. Bundled assets and liabilities are in the form of participations, 
whole loans, collateralized debt obligations, and other forms of securitization.  
Structure	  
The Mini-Fed is a partnership, possibly a cooperative, owned by the CDFI field. The 
Mini-Fed’s lending function is to focus on evaluating the loan request and the 
organizational risk of the borrowing CDFI. With the benefit of industry standard 
underwriting (such as CARS) and a volunteer loan committee, the Mini-Fed makes 
short- and long-term unsecured loans. Staff allocate credit in the portfolio in accordance 
with designated categories of risk and differences in term using guidelines provided by 
the bank partner. Staff monitor the performance of the loans and the credit quality of the 
organization. 
In its advisory capacity, the Mini-Fed serves as a clearinghouse for information on 
agency programs and competitive capital markets vehicles. Advisory includes 
information on structure, alternatives, relevance, and feasibility, as well as arranging 
contact with the providers.  
 
The Mini-Fed also has bank partners who provide credit enhancement. The banks 
assemble the bank participants in a $40 million letter of credit that provides the credit 
support for the A-1/P-1 level rating on the Mini-Fed’s short-term obligations. The bank 
partners are also responsible for asset/liability management. In that capacity, they 
provide guidance on the concentration of loan portfolio maturities and credit risk in the 
context of the liability side of the balance sheet and changes in the interest rate 
environment. The bank partners perform the loan servicing, and investor relations 
functions, and manage a discount window. The window ensures that short-term (30-180 
days) cash needs of one CDFI can be met by bidding on the deposited cash surpluses 
from another. The Mini-Fed arranges for one or more banks to serve as trustees on 
obligations.  
Funding	  
The Mini-Fed must raise $10 million in grants from several foundations, corporations, 
banks and agencies. The $10 million is permanent equity, which will serve as both a 
source of free funding and as a cushion in the event of losses. A key part of the effort is 
to convince foundations that this structure both simplifies and reduces the need for 
annual grants.  
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The Mini-Fed is structured to maximize the use of both CRA and tax credit benefits. By 
pooling surplus funds for investment in CDFIs, the Mini-Fed presents banks and other 
institutions with several forms of investment opportunity, including equity investment 
in the pool, credit enhancements of CDFIs, and investment in specific CDFI assets. These 
options are also viewed as ideal for insurance companies.  
A lead bank assembles a consortium to provide the funding for the Mini-Fed. The 
consortium provides a $40 million letter of credit that backs notes issued by the Mini-
Fed. The letter of credit is used to back notes issued by the CDFIs that are purchased 
directly by investors via the discount window. The notes have the equivalent of an A-
1/P-1 rating.  
 
Once the equity is in place, the Mini-Fed begins lending. Once the letter of credit is in 
place, the Mini-Fed solicits additional investments from CDFIs with surplus cash and 
issue the rated short-term notes.  
Financial	  Objectives	  
The guidelines for the financial structure of the Mini-Fed are to: 
• Obtain A-1/P-1 rating on short-term investments; 
• Ensure a target balance sheet leverage at 5:1 (based on an assessment of risk and 
on the calculation of the maximum amount of debt that the equity could 
prudently support); 
• Ensure the target maximum risk asset (CDFI exposure) does not to exceed 50 
percent of total assets at any point (e.g., 50 percent shrinkage in CDFI asset value 
before debt holders lose money); 
• Annually invest the full amount of contributed capital; 
• Cover transaction costs, and generate a moderate surplus, thereby achieving full 
self-sufficiency.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, there is significant risk inherent in the asset/liability 
mismatch, and it must be managed with care. But the Mini-Fed, by limiting the amount 
of CDFI loans outstanding to a maximum of $25 million (50 percent) at any given point 
reduces the interest rate exposure significantly. Exposure is reduced because at least 40 
percent of the $25 million in CDFI loans outstanding are funded by the $10 million in 
equity (plus cumulative surpluses). The remaining $25 million of the Mini-Fed assets are 
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largely asset-matched with short- and medium-term investments in high-quality 
marketable securities (e.g., treasuries, agencies). This leaves a maximum $15 million in 
CDFI loans exposed to interest rate risk at any point in time.  
The key operating assumptions for the Mini-Fed are:  
• Obtain $10 million of grant funding at outset. 
• Offer two unsecured loan types based on the organizational risk of the CDFI 
borrower. The first is a seven-year (average) amortizing term loan that funds 
permanent working capital (Loan type 1 in the Table 4.1). The second is a three-
year, interest-only, working capital loan covering relatively short-term 
organizational needs, such as acquiring a loan portfolio or initiating a new 
program (Loan type 5 in Table 4.1). 
• Offer loan interest rates of 3.0 percent for unsecured short-term loans and 5.0 
percent for unsecured long-term loans. This implies a rising yield curve, which 
has important implications.57 Both types of loans are priced at 50 basis points 
over the cost of funds of equivalent maturities. Most borrowings, however, are 
short-term and based on the assumption that CDFI and social investors will roll 
the bulk of them over at maturity.  
• Charge origination fees of 1.0 percent for the short-term loans and 1.5 percent for 
the long-term loans. 
• Average 4 percent yield on the investment portfolio, given that they are invested 
primarily in longer maturity agencies. 
• Operating expenses to include a staff of three full-time employees, including one 
lender and one advisor. All-in costs totaled $440,000 annually, plus other costs of 
$240,000 inflating at 3 percent per year. Administrative fees of 1 percent, and 
servicing fees of 0.5 percent on loans outstanding are paid to third-party (bank) 
providers. 
• Funding costs include 2.5 percent for short-term debt (CDFI investments at the 
commercial paper rate) and 5 percent for long-term debt. (A 10-year zero coupon 
bond was also an option, although not pursued. Such a bond could accelerate the 
period of stabilization and sustainability). Notably, it is assumed that the Mini-
Fed simply rolls over short-term debt without ever paying it down, which as we 
have discussed, is standard practice in the corporate and institutional sectors. 
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• Charge-offs of 0.25 percent per year for short-term loans and 0.5 percent per year 
for long-term loans. 
• Target total outstanding loans of $25 million and total restricted and unrestricted 
investments in treasuries and agencies of $25 million. 
• The Mini-Fed grows from $25 million in assets in the first year to about $50 
million in the third year.  
• CDFI loan assets grow from approximately $10 million at the end of the first year 
to approximately $25 million in the third year, remaining at that level for the 
duration. 
• Loan volume exceeds the $10 million grant investment on an annual basis. Over 
the seven-year period, the Mini-Fed makes $75 million in loans, divided between 
$22 million in short-term (maturity in two years; average life, 1.5 years) and $53 
million in long-term (maturity in seven years; average life, four years).  
• By the end of the sixth year, the Mini-Fed will have reached a stabilized, 
sustainable state, issuing approximately 15 loans per year of about $12 million 
total. Table 4.1 shows the loan design and volume of unsecured loans to CDFIs 
for the Mini-Fed. 
 
As shown in Table 4.1, each loan type is characterized by certain terms (interest rate, 
number of years with interest only terms, and number of years amortized), portfolio size 
(average size of loan and number of loans over the period, and percentage of loans sold), 
fees (origination, servicing received, servicing paid), and performance (charge-off rate). 
One of the most important indicators for the overall mission is in line 40. The $10 million 
in grant capital results in an overall lending volume of $75.5 million, or more than $10 
million per year in loan volume on the same $10 million granted by the foundations and 
social investors.   
 
Table 4.2 summarizes the key financial indicators for the Mini-Fed and how it performs 
under the final set of assumptions. The Mini-Fed increases the loan portfolio (line 271) 
by more than 120 percent in seven years. Total assets (line 273) nearly double over the 
same period. Although total debt (line 283) more than doubles, leverage (line 284) peaks 
in the third year and stabilizes below 4.0. Over a seven-year period, the Mini-Fed 
achieves self-sustaining performance.  
 
One of the critical features of this self-sustaining structure is in line 295: years to repay 
debt. This is an indicator of how many years it would take to pay off debt in full from  
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free cash flow, which is chiefly derived from loan principal repayments. While climbing 
for the first few years, by year 7, the Mini-Fed is generating enough cash to repay all of 
its debt within three years. By reducing this number to the two- to three-year range, the 
Mini-Fed reduces the exposure to interest rate risk. Regulated depositories (such as 
community development credit unions) are keenly aware of the need to keep this 
number low and in line with their deposit maturities; and the bank that manages the 
balance of the Mini-Fed assets and liability would be likewise keenly aware.  
	  
Chart 4.1. Assumptions on Mini-Fed unsecured loans to CDFIs
Loan Type 1: 6 Loan Type 4: 
Interest Rate 7 5.00% Interest Rate
Number of Years 8 7                            Number of Years
Average Size of Loan 9 $1,000,000 ($14,133.91) Monthly Payment Average Size of Loan $0.00
# Loans over the period 10 53                          $53,000,000 Total Loans # Loans over the period -                         $0
Origination Fees 11 1.50% Origination Fees
Servicing Fees Received 12 0 Servicing Fees 0
Servicing Fees Paid 13 1.500%        Servicing Fees Paid
Percentage of Loans Sold 14 Percentage of Loans Sold ($)
Charge-off Rate 15 0.50% Charge-off Rate
Market Interest Rate 16 Market Interest Rate
Loan Type 2: 17 Loan Type 5:
Interest Rate 18 Interest Rate 3.00%
Number of Years 19 Number of Years - Interest Only 1                            
Average Size of Loan 20 $0.00 Monthly Payment Number of Years - Amortizing 1                            ($42,346.85)
# Loans over the period 21 -                         $0 Total Loans Average Size of Loan $500,000 $22,500,000
Origination Fees 22 # Loans over the period 45                          
Servicing Fees Received 23 Origination Fees 1.00%
Servicing Fees Paid 24 Servicing Fees Received 0
Percentage of Loans Sold 25        Servicing Fees Paid 1.500%
Charge-off Rate 26        Charge-off Rate 0.250%
Market Interest Rate 27 Percentage of Loans Sold ($) 0%
28 Market Interest Rate
Loan Type 3: 29 Loan Type 6: 
Interest Rate 30 Interest Rate
Number of Years 31 Number of Years
Average Size of Loan 32 $0.00 Monthly Payment Average Size of Loan $0.00
# Loans over the period 33 -                         $0 Total Loans # Loans over the period -                         $0
Origination Fees 34 Origination Fees
Servicing Fees Retained 35 Servicing Fees 0
Servicing Fees Paid 36        Servicing Fees Paid
Percentage of Loans Sold 37 Percentage of Loans Sold ($) 0%
Charge-off Rate 38 Charge-off Rate
Market Interest Rate 39 Market Interest Rate
II. Loan Volume 40 Total Loans $75,500,000
Years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of Loans #1 41 10                          10                          10                          5                            6                            5                            7                            
Number of Loans #2 42
Number of Loans #3 43
Number of Loans #4 44
Number of Loans #5 45 5                            5                            5                            5                            5                            10                          10                          
Number of Loans #6 46
Total New Loans 47 15 15 15 10 11 15 17
Total Loans Outstanding (Not Incl.Amort) 48 15 30 40 45 51 61 73










Table	  4.2.	  Summary	  of	  Key	  Financial	  Indicators	  for	  the	  Mini-­‐Fed 
Key	  Indicators	  &	  Funding	  Choices	   	   2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
  	  MiniFed	   SCENARIO 4 Chart 1	   	   	   
The	  Four	  Categories:         
Total	  Assets:	  Gross	  Operating	  Yield 263 7.279% 5.464% 5.255% 4.790% 4.893% 4.759% 4.809% 
Operating	  Expense/Avg.	  Assets 264 5.716% 2.812% 2.346% 2.222% 2.268% 2.309% 2.358% 
Cost	  of	  Funds	  (to	  Average	  Assets) 265 1.566% 1.742% 1.936% 1.991% 1.984% 1.982% 1.976% 
Charge-­‐offs	  to	  Avg.	  Assets 266 0.385% 0.272% 0.270% 0.243% 0.246% 0.240% 0.233% 
Key	  Asset	  Diagnostic	  Indicators         
Loans:	  Total	  Yield 267 11.53% 7.08% 6.47% 5.51% 5.70% 5.41% 5.52% 
Loan	  Rate	  versus	  Debt	  Rate 268 5.91% 3.41% 3.16% 2.61% 2.74% 2.42% 2.41% 
Property	  Revenue	  to	  Property	  Value 269 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Property:	  Net	  Operating	  Rev	  to	  Value* 270 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Loan	  Portfolio 271 11,001,486	   18,255,524	   24,154,237	   24,357,984	   24,586,104	   25,402,924	   24,565,566	   
Real	  Estate	  Properties	  (Owned) 272 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
	  	  	  Total	  Assets 273 26,025,034	   38,281,919	   49,269,478	   49,430,634	   49,622,080	   50,419,440	   49,657,827	   
Off	  Balance	  Sheet	  Loans 274 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
	  	  	  Gain	  or	  (Loss)	  on	  Loan	  Sales 275 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
	  	  	  Gain	  or	  (Loss)	  on	  Real	  Estate	  Sales 276 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Mission	  Restricted	  Net	  Assets 277 10,000,000	   10,000,000	   10,000,000	   10,000,000	   10,000,000	   10,000,000	   10,000,000	   
	  	  	  Total	  Net	  Assets 278 9,725,034	   9,781,919	   9,969,478	   10,130,634	   10,322,080	   10,419,440	   10,557,827	   
Staff	  Stress         
	  	  	  Total	  Loan	  Volume/Staff 279 15.00	   15.00	   15.00	   10.00	   11.00	   15.00	   17.00	   
	  	  	  Total	  Projects	  Volume/Staff 280 0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   
	  	  	  Total	  Loans	  Outstanding/Staff 281 0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   
	  	  	  Total	  Projects	  per	  Property	  Staff 282 0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   
Trip	  Wires         
Total	  Debt 283 16,300,000	   28,500,000	   39,300,000	   39,300,000	   39,300,000	   40,000,000	   39,100,000	   
Total	  Liabilities/Net	  Assets 284 1.68 2.91 3.94 3.88 3.81 3.84 3.70 
Target	  Liabilities/Net	  Assets 285 5.00	   5.00	   5.00	   5.00	   5.00	   5.00	   5.00	   
	  	  	  Equity	  Needed	  to	  Meet	  Leverage	  Target 286 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Unrestricted	  Investments 287 5,000,000	   10,000,000	   15,000,000	   15,000,000	   15,000,000	   15,000,000	   15,000,000	   
Mission	  Restricted	  Investments 288 10,000,000	   10,000,000	   10,000,000	   10,000,000	   10,000,000	   10,000,000	   10,000,000	   
Cash	  Reserve	  Requirement 289 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Loan	  Reserve	  Requirement 290 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Target	  Cash/Investments	  Month	  on	  Hand 291 3	   3	   3	   3	   3	   3	   3	   
	  	  	  Cash	  Needed	  to	  Meet	  Cash	  Target 292 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
The	  Bottom	  Line         
Net	  Surplus	  (Deficit) 293 9,725,034	   56,885	   187,558	   161,157	   191,446	   97,360	   138,387	   
Ending	  Cash 294 23,548	   26,396	   115,241	   72,651	   35,976	   16,516	   92,261	   
	  	  	  Years	  to	  Repay	  Debt 295 1	   5	   6	   5	   5	   4	   3	   
Incr/Decr	  Unrestricted	  Investments	   296 (5,000,000) (5,000,000) (5,000,000) 	   	   	   	   
Short	  Term	  Debt 297 16,300,000	   12,200,000	   10,800,000	   	   	   700,000	   (900,000) 
Long	  Term	  Debt 298 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   
Operating	  Grants	  per	  Year	  ($) 299 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Mission	  Asset	  Restricted	  Grants	  per	  Year 300 10,000,000	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   




Figure 4.1 displays the self-sustaining performance that can be achieved by the Mini-
Fed. This parallels the management of risk in regulated depositories, although with 
longer maturities. This management of risk is reflected in the combination of leverage 
control and maximization of cash flow.  
 
Figure 4.1. The Connection between Leverage and Free Cash Flow 
 
As conceived, the Mini-Fed’s structure works primarily because it “plays” a rising yield 
curve. The bulk of the Mini-Fed’s borrowing is done with short-term notes issued to 
CDFI investors sourced at 2.5 percent. Up to half of the assets are invested in longer-
term loans and investments, with investments garnering an average 4 percent yield and 
long-term loans garnering 5 percent. When combined with origination fees, the loans 
yield in the 5-6 percent range.  
 
Effectively, the Mini-Fed’s ability to lend at below-market rates (for unrated unsecured 















Exposure (years to repay debt)
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yield curve, and keeping the average maturity on the portfolio, as a whole, relatively 
short.  
 
One of the chief benefits of this structure is that it eliminates the perceived CDFI 
organizational risk by keeping leverage under 5:1 and, more important, by investing 60 
percent of debt proceeds ($25 million of the $40 million in debt raised) in high-quality 
marketable securities. This is one form of over-collateralization that also ensures 
maximal liquidity for the Mini-Fed, if interest rates move.  
 
However, as noted above, another factor is at work as well. Consider what happens with 
the new loan volume the Mini-Fed created in Table 4.1 above. Table 4.3, which shows a 
portion of the Mini-Fed’s cash flow statement, starts with the dollar value of the new 
loans made in each year derived from the assumptions in Table 4.1 (i.e., 10 term loans 
[Loan Type 1] valued at $10.0 million occur in the first year, and five working capital 
loans [Loan Type 5] valued at $2.5 million, for a total of $12.5 million, as shown on the 
top line (422) of Table 4.3).   
 
Lines 422 and 435 in Table 4.3 reveal that the portfolio has managed to minimize the 
average term of the whole loan portfolio by adjusting loan volume in favor of shorter 
maturities. The result is that, by the fourth year, the principal being repaid finances 
nearly the entire new loan volume. This is one of the key reasons that, even with a large 
percentage of loans with a seven-year average maturity in the portfolio, the years to 
repay debt (line 295 in Table 4.2) is declining, along with the need to borrow more 
money.  
 
Comparing the dollar volume of new loans with the annual principal pay-off on 
previous loans, as shown in Figure 4.2, it is apparent that the Mini-Fed manages to 
become self-funding as well as self-sustaining. This capacity to self-fund is summarized 
in the Figure 4.2.  
 
The aggressive management of the yield curve represents the primary risk in this 
particular Mini-Fed scenario. Should spreads between short- and long-term rates narrow 
or invert (as indeed they did during 2006-07), this structure would not be viable or 
sustainable, at least not with these loan rates. Short-term borrowing would be less 
attractive. Long-term borrowers would want to keep their loans outstanding longer. 
Short-term investors might not renew their investments at maturity, and the Mini-Fed 
might be forced to liquidate portions of its portfolio at a loss to pay maturities as they 
come due.  
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Table	  4.3.	  Key	  to	  Self-­‐Funding   
         
CASH	  FLOW	  (EXCERPT)  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
New	  Loan	  Volume	  (Less	  
Charge-­‐offs) 422 (12,500,000) (12,500,000) (12,500,000) (7,500,000) (8,500,000) (10,000,000) (12,000,000) 
Loan	  Sales	  (Face	  Value) 423 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Property	  
Purchases/Development 424 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Property	  Sales	  at	  Cost	  -­‐	  
Total 425 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Property	  Sales	  at	  Cost	  -­‐	  
Restricted 426 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Incr/Decr	  Unrestricted	  
Investments	   427 (5,000,000) (5,000,000) (5,000,000) 0	   0	   0	   0	   
Mission	  Restricted	  
Balance	  Deployed 428 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Accounts	  Receivable 429 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Other	  Assets 430 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Accounts	  Payable 431 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Other	  Liabilities 432 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
	  	  	  Total	  Uses 433 (17,500,000) (17,500,000) (17,500,000) (7,500,000) (8,500,000) (10,000,000) (12,000,000) 
Net	  Operating	  
Sources/Uses 434 (17,500,315) (17,207,494) (17,073,794) (7,214,780) (8,182,222) (9,765,775) (11,762,196) 
Loan	  Principal	  
Repayments 435 1,223,863	   5,010,342	   6,362,639	   7,172,190	   8,145,547	   9,046,315	   12,737,941	   
Loan	  Princ	  Repymts	  &	  
Sales	  -­‐Restricted 436 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Short	  Term	  Debt 437 16,300,000	   12,200,000	   10,800,000	   0	   0	   700,000	   (900,000) 
Existing	  Long	  Term	  
Debt:	  Amortization 438 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
New	  Long	  Term	  Debt:	  
Amortization 439 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
Long	  Term	  Debt 440 0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   
         
	  	  	  Total	  Financing	  
Sources 441 17,523,863	   17,210,342	   17,162,639	   7,172,190	   8,145,547	   9,746,315	   11,837,941	   
         
Change	  in	  Cash 442 23,548	   2,848	   88,845	   (42,590) (36,675) (19,460) 75,745	   




           Figure 4.2. Self-Funding: New Loans Are Paid from Principal Payments 
 
Nevertheless, as noted earlier, aggressively managing the yield curve is an activity that 
corporations, and financial institutions generally, do every day to achieve a competitive 
edge on product pricing. This was true of subprime (and predatory lenders) as well, and 
it gave them a distinct pricing edge over more responsible lenders, who had a less 
sophisticated asset liability management capability. (Chapter 8 goes into more detail on 
this topic.) 
 
It was not the intent of the FIR team to be alone in this effort to build a sustainable 
platform based on an asset/liability mismatch. At the time, the Federal Home Loan 
Banks (FHLBs) were looking for ways to expand their commitments to community 
development. With their highly sophisticated asset/liability management tools, top 
ratings, and cash, the FHLBs offered CDFIs opportunities to help minimize the both the 
liquidity and the interest rate risk. The FIR team envisioned a system of derivatives 
based around the maturities in the loan portfolio that could establish a reasonable and 
prudent risk position. However, things didn’t get that far. There were too many 
challenges that could not be overcome. The section “What Didn’t Work” below offers a 
fuller understanding of why this didn’t work, and why it still won’t work. But first, 
some of the clear “wins.”   
 


















What	  Worked	  for	  the	  Mini-­‐Fed	  
 
As conceived, the Mini-Fed offers a number of advantages for CDFIs, including achieving the 
primary objective of achieving “funding parity” with lenders of equivalent quality. The main 
advantages are: 
 
1. Alternative funding sources. Enabled CDFIs to establish a platform that provided a 
collective alternative to the bank balance sheet; a critical step toward funding parity 
with other financial entities.  
2. A high-quality rating. Using bank letters of credit (L/Cs) to get an A-1/P-1 rating on 
notes issued by the Mini-Fed provided CDFI investors with mission-compatible 
investments of the highest quality credit rating, at equivalent yields.  
3. Below-market rate funding to CDFIs. The Mini-Fed borrowed at market rates and lent 
at below-market rates (for the perceived unsecured, unrated risk).  
4. Control of rates and yields. A lending partnership or cooperative like the Mini-Fed was 
not new; credit unions, for example, had been doing it for some time. However, the 
concept of enabling CDFIs, through their management of the Mini-Fed, to determine 
rates and yields, was new. By making the trade-offs among mission risk in the 
portfolio, interest expense, and the cost of maintaining the entity, CDFIs for the first 
time, would be in a position to calibrate the level of mission risk versus rate directly 
with funders and the banks (as credit enhancers) on a collective basis.  
5. Simplifying donor, lender and investor funding. The centralization and consolidation of 
CDFI credit exposure into a single entity simultaneously reduced credit risk through 
diversification, and simplified and reduced the cost of institutional investment in 
CDFIs. 
6. Leveraging grant dollars. The capacity to deploy $10 million of grant capital to 
produce $75 million of below-market-rate loan volume over a seven-year period—
and multiples of that over an extended period—was a breakthrough. Even more 
critical was that the loans were unsecured obligations based, ultimately, on the 
organizational risk of the participating CDFIs. This was a significantly more efficient 
use of grant capital than in a traditional revolving loan fund structure 
7. Sustainability. Deploying the initial grant in a manner that did not require additional 
subsidy going forward was a positive. Although various bonds used this approach 
(e.g., build all of the subsidy up front in the form of reserves), it was uncommon in 
the CDFI industry.  
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What	  Didn’t	  Work	  for	  the	  Mini-­‐Fed	  
 
As positive as the “wins” of the Mini-Fed were, several factors made the Mini-Fed 
difficult to implement. The key impediments were:  
 
1. The transaction was too small. At $50 million, with a $25 million allocation for CDFI 
risk, the Mini-Fed was too small for the rating agencies to consider on an economic 
basis. The minimum size for the rating agencies began at $75 million. The Mini-Fed 
was also too small to have much impact on the CDFI field. Moreover, for the CDFIs 
that were most likely to qualify (on the basis of financial strength), the loan sizes 
were too small.  
2. Rating agencies had no platform to evaluate CDFI risk in a manner consistent with the 
precision with which they evaluated other sectors. Moreover, the CDFI sector lacked 
the necessary performance data on organizational risk to assist the rating agencies in 
developing such a platform.  
3. Asset/liability mismatching was viewed with skepticism. The ability to generate surpluses 
on a mismatched book, and to build a funding structure independent of the 
maturities of individual assets were key benefits of gaining access to the capital 
markets. However, CDFIs and potential bank funders were unwilling to support a 
business in the community development sector that was built on this model. 
Moreover, CDFIs participating in the discussion were generally unfamiliar with the 
technology, and uncomfortable with taking this risk. Even using a bank partner was 
viewed with concern. Their preference was to stay with the traditional approach to 
asset/liability management, that is, matching the term of the funding with the term 
of the assets.  
4. CDFI investment policy restrictions were a deterrent to investing in a Mini-Fed. CDFI 
investment accounts are constrained in several ways that work against investing in a 
Mini-Fed. First, investment policies tend to restrict investments to the very highest 
quality instruments, and many exclude A-1/P-1 commercial paper or other forms of 
high-quality corporate risk. CDFIs often have restrictions on where they can invest, 
which might preclude investing in a fund that deploys the proceeds nationally. 
CDFIs also needed to be assured that the investment was as easy to use as it was 
liquid and riskless, a process that would take time to build and to market. 
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5. Maturities were too short. For the Mini-Fed to work under the proposed scenarios, the 
average maturity for the portfolio had to be in the 3-5 year range. The below-market 
lending rates forced a shorter maturity for technical reasons: below-market-rate 
loans could not be sold without taking a loss, so in this scenario, the Mini-Fed had to 
keep the loans on its balance sheet. If the Mini-Fed could not sell loans, and its cost 
of new funds exceeded the yield on the loans, then the only major source of cash for 
lending would be from principal repayment. At stabilization in this scenario, the 
portfolio was designed to run a ratio of repayments to new loan volume between 60 
and 120 percent, which meant that the maturity of the loans had to be limited. 
However, at the time of the Mini-Fed effort, CDFIs indicated that the biggest need 
was for long-term, low cost funding rather than short- or medium-term funding at or 
near market rates. 
6. The loan products involved a level of perceived risk that was unacceptable for banks and 
investors. The combination of short- and medium-term loan products introduced a 
challenging level of complexity, particularly because they were unsecured. Banks 
may lend on an unsecured basis to a CDFI for relatively short periods based on its 
organizational strength, but longer -term support, whether in the form of a revolving 
credit or a credit enhancement, was a challenge. Going beyond short- and medium-
term loans into pooling, participations, securitization and derivatives, added a 
further level of complexity that was not encouraging.  
7. Insufficient staff. Although the proposed staffing was likely sufficient for allocating 
risk and generating transactions, it was unlikely that staff could simultaneously 
carry out the kinds of collaborative data collection, credit evaluation, and 
performance monitoring that the Mini-Fed called for among the banks, the rating 
agencies, and the CDFI sector. Developing products that best suit CDFI constituent 
needs was an additional burden. The plan also called for a brokerage and placement 
capability, but it was clear that the necessary staff to accomplish this would make the 
Mini-Fed non-viable even at several times the target $50 million size.  
8. Credit risk was too low to be of value to the CDFI field. At the target .5 percent and .25 
percent annual loss rates, the level of organizational risk the Mini-Fed could take 
into its portfolio was limited. It was likely that only those entities already attaining 
comparatively low interest rates from the banks could use the facility. 
9. Sizable segment of CDFI was excluded. Using rating agency criteria to allocate credit 
risked excluding large segments of the CDFI sector. The analytical framework and 
oversight also militated against taking the kind of risk associated with the CDFI 
mission. In particular, some in the CDFI field viewed the process whereby CDFI risk 
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would be introduced to the capital markets—such as standardization of analysis, 
reporting, and oversight—as potentially compromising the community development 
mission. To be sure, the existing system in which CDFIs individually attain credit 
from their banks was also exclusionary for the same reasons—bank funders pick and 
choose the CDFIs they will lend to, and with the banks, the process was not 
transparent. Nevertheless, those CDFIs surveyed at the time felt strongly that 
targeting social investors as well as banks for support of the Mini-Fed would 
compromise the ability of smaller and newer CDFIs to raise funds.  
10. Housing versus other lending assets. The Mini-Fed was structured to invest on the basis 
organizational risk (i.e.,  how well management managed resources) rather than by 
asset class. Because the Mini-Fed presumed the loans were unsecured, the distinction 
among asset classes was unnecessary. However, a number of participants argued for 
distinct platforms for housing-related loans and community economic development 
loans.   
11. The Mini-Fed competed for scarce grant dollars with other mainstream CDFI activities. 
Several parallel initiatives in the community development field were underway at 
the time the Mini-Fed was conceived. Cooperation might be worth considering at a 
later date. The chief challenge was: with limited social investment subsidy available 
for capitalizing the various efforts, who should be first in line?  
12.  “Mini-Fed” was a misnomer. Although expressing the “discount window” component 
of the proposal, the term “Mini-Fed” did not capture the entity as a whole, which 
was really more of a broker/lender. The FIR Team therefore adopted the name 
“Capital Exchange.”  
 
Opportunities	  the	  Mini-­‐Fed	  Opened	  Up	  for	  the	  CDFI	  Field	  
 
As radical as some of the components of the Mini-Fed appeared when the FIR Team first 
discussed them, none of the pieces represented anything new in the field of finance. All 
of the proposed concepts and activities were derived from actual business conducted in 
the institutional sector. The big question was: to what extent could the team take these 
institutional tools and apply them with advantage to the CDFI sector? 
One of the bright lights in the discussion was the fact that the credit union industry had 
already demonstrated that a Mini-Fed concept could work for nonprofits. Through their 
access to Credit Union Leagues, Credit Union Centrals, Credit Union Service 
116	  
Organizations, the National Community Investment Fund and its trade group, the 
National Federation of Community Development Credit Unions, even miniscule 
community development credit unions could: a) place federally guaranteed deposits in 
other community development credit unions; and b) access a range of financial and 
advisory resources that provided liquidity and capital at the lowest available rates in the 
market.  
What made this work (in addition to the remarkable level of cooperative effort) was the 
federal guarantee of credit union deposits and the oversight of the National Credit 
Union Administration. That guarantee and the oversight was based on a common set of 
critical data points for all credit unions, standardized reporting, a comprehensive 
analytical framework, and the sector-wide oversight function that could ensure the 
integrity of all three factors. (The community development banks had similar 
capabilities, although the national framework was smaller). The Mini-Fed paralleled the 
concept in that it was a closed system in which members shared their surpluses with 
members who needed financing. The big problem was that, absent a federal guarantee, 
the Mini-Fed absolutely had to have a rating, and the best rating available, at that.  
Not that the idea of a Mini-Fed has disappeared from the community development field. 
The notion of a closed system in which participants lend to one another continues to 
crop up. NeighborWorks America, for example, reviewed a similar structure in 2006 to 
increase liquidity and capital availability in its network of more than 230 organizations. 
That proposal is in Appendix B.  
Clearly there are challenges to the Mini-Fed proposal. But some of the challenges can be 
addressed by taking it in a different direction. These include:  
1. Technical Challenges. Most of the technical failings, like size, rates on loans, 
maturities, product range, staffing, limited credit risk, and reliance on aggressive 
management of the yield curve, can be adjusted. There is little margin for error in the 
scenario that the FIR team developed, and clearly, much greater flexibility is needed 
in the context of a more focused level of access to the capital markets.  
2. Policy Challenges. Some of the policy failings can be addressed with relative ease. The 
desire to separate housing from non-housing loans becomes unnecessary once the 
benefits of unsecured lending based on organizational risk are fully comprehended. 
The issue of exclusionary forces can also be addressed once the case is made that a) a 
good rating for the Mini-Fed will bring in new money that would otherwise be 
invested in non-CDFI investments; and b) rating agency familiarity with CDFI 
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performance ultimately results in the largest, highest capacity CDFIs going directly 
to the capital markets, thereby freeing up additional social investment for others in 
need. The reluctance to take advantage of asset/liability mismatch is a much greater 
challenge. Indeed, the absence of expertise is a good reason for CDFIs to remain with 
the traditional asset/liability matching policy. Unfortunately this also reduces some 
of the attraction of gaining access to the capital markets. Finally, the constraints of 
CDFI investment policies are a challenge that has no easy solution: changing each 
participating CDFIs investment policy will take time, and the existence of donor 
geographic and purpose constraints makes the effort highly complex. It is this issue 
in particular that prompted the conclusion that a vehicle for gaining access to the 
capital markets must rely on external funds; that is, funds outside the CDFI field.  
3. Analytical Challenges. The analytical failings present, perhaps, the greatest challenge. 
For the CDFI and the institutional investors to become comfortable with their short-
term investments in the Mini-Fed, they must see a very good rating on their 
investment. Although the consortium of banks can provide a letter of credit to satisfy 
the rating agencies, an analytical platform is still needed that assures banks and  
rating agencies that the Mini-Fed’s portfolio exposure to unsecured CDFI 
organizational risk is prudent from both underwriting and monitoring standpoints. 
Although the banks, foundations, and many CDFI entities (e.g., NCB Community 
Impact, Calvert, NeighborWorks America, and Opportunity Finance Network) have 
their own individual analytical platforms, there is no common platform, and no 
conclusive evidence that any of these platforms is compatible with what the rating 
agencies require. To gain access to the capital markets for CDFI organizational risk, a 
common platform must be created. Clearly, the most important step is to collectively 
establish the kinds of data points, reporting requirements, analytical framework, and 
monitoring function for CDFI organizational risk that will satisfy both the field and 
the rating agencies. The CDFI field, together with its most active banks and 
foundations, has recognized this need in initiating The CDFI Assessment and Rating 
System (CARS). Participants on the CARS advisory board come from a number of 
the bank, foundation, and CDFI entities that have analytical platforms, and their 
presence in developing the CARS platform incorporates a level of sector-wide 
compatibility. Because CARS was the foremost collective effort in the field at the 
time, the FIR team concluded that the success of any capital markets initiative that 
involved rating agencies would depend on the growth and success of CARS.  
 









n stepping back from the Mini-Fed, the FIR team was also stepping back from the 
ability to obtain unsecured long-term debt for CDFIs, based on their organizational 
credit risk. That meant the team would need to focus on unsecured short-term debt in 
the effort to gain access to the capital markets and the wholesale side of the banks. As 
noted, a number of CDFIs contacted during the Mini-Fed phase indicated they didn’t 
need short-term debt. But the FIR team recognized that, in fact, many CDFIs were 
borrowing short term, they were borrowing for a wide range of reasons, and they were 
borrowing, for the most part, at comparatively high rates. The team agreed with the 
William P. Ryan’s assessment:  
 
Working capital presents the biggest challenge. … Working capital, which 
enables nonprofits to invest in their own capacity, is critically important and 
generally difficult to come by. Even nonprofits that are part of the community 
development financial infrastructure—dedicated to providing capital for 
economic development—find that they themselves are in need of working 
capital. … Performance and capital are inseparable. … Nonprofits need capital to 
perform, yet no one wants to provide capital to a nonprofit that is not capable of 
performing. This conundrum has profoundly shaped many of the responses to 
capital challenges. It may account for the general scarcity of philanthropic 
working capital, and it surely explains the emergence of several new approaches 
that stress accountability for performance as a condition of capital investment.58 
 
Although the Mini-Fed failed to materialize because of several technical and policy 
issues, its findings convincingly demonstrated one thing: a structure that aggregates 
CDFI assets and liabilities for the purpose of providing a much wider source of funding 
at competitive rates could be created. The steep yield curve during the period (2001-03) 
I 
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when the Mini-Fed was being designed, with short-term rates in the 1 percent range, 
was a compelling reason to move ahead with the collective effort to gain access to the 
capital markets and achieve funding parity for CDFI organizational risk.59 
 
The FIR team determined that the best way to “get the camel’s nose under the tent” of 
the capital markets was to eliminate as many impediments as possible. This meant 
narrowing the focus even further.  
 
It was decided that the “Capital Exchange” (the name of the FIR team’s new effort) should:  
 
• Go beyond the social investment and CDFI market to source funding from public 
market investors, specifically the commercial paper market. 
• Shorten the maturity of debt it would fund in order to eliminate the asset-liability 
mismatch. 
• Restrict borrowers to a small number of top-quality CDFIs as rated by CARS or 
equivalent platforms. 
 
However, challenges existed to this next phase in gaining access to the capital markets, 
including: 
• Commercial paper was largely unknown to the CDFI field. 
• Of the 41 CDFIs (and trade groups) surveyed, most appeared satisfied with the 
short-term financing they received from their banks, despite the generally higher 
cost; and, as noted they were more interested in long-term rather than short-term 
debt. 
• By restricting the effort to the highest-quality CDFIs, the Capital Exchange might 
lose the opportunity of benefiting the industry as a whole; it could risk 
establishing standards of performance that militated against taking the kind risk 
that CDFIs take as a function of their mission, and exclude the bulk of the CDFI 
field from the capital markets.  
 
Despite the obstacles, the FIR team determined to move ahead with the Capital 
Exchange for the following reasons: 
• Commercial Paper. The new mantra for the FIR team would be to take as much of 
whatever could be taken to the capital markets for the double purpose of 
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expanding the funding sources and freeing up grants and other social investment 
for the truly risky or unique CDFI efforts. 
• Short-Term Debt. As satisfied as some CDFIs were with their bank lines for short-
term needs, the rates were still higher than their organizational risk warranted. 
The best rates for secured loans among those participating in the Mini-Fed effort 
were in the LIBOR plus 75 basis point range at the time, and unsecured facilities 
were about double that, in the LIBOR plus 150 basis point range or more (where 
LIBOR pricing was available). Reportedly, spreads for for-profit institutions and 
corporations were 50 basis points under the secured rates and up to 125 basis 
points under the unsecured rate. The facilities for CDFIs were generally also less 
flexible and more time-consuming. 
• Segmenting CDFIs by Organizational Risk. The common experience of the CDFI 
sector over the previous 10 to 15 years was that once the conventional 
institutions became comfortable with the size and risk dynamics of an asset or 
group of assets, they tended to relax their hurdles for risk, and invest in greater 
and wider quantity. This had been as true of small business and micro-enterprise 
assets as it had been in housing and community facility assets in the CDFI sector. 
And it likely remains true. To expand eligibility to more CDFIs down the road, 
the Capital Exchange would be structured to facilitate the same process.  
	  
The	  Capital	  Exchange	  Proposal	  
 
The following was the FIR team’s proposed final structure of the Capital Exchange, as 
presented to the rating agencies and the potential participating banks.  
Purpose	  
The primary objective of the Capital Exchange is to break into the capital markets by 
way of the commercial paper market. However, the purpose goes beyond funding parity 
in terms of price and flexibility. The Capital Exchange is designed to establish a platform 
that enables CDFIs to be reviewed by the rating agencies on mutually satisfactory terms. 
In establishing this platform, the participating CDFIs also benefit from the lowest rates 
in the marketplace and access to a trillion dollar market.  
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The Capital Exchange is designed specifically to break through the three biggest 
impediments to capital market access for unsecured organizational risk—size, 
unfamiliarity with organizational risk, and the absence of relevant performance data. It 
accomplishes this by pooling unsecured CDFI promissory notes to achieve appropriate 
scale, developing a market-compatible platform for evaluating CDFI risk, and providing 
pertinent data through transparent demonstration of financial performance. 
Summary	  of	  the	  Proposal	  
The Capital Exchange is a $75 million fund owned by the CDFI industry and managed 
by a large CDFI with some bank partners. There is no designated staff. However, there is 
an industry-based board of directors. There is also a loan committee appointed by the 
board, which approves borrowers and tracks their performance. The Capital Exchange is 
capitalized with $3 million in grants and $4.5 million in program-related investments at 
1 percent for a period of 10 years. A group of high-quality CDFI borrowers is approved 
to borrow from the Capital Exchange on a short-term unsecured basis.  
 
The Capital Exchange finances its promissory notes by issuing commercial paper to 
investors in the marketplace through its own discreet conduit. The commercial paper is 
credit enhanced to the A-1/P-1 quality range by a bank letter of credit, thereby receiving 
the lowest borrowing rates available in the market.  
 
The Capital Exchange loan committee selects the CDFIs based on their CARS rating or 
evaluation of equivalent quality. Equivalent quality could include regulatory ratings for 
depositories and evaluations performed by the CDFIs’ existing lenders. The Capital 
Exchange loan committee tracks credit quality of the CDFIs by using CARS and/or 
equivalent evaluation. Each entity has discreet limits set for the maximum amount of 
borrowing outstanding at any point in time.   
Summary	  of	  the	  Benefits	  
• CDFIs provide rating agencies with a platform for capturing and evaluating 
CDFI organizational performance data in the context of their own criteria for 
evaluating performance (that is, CARS).  
• CDFIs establish a platform that enables them to tap into the trillion-dollar 
commercial paper market. 
• Participating CDFIs borrow at a spread over the A-1/P-1 commercial paper rate 
of 50–125 basis points. This is approximately 75–150 basis points less than what 
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most CDFIs surveyed are being charged for unsecured risk. The spread is set by 
the CDFI ownership and can be substantially lower than what the CDFI 
borrowers currently can obtain from lenders.  
• CDFI borrowers can roll over this short-term debt indefinitely so long as they 
maintain sound financial condition. 
• Once the fund is up and running, it pays for itself. Therefore, it is both self-
sufficient and self-funding. 
• The expectation is that once the Capital Exchange performs well with short-term 
unsecured obligations of high-quality CDFIs, it will expand to include lesser-
quality CDFIs. Over the longer term, once the analytical platform (CARS and 
equivalents) has been seasoned in the context of this market-based platform and 
performance data has been demonstrated, the Capital Exchange will expand to 
include longer-term unsecured loans. 
Potential	  Participants	  
The borrowers are selected on the basis of size, borrowing needs, and by credit quality 
as indicated by CARS and the CDFI Data Project comparatives. Key community 
development trade groups are also considered, as are CDFI-regulated depositories. 
Forty-one CDFIs and trade groups are approached on an individual basis to determine 
their interest in the proposal.  
 
The most likely candidates are community development banks; the banking industry 
and its regulators are already familiar with commercial paper as many bank holding 
companies issue it and many banks credit enhance it. There is little familiarity with 
commercial paper in the community development field, however, and only modest 
interest in short-term funding, even at low commercial paper rates. Hence, the FIR team 
lowers the target maximum number of participating CDFIs to 20.  
Products	  
There is only one product: an unsecured working capital line of credit to be used for 
general organizational purposes. As difficulties with the rating and tracking of CDFI 
credit quality arise (see below), the use of proceeds is restricted to interim financing 
needs on a secured basis under a borrowing base formula. (As we shall discuss further, 
the retreat to a secured type of transaction is a huge disappointment for the FIR team: it 
takes a big step back from the FIR objective to gain unsecured financing based on 
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organizational credit risk. It is also a major blow to competitiveness of the enterprise 
because the spreads that banks charge on secured loans to CDFIs are generally half of 
what they charge on unsecured loans.) Nevertheless, the borrowing base framework is a 
middle step that expands flexibility for the secured CDFI borrower. As a result of this 
change, the final product for the Capital Exchange proposal consists of a secured line of 
credit that finances any short-term needs backed by assets that can be pledged.  These 
funding needs include: 
 
• Funding of a loan pending receipt of principal payments from another loan, 
grant, government reimbursement, or other revenue stream. 
• “Table-funding” of a loan pending sale to the secondary market.  
• Funding operating expenses pending receipt of a grant, government 
reimbursement, or other form of revenue. 
 
Working capital uses that will not be eligible include: 
 
• Funding of operating expenses without a defined source of funding or 
repayment. 
• Funding the initiation of a new program with no proven source of repayment. 
• Funding the permanent expansion of a loan portfolio (i.e., permanent working 
capital need). 
Minimum denominations for borrowing (for example, $25,000) and maximums (for 
example, $750,000) are established at the outset and depend on evaluation of the need 
and credit support provided by the borrowing entity.  
Structure	  
Up to 20 high-quality CDFIs (including Community Development Credit Unions and 
Community Development Banks) can borrow for periods of up to 180 days. As with the 
conventional commercial paper borrowing, the notes can be rolled over at maturity. The 
borrowing rates are at the A-1/P-1 commercial paper rate plus approximately 125 basis 
points. The 125 basis points cover the cost of the liquidity facility, credit enhancement, 
and administrative costs. During 2003 and half of 2004, this enables the CDFI borrowers 
to finance their short-term needs in the 2.25–2.50 percent range. Again, the spread can be 
adjusted by the CDFI ownership to respond to market conditions.  
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The Capital Exchange is housed in a bankruptcy remote special-purpose vehicle housed 
at one of the participating banks, but managed at a large CDFI (the CX Manager). The 
entity that houses the fund is responsible for asset-liability management, maintaining 
the books, and managing the board and loan committee requirements. A bank provides 
bookkeeping, transfer and paying agency, and related administrative activities. The 
board of directors determines policy and appoints the loan committee. The loan 
committee tracks the credit quality of the borrowers by using CARS or ratings of 
equivalent quality. The Capital Exchange pays CARS  $15,000 per borrower per year for 
the initial analysis and subsequent annual updates.  
 
There is to be a pilot period of up to 36 months during which the participants are 
assembled, the CARS and equivalent ratings are developed, the credit enhancement is 
negotiated, the bank partner is enlisted, and the grants are committed. A board of 
directors, including leaders in the financial and community development fields, is to be 
assembled. A loan committee is to be identified. The Capital Exchange manager 
manages the pilot effort with assistance from the FIR team.  In the absence of a CARS 
rating for potential participants, the initial CDFI borrowers will be selected by the 
Capital Exchange manager based on its experience in lending to the industry. Following 
the pilot period, it will take up to 36 months for the Capital Exchange to reach its full $75 
million scale. The board of directors and its stakeholders will also determine, during the 
third year, whether the pilot should be terminated at the end of the third year or rolled 
into a permanent program. 
 
The Capital Exchange is an independent stand-alone commercial paper issuer. It brings 
CDFIs, social investors, and other investors who wish to participate in the community 
development mission to the table. This “closed” structure, with investors already at the 
table, makes it easier to sell the credit risk to banks and rating agencies. 
Funding	  
Capital funding totals $7.5 million, consisting of $3 million in grant funds and $4.5 
million in program-related investments from participating foundations. The $3 million 
functions as a loss reserve covering the first loss on the portfolio. The $4.5 million 
represents a second loss position. The initial thinking is that this 10 percent equity 
cushion should be sufficient given the secondary market nature of the entity and the low 
anticipated loss rate.  
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A commercial bank provides a combined liquidity facility/credit enhancement for the 
full amount of commercial paper outstanding, or $67.5 million. This combined facility 
ensures that the commercial paper investors in the fund (CDFIs and other institutional 
investors) can receive their principal and interest on a timely basis (the liquidity facility) 
and that the banks providing the liquidity facility will be repaid in full (the credit 
enhancement).   
 
Up to $67.5 million in debt is to be raised by issuing A-1/P-1 rated commercial paper to 
investors, which include bank foundations, mutual funds, and pension funds, and may 
include nonprofit foundations and participating CDFIs. 
 
	   Structure	  of	  the	  borrowing	  base:  The kinds of short-term assets that can be 
pledged in support of the CDFI borrowings from the Capital Exchange include the 
following: 
 
1) Unrestricted Cash 
2) Treasuries and other Marketable Securities 
3) Rated Bonds, Pools, Other Public Market Instruments 
4) Temporarily Restricted Cash within 12 months 
5) Restricted Cash that Will become Unrestricted within 12 months 
6) Federal Grant Receivables 
7) State and Local Grant Receivables 
8) Foundation Grant Receivables 
9) Institutional Grant Receivables 
10) Scheduled Loan Interest Payments for the Next Nine Months 
11) Scheduled Loan Principal Payments for the Next Nine Months 
12) Project Development Refinance Not to Exceed 1 Year 
13) Construction Loan Refinance Not to Exceed 1 Year 
14) Loans Held for Resale 





FORM OF BORROWING BASE CERTIFICATE
Officer's Certificate Certifying Borrowing Base
Executed as of this ______ day of ____________




A. Availability of Receivables
1 Balance of Receivables from previous period $11,500,000.00
2 Plus New Receivables $1,200,000.00
3 Sub Total (line 1 plus line 2) $12,700,000.00
4 Less Collections $300,000.00
5 New Receivables Balance (line 3 less line 4) $12,400,000.00
6 Ineligible Receivables
(a) Portion of Net Book Balance of each Receivable resulting from an unsecured End Borrower 
Loan or secured Pre-development Loan which, when added to all other unsecured End 
Borrower Loans and secured Pre-development Loans, exceeds thirty-five (35%) of the 
Available Capital $600,000.00
(b) Net Book Balance of Receivables which do not comply with all applicable laws, regulations 
and contractual restrictions $0.00
(c) Net Book Balance of Receivables which Lender or Borrower determine to be uncollectible in 
conformance with the Policy and Operations Manual or otherwise. $250,000.00
(d) Net Book Balance of Receivables which have fully matured
(e) Net Book Balance of Receivables with respect to which two or more required principal, 
interest or other material amounts have not been made within 60 days after date when due $450,000.00
(f) Net Book Balance of Receivables with respect to which any Material End Borrower Default 
(not specified in subparagraphs (d) or (e)) exists $0.00
7 Total Amount of Ineligible Receivables (line 6(a) through 6(f)) $1,300,000.00
8 Net Eligible Receivables (line 5 less line 7) $11,100,000.00
9 Advance Rate of 80% of Net Eligible Receivables 80.00%
10 Eligible Reeceivables Availability (line 8 times line 9) $8,880,000.00
B. Availability Computation
1 Total Availability (line A.10) $8,880,000.00
2 Less: the sum of the aggregate oustanding principal amount of Revolving Credit Loans $7,200,000.00
NET AVAILABILITY $1,680,000.00
I, ___________, Treasurer and duly authorized signatory of _______ Community Development Financial Institution, a non-profit 
corporation ("the Borrower") in good standing under the laws of the State of _________, hereby certify in connection with the 
Loan and Security Agreement dated as of _______ between the Borrower and _______ ("Lender") that the infromation and each 
calculation set forth in the attached borrowing base certificate are, to the best of my knwoledge, true, correct and complete 
(subject only to normal year-end audit adjustments) as of the date hereof and are calculated in accordance with the Loan 
Agreement. Unlesss otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms used herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the 
Loan Agreement.                                                                                                
BORROWING BASE CERFTIFICATE
Community Development Financial Institution
Period Ending ________
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The Capital Exchange, in negotiation with the banks and rating agencies, is to assign 
certain percentages for each of the 15 asset classes against which funds can be advanced. 
The percentages are to be based on the risk of the asset. Funding against cash, for 
example, might be 100 percent, while funding against individual pledge receivables 
might be 25 percent, depending on the history. The amount of funding goes up and 
down in accordance with the level that the borrowing CDFI has in each category that it 
chooses to borrow against. All borrowing is conducted under a blanket lien, held by the 
Capital Exchange. There is a reporting and validation requirement to assure that the 
assets are present. The reporting and the validation requirement are to be satisfied 
electronically, and the timing and extent of physical paper exchange are to be 
negotiated. The “Form of Borrowing Base Certificate” (above) shows various 
calculations associated with the establishing the amount that will be lent by the Capital 
Exchange to the participating CDFI borrower. 
Financial	  Objectives 
Guidelines for the financial structure of the Capital Exchange are as follows: 
 
• Achieve sufficient scale for the banks and rating agencies by consolidating the 
collective short-term borrowing needs of high-quality CDFIs. 
• Obtain an A-1/P-1 rating on the commercial paper via the bank liquidity/credit 
enhancement facility. 
• Make sure that the borrowing rate (commercial paper cost plus spread) is 
substantially below the cost of alternative funding sources. 
• Enable the participating CDFIs to roll over their borrowing under formulas that 
allow them to prudently fund longer-term assets. 
• Leverage the capital at a rate of approximately 9 to 1. 
• Expand balance sheet leverage by reinvesting at least double the full amount of 
capital annually; that is, at least $15 million of loan volume per year. 
• Limit risk exposure to any one obligor to a maximum of 5 percent of the total 
facility or 50 percent of the capital base. 
Cover all expenses through the spread over the cost of the commercial paper charged to 
borrowers. 
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Key	  Features	  of	  the	  Capital	  Exchange	  
The Capital Exchange is a $75 million special purpose vehicle that issues its own 
commercial paper in the commercial paper market. Table 5.1 shows its key assumptions. 
The Exchange will arrange in advance up to $67.5 million in commitments from 
investors, primarily social investors and others familiar with the community 
development field, including banks, foundations, and community development trade 
groups.  
 
• Maximum of up $65 million in loans to CDFIs. 
• No less than $10 million to be invested in conventional high-quality non-CDFI 
marketable securities. Of this amount, $7.5 million will be invested in long-term 
instruments and the remainder in short-term instruments.  
• Credit enhancement of $7.5 million. Of this, $3 million will be in the form of 
straight capital grants and the remainder will be sourced as a program related 
investment from several foundations.  
• A large CDFI (Management CDFI)  manages the books and manages the asset-
liability matches. 
• The management CDFI assesses eligibility of the CDFI from a credit standpoint 
and will also be responsible for monitoring and compliance. 
• Investment rates approximate the equivalent risk and returns in the marketplace. 
• Borrowing rates are at spreads over A-1/P-1 commercial paper.  
• Borrowers request a set amount for a set period but can roll the amounts over 
with proper notification. 
• Investors can either bid on specific issuance or on the pool of investments as a 
whole (blind trust or mutual fund structure). 
• Any asset/liability mismatches are made up by the pool via the liquidity reserve.   
Credit	  Risk/Credit	  Enhancement	  
The liquidity and credit enhancement provided by the banks endows the commercial 
paper issued by the Capital Exchange with an A-1/P-1 level credit rating.  Any 
participating CDFI borrower can issue notes to the Capital Exchange, which it, in turn, 
finances through issuance of commercial paper. The notes issued to the Capital 
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Table	  5.1.	  Summary	  of	  Key	  Assumptions	  for	  the	  Capital	  Exchange	  (in	  $	  thousands)	  
A-­‐1	  Rate	   	   1.00%	   2.00%	   5.00%	   3.00%	   4.00%	  
Plus	  Spread	   1.25%	   2.25%	   3.25%	   6.25%	   4.25%	   5.25%	  
LIBOR	   0.25%	   1.25%	   2.25%	   5.25%	   3.25%	   4.25%	  
Plus	  Spread	   1.00%	   2.25%	   3.25%	   6.25%	   4.25%	   5.25%	  
CD	  Rate	   0.13%	   1.13%	   2.13%	   5.13%	   3.13%	   4.13%	  
Yield	  Curve	  Increment	   0.25%	   1.38%	   2.38%	   5.38%	   3.38%	   4.38%	  
Loss	  Reserve	  
Investments	   6.00%	   7,500	  	   7,500	  	   7,500	  	   7,500	  	   7,500	  	  
Bank	  Line	  of	  Credit	   0.63%	   0.63%	   0.63%	   0.63%	   0.63%	   0.63%	  
Administration/Dealer	   0.25%	   0.25%	   0.25%	   0.25%	   0.25%	   0.25%	  
PRI	  Cost	   1.00%	   	   	   	   	   	  
BALANCE	  SHEET	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Cash	   	   ($207)	   ($120)	   $40	  	   $156	  	   $223	  	  
Treasuries	  -­‐	  ST	   	   $22,500	  	   $12,500	  	   $2,500	  	   $32,500	  	   $7,500	  	  
Treasuries	  -­‐	  LT	   	   $7,500	  	   $7,500	  	   $7,500	  	   $7,500	  	   $7,500	  	  
Commercial	  Paper	   	   $45,000	  	   $55,000	  	   $65,000	  	   $35,000	  	   $60,000	  	  
	  	  	  Total	  Assets	   	   $74,793	  	   $74,880	  	   $75,040	  	   $75,156	  	   $75,223	  	  
Short	  Term	  Debt	   	   $67,500	  	   $67,500	  	   $67,500	  	   $67,500	  	   $67,500	  	  
Equity-­‐	  PRI	   	   $4,500	  	   $4,500	  	   $4,500	  	   $4,500	  	   $4,500	  	  
Equity-­‐	  Grants	   	   $3,000	  	   $3,000	  	   $3,000	  	   $3,000	  	   $3,000	  	  
Excess	  Spread	  Reserve	   	   ($207)	   ($120)	   $40	  	   $156	  	   $223	  	  
	  	  	  Total	  Liabilities	  and	  Equity	   $74,793	  	   $74,880	  	   $75,040	  	   $75,156	  	   $75,223	  	  
PROFIT	  AND	  LOSS	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Investment	  Income	  (ST)	   	   $155	  	   $416	  	   $403	  	   $591	  	   $875	  	  
Reserve	  Income	  (LT)	   	   $449	  	   $446	  	   $448	  	   $453	  	   $458	  	  
Commercial	  Paper	  
Income	   	   $506	  	   $1,625	  	   $3,750	  	   $2,125	  	   $2,494	  	  
	  	  	  Total	  Revenues	   	   $1,110	  	   $2,487	  	   $4,601	  	   $3,169	  	   $3,827	  	  
COF:	  Investors	   	   $338	  	   $1,350	  	   $3,375	  	   $2,025	  	   $2,700	  	  
COF:	  PRI	   	   $45	  	   $45	  	   $45	  	   $45	  	   $45	  	  
	  	  	  Total	  Cost	  of	  Funds	   	   $383	  	   $1,395	  	   $3,420	  	   $2,070	  	   $2,745	  	  
(Number	  of	  CDFIs)	   20	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
Underwriting	   $15	  	   $300	  	   	   	   	   	  
Annual	  Review	   $15	  	   $0	  	   $300	  	   $300	  	   $300	  	   $300	  	  
Administrative	   	   $187	  	   $187	  	   $188	  	   $188	  	   $188	  	  
Bank	  L/C	   	   $422	  	   $422	  	   $422	  	   $422	  	   $422	  	  
Miscellaneous	   $25	  	   $26	  	   $27	  	   $28	  	   $29	  	   $30	  	  
	  	  	  Total	  Op	  Exp	   	   $935	  	   $936	  	   $938	  	   $939	  	   $940	  	  
Charge-­‐off	   0.125%	   $0	  	   $69	  	   $81	  	   $44	  	   $75	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  	  Total	  Surplus	   	  	   ($208)	   $87	  	   $162	  	   $116	  	   $67	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Exchange by the CDFIs are senior secured promissory notes backed by a blanket lien on 
eligible assets under a borrowing base formula.  
 
The risk to the Capital Exchange and the banks providing the liquidity and credit 
enhancement is mitigated through: 
•  The equity cushion in the Capital Exchange,  
• CDFI organizational risk,  
• The value of the CDFI assets that are pledged under the borrowing base,  
• Discrete borrowing maximums to avoid risk concentration,  
• Stop-loss triggers which prevent further loans to participating CDFIs in the event 
of default on performance benchmarks,  
• The selection of the participating CDFIs, and  
• The monitoring of the CDFIs for the purposes of assessing financial condition.  
 
Of the credit risk mitigants, the last two, the selection and the monitoring of the 
participating CDFIs, require details that bridge conventional risk assessment to the 
specific attributes of CDFI financial performance. These are summarized as follows.   
 
	   Selection	  of	  the	  CDFIs:  The criteria for selection of the participating CDFIs and 
maintenance of continued eligibility include:  
 
• Size: At least $10 million in total assets (including off-balance sheet assets).  
• Number of years in business: At least 10.   
• All the borrowers would already be examined by bank lenders and have some 
form of bank facility as a result. 
• Participating (nondepository) CDFIs would have a maximum leverage of 5 to 1; 
CDFI intermediaries would have a maximum leverage of 10 to 1. 
• Borrowers should have a sustainability ratio of at least 70 percent (that is, 
dependent on grants for less than 30 percent for operating costs). 
• All borrowers should have consistent amounts and diverse sources of grant 
funding. 
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• Change in mission assets (non-cash, non-fixed assets) as a percentage of balance 
sheet asset totals is less than 15 percentage points (changes in asset mix would 
be, for example, from housing to commercial loans, or community to housing 
loans). 
• No event of default on obligations. 
• Less than 20 percent turnover during the previous year in any of the three 
categories: management, board, or staff. 
• CARS financial rating of three or better, with an impact rating of B or better. A 
CARS rating is preferable because it includes an impact analysis as well as the 
financial and management analysis.  
 
Although it is not required, CDFIs that have already participated in a loan fund 
managed by one of the existing CDFI sector groups would be given a priority.  These 
include groups such as Opportunity Finance Network, Calvert, National Federation of 
Community Development Credit Unions, the National Community Investment Fund or 
the National Cooperative Bank Capital Impact.  
 
If an entity does not have a CARS rating or falls outside of the CARS analytical platform, 
other ratings may be used; for example, a CAMEL (Capital, Asset Quality, Management, 
Earnings, Liquidity; a regulatory framework for evaluating risk) or equivalent 
regulatory rating of three or better, or a NeighborWorks America assessment of “strong” 
or better, or equivalent rating from other community development funders, such as 
Opportunity Finance Network, Calvert, and National Cooperative Bank Capital Impact. 
To be eligible, borrowers will have current borrowing relationships with one or more 
large money center banks. 
 
	   Monitoring	  and	  financial	  analysis	  of	  the	  CDFIs: To provide the Capital Exchange 
Manager and loan committee the data needed to enforce the criteria, CDFIs will provide: 
 
• Full disclosure of historical data on the assets to be pledged subject to the 
borrowing base. 
• Full disclosure of their organizational and loan performance with banks and with 
CDFI sector loan funds. 
132	  
• Quarterly and annual statements, including supplemental information that 
enables CARS and the Capital Exchange to stress test, forecast, and update the 
borrower’s financial condition.  
 
To assure the banks and rating agencies that the selected CDFIs continue to represent an 
acceptable level of risk, the Capital Exchange commits to the following: 
 
• Ratings requirements will be negotiated in advance with Moody’s, Fitch or 
Standard and Poor’s relative to underwriting, compliance, and servicing 
standards. 
• A standard bank/foundation/CDFI system of borrower assessment will be 
established by the FIR team, which will build an interim update capability, stress 
test, and forecasting function on top of the CARS rating. It will correspond with 
rating agency requirements.   
• The team will develop a reporting regimen that satisfies the needs of the new 
system of borrower assessment. 
• The team will also develop standards for compliance and servicing that meet 
with rating agency requirements. 
 
Because of the possibility of changes in financial condition between the receipt of 
audited financial reports, CARS ratings and other equivalent forms of analysis, the 
Capital Exchange develops a system that stress tests, forecasts, and updates events that 
affect financial condition during the course of the year.   
 
The Capital Exchange develops an automated stress test based on the following key 
indicators:  
 
1) Rate of asset growth 
2) Change in average loan size 
3) Gross revenue to total assets 
4) Operating expenses to total assets 
5) Loss expense to total assets 
6) Funding cost to total assets 
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7) Sustainability ratio 
8) Rate of grant growth 
9) Yield on loan portfolio 
10) Number of loans made per year 
11) Operating cost per loan 
12) Loans to total assets 
13) Non-earning assets to total assets 
14) Principal repayment as a percentage of new volume 
15) Loan sales as a percentage of new volume 
16) Free cash flow to total assets 
17) Cash days on hand 
18) Cash investments to short-term liabilities 
19) Total liabilities to net assets 
20) Years for free cash flow to repay debt 
21) Weighted average maturity of debt 
22) Weighted average maturity of loans 
23) Rate of delinquency 
24) Charge-offs to delinquent loans 
25) Recoveries to charge-offs 
 
The Capital Exchange will deploy these indicators in an automated forecasting program 
that can stress test the historical financials of CDFIs.  The program is based on 
conventional finance and statement analysis, and it is consistent with the form of 
analysis that could be expected with the rating agencies.  
 
There is a separate value to the due diligence performed by the Capital Exchange 
manager: the Capital Exchange can begin building the kind of database on 
organizational performance that the rating agencies and investors require. One of the 
side benefits of capturing this data is that it can be used to develop a more expansive 
analytical platform in the future, one that can evaluate CDFIs on a comparative basis 
using the disciplines compatible with those used by the rating agencies. 
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What	  Worked	  for	  the	  Capital	  Exchange	  
 
Before discussing the reasons for the failure of the Capital Exchange, let’s take a quick look at 
the positive features.  
 
1. Access to commercial paper. Introduction of commercial paper as an alternative 
to CDFI deposits was a step forward conceptually, and opened up the CDFI 
sector to a trillion-dollar market (See Appendix A for greater detail on 
commercial paper). Highly rated commercial paper tends to be less expensive 
than deposits, tracking around the federal funds rate. The federal funds rate 
is what the banks charge when investing overnight funds in each other, and 
is generally the lowest rate of funding available in the marketplace.  
2. A high-quality rating. Using bank Letters of Credit (L/Cs) to obtain an actual 
A-1/P-1 rating on CDFI commercial paper had three advantages: a) it gained 
CDFI access to the commercial paper market for the first time, b) it provided 
CDFI investors with mission-compatible investments of the highest-quality 
credit rating, and c) it encouraged participating banks to conduct a 
collaborative review of CDFI performance with lenders in the CDFI field 
such as NeighborWorks, Opportunity Finance Network, Calvert, and NCB 
Capital Impact. Such a collaborative effort could substantially aid the 
community development finance industry’s efforts to establish credibility for 
their credit analysis standards with the rating agencies.  
3. Management of the yield curve. By targeting only short-term CDFI borrowing 
needs and assets, the Capital Exchange effectively minimized the asset-
liability mismatch and the risks associated with it.  
4. Market rate funding to CDFIs. The notion that a sustainable entity based on 
CDFI organizational credit risk could be set up and borrow at the best rates 
available in the capital markets was new. To be sure, this was not as 
attractive as the Mini-Fed’s structure, in that, with the Capital Exchange, 
there was no possibility of borrowing at interest rates that were below 
market. On the other hand, the fact that the CDFIs would not be tapping into 
scarce social investment dollars was a strong plus. The Capital Exchange was 
also informative: by creating a funding structure similar to those used by 
brokers, it positively demonstrated how conventional institutions could 
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achieve a pricing advantage without the benefit of grants or social 
investment. 
5. Simplifying donor, lender, and investor funding. As with the Mini-Fed, the 
centralization and consolidation of CDFI credit exposure into a single entity 
reduced credit risk through diversification. It also simplified as well as 
reduced the cost of institutional investment in CDFIs.  
6. Borrowing base formula. The introduction of this concept was both negative 
and positive. It was negative because, with it, came the recognition that the 
CDFI obligations to the conduit needed to be secured rather than 
unsecured—there just was not enough comfort with unsecured CDFI 
organizational risk. The positive aspect was that using the borrowing base 
structure represented a medium step between fully perfected asset-specific 
secured lending and unsecured lending.  
To the extent there had to be a security interest, a system could be established 
that significantly reduced the day-to-day title transfers, faxes, and paperwork 
associated with secured lending. Given the “two steps back” of losing the 
initiative on unsecured credit exposure, this was a “step ahead” in the right 
direction.  
There was another strong positive as well: included in the eligible assets for 
pledging were a number of short-term assets that had more organizational 
risk attributes than hard asset attributes. Exposure to such short-term assets 
as construction loan refinance and scheduled principal repayments 
represented a very short leap to unsecured organizational risk. These were 
included as a way of (subtly) moving the Capital Exchange banks and 
investors closer to unsecured credit exposure. 
7. Rating agency compatibility: Use of CARS (the CDFI Assessment and Rating 
System). The Capital Exchange used the CARS rating system as the basis for 
selecting and monitoring the 20 or so CDFI (non-depository) participants in 
the commercial paper conduit. As the foremost effort in establishing a 
common understanding of CDFI organizational risk, CARS brought 
analytical discipline and consistency to the risk analysis of the organization. 
Equally important, CARS would be the platform through which the banks 
providing the Letters of Credit and the rating agencies providing the ratings 
would comprehend the CDFIs. The structure simultaneously promoted use 
of the CARS, and assisted the rating agencies in developing a platform of 
evaluating CDFIs generally. This transfer of knowledge to the rating agencies 
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through the operations of the Capital Exchange was, perhaps, the most 
important long-term objective of the effort. There was an additional benefit: 
the Capital Exchange did not have to maintain underwriting staff.  
8. Leveraging Grant Dollars. The capacity to deploy $7.5 million of grant capital 
to produce up to $67.5 million of loan volume annually put the leveraging 
capacity of the model in the stratosphere. It represented a level of efficiency 
unsurpassed in the CDFI field for unsecured or secured credit risk.  
9. Sustainability. The capacity to deploy the initial grant in a manner that did not 
require additional subsidy going forward—just as with the Mini-Fed—was a 
positive. Again, this level of self-sufficiency is not common in the CDFI field.  
 
What	  Didn’t	  Work	  for	  the	  Capital	  Exchange	  
 
The Capital Exchange could not be implemented as proposed due to a number of impediments: 
 
1. Size of transaction. At $75 million, with a maximum $67.5 million allocation for 
CDFI risk, the Capital Exchange was still too small. Although it hit the 
minimum rating agency scale of $75 million, the start-up costs were out of 
proportion to the benefits. The cost of setting up an independent dedicated 
commercial paper conduit was in the $500,00–750,000 range; the cost of 
training and assisting the CDFIs in using the facility was substantial; and the 
cost of getting the rating agencies up to speed on the range of eligible CDFI 
borrowing base assets as well as CDFI organizational risk via CARS was 
indeterminable.  
2. Maturities. As in the case of the Mini-Fed, CDFIs surveyed by the FIR team 
indicated that the biggest need was for long-term, low-cost funding rather 
than short- or medium-term funding. Although the potential participants 
identified a number of short-term funding needs—some of which were 
substantial—there was insufficient scale or certitude as to what the collective 
needs were, or when they would occur, over the course of any given year.  
3. Asset-Liability Mismatch. Another disadvantage of the Capital Exchange was 
the focus on short-term assets for funding. Although there were many good 
reasons for this structure, it meant the Capital Exchange could not follow the 
conventional sector’s lead on the strategic mismatch of assets and liabilities. 
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As noted before, many corporations and financial institutions use the 
commercial paper markets to fund long-term assets (still!). Next to federal 
funds, commercial paper rates over time are the cheapest way to borrow, and 
through disciplined mismatching corporations can boost their margins—
sometimes significantly. During the Mini-Fed phase, the FIR team had 
viewed the reliance on short-term funding of longer-term assets as a way to 
help CDFIs lower their cost of funds. This advantage was not a high priority 
for the CDFIs invited to participate in the Capital Exchange, either; indeed 
many felt that this kind of mismatch was injudicious; either that, or they did 
not have the capacity at the time to engage in the techniques that would 
enable them to pursue such a mismatch prudently or effectively.  
4. Control of rates and yields. With the Capital Exchange sourcing market-rate 
funding from regular investors rather than below-market-rate funding from 
social investors (and other CDFIs), the discretion over setting borrowing rates 
was significantly reduced. A key problem was that the rates CDFIs paid on 
their bank borrowings were widely diverse. Large, high-quality CDFIs could 
get LIBOR plus 75 basis points on their secured borrowings (sometimes less) 
and LIBOR plus 150 basis points on their unsecured borrowing. The rest of 
the industry borrowed at LIBOR plus 100 basis points or more on secured 
obligations and 200 basis points or more on unsecured obligations.  
Given that both the Mini-Fed and Capital Exchange needed the large CDFIs 
to join, the rates offered by the Capital Exchange had to be at or better than 
the rates the large players paid. This was not a substantial hurdle for the 
Mini-Fed, which was sourcing funds primarily from social investors and 
other CDFIs, and targeted a substantial asset-liability mismatch. However, 
for the Capital Exchange, it was a serious challenge. The challenge became 
even greater when the Capital Exchange moved from providing unsecured to 
secured obligations for the CDFIs. At that point, the best rates the large 
CDFIs could receive from their banks on secured debt—that is, LIBOR plus 
75 basis points—were clearly less than what the Capital Exchange would 
need to charge to cover its costs. The decision to run a matched book on the 
assets and liabilities reduced the opportunity to make up the difference.  
The result was that with a spread of 125 basis points over the commercial 
paper rate, the large CDFIs would be paying 30 to 40 basis points more for 
the privilege of joining. It was unlikely that they would do so. As a 
consequence, the Capital Exchange would need to target smaller, lower-
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quality CDFIs, a target that could compromise the projected charge-off rate as 
well as the willingness of the banks to provide a credit enhancement.  
5. Credit Enhancement. In early discussions with the FIR team, several banks 
indicated they would provide a Letter of Credit (credit enhancement) fee for 
this kind of facility in the 100 to 200 basis point range. Such a cost would 
immediately make the vehicle uncompetitive. The Capital Exchange team 
argued that credit enhancement fees at this level made no sense for two 
reasons: reportedly, the wholesale side of the banks were charging 
significantly less (e.g., .25 percent) for Letters of Credit on facilities of similar 
size to entities with substantially greater risk; and the Capital Exchange, with 
its diversified portfolio and capital base, represented a significant reduction 
in risk and, hence capital allocation, vis-à-vis retaining the assets on their 
balance sheets.  
The banks indicated that final pricing, terms, and conditions could not be 
established until the actual CDFIs and the assets they pledged were 
identified. Hence, while the Capital Exchange settled on a .625 percent 
liquidity/credit enhancement fee for the purposes of designing the platform, 
there was no guarantee that it would be acceptable to the banks. Moreover, a 
question lingered. Why would a bank want to take a high-quality, high-
yielding CDFI loan off its balance sheet and put it in a bankruptcy remote 
special-purpose vehicle, where it could get financing from the commercial 
paper market? Why would it want to lose the earnings? 
6. Range of products and participants. To build a sufficient volume of activity, the 
Capital Exchange included a wide number of eligible assets that the CDFIs 
could pledge. As shown above in the list of eligible assets, the range included 
everything from grant receivables and the anticipated refinancing of 
construction loans to unrestricted cash. Although the flexibility was a benefit 
and the selection of assets moved lenders, the rating agencies, and investors 
in the direction of unsecured risk, the complexity of the different levels of 
risk presented its own impediment—an impediment of time and resources. 
The fact that the participating CDFIs had not been identified and 20 to 30 
were being considered only added to the complexity.  
7. Inadequate platform for risk analysis and monitoring. The proposal called for an 
initial CARS underwriting of each participating CDFI and subsequent annual 
reviews. The Capital Exchange would pay $15,000 for each analysis, or about 
$300,000 per year. There were two major challenges to this plan. First, CARS 
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was not in a position to analyze all of the potential participants, particularly 
the larger secondary market entities that were not certified CDFIs. Second, 
the rating agencies would need regular updates during the course of the year 
in the event of material changes in CDFI condition, which CARS was not in a 
position to deliver or the Capital Exchange to purchase.  
The $300,000 that the Capital Exchange was already budgeted to pay, as 
shown in the budget above (Table 5.1), was as much as it could reasonably 
afford. A number of scenarios were run to determine what would happen if 
the Capital Exchange retained an experienced analyst to evaluate the entities 
that did not receive CARS ratings and monitor the participants for material 
interim changes. The only way it could work under the budget was if the 
Capital Exchange had the same analytical tools the banks deployed, 
specifically, trend-line and stress-test methodologies that automatically ran 
programs to identify weaknesses in performance or financial condition.  
The Capital Exchange team built a tool to do this for the CDFI field (see 
discussion of the “Quad,” below). However, the tool did not work owing to 
the idiosyncratic and inconsistent financial reporting across the CDFI sector 
(see further discussion in Chapter 9). The team concluded that the only way 
to properly evaluate CDFI financial condition was through the 
comprehensive on-site approach that CARS, bank lenders, social investors, 
and foundations employed. However, the narrow margins that the Capital 
Exchange worked with could not support this level of additional due 
diligence.  
8. Credit Risk. Once the decision was made to have the CDFIs pledge assets 
under the borrowing base structure when they borrowed from the Capital 
Exchange, the loss parameter could be allowed to decline. On an unsecured 
basis, annual charge-off targets at .5 percent and .25 percent were thin, but 
with the security, a target .125 percent was considered reasonable. The 
reason: the Capital Exchange had both the organization’s commitment and a 
first claim on assets—that is, the classic “belts and suspenders”—and this 
was in addition to the $7.5 million in capital that represented a first loss 
position. Still, this target level of charge-off was relatively thin, particularly 
for institutions such as banks, rating agencies, and investors that were 
unfamiliar with the CDFI structures and performance. In setting up the initial 
participants, it would be necessary to be very selective to hit this target. It 
would likely be necessary to include only those CDFIs that could 
demonstrate low loss rates using conventional metrics for determining losses. 
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This could prove exclusionary in terms of participants—even more so than 
with the Mini-Fed. Once again, the effort to open doors for CDFIs to enter the 
capital markets could be viewed as contrary to the mission of the CDFIs as a 
whole.  
The	  Missing	  Link:	  Unsecured	  Borrowing	  
The crucial loss for the Capital Exchange was the inability to move CDFI funding 
forward on an unsecured basis. The introduction of the borrowing base was a way of 
keeping some features of unsecured borrowing while still providing a security interest—
but it was not the same. Because unsecured borrowing was the chief objective of 
securitizing organizational risk, it is worth taking a deeper look at this failure.  
 
The reasons for the retreat from unsecured lending go to two issues: cost and the 
financial and reporting protocols in the CDFI industry. Although the margins on a long-
term pool can be fairly high, the margins on a short-term pool that matches asset and 
liability maturities are inevitably very low. Thus, after the cost of credit enhancement, 
administration, and loss provisions, there would be very little left over for evaluating 
and monitoring the CDFIs in the portfolio. The Capital Exchange was stretching to make 
the target $300,000 per year to pay for CARS, but CARS did not review all the potential 
participants, and the rating agencies would want to see a framework of active updates 
on the portfolio borrowers to cover material changes during the course of the year. The 
only way to provide both was to hire staff or pay another lender to the industry, such as 
a bank or foundation, for their analyses. The problem was that there would not be 
sufficient margin in this model of the Capital Exchange to accommodate such an 
increase in cost.  
 
There was an additional alternative to hiring a lender to provide analysis: automate the 
analysis of CDFIs the way that banks, investment banks, regulators, and rating agencies 
do for the purpose of assessing risk. By feeding audited financials and key performance 
numbers into software programs, the analysts at these institutions can receive critical 
insights with minimum amounts of work, often without site visits. These systems are 
particularly useful for flagging activities that deviate from the normal conduct of 
business and providing early warnings of potential deterioration. For the rating 
agencies, the quality of this analytical capacity is an essential criterion in establishing the 
ratings of bank lenders.  
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Standard and Poor’s developed an excellent example of this kind of structure 
specifically for the small business market.  
 
Over the past several years, the issuance of small business loan securitizations 
rose steeply with rated transactions competed by Business Loan Express, GE, 
and Lehman, to name a few. Community development lenders also gained 
notoriety beginning in 2004 when Standard & Poor’s rated its first portfolio of 
loans whose underlying loan purpose was to spur community growth and 
development. In rating both small business and community development 
portfolios, we recognized an opportunity to provide a tool—our Small Business 
Portfolio Evaluator—for both our ratings process and our lenders’ internal risk 
management. For a community development lender who is issuing debt in the 
capital markets, these potential benefits could have favorable credit 
implications.60 
 
The	  FIR	  Team	  Develops	  the	  “Quad”	  —	  But	  It	  Only	  Works	  on	  Depositories	  
In the context of this logic, the FIR team built an automated forecasting and analytical 
mechanism—the Quad (see Appendix C)—that could be used as a stress test and 
financial comparative for the Capital Exchange portfolio of loans to CDFIs. The objective 
was to eliminate the cost of manually forecasting a range of scenarios, performing 
liquidity analysis, performing a stress test on the results, and making on-site visits on an 
interim basis between scheduled reviews.  
 
As with all automated analyses, the Quad was predicated on the notion that there are 
key financial figures and ratios in any kind of lending activity, which on a trend-line 
basis capture the quality of management decision making and the strength of the entity. 
It was assumed that an automated monitor for CDFIs would be able to accomplish the 
same once the adjustments for size, mission, net asset restrictions, and the grant revenue 
line were made.  
 
The team succeeded in identifying these key financial figures and ratios and reducing 
the full Quad analysis to an average seven hours of work, including four hours for 
comprehending and spreading four years of audited statements and supplementals, two 
hours for analysis, and an hour to summarize results in writing (the calculations done 
automatically as historical numbers are spread).   
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However, although the mechanism worked on a case-by-case basis, it could not be 
deployed generally or consistently. There were two key reasons. First, net asset 
restrictions, which can greatly affect the CDFIs liquidity calculations, were difficult to 
capture or assess. Second, financial reporting was not standardized. Examples of how 
these problems manifested themselves are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 7, 8, 
and 9. The conclusion was that those who wished to evaluate a CDFI must necessarily 
interact with CDFI management to discern what the numbers actually mean. This lack of 
consistency in financial accounting and reporting translated into a simple fact: 
evaluation of the portfolio CDFIs would occur on a case-by-case basis, which would 
necessarily involve a substantially higher cost.  
 
For the Capital Exchange, the economics would not work without an automated 
monitoring system such as the Quad. The Capital Exchange’s razor-thin margins 
required analytical technologies that produced credible results in the range of $1,000 to 
3,000 per year, per CDFI obligor (after setup). At seven hours per analysis, the cost of the 
Quad was under $1,000, which would make it more than suitable, but in the absence of 
adequate or consistent financial accounting and reporting, the analytics would not 
produce credible results for the Capital Exchange portfolio risk analysis as a whole.  
 
That the problem stemmed from the inconsistency of CDFI accounting and reporting 
was not in question. The Quad worked well for industries that shared standardized 
accounting and reporting protocols. The example in Appendix C shows how the 
program is used for community development credit unions, for example, whose 
accounting and reporting protocols are enforced and monitored by the National Credit 
Union Administration.  
 
There was an additional disappointment associated with the inconsistency of the 
accounting and reporting: the opportunity would be compromised to transfer a useable 
analytical framework for the CDFI sector to the rating agencies. Although the CARS 
methodology was sound, it was unclear whether the rating agencies would want to 
exert the same level of effort on a case-by-case basis given the generally smaller size of 
CDFIs, or address the variability in accounting and reporting protocols. Unless the 
rating agencies charged more or the CDFI credit exposures were exponentially larger, 
this level of due diligence would not be a profitable prospect for the agencies.  
 
To be sure, there is excellent work being done to improve CDFI reporting and analysis, 
which is likely to ameliorate the situation over time. Through the CARS initiative and 
the side-by-side peer comparisons, the Opportunity Finance Network is at the forefront 
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for the CDFI sector on this issue. Through its Organizational Assessment Division, 
NeighborWorks America is also developing standards for community development 
corporations that are often involved in lending as well as real estate. Others in the 
community development and banking industries have developed or are developing 
internal analytical platforms that work and work well, including Enterprise, Calvert, 
and NCB Capital Impact. These efforts all serve to build standards of performance and 
analysis for the industry. Generally speaking, however, these are comprehensive efforts, 
often involving on-site analysis, and they require significant expenditure of time and 
talent. Transferring the current technology to the rating agency arena would still 
produce a high cost for analysis given the size of the CDFIs—even assuming that the 
community development industry’s knowledge of CDFI operations could be conveyed 
seamlessly to the rating agencies.  
 
	  Opportunities	  the	  Capital	  Exchange	  Opened	  Up	  for	  the	  CDFI	  Field	  
 
At present, there is no standardized framework for evaluating CDFIs at the rating 
agency level, and the absence of such represents a barrier to entry for both. A rating for a 
CDFI still requires a customized approach—that is, “reinventing the wheel” each time a 
rating agency evaluates a CDFI. At $75,000 (and more), a CDFI must be large or have a 
large appetite for debt to embark on the effort. Although the rating agencies have rated 
specific pools of CDFI assets, they have not rated CDFIs on the basis of their 
organizational credit risk.  
 
As noted above, perhaps the greatest value of the Capital Exchange proposal was its 
potential as a vehicle for facilitating rating agency assessment of CDFIs. The strategy 
was a simple one: put a group of CDFIs together in a large-scale vehicle and apply the 
CARS methodology for evaluating credit. It would be hard for the rating agencies not to 
see the value in the proposition. They would gain a new industry sector with perhaps 50 
or 60 clients in the near term and as many as several thousand over the long term, and 
they would not have to build the analytical framework from the ground up—essentially 
it would be handed to them via CARS.  
 
By adding the $7.5 million in first loss capital and the security interest in pledged assets 
under the borrowing base formula, the Capital Exchange would make rating CDFIs less 
of a risk. How could the rating agencies go wrong with all of the diversification and 
layering of protection? The business potential was compelling for two of the three rating 
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agencies (see Chapter 7); although the amount of rated debt issues would not be similar 
for some time, the CDFIs presented a client base similar to the hospital sector, which 
represents a profitable line of business.  
 
The opportunity for rating agencies to assess CDFI organizational risk as a robust 
ongoing business remains. For CDFIs to expand the range of funding sources, lower 
costs, and obtain unsecured debt, it should remain a priority to find a way for the rating 
agencies to adopt the CDFI industry as a business. The alternative is for CDFIs to remain 
reliant on social investors and philanthropy, which means a smaller footprint, less 
flexibility, lower impact, and, as we discussed earlier, a mission pursued at the margins.  
 
Given the challenges with the Capital Exchange, it was clear to the FIR team that the 
CDFI field must improve its standing with the rating agencies through efforts in vital 
areas of standardization and efficiency in analytical protocols. We address these in 
Chapter 8. It must also improve efforts in standardization and reporting of appropriate 
financial data, which we address in Chapter 9.   
 
After	  the	  Capital	  Exchange	  
The “losses” that the Capital Exchange experienced—in particular, the retreat from 
unsecured debt—prompted the team to consider ending the entire effort. However, in 
the final months of 2005, as the disappointing results of the Capital Exchange were 
becoming clear, the home mortgage market was still on a tear. Credit, while not as cheap 
as in the previous four years, was still being pushed out to the public in staggering 
volume. The lenders and brokers who were targeting low-income constituencies with 
“exploding mortgages”—and marginalizing CDFIs’ work in the process—were financed 
by the capital markets. Indeed, the capital markets were what made the whole mania 
possible, including the imprudently structured mortgages and widespread predatory 
activity. The question arose: if a predatory lender can obtain secured and unsecured 
financing via the capital markets, why can’t a group of high-quality CDFIs with a 7.5 
percent cash loss reserve in hand?  
 
All the special-purpose vehicles used to securitize the loans the brokers and lenders 
were booking were backed by some form of credit enhancement. The bulk of the credit 
enhancements were provided or structured by banks. Clearly, the banks had concluded 
that it made more sense for all of these mortgages to be off the balance sheet, generating 
fee income, rather than on the balance sheet, generating interest revenue. Clearly, 
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funding the loans off the balance sheet was cheaper for the lenders and brokers, and at 
the same time, more profitable for the wholesale side of the banks. But how? And why 
should the CDFIs be missing the party?  
 
The FIR team’s conclusion was that it had to study the banks much more carefully and 
determine what they needed to make the market mechanisms work for CDFIs as they 
were working for everyone else.   
 
Several lessons had already been learned that would help speed the effort along. 
 
• Set a minimum size of $100 million. 
• Preselect a limited number of CDFIs to participate. 
• Make the amount of financing for each CDFI meaningful. 
• Identify a limited range of assets to be pledged. 
• Perform the risk assessment and demonstrate the capital adequacy of the model. 
• Calculate the earnings for the participating banks and ensure they are more than 
adequate.  
 
Thus, with a somewhat less ambitious plan in terms of obtaining unsecured debt on the 
basis of organizational risk, the FIR team moved forward with the concept of the 










ollowing the demise of the Capital Exchange effort in fall 2005, the FIR team had to 
decide whether it made sense to continue attempting to gain access to the capital 
markets for unsecured obligations of CDFIs. After all, it was clear that neither the credit 
enhancement banks nor the rating agencies were in a position to assess unsecured CDFI 
credit risk until the CDFI field could produce standardized financial data in 
standardized reporting with widely accepted and market-compatible analytical 
protocols. And even when the FIR team switched over to a secured borrowing base 
structure, the issues of size, complexity, pricing and the still-present concerns about 
CDFI organizational risk continued to present deal-breaking obstacles. However, in 
2005, predatory and conventional lenders were still on a rampage up the steepening 
curve of the boom, and the capital markets were frantically providing all the funding 
they needed. How could the FIR team abandon the effort in the face of all that?  
 
The Commercial Paper Co-op phase of the FIR effort to gain access to the capital markets 
for CDFI obligations lasted from December 2005 through April 2008.61 In April 2008, as 
the predatory and conventional lenders fell off the increasingly downward curve of the 
bust, and the capital markets accelerated their collapse, the FIR team put the effort on 
hold. It was more than a disappointment: the team had just figured out a way to open 
the door to the capital markets and suddenly they were trampled by the rush of lenders, 
investors, and everyone else fleeing the demise.  
 
What follows draws on the final structure of the Commercial Paper Co-op, as presented 
to the participating CDFIs’ potential credit enhancement providers and the rating 




The	  Commercial	  Co-­‐op	  Proposal	  
Purpose	  
The purpose of the Co-op was to level the financial playing field for CDFIs so they could 
obtain flexible funding as cheaply as conventional lenders and brokers. Doing so would 
reduce the CDFI cost disadvantage in delivering prudent loan products to their low-
income constituencies. The Co-op was to accomplish this by selecting a small group of 
high-capacity CDFIs and providing them access to the commercial paper market, 
thereby reducing the time, complexity, and cost of borrowing. 
 
Banks provide their best customers with credit facilities to issue commercial paper. 
These credit facilities also typically enable the customers to borrow from the bank at 
prime, or a spread over LIBOR, federal funds, or another similar index in the event there 
is an interruption in the commercial paper market. The Co-op was designed to help 
banks provide the same flexibility and cost advantage to their best CDFI clients. CDFIs 
do not have access to this kind of funding suite, primarily because they do not have 
access to the commercial paper market, but also because they lack access to the 
wholesale side of banks, which routinely provide these facilities to their clients.  
 
The Co-op would overcome this lack of access to commercial paper by: a) aggregating 
CDFI borrowings, thus creating sufficient scale to facilitate commercial paper access; b) 
placing the CDFI secured obligations in a funding framework that obtains the highest 
quality ratings and lowest available rates; and c) capturing performance data for both 
pledged assets and organizational credit risk on a fully transparent platform for CDFI 
issuers, banks, rating agencies, and investors alike.  
 
Summary	  of	  the	  Co-­‐op	  Proposal	  
Five large, high-capacity CDFIs form a co-operative to access cutting-edge, short-term 
funding arrangements.  The Co-op has the following features: 
 
• $100 million in size, with up to $75 million extended to the five CDFIs at any 
time. 
• Banks, foundations, and social investors provide approximately $20 million in 
capital. 
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• Participating CDFIs borrow (typically for 30 days) and roll over the maturity 
until the pledged assets are sold or replaced. The assets pledged are match-
funded with a tenor of not more than 270 days. 
• The Co-op provides warehouse financing to the five-member CDFIs in amounts 
up to $15 million each. 
• Participants have access to a range of pricing options including commercial 
paper, LIBOR, prime, federal funds, and other indices. 
• Sub-limits are set relative to the type and quality of the assets being financed by 
the CDFIs. There is a limited range of allowable asset classes for pledging.  
• The loans to the CDFIs are secured by the loans that the CDFIs pledge. Advances 
are made under a blanket lien on the basis of a borrowing base formula. Rather 
than using paper, the CDFIs use the Mortgage Electronic Registration System 
(MERS) for tracking and monitoring security. 
• The Co-op maintains a series of stop-loss triggers to ensure quality collateral and 
compliance by the CDFIs.  
• Banks provide a liquidity facility that enables the Co-op to issue top-quality, 
short-term notes to an independent and separate commercial paper conduit. 
 
Summary	  of	  the	  Benefits	  
The benefits of the Co-op include:  
• Reduced Interest Rates. At present, a number of CDFIs borrow from banks to fund 
the origination and aggregation of loans they intend to sell.  In return for 
funding, the CDFIs pledge the loans they are originating and aggregating. When 
they sell the loans, they pay off the warehousing lines. These warehousing lines 
are individually negotiated, and the terms and conditions vary considerably 
from one CDFI to the next. By gaining access to the commercial paper market via 
a centralized cooperative, participating CDFIs can minimize their borrowing 
rates and the risk associated with working with a limited number of lenders. 
• Reduced Operational Costs. The pledging process involves, among other things, the 
physical transfer of promissory notes and related documents from the CDFI to 
the lender when the CDFI borrows, and then the return of the documents when 
the loan is paid off. The Co-op framework enables CDFI participants to use 
electronic technology rather than paper transfer.  Although the electronic 
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technology does not enable the Co-op to technically “perfect its security 
interest,” it does reduce the potential for error while accelerating the speed of the 
transaction. With its capital and layered protections, the Co-op can insulate the 
commercial paper investors and banks providing the liquidity facility from the 
risk of eliminating paper transactions.  
• Reduced Costs Associated with Annual Renewals. At present, the warehousing lines 
often involve annual renewal procedures, annual renewal fees, legal expenses, 
and other costly requirements. The Co-op consolidates and absorbs these on 
behalf of the participating CDFIs. 
• Increased Flexibility. Many warehousing lines provided to banks restrict the 
borrower to pledging only new loans. One of the chief objectives of the Co-op is 
to enable the participating CDFIs to pledge existing loans that conform to the 
allowable terms and conditions per asset class.  Clearly seasoned loans are less 
risky than new loans, and in addition to providing the CDFI borrower with more 
flexibility, they also produce a potentially higher quality of collateral. The moral 
hazard inherent in this structure is mitigated when borrowers also own the Co-
op and, therefore, would not want to undermine it. Thus, they have “skin in the 
game.”  
• Access to the Rating Agencies. One of the chief benefits of this structure is that 
participating CDFIs can place their assets in a facility that will be monitored and 
evaluated by the rating agencies on a dynamic, ongoing basis. Participation also 
allows the CDFIs to showcase their capacity to service assets, another key area in 
the CDFI sector that, at present, is not monitored or routinely evaluated by the 
rating agencies. Exposure in both areas assists participating CDFIs in moving 
toward the ultimate objective of being rated on the basis of their organizational 
and financial strength.  Employing electronic rather than paper-based security 
interests, as planned, can accelerate this process. Over time, the exposure 
provided by the Co-op can expand to more CDFIs, and parameters for funding 
higher-risk asset classes, including unsecured loans, can be accommodated 
through this structure. 
 
Notwithstanding the benefits, the Co-op is not designed to completely replace existing 
bank warehousing lines or other lending facilities. Although participants may choose to 
reduce the lines, it is not advisable to entirely replace the relationship with the bank, or 
the range of funding options that banks currently provide. The purpose is instead to 
augment existing relationships, and collaterally, to provide the key banks with an 
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alternative, and potentially more effective and remunerative, method for lending to the 
community development field. The optimal solution is to roll the commercial paper 
option into one of the existing bank facilities, as a borrowing option.  
 
Potential	  Participants	  
The Co-op involves five potential participants. Each of the five participants has assets 
under management in excess of $50 million, has been in existence for more than 10 
years, and has warehousing lines from commercial banks to support their borrowing 
and aggregation activities. None of the participants have a delinquency on any of its 
loan agreements within 10 years. The five participants were:  
 
• Self-Help (single-family first mortgages) 
• Neighborhood Housing Services of America’s Just Price Solutions subsidiary 
(single family first and second mortgages) 
• Community Development Trust (multifamily first and second mortgages) 
• National Cooperative Bank Capital Impact (multifamily and community facility 
first mortgages) 
• Community Reinvestment Fund (small business first and second mortgages). 
 
Community Development Trust dropped out in October 2007 after it issued $64 million 
in preferred stock. At the same time, New Hampshire Community Loan Fund and 
Impact Community Capital expressed interest in participating. None of the participants 
had committed to the Co-op’s development as of April 2008, when the effort was 
suspended. 
Products	  
The primary assets financed by the Co-op are new assets that the participating CDFIs 
would normally fund with bank warehousing lines. These include first mortgages on 
single and multifamily residential units, and small business loans secured by real estate. 
These loans and mortgages are typically in the process of being aggregated by the CDFI 
for sale, securitization, or other form of off-balance sheet placement. Initially, only assets 
funded by banks under their existing warehousing lines are eligible. The Co-op also 
includes loans and mortgages that have already been originated, are seasoned, and are 
151 
on the balance sheet of the borrowing CDFI. The key focus for the Co-op is to develop a 
relatively homogeneous set of asset classes with a portfolio distribution that is 







The total amount of the Co-op facility is $100 million. A minimum of $25 million is 
invested in treasuries and other high quality marketable securities. The remaining 
facility is deployed in the form of CDFI notes secured by “ratable” and “unratable” 
loans held on the CDFI books. Additional asset allocations are to include: 
 
• Each participant can borrow up to $15 million fully outstanding at any one time. 
This affords the Co-op additional flexibility in allocating funds in unusual 
circumstances. 
• Co-op members set in advance sub-limits on ratable and unratable paper.  
 
Table 6.1. Co-op Portfolio Allocation per Loan Type by CDFI Participant
PARTICIPANTS Line SELF-HELP NHSA JPS CDT NCBCI CRF TOTAL
# 
Single Family 1 23.00% 23,000
First Mortgage Ratable 2 10.00% 10,000 10,000,000 10,000,000
First Mortgage Not Ratable 3 13.00% 13,000 10,000,000 3,000,000 13,000,000
Single Family 4 2.00% 2,000
Second Mortgage Not Ratable 5 2.00% 2,000 2,000,000 2,000,000
Multifamily 6 10.00% 10,000
First Mortgage Ratable 7 5.00% 5,000 5,000,000 5,000,000
First Mortgage Not Ratable 8 5.00% 5,000 5,000,000 5,000,000
Multifamily 9 10.00% 10,000
Second Mortgage Not Ratable 10 10.00% 10,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 10,000,000
Community Facility 11 15.00% 15,000
First Mortgage Not Ratable 12 15.00% 15,000 10,000,000 5,000,000 15,000,000
Small Business 13 15.00% 15,000
First Mortgage Ratable 14 5.00% 5,000 5,000,000 5,000,000
First Mortgage Not Ratable 15 10.00% 10,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 0 10,000,000
Unsecured Credit Line 16 0.00% 0
Not Ratable 17 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Available by Loan Type 18 75.00% 75,000 15,000,000 15,000,000 15,000,000 15,000,000 15,000,000 75,000,000
Max Single Obligor Exposure 19 15,000,000 15,000,000 15,000,000 15,000,000 15,000,000 75,000,000
Single Obligor to Capital 20 74.63%
Single Obligor to Total Facility 21 15.00%
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Structure	  of	  the	  Co-­‐op	  
	   Existing	  commercial	  paper	  conduit. The Co-op conducts business via an existing 
commercial paper conduit. A number of lending institutions serving the CDFI industry 
have multiple commercial paper conduits. Using an existing conduit reduces the cost of 
start-up, and ensures that the funding obtained for the CDFI borrowing is 
indistinguishable, for investors, from any other paper in the market. One of the chief 
objectives of the Co-op is to eliminate the need for subsidy and the collateral 
consumption of scarce social investment and foundation resources. In becoming 
invisible to the investor, the CDFIs in the Co-op can eliminate any further need for social 
investment subsidy to support their warehousing activities.  
 
In keeping with market practice, the existing conduit must assure commercial paper 
investors they will get paid. As a result, the existing conduit requires that the Co-op 
obtain a 100 percent liquidity facility that guarantees timely payment of principal and 
interest. The 100 percent liquidity facility is obtained from a group of banks that, 
preferably, already lend to the Co-op’s five CDFI participants.  
 
	   The	  banks. Banks are invited into the syndicate for the liquidity facility if they 
have existing exposure to one or more of the five participating CDFIs and CDFI assets. 
This is to avoid the learning curve for banks associated with providing credit support 
for the first time to a CDFI and its pledged assets (the learning curve has proved a 
material impediment for many conventional lenders as well as the capital markets.) The 
Co-op works with a lead bank that arranges a syndicate for the letter of credit that 
covers the liquidity risk. The lead bank invites the other banks already providing credit 
or warehouse lines to the participating CDFIs to participate in the syndicate.  The Co-op 
is structured to be an attractive alternative to direct lending for the banks because it 
provides the banks with: a) reduced risk-based capital allocation against the same assets; 
b) the same CRA benefits that pertain to bank warehousing lines; c) diversified risk; and 
d) at a minimum, a market return. 
 
	   The	  Co-­‐op. The Co-op requires the participating CDFIs to regularly report 
performance data, maintain sound financial condition, comply with “stop-issuance” 
triggers, and provide security interests appropriate to the transaction. The latter two 
requirements are similar to those required by the banks in their other asset-backed 
commercial paper transactions, except that the CDFIs are pledging their assets through 
MERS, as noted above. The Co-op employs an administrator and a transfer agent who 
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are distinct from the banks in the liquidity facility. The Co-op also employs one to two 
full-time equivalent (FTE) staff to manage the interests of the CDFI owners.  
 
	   The	  CDFI	  borrowers. Each CDFI participant has the option to borrow under its 
existing credit facilities with its banks or with the Co-op. Depending on events in the 
market on any given day, the Co-op may or may not be more attractive than the 
financing provided by the banks. As with their corporate counterparts, it is up to the 
CDFI treasurer to determine which funding source is preferable. At present, the 
procedures for borrowing under warehousing lines are cumbersome, costly, and paper-
intensive. The Co-op minimizes the time and money associated with the secured CDFI 
notes. As noted above, the ideal solution with the banks is to roll the Co-op funding 
option into existing bank facilities, as a borrowing option.  
 
	   Grants	  and	  program-­‐related	  investments.  To obtain the liquidity facility from 
banks that the third-party commercial paper conduit requires, the Co-Op approaches 
financial institutions, corporations, and foundations to capitalize the Co-op with both 
grants and Program-Related Investments (PRI). The capital target is $5 million in grants 
and $15 million in PRIs at 1 percent for 10 years.  The Co-op is designed to be self-
supporting and generate surpluses. Together with start-up costs, this upfront capital 
infusion serves as the only social investment subsidy in the Co-op structure. The capital 
is designed to grow over time by generating surpluses at the Co-op level. The members 
of the Co-op will determine the level of surpluses. 
  
	   The	  borrowing	  process (as shown in Figure 6.1). The following is how the CDFI 
accesses the commercial paper market: 
 
• To finance the loans that it is warehousing, a CDFI asks to borrow $5 million 
from the Co-op for 30 days. 
• The Co-op immediately borrows $5 million for 30 days from the commercial 
paper conduit. The Co-op selects the conduit to issue commercial paper on the 
Co-op’s behalf. A major financial institution operates the conduit. 
• The conduit issues A-1/P-1 rated commercial paper in the amount of $5 million 
for 30 days. Institutional investors purchase the commercial paper. 
• The Co-op receives the proceeds of the conduit’s commercial paper issue. 
• The CDFI receives the proceeds from the Co-op’s short-term promissory notes 
issued to the conduit. 
0Wb 
• The transactions are simultaneous. To ensure simultaneity and accuracy, the Co-
op has an administrator, typically a bank, that manages the books of the Co-op 
and the activity with the CDFI borrowers. It also has an agent, who manages the 
flows between the commercial paper conduit and the Co-op. The conduit itself 
conducts business with the investors.   
 
At the end of 30 days, the CDFI sells the warehoused loans and retires the debt to the 
Co-op, which in turn retires the debt to the conduit. If the warehoused loans are not 
sold, or if new loans are to be warehoused at maturity, the CDFI may pay the notes off 
by issuing new notes. This effectively rolls the debt over and extends the term of the 
financing. Most entities participating in the commercial paper market borrow on 30-day 
maturities to get the lowest rates, and they tend to roll them over at maturity.   
 
The Co-op assumes that most borrowers will want to borrow for 30 days at a time to 
benefit from the lowest pricing (assuming a rising yield curve) and roll over three or 
155 
four times before repaying the funding need by a loan sale or other means. It also 
assumes that funding needs typically do not exceed 120 days and never exceed 270 days.  
 
Financial	  Objectives	  
The following financial scenarios show how the Co-op works in a range of economic 
conditions.  Table 6.3 shows the average rates and average rates plus the spread in five 
different interest rate and loan demand scenarios. The rates are for A-1/P-1 commercial 
paper (lines 45), LIBOR (lines 47), and the CD rate and the Yield Curve increment rate 
(lines 49 and 50). LIBOR is assumed to be 25 basis points more than the A-1/P-1 
commercial paper rate. The A-1 Rate Plus Spread and the LIBOR Rate Plus Spread 
represents the rate at which the CDFI borrows from the Co-op. (As of February 2010, the 
borrowing rate for the CDFIs assuming the Co-op had been established would likely be 
under 1 percent.)  
 
The yield curve increment is an indication of how much additional yield the Co-op 
could likely squeeze out of funding operations if cash and short-term investments were 
run at a slight mismatch. The amount could be as high as (approximately) 3/8 percent.  
However, it is assumed that cash and short-term investments are invested in commercial 
paper at the base rate as shown in line 45. 
 
The spread, which is designed to cover a large portion of the costs of the Co-op, is 0.75 
percent in Scenario A (line 46).   
 
Funding	  




Table	  6.2.	  	  Term	  Sheet	  for	  the	  Commercial	  Paper	  Co-­‐op	   
Obligor Commercial	  Paper	  Co-­‐op,	  a	  cooperative	  financing	  entity	  owned	  by	  qualified	  borrowers.	  
 
Amount Up	  to	  $100,000,000.	  The	  facility	  is	  syndicated	  to	  banks	  that	  presently	  lend	  to	  the	  qualified	  borrowers.	  
 
Facility Letter	  of	  credit	  to	  provide	  liquidity	  support	  for	  the	  asset-­‐backed	  commercial	  paper	  (liquidity	  facility).	  This	  
facility	  ensures	  the	  conduit’s	  commercial	  paper	  investors	  receive	  timely	  payment	  of	  principal	  and	  interest.	  
A	  lead	  bank	  arranges	  and	  manages	  the	  syndicate.	  
 
Fees .375	  percent	  for	  the	  Letter	  of	  Credit,	  payable	  quarterly	  each	  year;	  .125	  percent	  for	  the	  lead	  bank	  syndicate	  
manager	  payable	  quarterly	  each	  year.	  Set-­‐up	  fee	  to	  be	  determined.	  
 
Interest	  Rate The	  Co-­‐op	  will	  charge	  qualified	  borrowers	  (the	  CDFIs)	  75	  basis	  points	  over	  the	  A1/P1	  commercial	  paper	  
rate.	  	  CDFIs	  have	  the	  option	  to	  borrow	  at	  75	  basis	  points	  over	  LIBOR,	  or	  at	  the	  equivalent	  spread	  over	  
alternative	  bank	  cost	  of	  funds.	  
 
Maturities Annual	  Renewal	  
 
Purpose To	  provide	  qualified	  borrowers	  (CDFIs)	  additional	  financing	  and	  pricing	  flexibility	  by	  creating	  an	  avenue	  to	  
the	  commercial	  paper	  market	  through	  a	  capitalized	  Co-­‐op.	  At	  present.	  All	  the	  CDFIs	  have	  bank	  warehousing	  
lines	  and	  unsecured	  facilities.	  
 
Process The	  Co-­‐op	  will	  purchase	  short-­‐term	  notes	  issued	  by	  the	  CDFIs	  for	  periods	  of	  up	  to	  270	  days.	  The	  Co-­‐op	  will	  
aggregate	  the	  notes	  daily	  for	  funding.	  The	  notes	  are	  secured	  by	  assets	  pledged	  by	  the	  CDFIs	  under	  a	  
borrowing	  base	  formula.	  The	  formula	  ensures	  over-­‐collateralization	  of	  advances	  to	  the	  CDFIs	  from	  the	  Co-­‐
op.	  To	  fund	  the	  CDFI	  notes,	  the	  Co-­‐op	  issues	  its	  own	  notes	  to	  an	  existing	  commercial	  paper	  conduit.	  The	  
conduit	  issues	  rated	  commercial	  paper	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  commercial	  paper	  is	  rated	  A-­‐1/P-­‐1	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  





The	  participating	  CDFIs	  are	  large-­‐scale,	  high-­‐quality	  originating	  and	  secondary	  market	  CDFIs	  or	  CDFI-­‐like	  
institutions.	  	  The	  participating	  CDFIs	  originate	  loans	  for	  resale	  and/or	  purchase	  loans	  from	  for-­‐profit	  and	  
nonprofit	  lenders	  whose	  mission	  is	  to	  serve	  low-­‐income	  areas	  and	  populations.	  Loans	  purchased	  include	  
first	  and	  second	  mortgages	  on	  single-­‐family	  homes,	  secured	  development	  and	  permanent	  loans	  on	  









1. Loan	  performance.	  Only	  banks	  that	  already	  extend	  warehousing	  lines	  and	  other	  credit	  facilities	  to	  
one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  CDFIs	  will	  be	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  syndicate.	  	  
2. QB	  credit	  quality.	  None	  of	  the	  five	  participating	  CDFIs	  has	  been	  delinquent	  or	  in	  default	  on	  debt	  
obligations	  for	  a	  minimum	  of	  ten	  years.	  	  
3. First	  Loss:	  There	  will	  be	  a	  target	  of	  $21mm	  with	  a	  minimum	  15	  percent	  ($15.0mm)	  injection	  of	  
grants	  and	  program	  related	  investments	  at	  the	  Co-­‐op.	  This	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  first	  loss.	  The	  Co-­‐op	  is	  
designed	  to	  generate	  surpluses,	  so	  the	  first	  loss	  coverage	  is	  likely	  to	  grow.	  
4. Security	  Interest	  for	  the	  Banks:	  the	  banks	  will	  have	  a	  first	  lien	  security	  interest	  in	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  
Co-­‐op,	  which	  consist	  of	  the	  secured	  notes	  issued	  by	  the	  participating	  CDFIs.	  	  
5. Security	  Interest	  for	  the	  Co-­‐op:	  the	  Co-­‐op	  will	  have	  a	  security	  interest	  in	  the	  assets	  to	  be	  funded	  
by	  the	  CDFIs	  as	  part	  of	  their	  warehousing	  activity,	  or	  by	  seasoned	  assets	  already	  on	  the	  balance	  
sheets	  of	  the	  CDFIs.	  Advances	  to	  the	  CDFIs	  (backed	  by	  the	  CDFI	  Notes)	  will	  be	  sized	  via	  a	  
borrowing	  base	  formula	  specific	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  assets	  being	  funded.	  The	  Co-­‐op	  will	  use	  the	  
electronic	  MERS	  system	  to	  track	  and	  monitor	  pledged	  collateral	  of	  the	  CDFIs.	  	  Security	  interests	  in	  
assets	  managed	  via	  the	  MERS	  system	  are	  not	  perfected	  under	  the	  Universal	  Commercial	  Code.	  
The	  Co-­‐op	  mitigates	  the	  risk	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  CDFIs	  own	  the	  Co-­‐op.	  	  Pledged	  loans	  in	  excess	  of	  
90	  days	  delinquent	  must	  be	  substituted	  with	  loans	  of	  equivalent	  quality	  and	  rate	  
6. Asset	  Quality:	  The	  Co-­‐op	  will	  keep	  a	  minimum	  of	  100	  percent	  of	  its	  cash	  and	  marketable	  
securities	  invested	  in	  high-­‐quality	  investment	  grade	  instruments	  at	  all	  times.	  It	  will	  keep	  25	  
percent	  of	  its	  total	  assets	  in	  high-­‐quality	  investments.	  In	  addition	  the	  CDFIs	  will	  borrow	  under	  
sublimits	  which	  restrict:	  a)	  obligor	  concentration,;	  b)	  asset	  type;	  and	  c)	  unratable	  assets.	  
7. 	  “Stop-­‐issue”	  Triggers.	  Covenants	  will	  be	  established	  for	  the	  CDFIs	  which	  trigger	  “stop-­‐issuance”	  
through	  the	  Co-­‐op	  in	  the	  event	  of	  default.	  If	  a	  CDFI	  is	  in	  default,	  it	  cannot	  roll	  over	  its	  notes	  to	  the	  
Co-­‐op	  nor	  can	  it	  issue	  new	  notes	  to	  the	  Co-­‐op.	  	  The	  stop-­‐issue	  triggers	  include	  the	  following:	  
	  
a)	  CDFI	  pledged	  loans	  that	  in	  excess	  of	  60	  days	  delinquent	  exceed	  3	  percent	  
b)	  Default	  on	  covenants	  in	  any	  other	  loan	  agreement	  
	  
8. QB	  Capacity:	  The	  group	  of	  CDFIs	  is	  pre-­‐selected	  to	  be	  of	  a	  certain	  size,	  longevity,	  management	  
capacity	  and	  level	  of	  performance.	  	  The	  Co-­‐op	  will	  ensure	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  Co-­‐op	  have	  
maintained	  their	  financial	  health.	  	  Default	  on	  financial	  covenants	  will	  activate	  stop-­‐issuance.	  
Default	  on	  financial	  covenants	  include:	  
	  
a) Loans	  past	  due	  of	  60	  days	  or	  more	  in	  the	  total	  CDFI	  loan	  portfolio	  exceed	  7	  percent	  
b) Maintenance	  of	  a	  current	  ratio	  of	  	  1.05:1	  











The interest rates and loan volumes in Table 6.3 are for testing the profitability of the 
model under different volume and rate scenarios. They scenarios are arbitrary. Key 
assumptions for the remaining items, as continued in Table 6.4, are: 
 
• Approximately $7.9 million of the $20 million in contributed capital and PRI 
funds is invested in high-quality, short-term instruments (line 57, Table 6.4), and 
earn at the commercial paper rate (line 45, Table 6.3).  Interest is also earned on 
cash in line 56 (Table 6.4) at the commercial paper rate. The cash builds up a $1.7 
million surplus over the five-year projection of arbitrary rate scenarios. (The 
earnings from the short-term investments and cash are shown in line 67 and are 
not included in the surplus figure in line 82—a shortcoming of the test model.)  
• Approximately $17 million of the contributed capital and PRI funds is invested 
in high-quality, long-term instruments (line 58) and earns at a 6 percent rate (line 
51, Table 6.3). (This was achievable during most of the years that the Co-op was 
under development). The revenue is shown in line 68 in Table 6.4. 
• Outstanding CDFI notes issued to the Co-op are in line 59, Table 6.4. Co-op notes 
outstanding are shown from $25 million to $45 million to $75 million before 
dropping back to $50 million. The revenue they generate is based on the rate in 
line 46 (Table 6.3), which includes the commercial paper rate and the spread. The 
dollar amount is shown in line 69. The related volume is shown in line 84 for 
each year. It is assumed that the average CDFI financing need—that is, the actual 
!"#$%&'()(&*+,+-&*+./.&01+2345&6%78+79"4:%&;4<%7&=388%7%4/&>+$;9%&"4<&?"/%&@..;9-/3+4.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS Line Rates Year Year Year Year Year 
# % or $ 1 2 3 4 5
A-1 Rate 45 6.00% 3.00% 4.00% 8.00% 2.00%
Plus Spread 46 0.75% 6.75% 3.75% 4.75% 8.75% 2.75%
LIBOR 47 0.25% 6.25% 3.25% 4.25% 8.25% 2.25%
Plus Spread 48 1.00% 7.25% 4.25% 5.25% 9.25% 3.25%
CD Rate 49 0.13% 6.13% 3.13% 4.13% 8.13% 2.13%
Yield Curve Increment 50 0.25% 6.38% 3.38% 4.38% 8.38% 2.38%
Long Term Investment Rate 51 6.00% 17,100 17,100 17,100 17,100 17,100
Bank facilities: Liquidity & Mgmt Fees 52 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50%
Management 53 $250 250 258 265 273 281
Administration/Dealer 54 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25%
PRI Cost 55 1.00%
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duration the money is needed versus the term of the note that determines the 
pricing, which is often 30 days—is four months (turning three times per year). 
• Outstanding Co-op notes to the conduit are shown in line 61 of Table 6.4. They 
track the CDFI notes closely, but in this scenario, the Co-op uses several million 
of its long-term capital to fund the notes.  
• The all-in cost of the bank liquidity fee is .375 percent (line 52, Table 6.3. Line 52 
includes the lead bank’s additional .125 percent for running the syndicate of 
banks). This .375 percent fee is a product of a) the reduced risk occasioned by the 
capital and collateral support; and b) the achievement of a 60+ percent return on 
capital for the bank, assuming a risk-based allocation as shown in Table 6.1. (see 
section, “Bank Return on Capital” below for further explanation).  The dollar cost 
is in line 71. 
• The rate on the PRI, which accounts for three-fourths of the capital of the Co-op, 
is assumed to be 1 percent. The cost is in line 72. 
• Management is estimated at $250,000 a year, rising at the rate of inflation (line 
53). This is likely high.  It is unclear that the Co-op will require more than one 
full-time employee to manage the interests of the members. Co-op members will 
determine this need. The dollar amount is shown in line 75.  
• In addition to the management expense in line 75 is a line item for CARS and/or 
other annual financial analyses to assess financial health of the five CDFI 
members at a rate of $10,000 per analysis.  
• The administrator/dealer in line 54, which runs at 0.25 percent on total 
outstandings, is based on discussions with various providers. The dollar cost is 
shown in line 77. 
• A miscellaneous expense allowance of $50,000 is included, rising at the rate of 
inflation. 
• The charge-offs (line 81) are a summary of assumptions from the Risk Allocation 
Table 6.4.  It is assumed that there is a one-year lag: e.g., this year’s charge-offs 
are against last year’s average outstandings. The charge-offs are unlikely since 
none of the participating CDFI borrowers has ever defaulted on a loan. 
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Table	  6.4.	  	  Summary	  Financials	  for	  the	  Co-­‐op	  in	  Different	  Rate	  and	  Volume	  Scenarios	  
 
BALANCE	  SHEET Line Rates Year	   Year	   Year	   Year	   Year	   
	    %	  or	  $ 1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   
Cash 56	   	   $344	   $532	   $731	   $1,053	   $1,173	   
Treasuries	  -­‐	  ST 57	   	   $7,900	   $7,900	   $7,900	   $7,900	   $7,900	   
Treasuries	  -­‐	  LT 58	   	   $17,100	   $17,100	   $17,100	   $17,100	   $17,100	   
CDFI	  Notes 59	   	   $25,000	   $40,000	   $75,000	   $60,000	   $50,000	   
	  	  	  Total	  Assets 60	   	   $50,344	   $65,532	   $100,731	   $86,053	   $76,173	   
Coop	  Notes	  to	  Conduit 61	   	   $29,900	   $44,900	   $79,887	   $64,832	   $54,892	   
Equity-­‐	  PRI 62	   	   $15,075	   $15,075	   $15,075	   $15,075	   $15,075	   
Equity-­‐	  Grants 63	   25.00% $5,025	   $5,025	   $5,025	   $5,025	   $5,025	   
Excess	  Spread	  Reserve 64	   	   $344	   $532	   $744	   $1,121	   $1,181	   
	  	  	  Total	  Liabilities	  and	  Equity 65	   	   $50,344	   $65,532	   $100,731	   $86,053	   $76,173	   
	   	   	   $0	   $0	   $0	   $0	   $0	   
OPERATING	  STATEMENT 66	   	   	   	   	   	   	   
Investment	  Income	  (ST	  plus	  Cash	  Interest) 67	   	   $474	   $258	   $332	   $661	   $242	   
Reserve	  Income	  (LT) 68	   	   $1,026	   $1,026	   $1,026	   $1,026	   $1,026	   
Commercial	  Paper	  Income 69	   	   $844	   $1,219	   $2,731	   $5,906	   $1,513	   
	  	  	  Total	  Revenues 70	   	   $2,344	   $2,502	   $4,089	   $7,593	   $2,781	   
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   
COF:	  Investors 71	   	   $897	   $1,122	   $2,496	   $5,789	   $1,197	   
COF:	  PRI 72	   	   $151	   $151	   $151	   $151	   $151	   
	  	  	  Total	  Cost	  of	  Funds 73	   	   $1,048	   $1,273	   $2,646	   $5,939	   $1,348	   
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   
(Number	  of	  CDFIs) 74	   5	   	   	   	   	   	   
Management 75	   	   $250	   $258	   $265	   $273	   $281	   
Underwriting	  and	  annual	  review 76	   $10.00	   $50	   $50	   $50	   $50	   $50	   
Administrative/Management 77	   	   $126	   $164	   $252	   $215	   $190	   
Financing 78	   	   $500	   $500	   $500	   $500	   $500	   
Miscellaneous 79	   $25	   $26	   $27	   $28	   $29	   $30	   
	  	  	  Total	  Op	  Exp 80	   	   $952	   $998	   $1,095	   $1,068	   $1,052	   
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   
Charge-­‐off 81	   0.51% $0	   $64	   $166	   $293	   $344	   
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   
	  	  	  Total	  Surplus 82	   	   $344	   $168	   $182	   $293	   $36	   
	   	   	   $344	   $167	   $183	   $293	   $36	   
Note:	  interest	  on	  cash	  not	  included 83	   	   21	   16	   29	   84	   23	   
CDFI	  Note	  Volume 84	   3	   75,000	   120,000	   225,000	   180,000	   150,000	   
CDFI	  Note	  Repayment 85	   	   50,000	   80,000	   150,000	   120,000	   100,000	   
 
 
Credit	  Risk/Credit	  Enhancement	  	  
The plan is designed to provide a reserve structure per asset type identical to what 
existing banks require in their secured warehousing facilities. However, it is somewhat 
more complicated: the FIR team is also attempting to provide an equal level of access to 
each of the participants in the context of the different risk the loans that they warehouse 
present. In the following analysis for balancing risk and access, “investment assets” of 
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the Co-op are distinguished from “risk assets.” The latter are the CDFI promissory notes 
to the Co-op, secured by the pledged assets. 
 
 Risk	  Allocation	  for	  the	  Co-­‐op	  (see	  Table	  6.5).   The distinction between ratable and 
nonratable mortgages is crucial in the allocation capital based on risk. This issue is 
further detailed in Appendix D, along with the guidance language from the Federal 
Reserve. The question is whether an asset can be assigned to an investment grade pool 
or not, given the criteria of the rating agencies. The distinction requires materially 
different risk allocations by the banking partner, whether on or off the bank’s balance 
sheet. The higher allocation of collateral reserves, which may also be a percentage 
advance against the full face value of the assets warehoused by the CDFI (for example, 
the Co-op advances funds representing 85 percent of the value of the CDFIs assets being 
financed), is intended to level the risk, so that all CDFI borrowings represent equal risk 
to the Co-op. It is assumed that additional credit enhancement by the banks is not 
necessary given that the collateral and capital requirements are enough to help the 
banks achieve a 10 percent credit conversion ratio and an 8 percent risk-based capital 
ratio in all asset classes. The only exceptions to this are the unsecured, ratable, single-
family first mortgages, for which we assume a 4 percent risk-based capital ratio. This is 
in line with the current practice of the market and assent of the regulatory agencies.  
 
 
Another key assumption is that the Co-op notes will reflect the same term as the CDFI 
notes, and that the conduit-issued commercial paper will have the same maturity. It is 
also assumed that the CDFI borrowers will typically borrow at the 30-day rate and 
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RISK ALLOCATION Line Size Total Charge- Collateral Co-op % Managed Management Liquidity Credit RBC RBC 
# Off Reserve $ Capital $ $ Fee $ Facility Conversion % $
Treasuries 22 25,000 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 100.00% 25,000 0.125% 31 0.38% 94 10.00% 4.00% 100
Single Family 23 0 23,000
First Mortgage Ratable 24 10% 10,000 0.25% 2.50% 250 2.50% 250 100.00% 10,000 0.125% 13 0.375% 38 10.00% 4.00% 40
First Mortgage Not Ratable 25 13% 13,000 0.50% 5.00% 650 5.00% 650 100.00% 13,000 0.125% 16 0.375% 49 10.00% 8.00% 104
Single Family 26 0 2,000
Second Mortgage Not Ratable 27 2,000 1.00% 10.00% 200 10.00% 200 100.00% 2,000 0.125% 3 0.375% 8 10.00% 8.00% 16
5
Multifamily 28 0 10,000
First Mortgage Ratable 29 5% 5,000 0.25% 2.50% 125 2.50% 125 100.00% 5,000 0.125% 6 0.375% 19 10.00% 8.00% 40
First Mortgage Not Ratable 30 5% 5,000 0.50% 5.00% 250 5.00% 250 100.00% 5,000 0.125% 6 0.375% 19 10.00% 8.00% 40
Multifamily 31 0 10,000
Second Mortgage Not Ratable 32 10,000 1.00% 10.00% 1,000 10.00% 1,000 100.00% 10,000 0.125% 13 0.375% 38 10.00% 8.00% 80
Community Facility 33 0 15,000
First Mortgage Not Ratable 34 15,000 0.50% 5.00% 750 5.00% 750 100.00% 15,000 0.125% 19 0.375% 56 10.00% 8.00% 120
Small Business 35 0 15,000
First Mortgage Ratable 36 5% 5,000 0.75% 7.50% 375 7.50% 375 100.00% 5,000 0.125% 6 0.375% 19 10.00% 8.00% 40
First Mortgage Not Ratable 37 10% 10,000 1.50% 15.00% 1,500 15.00% 1,500 100.00% 10,000 0.125% 13 0.375% 38 10.00% 8.00% 80
Unsecured Credit Line 38 0
Not Ratable 39 0 3.00% 30.00% 0 30.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.125% 0 0.375% 0 50.00% 16.00% 0
125 375
Treasuries 40 25,000 0.40% 100
Ratable 41 20,000 750 750 0.60% 120
Unratable 42 55,000 4,350 4,350 0.65% 360
Unallocated 43 15,000
   Total 44 100,000 5,100 20,100 0.58% 580
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rollover at 30 days until the need for funding ends with an asset sale. These factors 
minimize the asset-liability risk and maximize the liquidity of the Co-op.  
 
Other key assumptions include: 
 
• The breakdown between ratable and unratable loans by asset class is an estimate 
on the basis of discussions with the potential CDFI members. The Co-op 
members can change these sublimits as they see fit, understanding there may 
well be a change in risk-based capital and financing fees as a result. 
• The charge-offs in the fourth column of Table 6.5 are estimates.  All the collateral 
and capital coverage figures are based on the charge-off assumptions. Hence, 
they are the critical part of the allocation equation.  It is unlikely that the 
incidence of charge-offs will be this high, given that none of the CDFI borrowers 
has been delinquent on loans and there have been no charge-offs. However, it is 
appropriate to err on the side of conservatism, and the estimated cushion allows 
for alterations in other items.  
• Collateral reserves at the CDFIs are calculated at 10 times the estimated charge-
off rate.  
• Co-op capital required is also 10 times the estimated charge-off rate. This is 
called allocated capital. Notably, the total capital of the Co-op exceeds this 
requirement by $15 million, shown in Table 6.5 as the “unallocated” portion of 
capital.  
• Allocated capital consists of $0.75 million (line 41) for ratable paper and $4.35 
million (line 42) for unratable paper. This leaves $15 million as unallocated 
capital (line 43) available for allocation as needed in the future.  
 
This asset and risk allocation process is rather complex. But when aggregating different 
kinds of assets from different organizations through a single conduit, the complexity is 
unavoidable. If we were dealing with one asset class and only one CDFI, the exercise 
would be unnecessary. However, the biggest challenge for the CDFI field relative to the 
capital markets is scale. To achieve scale, CDFIs must bring different assets together 
from a number of different lenders. Table 6.5 allocates capital and funding as equitably 
as possible while minimizing the risk to the Co-op. This process of minimizing risk to 
the Co-op is a key driver in minimizing the risk premium that the bank syndicate builds 
into the cost of the liquidity facility, and the rate the investors accept on the commercial 
paper. Table 6.5 shows the process by which this allocation is accomplished: creating 
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equal access for each participant in terms of dollar amount, while balancing the risks of 
their respective concentration of assets. Notably, this set of allocations would be 
adjusted annually, quarterly, or perhaps even monthly in response to conditions in the 
marketplace.  Table 6.6 displays the layers of protection against credit risk on the 
borrowed funds.   
 
 
Table	  6.6.	  CDFI	  Coverage	  from	  Bank	  and	  Investors’	  
View	  
 
CDFI	  Note	  Portfolio Line Rates 
	   #	   %	  or	  $ 
CDFI	  NOTES	  (DEBT)	  TO	  CO-­‐OP	   	   	   
Losses: 	   	   
Total	  Charge-­‐offs 86	   510	   
Charge-­‐off	  Ratio 87	   0.51% 
	   	   	   
Collateral	  Coverage	  at	  CDFI: 	   	   
Collateral	  Reserve	  to	  Charge-­‐offs 88	   10	   
Collateral	  Coverage	  on	  Rated 89	   3.75% 
Collateral	  Coverage	  on	  Unrated 90	   7.91% 
Combined	  Collateral	  Coverage 91	   6.80% 
	   	   	   
Capital	  Coverage	  at	  Coop: 	   	   
Capital	  to	  Charge-­‐offs 92	   10	   
Capital	  Coverage	  on	  Treasuries 93	   0.00% 
Capital	  on	  Rated	  (Allocated) 94	   3.75% 
Capital	  on	  Unrated	  (Allocated) 95	   7.91% 
Unallocated	  Capital 96	   20.00% 
	   	   	   
Total	  Coverage	  Treasuries 97	   0.00% 
Total	  Coverage	  Rated 98	   7.50% 
Total	  Coverage	  Unrated 99	   15.82% 
Total	  Unallocated	  to	  Risk	  Assets 100	   20.00% 
Total	  Capital	  and	  Collateral	  to	  Risk	  Assets 101	   33.60% 
	   	   	   
 
Table 6.6 illustrates what we introduced above, but from the standpoint of the funding 
participants. It shows that in this scenario for the Commercial Paper Co-op, the 
following holds:   
 
• Based on the configuration of loans in Table 6.5, the overcollateralization for 
unrated assets is 3.75 percent (line 89, Table 6.6) and 7.9 percent for unrated 
assets (line 90).  Hence, on a combined basis, at the fullest borrowing, the 
overcollateralization on the CDFI balance sheet (that is, what the CDFIs hold in 
reserve over and above the loans they are pledging) is 6.80 percent (line 91). Of 
course, as we noted, those with a higher level of unrated assets must keep higher 
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reserves on their balance sheet, and those with rated assets can keep lower 
reserves (a distinction which can be enforced, as noted above, through the Co-
op’s adjustment of advance rates against the value of the assets that the CDFIs 
pledge). 
• The reserves required by the Co-op, which are in addition to the CDFI 
overcollateralization, are 3.75 percent for total rated assets (line 94) and 7.91 
percent of total unrated assets (line 95). In theory, this is similar to what the 
CDFIs hold in reserve on their balance sheets. But the Co-op holds these reserves 
in cash and marketable securities. In addition, the Co-op maintains 
overcollateralization of another 20 percent (line 96) of the risk assets (the $15 
million noted above) that remain unallocated against the risk assets. This is held 
in case the estimates for the rated or unrated assets prove insufficient to cover 
actual or perceived risk.  
• Thus, against the maximum of $75 million in Co-op borrowings from the 
commercial paper market, backed by the overcollateralized CDFI pledges of 
rated and unrated assets on their balance sheets, and the overcollateralization on 
the Co-op balance sheet, there is a combined reserve against losses of 33.60 
percent (line 101) when the Co-op notes are fully outstanding.  
• Against the entire $100 million facility, including the $25 million in treasuries, the 
combined collateral and cash reserves of the CDFIs and the Co-op amount to 
$25.2 million, or 25.2 percent, providing a very sound level of credit support.  
 
In other words, before the banks felt any losses, the Co-op’s risk assets and total assets 
would have to lose $25.2 million. And for this to occur, more than one of the 
participating CDFIs would have to be liquidated with no value attributed to its pledged 
assets.  
 
Notably, this entire procedure gives no value to the organizational credit risk of the 
participating CDFIs. In reality, the organizational risk would be the most valuable part 
of the risk mitigation structure, but because the rating agencies are not yet prepared to 
value CDFI organizational credit risk, no value is set aside for it. Indeed, the 
Commercial Paper Co-op is structured to bypass the need for evaluating CDFI 
organizational credit risk.  This is an important point: while one of the original objectives 
of the FIR team was to get the rating agencies to assess CDFI organizational credit risk, 
the team recognized during the Capital Exchange effort that this would be an 
impediment. Hence, a big step forward is the strategic avoidance of organizational 
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credit risk assessment for the CDFIs with the credit enhancement structure summarized 
above.  
 
However, what applies for the CDFI participants does not apply to the Co-op itself. The 
Co-op must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of its organizational credit risk as 
part of the rating process. To protect the assets and the bank liquidity facility, the Co-op 
must function safely and soundly as a going concern.  Key ratios, as set forth in Table 
6.7, indicate the following attributes of the Co-op under widely variable rate and volume 
conditions: 
 
• Surpluses are manageable. Although we show a declining trend in this scenario 
owing to high loss assumptions, conservative cost estimates, and a negative 
asset-liability tilt, the model shows the capacity to generate surpluses (line 103) 
in this interest spread range. 
• Liquidity is strong. A high level of investment grade assets is maintained at all 
times against risk assets (line 110); the months of cash on hand are more than 
adequate (line 115), and the three-times turnover (lines 84 and 85 in Table 6.4) 
provide considerable discretion over cash allocations. 
• Capital is strong.  Leverage (line 114) is low given the high-quality and short-
term nature of the CDFI notes that the Co-op holds. Risk assets do not rise higher 
than 75 percent (line 111), and, at worst, would have to shrink in value by 35 
percent for the banks to lose money (line 112). 
Graphing these results highlights the acceptable risk of the Co-op structure.  In Figure 
6.2, the Co-op is at the greatest risk in terms of leverage in scenario 3, when borrowing is 
at its fullest extent at $75 million. However, the leverage ratio (i.e.. liabilities to net 
assets) is still less than 4:1, an acceptable level. Under lesser levels of borrowing, the 
liability to net asset ratio is less. Meanwhile, in all five scenarios, the surplus to asset 
ratio is always positive, indicating room for changes in costs or risk allocations.  
 
It is evident how these indicators of financial health interrelate in the five scenarios in 
Figure 6.2. Although two ratios measuring the ability to cover risk (cash and treasuries 
to Co-op notes and risk loss coverage) both dip in scenario 3 in Figure 6.3, when the 
CDFI and Co-op borrowing is at the maximum $75 million, the credit risk remains 
manageable.  And again, at lower levels of borrowing, the coverages are greater.  
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Table	  6.7.	  How	  the	  Co-­‐op	  Performs	  How	  It	  Covers	  Credit	  Risk	  in	  Different	  	  
Rate	  and	  Volume	  Scenarios	  
 Line Year	   Year	   Year	   Year	   Year	   
	    1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   
OPERATING	  STATEMENT 	   	   	   	   	   	   
Revenues	  to	  Avg.	  Total	  Assets 102	   9.31% 4.32% 4.92% 8.13% 3.43% 
Surplus	  to	  Avg.	  Total	  Assets 103	   1.37% 0.29% 0.22% 0.31% 0.04% 
Operating	  Expenses	  to	  Avg.	  Total	  Assets 104	   3.78% 1.72% 1.32% 1.14% 1.30% 
Funding	  Cost	  to	  Avg.	  Total	  Assets 105	   4.16% 2.20% 3.18% 6.36% 1.66% 
Losses	  to	  Avg.	  Total	  Assets 106	   0.00% 0.11% 0.20% 0.31% 0.42% 
	  	  	  Average	  Assets 107	   25,172	   57,938	   83,131	   93,392	   81,113	   
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   
RISK	  COVERAGE 	   	   	   	   	   	   
Cash	  and	  ST	  Treasuries	  to	  Risk	  Assets 108	   32.98% 21.08% 11.51% 14.92% 18.15% 
Cash	  and	  ST	  Treasuries	  to	  Co-­‐op	  Notes 109	   27.57% 18.78% 10.80% 13.81% 16.53% 
Cash	  and	  All	  Treasuries	  to	  Co-­‐op	  Notes 110	   53.99% 36.37% 20.69% 25.99% 30.92% 
Risk	  Assets	  to	  Total	  Assets 111	   49.66% 61.04% 74.46% 69.72% 65.64% 
First	  Loss	  Coverage	  (Capital	  +	  Collateral) 112	   102.18% 64.33% 34.59% 43.87% 52.76% 
First	  Loss	  Coverage	  (Coop	  Capital	  only) 113	   81.78% 51.58% 27.79% 35.37% 42.56% 
Total	  Liabilities	  to	  Net	  Assets 114	   1.46	   2.18	   3.83	   3.06	   2.58	   
Months	  Op	  Cash	  on	  Hand 115	   4	   6	   8	   12	   13	   




Again, it is unlikely that the Co-op would be sustaining any losses, since the reserves at 
the CDFI level (representing 10 times annual charge-offs) would absorb losses first. And 
once again, the CDFI notes are first and foremost obligations of each CDFI. From a 
practical standpoint, it is likely that the CDFI itself would make the requisite payments 
using its own cash flow. This suggests that, at a spread of 75 basis points over the 
commercial paper rate, there is more than adequate cushion to maintain and build 
capital.  
 
To avoid the necessity and cost of obtaining credit enhancement from the banks, it is important to 
take a look at the risk from the standpoint of the banks providing the liquidity facility, and the 
rating agencies.  
	  
Risk	  analysis	  for	  the	  banks	  and	  rating	  agencies. The chief difference between the proposed 
Co-op structure and existing bank warehousing lines is that the banks’ obligor is the Co-
op. Rather than having a direct security interest in the loans being warehoused by five 
distinct CDFIs, the banks have a direct security interest in the notes of these CDFIs. 
These notes, in turn, are secured by those loans. In effect, the banks are one further step 
removed from the CDFIs’ loan assets. 
0Qw 
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However, in substitution for the direct claim on the CDFI loan assets, the banks receive 
the following: 
 
1. First loss: A direct claim on Co-op capital. The capital serves as a first loss against the 
total $100 million value of the facility. Because the Co-op is designed to generate 
surpluses, this is likely to grow as a percentage of the total facility. 
2. Asset Security: First lien interest in the Co-op’s assets. The Co-op’s assets consist of 
high-grade investments (25 percent) and CDFI promissory notes that are, at the very 
least, 100 percent secured by mortgages, plus (in this scenario) a minimum of 6.80 
percent in collateral reserves at the CDFI.    
3. Collateral Cushion: The Co-op will make advances against the CDFI short-term 
secured notes on a borrowing base formula that ensures a collateral cushion specific 
to the assets being financed by the CDFI.  
4. Liquidity: the Co-op targets a $25 million investment in high-grade securities and 
will commit to maintaining no less than a minimum of 25 percent of total assets in 
these instruments. 
5. Early Warning: the Co-op will enforce “stop issue” triggers designed to identify 
deteriorating trends at a member CDFI and to terminate its ability to roll notes over 
if the trends are negative. 
6. The capacity of the obligors: The members are selected on the basis of their size, 
longevity, and performance.  Among other tools, the Co-op will use the CDFI 
Assessment and Rating System (CARS) for evaluating performance of the CDFI 
obligors. 
7. A diversified portfolio: For the same dollar of community investment, the bank gets 
a much more diversified portfolio in terms of obligor, geography, asset class and 
risk. 
 
In effect, the banks will be gaining a first loss reserve, liquidity, trigger mechanisms and 
portfolio diversification, all of which add up to level of credit support that they 
previously did not have.   
 
These factors enable the banks to reduce their capital allocation against community development 
assets of the type being financed by the Co-op by more than 90 percent, a reduction that sets the 
stage for a significant increase in return on capital. 
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Thus, the Commercial Paper Co-op provides a level of credit support well in excess of 
what the banks would garner by lending to the CDFIs alone, while at the same time, 
increasing their profitability. This brings the Commercial Paper Co-op close to that 
highly coveted Wall Street designation: “no-brainer.”   
 
Bank	  Return	  on	  Capital	  
The collateral at the CDFIs and the capital at the Co-op were structured to ensure that 
the CDFI notes, backed by all-mortgage types with all-mortgage risks, obtained 
investment grade for risk-based allocation treatment. So long as the collateral and capital 
achieve investment grade status, the pricing for the bank’s liquidity facility (i.e., 0.375 
percent) should be reasonably attractive, as the 64.66 percent return on capital (line 122) 
in Table 6.8 would suggest.  The pricing is even more attractive for the lead bank: if the 
lead bank retains 100 percent of the liquidity facility, it generates an 86.21 percent return 
on capital; but if it participates out 90 percent of the risk to a syndicate of banks, its 
(annual) return on capital goes to 280.17 percent. It’s another demonstration of what we 
introduced in Chapter 1: how the high asset turnover strategy pumps up the return on 
capital. It’s also another demonstration of why securitization is such an efficient and 
attractive tool.  
 
 
Table	  6.8.	  	  	  Return	  on	  Equity 
 Line Rate $ (000s) 
Capital	  required	  for	  unrated	  assets 117 0.65% 360 
Capital	  required	  for	  total	  facility 118 0.58% 580 
Syndicate	  lead	  management	  fee 119 0.13% 125 
Liquidity	  fee 120 0.38% 250 
Total	  fees 121  500 
Return	  on	  capital	  for	  syndicate	  bank 122 64.66%  
ROC	  for	  lead	  bank	  with	  100%	  retention	   123	   86.21%	    
ROC	  for	  lead	  bank	  with	  10%	  retention	   124	   280.17%	    
 
 
Low-cost financing at a market-based rate while generating both CRA credit and higher 
returns on capital for the bank is a big breakthrough for the CDFI field. In addition, 
because CDFIs are only working with banks that already make loans to participating 
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CDFIs, the Co-op removes the intense scrutiny by the banks of the CDFI organizational 
credit risk that would otherwise be required. In this case, the banks are willing to back 
the CDFI organizational credit risk because they already have it on their books. Hence, 
as it is showing banks how to lend to CDFIs more profitably, the Co-op is also 
advancing a platform that can produce rating-agency-level performance data, without 
the cost, time and effort of building a mutually workable CDFI credit assessment 
platform. Complex as the structure is, it is an end run around the chief obstacles to the 
capital markets the FIR team faced in the Mini-Fed and the Capital Exchange.  
 
This is not to say, however, that the FIR team is abandoning rating agencies and their 
assessment of CDFI organizational risk. On the contrary, it is expected that, as the CDFIs 
and their assets perform, the level of first-loss protection can be reduced; that is, the 
overall facility can increase from $100 million to $250 million or more on the same level 
of capital. Alternatively, the Co-op can introduce higher-risk or less common forms of 
assets in the future, such as social enterprise, predevelopment, or—and here we get back 
to the original purpose—unsecured working capital loans. 
 
What	  Worked	  for	  the	  Commercial	  Paper	  Co-­‐op	  	  
 
Assuming the funds could be raised and final deal points worked out, CDFIs—at least a 
few at the top, anyway—could finally reach the capital markets, and achieve the 
“funding parity” with for-profit lenders that the FIR team had been seeking since 2001.  
 
Advantages of the Co-op included:   
 
• Incorporation of bank needs into the structure. The biggest breakthrough of the Co-
op was the incorporation of bank metrics and perspectives into the structuring 
and pricing of the platform. For the first time, the constraints of the banks from a 
credit and operational standpoint were analyzed and addressed in relation to 
their risk-based capital allocation process. By making this connection effectively 
on a partnership basis, it predisposed the banks to going forward on familiar 
ground in terms of their regulatory guidelines and profitability targets. 
• Minimum size of $100 million. The Co-op team was able to identify CDFIs that had 
short-term funding needs sufficient to justify at least a $100 million facility. In 
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fact, the short-term funding needs of the prospective participants were well in 
excess of $100 million.  
• Market-rate investment versus social investment. In terms of size and risk/return, 
the Co-op could be evaluated on the same playing field as other corporate and 
institutional debt transactions. Because there was no subsidy beyond the initial 
capital infusion, the transaction could be evaluated solely on its merits. Given the 
benefit of hindsight, the merits of this transaction would have placed it fairly 
high on the list of quality commercial paper issuers, particularly relative to the 
home mortgage market. The Co-op would have been a step forward from 
another standpoint as well: other than the $20 million injection of subsidy at the 
front end, there was no further need for social investment.  
• Identification of a limited range of assets to be pledged. The focus on mortgage assets 
being held primarily for sale or resale enabled the Co-op to avoid the complexity 
and time-consuming research and negotiation associated with the Capital 
Exchange and the Mini-Fed. At the same time, the focus enabled potential 
participants to detail specific problems with their existing funding structures that 
the Co-op could resolve; for example, reduced paperwork, legal and 
administrative costs, and the potential for funding existing and new mortgages 
held for sale or resale.  
• Identification of a limited number of likely CDFI participants. The focus on size of 
borrowing need and assets held for sale offered another benefit: it essentially 
self-selected the potential participants. CDFIs sophisticated enough to be active 
sellers of mortgage assets would be familiar with the obstacles that the Co-op 
was attempting to overcome with the banks and the commercial paper market. 
Moreover, they could actively assist in crafting the terms and conditions of the 
Co-op product lines, services, and financing arrangements.  
• Maturities. The interest shown by the CDFIs in participating in the Co-op clearly 
demonstrated that community development entities had short-term funding 
needs. It was also apparent that the existing short-term funding facilities that 
these CDFIs were obtaining were not, for the most part, competitive with what 
private-sector lenders were obtaining.  
• Risk assessment by the banks. One of the most important strategies was to restrict 
bank participation to only those banks that were already lending to the CDFI 
participants on an unsecured or secured (warehouse) basis. Hence, the banks 
participating had the detailed credit loss data the rating agencies required—data 
the community development industry had been as yet unable to provide. This 
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not only eliminated the tension associated with taking on new risk, but it also put 
the banks into a position where they could clearly see, individually as well as 
collectively, that working through the Co-op was both more prudent and more 
profitable than retaining the funding and credit risk of the loans on their balance 
sheets.  
• The cost of underwriting and risk monitoring. Requiring participating banks to 
already be lending to CDFI borrowers also substantially reduced the cost to the 
Co-op of monitoring the CDFIs. Banks were already conducting this function in 
the normal course of business. Limiting the number of participating CDFIs also 
reduced the cost. In addition, the Co-op could subscribe to CARS and get the 
needed ratings for substantially less than the Capital Exchange target of $15,000 
apiece. This would substantially reduce the amount of staff activity required to 
maintain the portfolio for the Co-op vis-à-vis the earlier iterations.  
• Credit Enhancement. Because the Co-op was open only to banks that had already 
approved and extended credit on participating CDFIs and CDFI assets, and 
because it had several layers of solid protection, credit enhancement from the 
banks was no longer necessary. The need for support was confined to a liquidity 
facility instead. The liquidity facility guarantees that investors will get paid in 
full at maturity. It does not cover credit loss. This elimination of credit 
enhancement from the banks enabled the Co-op to target a lower cost of bank 
support, dropping the fee from the Capital Exchange minimum of .625 percent (it 
was likely to be more) to the 0.50 percent range (including the 0.125 percent for 
the lead bank). This freed up at least 0.125 percent for support of the operations 
of the Co-op.  
• A high-quality rating without scrutiny of CDFI organizational risk. Along with the 
bank liquidity facility, the $20 million in grant and PRI support and the other 
layers of protection were designed to achieve the A-1/P-1 level rating on 
commercial paper. The benefits were threefold:  1) it provided CDFIs access to 
the commercial paper market for the first time; 2) it provided CDFI participants 
with the lowest rates in the market; and 3) it provided the rating agencies with a 
platform for viewing the performance of CDFIs and CDFI assets, a platform that 
was loaded in favor of the CDFI point of view.  
That said, the Co-op structure alleviated the rating agencies of the need to 
establish an upfront platform for evaluating organizational risk. Essentially, with 
the existing conduit, the bank liquidity facility, the borrowing base, the Co-op 
capital, and the CDFI asset performance data, it was no longer necessary to 
173 
review the organizational risk of the participating CDFIs at inception. Given the 
time frame needed to arrive at a mutually compatible analytical framework, 
bypassing the organizational risk component while still getting a top rating was 
a significant improvement. Of course, once the Co-op was up and running with 
its pledged assets and borrowing base, its ongoing operational performance 
would contribute to the development of that framework. There was an 
additional bonus: one of the rating agencies indicated that it would be willing to 
“shadow rate” participating CDFIs should the CDFI so desire (see Chapter 7 for 
further discussion). Although this would have no effect on the operations of the 
Co-op, it could be used to initiate the transfer of knowledge and analytical 
metrics on organizational credit risk to the rating agencies.  
• Credit Risk. At 0.5 percent forecasted annual loss rates, the level of projected 
charge-offs by the Co-op was well in excess of the rates of charge-off actually 
experienced by the lenders to the five CDFI participants. The real loss rate was 0 
percent, in line with the actual experience of the borrowers selected.  
• Asset /liability management: The notes the CDFIs issued to the Co-op had 
approximately the same term as the commercial paper issued by the conduit. 
This reduced the risk of asset/liability mismatch at the Co-op and elevated the 
credit quality of the Co-op from the standpoint of both bank and rating agency 
risk assessment.  
• Existing commercial paper conduit. As discovered in the Capital Exchange effort, 
the cost of establishing a single-purpose commercial paper conduit for the CDFIs 
was high (approximately $500,000-750,000). Using an existing bank supported or 
managed conduit eliminated the bulk of that cost. Equally important, it enabled 
investors in the marketplace to fund the Co-op and the participating CDFIs, on 
par with other issuers.  
• Control of rates and yields. Because of the reduced cost of the bank support (e.g., 
liquidity but without bank credit enhancement), there was more room for 
generating surpluses. Consequently the Co-op had more discretion in 
determining the pricing on the CDFI notes, the design and allocation of the 
assets, the configuration of staff functions, and the risk profile for assets and 
additional CDFI participants. The participating CDFIs could also determine how 
much could be distributed to the owners (themselves).  
• Simplifying donor, lender and investor funding. As with the Mini-Fed and the 
Capital Exchange, centralizing and consolidating CDFI credit exposure into a 
single entity simultaneously reduced credit risk through diversification, 
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simplified the grant-making decision, and confined the grant support to a single 
upfront infusion of cash. The Co-op offered another benefit: the social investors 
were handing over the responsibility for funding future needs to the 
marketplace, without compromising the mission.  
• Leveraging grant dollars. The capacity to deploy $5 million of grant capital and $15 
million of PRIs in the Co-op enabled social investors and foundations to produce 
lending volume up to 10 times the amount of the grants annually, assuming the 
rollover of notes). There is no other financial vehicle in the community 
development sector that comes close to this subsidy-leveraging capacity.  
• Sustainability. With this level of bank and administrative fees, staff and charge-
offs, the Co-op could deploy the initial grant and PRIs without the need for a 
continuing subsidy. Moreover, the capital was designed to grow over time 
through the generation of surpluses at the Co-op. Its sustainability was 
reinforced by the fact that the owners of the Co-op (the CDFI participants) had 
the authority to determine the pricing, asset allocation, and the staffing 
configuration in response to market conditions.   
 
What	  Didn’t	  Work	  for	  the	  Commercial	  Paper	  Co-­‐op	  	  
 
On April 29, 2008, the FIR team sent the following letter to the participating CDFIs and 
banks:  
 
Given	   events	   in	   the	   institutional	  marketplace	  as	  well	   as	   the	  mortgage	  market,	   it	   is	  
clear	  that	  the	  assumptions	  we	  have	  been	  working	  with	  on	  the	  project	  have	  ceased	  
being	   applicable.	   Initially	   we	   thought	   that	   the	   structure	   would	   be	   so	   much	   more	  
attractive	  than	  ABCP	  for	  investors,	  and	  so	  much	  more	  compelling	  for	  the	  banks,	  and	  
that	  the	  current	  crisis	  would	  not	  affect	  either	  the	  structure	  or	  the	  pricing.	  We	  were	  
wrong.	  	  
	  	  
The	  Commercial	  Paper	  Co-­‐op	  as	  structured	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  get	  CDFI	  organizational	  
risk	  funded	  at	  the	  cheapest	  rates	  in	  the	  money	  markets	  -­‐-­‐	  with	  more	  than	  adequate	  
protection	   for	   the	   credit	   enhancing	   banks.	   The	   structure	   is	   almost	   surgical	   in	   its	  
allocation	  of	  risk	  and	  pricing.	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But	  we	  are	  not	  in	  a	  time	  of	  surgical	  solutions.	  The	  financial	  markets	  are	  in	  a	  time	  of	  
blunt	   instruments,	   trauma,	   and	   dislocation.	   Some	   of	   the	   key	   features	   that	   are	  
affected	  by	  the	  changing	  conditions	  are:	  
• Almost	  half	  of	  the	  underlying	  collateral	  for	  the	  Co-­‐op	  is	   in	  affordable	  single	  
family	  mortgages;	  	  
• The	   remainder	   is	   in	   generally	  higher	   risk	   loans,	   including	   development,	  
multifamily,	  small	  business	  and	  community	  facility	  loans;	  	  
• The	   pricing	   on	   the	   credit	   enhancement	   is	   based	   on	   a	   syndicated	   liquidity	  
facility	  at	  the	  AAA	  level	  of	  credit;	  	  
• The	  allocation	  of	  risk	  is	  based	  on	  a	  determination	  of	  how	  much	  of	  each	  type	  
of	   loan	   is	   ratable	   or	   unratable	   based	   on	   regulatory	   and	   Rating	   Agency	  
criteria;	  	  
• The	   double	   layer	   of	   organizational	   support	   distinguishes	   the	   notes	   from	  
ABCP	   vehicles	   and	   other	   financial	  obligations	   -­‐-­‐	   resulting	   in	   a	   premium	  
versus	  LIBOR	  and	  ABCP	  commercial	  paper	  rates;	  	  
• The	  benefits	  to	  the	  banks	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  credit	  conversion	  ratio	  and	  the	  risk	  
based	   capital	   allocation	   is	   derived	   from	   current	   regulatory	   thinking	   about	  
special	  purpose	  vehicles;	  	  
• The	  amount	  of	  subsidy	  is	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  access	  to	  ratings	  and	  the	  
capital	   markets	   is	   a	   clear	   priority	   for	   the	   community	   development	   field	  
among	  philanthropists	  and	  participating	  organizations.	  	  	  
	  
Each	  of	  these	   is	  a	  key	  driver	  of	  the	  Commercial	  Paper	  Co-­‐op	  platform,	  and	  each	  of	  
them,	   due	   to	  market	   conditions,	  is	   now	   in	  motion.	   This	  makes	   it	   that	  much	  more	  
difficult	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  the	  Co-­‐op—even	  as	  the	  tightening	  of	  credit	  makes	  the	  
Co-­‐op	  more	  valuable	   for	  both	   the	  banks	  and	   the	  participating	  CDFIs.	  We	  don't	   see	  
how,	  at	  present,	  we	  can	  pull	  all	  of	  these	  volatile	  items	  together	  in	  what	  would	  be	  an	  
ambitious	  undertaking—even	  in	  even	  static	  markets.	  	  
	  
We	  don't	   see	   this	   as	   an	   end	  of	   the	   effort	   so	  much	   as	   a	   hiatus.	   The	   key	   operating	  
concept—to	   work	   the	   CDFI	   access	   to	   capital	   markets	   around	   the	   capital	   and	  
profitability	   needs	   of	   the	   participating	   banks—remains	   viable	   under	   any	   set	   of	  




We	  will	   be	   reporting	   on	   the	   efforts	   so	   that,	   when	   we	   do	   revive	   the	   attempt,	   the	  
work	   with	   the	   CDFIs,	   the	   regulators,	   the	   banks	   and	   the	   rating	   agencies	   does	   not	  
have	   to	  be	   reinvented.	  We	  are	   in	   the	  process	  of	  writing	   the	   report,	  which	   include	  
the	   participants,	   the	   chief	   contacts,	   calculations,	   software	   and	   the	   history	   of	   the	  
effort.	   The	   working	   title	   of	   the	   report	   is:	   Securitizing	   Organizational	   Risk:	   Wins,	  
Losses	   and	  Opportunities	   for	   CDFIs	   in	   the	  Capital	  Markets.	   It	   will	   be	   published	  by	  
Southern	  New	  Hampshire	  University,	  hopefully	  later	  this	  year.	  
 
 
The market continued to deteriorate after April, descending into virtual chaos in 
October 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The slide rendered the weaknesses 
in the key drivers both more obvious and more trenchant. We discuss each of the letter’s 
bullet points (in italics below) in more detail, to gain more insight into what happens 
when the financial markets collapse.  
Almost half of the underlying collateral for the Co-op is in affordable single-family 
mortgages; the remainder is in generally higher-risk loans, including development, 
multifamily, small business, and community facility loans.  
As initially conceived, the CDFI mortgage assets were pledged to support the CDFI 
organizational risk at the Co-op level. This was considered necessary given that a) the 
organizational risk was considered unassessable; and b) the assets to be pledged were 
already being used by the banks as the basis for extending credit, primarily in the form 
of secured bank warehousing lines.  
As of February 2010, institutions had written down well over a trillion dollars of value in 
the home mortgage market. Through late 2008 and the better part of 2009, some in the 
investor community and the media continued to blame (incorrectly, see Chapter 1) the 
housing crisis on low-income homeowners (i.e., the community development 
constituency). During the period, bank warehousing lines were dramatically reduced or 
cancelled across the marketplace, thereby undercutting the capacity to originate as well 
as sell loans of any kind. Even the best CDFIs were unable to avoid the reductions and 
cancellations in warehousing facilities. To be sure, there were enough low-income 
homeowners, small businesses, and other kinds of community-based borrowers in 
distress to warrant concern about assuming added risk. Unfortunately, the perception 
was driving reality, and the overwhelmingly negative perception of community-based 
loans made a proposal like the Co-op, which was largely focused on providing better 
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pricing for CDFI warehousing lines, very difficult. The perception that the markets had 
not yet reached the bottom in housing prices continued to compound the difficulty.  
When low-income mortgages lost support in the marketplace, followed by a general 
tightening of credit, the pledged mortgages of the participating CDFIs became just as 
impossible to assess as the CDFI organizational risk. Although it would be possible to 
present the Co-op as a prime credit to the banks, the rating agencies, the investing 
public, and perhaps most important, the regulators, it could only be accomplished by a 
significant increase in capital, if it were to be accomplished at all.  
The pricing on the bank support is based on a syndicated liquidity facility at the AAA level of 
credit.  
The collapse of the housing and, consequently, the asset-backed commercial paper 
markets strained bank balance sheets. Not only were bank portfolio assets called into 
question, but banks had to make good on their liquidity and credit enhancement 
facilities to the special purpose vehicles (such as the Co-op). This added even more 
assets to their balance sheets, many of them of questionable value (as in Case IV in 
Chapter 3). Banks had differing levels of stress, and some questioned whether a top 
rating could be produced with all the participating banks.  
 
As we saw in Chapter 3, one of the key indicators of bank distress was the LIBOR rate, 
the primary base rate for higher-quality borrowers. Not only did the LIBOR rate diverge 
dramatically from nonfinancial commercial paper rates and the fed funds, but its very 
validity was called into question by the market. There were indications that some banks 
were underreporting the true cost of their LIBOR deposits to assure rating agencies and 
investors that they were as strong as other banks. Since LIBOR reporting is voluntary, 
there was no authority in place to enforce accurate reporting. Loss of confidence in this 
index further undermined confidence in the banking system, which exacerbated the 
divergence of LIBOR from other short-term money market rates. The rise in the cost of 
LIBOR was echoed by rises in bank fees for credit and liquidity support. Prior to the 
crisis, the highest-quality transactions could obtain credit and liquidity support fees in 
the 25–37.5 basis point range. During 2009, the fees rose to 70 basis points or more. For 
lower-quality transactions, the fees rose from 75–100 basis points to 150–200 basis points. 
In all cases, the increases blew right through the model for the Commercial Paper Co-op.  
 
The allocation of risk is based on a determination of how much of each type of loan is ratable 
or unratable based on regulatory and rating agency criteria.  
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Questions about asset ratings in the asset-backed commercial paper conduits raised the 
issue of rating criteria for mortgage assets as a whole. Even though the Co-op was 
technically not an asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) program (it was a loan-
backed commercial paper program), the best rates for the ABCP paper (AAA/Aaa) 
reached the 10 Year Swap Rate plus 1,000 basis points while the BBB/Baa tranches 
reached the SWAP rate plus 5,500 basis points. In simplistic terms, it meant that 
investors valued the AAA tranche assets at 85 to 90 cents on the dollar, and the BBB 
tranche assets at 40 to 45 cents on the dollar.62   
The steep discounts in the market’s valuation of AAA and BBB tranches of securitized 
mortgage assets also reflected a severe loss of confidence in the ability of rating agencies 
to quantify risk in the sector. Inevitably, this loss of confidence also undermined the 
assumptions about the ratability of community development assets being pledged to the 
Co-op by the CDFI borrowers. The adverse effect would surface in two ways: 1) the 
rating agencies would be much tougher on what they deemed ratable; and 2) investors 
would still question asset ratings because they had lost confidence in the rating agencies.  
The double layer of organizational support distinguishes the notes from ABCP vehicles and 
other financial obligations, resulting in a premium versus LIBOR and ABCP commercial 
paper rate.  
The Co-op was a loan-backed commercial paper vehicle; the commercial paper was 
secured by loans to the CDFIs on an organizational risk basis, but these loans to the 
CDFIs in turn were backed by the pledged assets of the CDFIs. In theory, this “belts and 
suspenders” structure would be much more attractive to investors because there were at 
least two primary levels of payout (three including the Co-op cash and capital). So, in 
theory, the loan-backed commercial paper structure would not suffer the same 
astonishing disaster that struck the asset-backed commercial paper issuers. But in this 
instance, because the organizational risk of the CDFIs was not assessable and definitely 
not ratable, the loss of confidence in the classes of assets the CDFIs would be pledging 
was lethal. With the market discounting the cash streams from real estate assets at the 
levels noted above, it was simply impossible for the Co-op to make the case that the 
assets backing the unsecured obligations were of much value to the transaction, or that 
the capital in the loss reserve would provide adequate coverage.   
The benefits to the banks in terms of the credit conversion ratio and the risk based capital 
allocation are derived from current regulatory thinking about special purpose vehicles.  
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Even if the banks could produce a syndicated letter of credit at the top rating, the 
amount of unratable risk in the Co-op portfolio of pledged assets could translate into a 
significantly higher capital requirement. If this were the case, the Co-op would be forced 
to bring much more capital to the table to ameliorate the adverse risk allocation, and to 
cover the inevitable (and necessary) increase in bank facility fees. More important, the 
markets were showing virtually no interest in Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) involving 
affordable real estate assets. Hence, even with a doubling or tripling of the capital 
contributed to the Co-op, investors were unlikely to be found. Essentially, the CDFIs 
were locked out of the capital markets, and locked into the bank balance sheets, if there 
was to be any borrowing at all.  
The amount of subsidy is based on the notion that access to ratings and the capital markets is 
a clear priority for the community development field among philanthropists and participating 
organizations.   
With the advent of the foreclosure crisis, and the related confusion in the capital 
markets, the priority to get capital market access and a level playing field for financing 
CDFIs slipped.63 For the financial institutions that were expected to provide grant 
support, needs of the community development sector paled in comparison to the needs 
across a much larger spectrum of the conventional sector, and material losses reduced 
the capacity to provide grants to the field. For the agencies and foundations, the priority 
of keeping people in a house or reversing the negative affects of foreclosure on 
communities far outstripped the objectives of the Co-op in immediate importance. 
Grants and PRIs for the Co-op at this stage would have been an extremely hard sell and 
could have compromised efforts in the future when the markets stabilized.  
 
Market conditions were not the only challenges for the Co-op. Its proposed structure 
also revealed several shortcomings, including: 
 
• Organizational underwriting. The biggest failure of the Commercial Paper Co-op 
was its inability to obtain unsecured funds for CDFI borrowers from the 
commercial paper market. The CDFIs would be forced to pledge loans as 
collateral to the Co-op. Notwithstanding the advantages of the borrowing base 
and MERS features, the FIR team was unable to take this objective any further 
than it had gotten with the Capital Exchange. Again, the obstacles could be 
found primarily within the community development sector itself, including the 
absence of: 1) standardized financial accounting and reporting; 2) a mutually 
compatible analytical framework between rating agencies and the industry, and 
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3) relevant performance data. Because of this, the Co-op could not achieve one of 
the FIR team’s fundamental objectives: to have rating agencies evaluate CDFIs on 
the basis of true organizational risk. To be sure, the Co-op could, and would, still 
go for the “shadow ratings” for each participant from the rating agencies, but 
there would likely be a continued gap between how the CDFI field viewed the 
participants’ financial performance and how the rating agencies viewed it.  
• Maturities. The original objective of FIR was to access long-term debt in the 
capital markets. The Co-op was designed to handle short-term funding needs 
only.  
• Asset/liability mismatch. Although it was possible that the CDFIs could effectively 
use commercial paper the same way conventional lenders use it (to roll it over 
perpetually, thereby funding long-term assets), the participants did not want to 
use it this way. Hence, the CDFIs and the Co-op could not benefit from the net 
interest margins that conventional competitors were receiving. There were 
benefits to this, of course. First and foremost, tenor-matching of assets and 
liabilities reduced the risk, and hence the price, of the bank facilities. And, as 
events were to prove, the decision was the right one, given the wreckage that 
abuse of the mismatching produced for the conventional lenders and the 
marketplace for asset-backed commercial paper as a whole.  
• Range of products. Restricting eligibility to assets held for resale limited the Co-
op’s capacity to include a much wider range of CDFIs. Only large, sophisticated 
organizations with active secondary market platforms could reasonably 
participate. Although this was a clear benefit for implementing a “door-opener,” 
it would make demonstrating the magnitude and timing of the benefit to the 
community development sector much more difficult.  
• Exclusionary impact. The focus on a few large CDFIs at inception excluded the rest 
of the community development field. Because the timing and magnitude of the 
benefits would be difficult to predict at the outset, it would be difficult to make 
this a priority for funders, other than those, such as bank foundations, who 
might welcome the alignment of missions and objectives between the Co-op and 
the wholesale side of the bank. Again, the perception among some in the CDFI 
sector that a successful Co-op would force all CDFIs to standardize in a manner 
that could compromise the overall community development mission was an 
impediment: Was it possible that CDFIs that did not grow in scale or manage a 
secondary market platform would find it harder to get bank financing? There 
was a possibility that this would occur. Although this point of view could prove 
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self-defeating in the long-term for the CDFI field, the potential for a near-term 
negative impact on accessing funds from banks was of more immediate 
importance for some in the CDFI field. With grant subsidy being a limited 
resource in the community development field, this view translated into less 
support for the Commercial Paper Co-op as a community development priority.   
 
At the time the FIR team determined to set the project aside in April 2008, several items still 
needed to be completed. In addition to the weaknesses of the Co-op noted above, those 
unfinished items (which we also consider to be things that didn’t work) include:   
 
• CDFI participants. The potential participants worked under an expression of 
interest in the Co-op. There were no legal or financial commitments. The CDFIs 
would not be asked to commit until the banks had approved the outlines of the 
transaction, and the CDFIs had agreed on the structure of the Co-op, the bylaws, 
loan policies, and business plan. In October 2007, the Community Development 
Trust dropped out of the effort because its recently issued preferred stock ($64 
million at approximately 4 percent) had reduced its funding need. At the same 
time, New Hampshire Community Loan Fund and Impact Community Capital 
expressed interest in joining. But again, these were only expressions of interest, 
focused on engaging in the discussions.  
• Structure of the Co-op. Discussions about the structure of the Co-op had led to the 
decision to use an existing model for a cooperative. Examples from the Housing 
Partnership Network and the NCB Capital Impact were considered. However, 
the FIR team made no decisions, and it took no steps to establish the final 
structure of the organization.  
• Pricing of the liquidity facilities. Discussions with banks, commercial paper 
conduits, the ratings agencies, and federal regulators produced general 
guidelines on the data needed, the credit support required, the structure of the 
credit support, and the operational functions of the Co-op. However, in the 
absence of specific loans, borrowing base advance rates on the loans, 
commitments from the CDFI participants and funders, FIR could not finalize the 
pricing on the liquidity facility from the banks. As noted, there is sufficient room 
for running the fees at a higher rate, but as the Capital Exchange experience 
indicated, once the fees reached the 0.625 percent range, it would be hard for the 
Co-op to provide a competitive rate to the CDFI borrowers. The alternative 
would be to improve the margins by increasing the amount of grant and PRI 
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capital, and this would also improve the credit quality of the transaction as a 
whole. Given the fees charged to conventional brokers and lenders in the 
marketplace, this was not deemed necessary at the time. However, the project as 
a whole was not far enough along to conduct a discussion with the banks as a 
group on the issue of mutually acceptable fee pricing for the Co-op, and how this 
would compare with the fees that supported commercial paper vehicles for 
conventional brokers and lenders on the wholesale sides of their banks. 
Although two of the banks engaged in the discussion offered to engage the 
wholesale sides of the banks, the effort was tabled prior to active engagement. 
• The relationship to existing bank lending and warehousing facilities. Because of the 
volatility of the commercial paper market, it was advisable to augment, but not 
replace, existing bank and warehousing lines of credit. The question arose 
whether the Co-op could attain the credit and pricing terms from the banks (for 
example, LIBOR plus 0.5 percent) in the event that the commercial paper market 
dried up. In such event, the risk-based capital allocations that made the Co-op so 
attractive to the banks would evaporate, as would the attractive returns. Under 
such circumstances, the question remained: would the Co-op benefit from the 
best pricing or would additional credit enhancements and additional fee or 
interest rate increments be needed for borrowing under the regular on-balance 
sheet loan facilities?  
• Final configuration of the Commercial Paper Co-op portfolio. The loss of Community 
Development Trust combined with the addition of the New Hampshire 
Community Loan Fund and Impact Community Capital would change the 
proposed configuration of the Co-op portfolio. FIR had not yet modeled this 
change when the effort was put on hold. Moreover, the final configuration would 
not be established until all of the participants had committed. The configuration 
of the portfolio could change the risk parameters of the Co-op as well as the 
pricing of the liquidity facilities or the amount of grant and PRI capital required.  
• Grant and PRI funding. The plan for raising the capital for the Co-op depended 
heavily on funding from bank foundations. It was determined that grants from 
the participating banks, as well as some other banks, would provide the basis for 
raising PRI funding from key foundations. The plan was not to be implemented 
until the CDFI participants had committed and it was clear to all that the Co-op 
was an industry breakthrough for all involved.  
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Opportunities	  that	  the	  Commercial	  Paper	  Co-­‐op	  Opened	  Up	  for	  the	  Next	  Effort	  
 
In 2001, Kirsten Moy and Alan Okagaki, writing for the Brookings Institution argued 
that CDFIs had it in their own power to gain access to the capital markets:  “The CDFI 
industry could take a number of steps to promote standardization. For example,  
• Loan documents could be standardized so they contain consistent and complete 
information for securitizers and investors. 
• Due diligence and origination procedures could be standardized to obtain 
greater consistency in credit quality. 
• Standards could be created for loan servicers to better protect long-term asset 
quality 
• Licensing and certification procedures could be created for institutions and for 
individuals that are understood and accepted in the mainstream financial 
community, not just the CDFI industry.  
• CDFIs that meet specified standards could be organized into a network of 
originators to facilitate timely and efficient aggregation of loans.”64 
 
The Commercial Paper Co-op could be seen as an efficient and focused effort to 
accelerate these recommendations.   
 
The rising losses in the mortgage portfolios across the housing market, the implosion of 
the commercial paper market, the deterioration of bank and CDFI creditworthiness (real 
or perceived), the evaporation of credit support instruments, and the realignment of 
philanthropic interests all served to shelve Commercial Paper Co-op in April 2008. As 
the crisis in the housing market accelerated into a crisis in the global financial arena, it 
became evident that key structural pieces of the Co-op were part of the problem. 
Specifically: 
 
• Off balance sheet financing vehicles 
• The commercial paper market  
• The aggressive leveraging of capital.  
These were all quarantined and scrutinized. The scrutiny continues and may well 
continue for months and years to come, remaining weak perhaps long after the housing 
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market recovers and mortgages regain their prime location in the capital markets. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, there is little doubt that all three will return to 
health if not primacy at some point. The juggernaut logic of the “return on equity” 
equation we introduced in Chapter 1 requires no less. Moreover, these technologies are 
likely to reappear in similar forms—as indeed, they always have (think Penn Central 
commercial paper, sovereign debt for lesser developed countries, Continental Illinois, 
the S&L collapse, Bear Stearns and Long-term Capital Management). 
 
This likelihood assures us that within the foreseeable future, we will be able to take the 
Commercial Paper Co-op off the shelf and resume the effort to gain parity with for-profit 
entities of similar standing. The key components will likely remain crucial to success: 
• The establishment of a cooperative of large, high-quality CDFIs with short-term 
assets that require financing, and existing credit relationships with banks; 
• Banks looking for portfolio diversification and a reduction in the capital 
allocation for loans to these organizations; 
• Regulatory rulings that reward a well structured, solid credit-enhancement from 
philanthropic sources that back bank liquidity facilities; and 
• Rating agencies looking for a series of transactions in a large, untapped field, 
benefiting from an analytical platform that facilitates their prudent and accurate 
review.  
 
The primary differences are likely to be in the configuration of assets funded, and the 
amount of capital that the Commercial Paper Co-op needs to inject in order to establish 
the solidity of the credit enhancement.  
 
This is not to say that all of the technologies and strategies that contributed to the 
collapse of the housing and financial markets will reappear. It is unlikely we will see 
teaser rates, Option ARMS, 2/28s, 3/27s, collateralized debt obligations backed by 
subordinate claims, or massive bets on all these via the temptation of credit default 
swaps. CDFIs never had an interest in these more extreme, highly flammable, products, 
nor did they ever have a need for them. Indeed, these products have had a strikingly 
negative impact on the communities and constituencies the CDFIs serve.  The field 
should continue to be vocal in ensuring that truly volatile products such as these are not 
revived, at least in a way that affects consumer and small business financing 
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The markets will return to some semblance of normalcy and stability, and the four 
components above will once again become viable. To resurrect this avenue to the capital 
markets, the CDFI field will have to, once again, partner closely with the banks.  
 
Not only are the banks the CDFI field’s chief source of capital, but they are also 
potentially its best allies in moving forward: One of the chief discoveries of the FIR team 
in its work on the Co-op was that the entire structure could be, in fact, initiated by a 
consortium of banks (or credit unions) that have a commitment to the community 
development mission – without any assistance from the CDFI field. From the standpoint 
of cost and implementation, this might even be preferable to a CDFI-based co-operative. 
To be sure, it would likely involve the loss of CDFI authority over investment pricing 
and risk decisions, which, of course, was a chief goal of pursuing the Co-op.  But it does 
lend support to the notion that funding parity can be achieved in some form, based 
more or less on features the FIR team devised for the Co-op. 
 
While we wait for the rules to be revised and for the banks and the commercial paper 
markets to return to a semblance of normalcy and stability, it is imperative to keep 
moving forward on the items that have prevented CDFIs from gaining access to the 
capital markets to date.65 The chief focus remains finding a way to satisfy the rating 
agencies. The rating agencies already know how to evaluate loans and other assets 
generated by the CDFI field, as the work by Community Reinvestment Fund, NHSA, 
Housing Partnership Network, NCB Community Impact, and others attests. But they do 
not know how to evaluate the strength of an organization or the quality of management. 
The CDFI sector must work collectively in developing a system of financial reporting 
and analysis that is compatible with how the rating agencies evaluate unsecured 
corporate and institutional risk.  
 
As Moy and Okagaki suggest above, the heavy work in this effort is less with the rating 
agencies than with the CDFIs themselves. The biggest setback for the Capital Exchange 
was not the difficulty of devising a low-cost analytical adjunct to the CARS review (i.e., 
the Quad), but rather the fragmented and idiosyncratic state of financial reporting across 
the CDFI field.  
 
Before CDFIs gain access to the capital markets to raise unsecured debt, they must 
consolidate their evaluation criteria and procedures. And before they do that, they must 
reach agreement on what constitutes adequate disclosure of financial information, for 
the disciplined use by management as well as the providers of credit.  
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CHAPTER	  	  7	  





et’s revisit this quote from Chapter 3. 
 
The Securitization Capital Rule permits a banking organization with a qualifying 
internal risk rating system to use that system to apply the internal ratings 
approach to its unrated direct credit substitutes provided to asset-back 
commercial paper programs that it sponsors by mapping its internal risk ratings 
to external ratings equivalents. The external credit rating equivalents are 
organized into three ratings categories: investment-grade credit risk, e.g., BBB– 
and above; high non-investment grade credit risk, e.g., BB+ through BB–; and 
low non-investment grade credit risk, e.g., below BB–. The rating categories are 
used to determine the appropriate risk-weight category or categories to which 
banking organizations should assign either the entire notional amount, or 
portions thereof, of their direct credit substitutes.66 
 
The rating agencies are being (appropriately) chastised for their role in the collapse of 
the financial markets. Nevertheless, they are not going away. The rating agencies are the 
gatekeepers for the capital markets. Their analysis determines whether a security 
receives a wide range of institutional investors at a low interest rate or a narrow range of 
investors with a high interest rate, or whether it gains entrance into the capital 
markets—public or private—at all. They have been at the center of the capital markets 
for almost a century, and during that period investors have come to depend more on 
them rather than less. As we have noted before and reprise above, even federal 
depository regulators have incorporated rating agency criteria and judgment into 
evaluation of portfolio risk and capital adequacy. The fact that the bank regulators hold 
the rating agencies in such high regard makes rating agency assessment of credit risk as 
important to the banks as it is to the capital markets. There is no one else out there to 
L
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take over their disciplines or who can, with any degree of prudence or credibility, be 
allowed to take their place.  
Hence, whether going to the capital markets or to the wholesale side of the bank, the 
rating agencies remain the gatekeepers for the CDFI field.  
 
Where	  the	  Rating	  Agencies	  Are	  
 
The collapse of the financial markets is having an impact on the rating agencies, and 
how investors view their work. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now evident that 
mistakes were made on an grand scale, particularly in the area of housing securities. It is 
evident that the methodologies used by the structured finance teams at the rating 
agencies were flawed. Over several years, the actions of the rating agencies will be 
scrutinized, probably harshly. It is likely that a number of procedures will change.  
 
Indeed, one critical component of the capital markets already has changed. When the 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market collapsed, the banks providing the 
liquidity facilities and credit enhancements were effectively obligated to take the 
underlying assets back onto their balance sheets—a move that swelled total assets while 
simultaneously hammering bank capital with losses. Now, the bias for market, as well as 
regulatory agency forces is toward bringing all new assets—which might otherwise be 
supported by the various forms of bank credit in off-balance sheet vehicles—on to the 
bank balance sheets. This is accomplished by assigning the same or similar capital 
allocation to off-balance sheet assets as to on-balance sheet assets. Effectively, the new as 
well as existing assets are being quarantined until the range of infections can be fully 
diagnosed and remedied.  
 
This policy reduces any interest the banks might have in backing the kinds of platforms 
the FIR team developed for CDFIs to gain access to the capital markets. Aside from a 
federal funds rate in the 15 percent range, it would be hard to imagine a policy that 
could more effectively slow the flow of funds in the marketplace. One consequence of 
moving infected assets on to the balance sheet is that the strength of a bank’s 
commitment via a line of credit or letter of credit backing a CDFI facility cannot be 
compellingly evaluated; there is no guarantee that a credit enhancement or liquidity 
facility will be genuinely well received in the market. As a result, the ability to obtain a 
rating for a Mini-Fed, Capital Exchange, or Commercial Paper Co-op—as structured—
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has virtually evaporated. The banks simply cannot accommodate CDFIs in these ways at 
this time.  
 
However, this retreat does not mean the work for CDFIs towards “funding parity” is 
over. Just because the preferred off-balance sheet vehicle with bank credit or liquidity 
support is not presently available does not mean the objective disappears. In fact, the 
work has just begun, and it has just gotten a lot more demanding.  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, during the first weeks of October 2008, the Federal Reserve 
stepped in to reduce the federal funds rate from 2 percent to 1.5 percent. Since then, the 
rate has been lowered to the 10–20 basis point range, effectively reducing the cost to 
banks that borrow federal funds and to those who borrow at spreads over the federal 
funds rate. At the same time, the federal government reduced the cost to those who 
borrow in the commercial paper market by announcing a form of federal guarantee.   
 
CDFIs exclusively borrow at spreads over LIBOR or under prime; they do not have 
access to facilities tied to the federal funds or commercial paper rates. The federal 
government did not reduce the cost of those who borrow at spreads over LIBOR or 
under prime; both are rates set by the banks, based on their assumptions about risk and 
the needs for earnings. Although banks were sure they needed earnings, they were not 
sure which of their confreres in the banking industry represented a safe investment. This 
kept the rates unusually high. As we saw in Chapter 3, in late 2008 and into 2009, the 
difference in borrowing costs ranged from 100 to 200 basis points, or $10,000 to $20,000 
per million dollars of debt per year. For most CDFIs, that differential would exceed their 
net interest margin. Was that differential to be made up from CDFI donors or from their 
borrowers? CDFIs were still at the back of the bus.  
 
Although it is true that CDFIs could have asked their banking partners to provide them 
with federal funds–based pricing, there was no reason to assume that their banks would 
assent. The small size of the facilities, the perceived risks, and the operating costs would 
be good reasons, on top of which, the banks would frankly have a hard time justifying 
such a voluntary reduction in interest rate, given the state of the economy and their 
imperative need for earnings and capital.  
 
The evaporation of the opportunity to drive a special-purpose vehicle backed by a bank 
liquidity facility into the capital markets leaves the CDFI with only one option—to 
develop an analytical platform that enables rating agencies to evaluate organizational 
risk for the CDFI field. Alternatively, the CDFI field could focus on making the leap over 
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to the wholesale side of the bank. However, as the regulatory agencies are still relying 
on the rating agencies to be arbiters of asset quality for the purposes of risk-based capital 
allocation, CDFIs need to satisfy them when going the wholesale banking route as well. 
There’s no way around the rating agencies.  
 
It is likely that, as the scrutiny and the critiques of rating agency performance in the 
subprime crisis continue, the rating agencies will be exceedingly diligent in evaluating 
new forms of risk. This will make the task even more difficult. The irony that credit 
losses in the CDFI field are a fraction of those experienced by rated lenders (on a 
percentage basis) will not help move the dialogue forward. The lack of comprehensive 
and compatible CDFI data and the absence of a consistent analytical platform combine 
with the bad name attributed by the markets to community development assets to keep 
CDFIs out of the capital market. 
 
But if the CDFI field wants to overcome this hurdle of poor perception, and achieve the 
objective of funding parity, they will have to go to where the rating agencies are.  
 
Where	  the	  Rating	  Agencies	  Were	  
 
The FIR team engaged in discussions with three rating agencies—Fitch, Standard and 
Poor’s, and Moody’s—from 2004 through 2007. The team was joined in some of the 
discussions by representatives from CARS. The following are general observations made 
by the three agencies. These are not specific to any one agency and not necessarily 
applicable to all of them. 
 
Nonprofit	  Ratings	  	  
Many nonprofits are rated at the equivalent of BB/Ba or less. Hence, many are not 
investment grade. They may be eligible for investment from banks with a mission or 
pension funds with alternative investment allocations to fill, but they generally cannot 
benefit from the low interest rates or wide range of investors that the capital markets 
provide.  
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Private	  Ratings	  	  
Borrowers can opt to receive private ratings, which would not be disclosed to anyone 
but the purchasers of the debt. This can help non-investment grade nonprofits raise 
funds from banks, insurance companies, and other institutional investors involved in the 
nonprofit’s mission. Although the interest rate may not be top grade, the rating may 
afford mission-driven investors a higher level of confidence than they would otherwise 
have, and as a consequence, the CDFI may have greater access to more funds with 
longer terms.     
Business	  Category	  	  
The CDFI field does not fit easily into any of the industry sectors that rating agencies 
have delineated within their organizations. The FIR team held discussions with 
representatives of a range of departments including: public finance (municipal bonds), 
nonprofit hospitals, higher education, nonprofit arts and entertainment institutions 
(such as museums, public radio, and theaters), and for-profit financial institutions. The 
team also spent time with representatives from the structured finance departments at 
each agency (in the event of a transaction involving the special-purpose vehicles the 
team was proposing). At present there is no specialty sector or designated expertise that 
could credibly evaluate CDFI transactions, and given the small number of CDFIs 
seeking a rating (at least at inception), it is hard for the rating agencies to justify 
assembling one.  
 
The	  Rating	  Agency	  Business	  Proposition	  	  
The number of CDFIs that could conceivably receive a rating or participate in a 
collective effort to receive a rating would have to be significant to warrant the time and 
cost of establishing a rating agency specialty area. An example was nonprofit hospitals: 
there are approximately 500 hospitals with the capacity to receive a rating, and perhaps 
as many as 50 might try for a rating in any given year. The size of the CDFI field is 
adequate, but the question is whether there would be enough CDFIs of size or enough 
CDFI transactions of size to warrant the creation of a specialty area. Effectively, the 
rating agencies need to see a reasonable business to expend the funds necessary to build 
a specialty. In the absence of such a proposition, another entity—perhaps the 
government—will have to make the effort.  
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CDFI	  Assistance	  in	  Building	  a	  Specialty	  Area	  	  
There were two areas in which the CDFI field could facilitate development of a specialty 
at the rating agencies: 
 
• Producing a credible system for evaluating CDFI credit risk, such as CARS. Assuming 
that the criteria and procedures were compatible with the disciplines employed 
in other sectors, the program could be transferred to the rating agencies in such a 
way as to reduce their development costs. Caution to the CDFI sector: the 
agencies would still use their own criteria for the ratings, and it is unlikely that 
their final evaluations would neatly coincide with the views of the CDFI field.  
• Providing a parallel “monitoring” function that ensures the agencies that crucial 
information is made available in a timely fashion. Essentially, this amounts to an early 
warning system for the agencies, which is critical for anticipating stop-issuance 
triggers. The rating agencies also welcomed the notion of the CDFI field 
establishing a remedial function that enabled CDFIs participating in the capital 
markets to stay in compliance with financial requirements.  
Cost	  
The minimum cost for a one-time rating of a transaction was about $75,000. The rating 
agencies would be willing to look at CDFIs on an individual basis in the context of a 
collective effort, such as the Capital Exchange or the Commercial Paper Co-op. One of 
the agencies indicated it would consider reducing the cost of rating CDFIs that 
participated in the collective effort to about $5,000 to $10,000 apiece if a) the rating were 
a private one created specifically for the banks providing the liquidity facility, b) it had 
the requisite level of discipline in terms of analysis and due diligence, and c) the rating 
agency was satisfied with the safety of the overall transaction. This was a breakthrough 
concept and one that would have been beneficial not only to CDFIs generally, but also to 
those participating in the Co-op specifically.  
 
Scale	  	  
For the cost of analysis to be economical—that is, the benefit of obtaining a lower 
interest rate is not outweighed by the cost of receiving the rating—the size of a rated 




Access	  to	  the	  Commercial	  Paper	  Market  
 
As demonstrated with the Commercial Paper Co-op, it is entirely possible for CDFIs to 
benefit from commercial paper market pricing without actually getting rated. The rating 
agencies pointed out that if the intermediary platform is properly structured, there is no 
reason the organizational risk of the CDFI would have to be evaluated because the 
intermediary platform would absorb all the credit risk, likely in the form of some 
combination of liquidity and credit enhancement facilities. Notably, the banks have the 
capacity to make this happen right now. One of the agencies said it was entirely possible that 
CDFI risk is already being pledged by the banks through a commercial paper conduit structure, 
but that there was no way for either the agency or the CDFI bank relationship managers to know. 
That would be the kind of decision made within the treasury departments of the banks.  
 
These were general comments by the agencies, and again, not all of them subscribed to 
the particulars of each item.  In addition, however, one of the agencies was invited to 
address the specific attributes of the FIR team’s intermediary platforms.  
 
A	  Rating	  Agency	  Reviews	  the	  FIR	  Team’s	  Intermediary	  Platform	  
 
The FIR team assembled a summary of structural attributes of an intermediary platform 
pertaining to the Capital Exchange and the Commercial Paper Co-op. The team then 
developed a questionnaire that addressed these attributes for one of the rating agencies. 
The purpose was to gain clarity about how to best position the intermediary platforms 
for the highest commercial paper rating. The FIR team was looking in particular for the 
sorts of benchmarks the agency would look for and tests the agency would perform in 
the process of assigning a rating. With this, the team could craft a highly rated structure 
from the ground up.  
 
The questionnaire follows, with the verbal (paraphrased) responses from representatives 
of the agency.   
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Pilot	  Programs	  	  
One strategy of the FIR team was to run the Capital Exchange or the Commercial Paper 
Co-op on a trial basis. The concern was that while these ideas were pretty standard 
procedure for the conventional sector, they were new for the CDFI field and might 
prove inapplicable. A pilot would enable the FIR team to minimize the number of 
borrowers, minimize the amount of grant subsidy, and maximize the level of comfort for 
all parties by having limited objectives and a short time frame.   
 
“Can we rate the pool and/or CDFI paper for a set period of time—for example, up to 
three years—and if so, what complications can we expect as we near termination of the 
pilot relative to maintaining an A-1 rating?” 
 
Technically, this was possible, the agency replied, so long as the rating agency was 
certain that adequate funds were available to pay investors at termination. However, the 
agency questioned whether it made sense to set up a platform with the intent to unravel 
it. If the project were a success, there would be a desire to keep it running, and if there is 
reason to believe that it would not be a success, then it should not be developed. The 
agency suggested that one could achieve the benefits of a pilot more easily, however, by 
working through an existing conduit rather than on a stand-alone basis. So long as the 
conduit was not involved in evaluating the credit or any other activity that required 
expenditure of time and resources, it would be reasonably indifferent to whether the 
new CDFI platform were issuing paper or not over the long term.  
 
Organizational	  Credit	  Risk	  Benchmarks	  for	  the	  Collective	  Platform	  	  
The FIR team established benchmarks for the Capital Exchange. The FIR team developed 
somewhat more conservative benchmarks for the Commercial Paper Co-op. The agency 
indicated that these sets of benchmarks were a sound way to start. The benchmarks for 
the intermediary platforms were summarized in the questionnaire as follows. 
 
• CDFIs will be drawn from the top tier of the industry in terms of size and 
longevity.   
• All the CDFI borrowers would already be underwritten by banks and have some 
form of bank loans.  
• Nondepository CDFIs would have a maximum leverage of 5 to 1 (excepting 
secondary market platforms, which could go to 10); a minimum asset size of $10 
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million; a sustainability ratio of at least 70 percent, and have experienced no 
event of default on debt obligations. 
• The intermediary (the Capital Exchange or Commercial Paper Co-op) would 
have a maximum leverage of 10 to 1.  
• Regulated CDFIs such as community development banks and community 
development credit unions would have at least a three or “average” rating in 
their CAMEL or other regulatory rating. 
• All borrowers will have at least 10 years of operation. 
• All borrowers will have low staff and management turnover, using measures to 
be developed. 
• All borrowers will have consistent amounts and diverse sources of grant 
funding. 
• All borrowings would be senior obligations of the CDFI. 
 
The FIR team asked the agency a number of questions about these benchmarks.  
 
“Are there additional ratios or benchmarks that we should include, particularly for the 
unregulated entities?” 
 
The agency wanted to ensure there was a distinction between the intermediary platform 
and the participating CDFI entities. The ratios and benchmarks given were a good place 
to start for the Co-op, but the need for additional measures would depend on the 
structure and size of the credit enhancement, which in both the Capital Exchange and 
the Commercial Paper Co-op consisted of the contributed capital from the banks and 
foundations. The agency would need to know more about the operating and financial 
dynamics of CDFI borrowers and their assets generally before assessing the adequacy of 
the contributed capital.  
 
The agency noted further that CDFIs and banks appear to share many features in their 
lending activities, including credit policy, loss reserve policy, portfolio assessment, 
servicing mechanisms, and underwriting methodologies, to name a few. Although 
criteria and risk parameters differ, it would be easy to adjust for these from an analytical 
standpoint, so long as the CDFIs were generally consistent. With the proper credit 
enhancement and liquidity facility, however, it is possible that the underlying CDFIs 
would not need to be analyzed from an organizational standpoint. If the assets that the 
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CDFIs were pledging were shown to be of quality, and the servicing of the CDFI assets 
was deemed adequate, for example, the requirements could be reduced for evaluating 
the organizational risk of CDFIs in sizing the credit enhancement.  
 
The FIR team noted that it was their intent to see that the CDFIs and their pledged assets 
(in the case of the Commercial Paper Co-op) were evaluated in some form in the future 
and that a door could be opened to the capital markets for CDFI organizational risk.  
 
“Are there ratios or benchmarks that capture the true liquidity and asset-liability status of 
financial entities which the agency prefers?” 
 
The agency responded that there were, but the FIR team’s project and the agency’s 
expertise on the CDFI field needed to be further developed to delineate which were 
applicable or inapplicable for the participating CDFIs and their intermediate platform.  
 
In the discussion with the agency, one balance sheet item was a cause for concern from 
an analytical standpoint: the net asset accounts. For the rating agencies, the key to 
evaluating organizational credit risk in rating unsecured obligations is a comprehensive 
analysis of the sources and uses of cash; that is, how management behaves with cash. 
The biggest difference between a for-profit lender and nonprofit CDFI is that surplus 
cash in a for-profit is fungible and almost always available for debt service. Not so in the 
nonprofit world. The distinctions among unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and 
permanently restricted net assets require close scrutiny on a case-by-case basis, even in 
liquidation.  
 
Hence, in a nonprofit organization, cash flow analysis presents an extraordinary 
challenge. In theory, the analyst must recreate the terms and conditions under which 
each gift can be deployed and calculate the cash flows accordingly. This could involve 
reviewing hundreds of donor agreements and related cash flows to accurately assess 
capital, and more important, liquidity. The existence of so many different agreements 
would make comparisons of the net asset accounts across CDFIs virtually impossible for 
collective rating purposes. That there are different ways of interpreting the governing 
FASB rules (Financial Accounting Standards Board; rules 116 and 117) renders the 
analysis even more problematic. What distinguishes CDFIs from other nonprofits in this 
area is that, unlike other nonprofits, CDFIs routinely use temporarily and permanently 
restricted net assets in the pursuit of their mission (that is, providing principal or 
lending in the normal course of business). The challenge this feature presents to the 
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rating agencies, and a solution, are discussed below in the section, “What Is a Restricted 
Net Asset?” 
 
“Does the agency have preferred benchmarks or criteria for evaluating the longevity and 
consistency of management performance?” 
 
The agency does. However, the management evaluation would be tailored to the 
structure of the organization and an examination of who is managing what function. 
The Capital Exchange and Commercial Paper Co-op were not yet sufficiently delineated 
to determine what the agency would look for when rating them. This is a problem 
generally with any start-up, and the mitigant to the risk is: more capital.  
 
“Does the agency have preferred methods for evaluation of the grant revenue stream that 
supports these nonprofits?” 
 
Very few, if any, of the nonprofits the agency evaluates have sustainability ratios under 
90 percent. Conversely, very few rely on annual giving at a rate in excess of 10 percent of 
total expenses. Because CDFIs often find themselves operating in the 60–70 percent 
sustainability range, the methodology of evaluating the organizational capacity must be 
clear and precise to raise funds on a consistent basis. The agency outlined the items they 
would need to know. It was clear that the CDFI field would have to build a case for 
sustainability in the 70–80 percent range rather than the 60–70 percent range. The FIR 
team knew this would be a big challenge for CDFIs and proceeded to map out the items 
the rating agency would want to see as part of the evaluation of the grant revenue line. 
These requirements and a proposed methodology for the CDFI field are discussed in the 
section,  “How Can You Be Sure You’ll Get the Grants?” 
 
“To what extent do CDFIs need to set standards for loss experience, delinquencies, and 
provisions for losses (in the context of the portfolio mix and mission)?” 
 
This will be a key issue for the banks providing the liquidity facility as well as for the 
rating agency. It will be a critical component in reviewing the adequacy of capital 
contributed to the platform and the viability of cash flow. However, this does not mean 
there are absolute standards that the participating CDFIs must meet. So long as the 
capital and cash flows can cover debt service, CDFIs do not have to limit their risk 
parameters to the level of the conventional sector. In short, the CDFIs can target higher 
levels of risk so long as they can demonstrate capacity to manage borrowers and the 
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financial dynamics of a community development portfolio in a prudent and effective 
manner. 
 
“To what extent do CDFIs need to incorporate operating expense ratio standards?” 
 
This goes to the sustainability ratio and grant revenue line issue. Considerable work is 
needed to accommodate the typically high level of costs in the CDFI field and, further, to 
accommodate wide variations.  
 
“What documentation does the agency need to see in terms of the evaluation of the entity’s 
structure?” 
 
All governing documents, preferably finalized.  
 
“Are there any preferences relative to intermediaries like the Capital Exchange or the 
Commercial Paper Co-op?” 
 
There are a series of benchmarks for intermediaries such as the Capital Exchange and 
the Commercial Paper Co-op. These are associated with special-purpose vehicles that 
issue commercial paper. The benchmarks can be found in their various agreements and 
include the amount and structure of equity, timing and allocation of losses, stop 
issuance triggers, and the like. The benchmarks are tied directly to the type and design 
of assets, configuration of the portfolio, and credit enhancements and liquidity 
arrangements. They will vary depending on the balance of these and other lesser factors. 
There are publications that address these benchmarks, but the actual configuration that 
achieves the best rating for a CDFI intermediary platform would have to be determined 
in negotiation and analysis.  
 
“Is an ‘average’ rating for the regulated entities adequate?” 
 
Probably not, unless there is a “joint and several” guarantee in which the regulated 
entities all cover one another’s losses. It would be much cleaner to have—and enforce—a 
minimum CAMEL or equivalent rating. Neither the Capital Exchange nor the 
Commercial Paper Co-op were structured with borrowers covering one another’s  
losses.  
 
“Does the agency need to underwrite all the borrowing CDFIs or a sample of them, or will 
pre-established restrictions on participation be adequate?” 
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Generally, either all the entities are rated or none are. In the latter case, the credit 
enhancement should be structured to cover the unrated exposure.  
 
Underwriting	  Platform	  
The questionnaire laid out several key elements of the underwriting platform for the 
Capital Exchange (though not the Commercial Paper Co-op) as follows. 
 
• Ratings requirements will be negotiated in advance with the agency relative to 
underwriting, compliance, and servicing standards. 
• A standard bank/foundation/CDFI analysis will be established by the team and 
its consultants, which will develop specific new criteria and corresponding 
analytical framework. This new criteria will focus on management analysis and 
the viability of the grant revenue line. It will correspond with rating agency 
requirements.   
• The financial analysis portion of the underwriting will involve an annual CARS 
review and include an automated forecast and rating structure for interim 
financial analysis. It will correspond with rating agency requirements. 
• The FIR team will develop standards for compliance and loan servicing that meet 
rating agency requirements. 
• The primary underwriter will be an existing CDFI intermediary, which will 
receive quarterly financials as well as annual audits, and perform full reviews 
and onsite visits at least annually. 
 
The questions by the FIR team and the responses from the agency were as follows: 
 
“Are there any early warning mechanisms that the agency would consider particularly useful 
in the underwriting and compliance work?” 
 
If CDFI lenders are processing loans in ways similar to banks and credit unions, then 
conventional early warnings would apply. This would include excessive growth in loan 
volume and/or borrowing to support volume, change in asset type being funded, 
change in size and term of asset being funded, decline in (unrestricted) cash available for 
operations and/or debt service, rise in restructurings, rewrites, declining ratio of 
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recoveries to charge-offs, rising ratio of charge-offs to delinquencies and ratio of 
delinquencies to loans outstanding, increase in delinquencies among loans originated 
within 12 months, lending staff turnover, noncompliance with credit and loss reserve 
policies, and non-adherence to budgets. 
 
“Are there any preferences relative to the analysis of asset growth, portfolio mix, and fund 
balance growth” 
 
The measures would have to be determined. The measures that are most useful will be 
determined by such factors as the following:  the reason for the funding need, the type of 
assets being funded, the level of self-generated funding, the level of subsidy, the cost of 
making and delivering the loans, the level of diversification of these assets by type, size, 
geography, risk, and reserves; and the concentrations of risk relative to the amount each 
CDFI represents against intermediary platform capital.  
 
“Preferences relative to trend line analysis generally?” 
 
Again, this is to be determined. There is insufficient knowledge of the CDFI field to 
know yet exactly how many years of performance must be reviewed to arrive at a 
reasonable set of conclusions about organizational credit risk based on trend line 
analysis. 
 
“Is an annual review with a site visit adequate for the purpose?” 
 
This is yet to be determined. The agency indicated that this would depend on how 
volatile the participating CDFIs were in terms of performance. The larger, more 
established, and more consistent, the better. It also depends on how thorough the annual 
analysis is. Do interim analyses help? The agency thought that this would depend on 
what the interim analyses cover. Do the quarterly numbers tell 80 percent of the story or 
20 percent? Is there a system for updating lenders and creditors for material changes in 
the operations of the organization? These would all have to be set forth in advance as 
part of the platform to be evaluated. It would be expensive for the agency to do all of 
this work, so the transaction would have to be of sufficient scale to cover the costs and 
still show an interest rate benefit to the participants. There could be ways that 
information is transmitted to the agency in form and content that could reduce the need 
for more than an annual review. Again, the answer to all of this would come with a 
better understanding of the financial and operating dynamics of CDFIs.  
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“What would an appropriate set of steps consist of in the event of a borrower default?” 
 
This refers to a default by a participating CDFI. With either the Capital Exchange or the 
Commercial Paper Co-op, the intermediary would have no cause to default unless one 
of the participants is unable to pay off its notes as they mature. From the standpoint of 
the rating agency, the intermediary’s first line of defense would lie in the selection of the 
participating CDFIs. After that, a properly structured system of stop-issuance triggers 
would make the default of a participating CDFI a nonevent for the investors. A properly 
structured intermediary would make it a nonevent for the banks that provide the credit 
enhancement and/or liquidity facility, as well. The intermediary would do this by 
ceasing to lend to the CDFI so that the CDFI could not increase its exposure.  
 
After that, the intermediary would make its claims as necessary against the CDFI as the 
notes held by the investors mature. If the CDFI could not make payment on these (for 
example, if it were to file for bankruptcy), then the intermediary must make payments 
out of its own reserves. It is important to ensure that none of the defaults affects the 
banks, let alone the ultimate investor. Protection of the banks and the investors also 
serves to protect the other participating CDFIs and their ability to fund their needs in the 
capital markets. The risk of these steps can be significantly reduced by requiring the 
participating CDFIs to maintain collateral reserves in support of their borrowing and/or 
an advance rate at a percentage of the face value of the assets being funded.  
 
“What sort of reporting would the agency require relative to the underwriting and 
compliance work of the team?” 
 
This would have to be determined. Quarterly financials would be important for the 
intermediary, as well as comprehensive updates on the portfolio of notes issued by the 
CDFIs and the assets backing these notes. If the notes are unsecured obligations of the 
participating CDFIs, this brings an additional level of complexity. If they are secured 
under a borrowing base or otherwise isolated, the risk is lower, and the reporting is less 
complex. One way or another, the CDFI will want to be sure that it can convey the status 
of the all the sources of repayment on an ongoing, systematic basis.  
 
“What would the agency consider necessary for the servicing activity, and what sort of 
information is necessary to satisfy the agency on this issue?”  
 
A bank with high-quality servicing capacity will perform the servicing function for the 
intermediary platform. The servicing function employed by the CDFIs should be 
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reviewed by the rating agency. CDFIs using a reputable third-party servicing vendor 
would be at an advantage.  
 
Use	  of	  Funds	  
Whether the CDFIs borrow from the intermediary platform on a secured or unsecured 
basis is a critical issue for the rating agency, as is the type and term of the assets being 
funded. The questionnaire identified the proposed use of funds for both the Capital 
Exchange (and later, the Commercial Paper Co-op as “working capital needs”). The 
working capital uses were to be restricted generally as follows. 
 
• “Warehousing” loans being held for resale. 
• “Table-funding” of a loan pending sale to the secondary market. 
• Funding of a larger loan pending receipt of principal payments from another 
large loan, grant, government reimbursement, or other revenue stream. 
• Funding operating expenses pending receipt of a grant, government 
reimbursement, or other revenue stream. 
• Other forms of bridge financing in which repayment is likely and verifiable. 
 
Working capital uses that would not be eligible include: 
 
• Funding of operating expenses without a defined source of repayment. 
• Funding the initiation of a new program. 
• Funding the permanent expansion of a loan portfolio. 
 
Minimum denominations (for example, $25,000) and maximums (for example, $750,000) 
would be established at the outset, depending on the FIR team’s evaluation of need and 
the credit support provided by the borrowing entity.  
 
The questionnaire had one question on this proposed set of portfolio parameters: 
 
“Do we need to restrict uses of funds beyond those normally associated with commercial 
paper borrowings in the conventional sector?” 
202 
 
The maturity of the assets being funded by the intermediary platform is a fundamental 
issue. Many ABCP issuers fund longer-term assets with the proceeds from the 
commercial paper issuance. The agency was well aware of the profitability associated 
with this kind of asset/liability mismatch, particularly when there is a yield curve, but 
also views the mismatch as inherently risky. As a result, the ratings on securities that 
involve a mismatch tend to be lower. The restrictions on the types of assets that can be 
funded and the related maturities proposed by the FIR team for the intermediary 
platforms minimize the risk of default on the part of the CDFIs and, hence, the risk of 
default on the intermediary platform. By targeting only the working capital uses that 
have identifiable short-term sources of repayment, the rating would be higher. The 
circumstances under which these short-term sources of repayment could be impaired 
would be a focus of the agency review. Ultimately, the level of credit enhancement 
relative to the risks being taken is a determining factor.  
 
The	  Benefits	  of	  Ratings	  
 
At the end of the discussions with all the rating agencies, it was apparent that moving 
forward with the effort to obtain ratings for CDFIs—in whatever form—would be 
beneficial.  
 
Getting	  a	  Rating:	  Best-­‐case	  Scenario	  	  	  	  
All the CDFIs participating in a Capital Exchange, Commercial Paper Co-op, or other 
collective effort would receive investment-grade ratings through sound underwriting 
and gate keeping. The benefits would be:  
 
• Lower-cost funding for the CDFIs. 
• Significant expansion of funding sources. 
• Reduced regulatory capital allocation (and cost) for the bank lending to the 
platform, whether on or off balance sheet. 
• Advance participating CDFIs toward receiving ratings on individual financing in 
the capital markets. 
• Advance participating CDFIs toward receiving ratings on long-term capital.  
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• Rating agencies begin tracking performance of CDFIs in a controlled 
environment for the purposes of building a database. 
• Rating agencies base their ratings on analytical criteria and procedures 
developed by the CDFI field, which saves time and money and reduces incidence 
of miscalculation of risk. 
 
Getting	  a	  Rating:	  Worst-­‐case	  Scenario	  	  
Participating CDFIs receive private non-investment grade ratings. The benefits would 
be:  
 
• Possible lower-cost funding for the CDFIs. 
• Expansion of funding sources for the CDFIs. 
• The prospect of higher costs to the Capital Exchange or Commercial Paper Co-op 
due to higher regulatory capital allocation for the supporting banks, requires the 
Co-op to raise additional subsidized capital. 
• Advance participating CDFIs toward receiving ratings on individual financing in 
the capital markets. 
• Advance participating CDFIs toward receiving ratings on long-term capital. 
• Rating agencies begin tracking performance of CDFIs in a controlled 
environment for the purposes of building a performance database. 
• Rating agencies use industry-created underwriting standards (i.e., like CARS) 
but do not fully rely on  them for five or more years, or until such time as the 
performance database confirms their evaluations.  
  
Clearly, there was not any downside to pursuing the effort to work with the rating 
agencies, other than cost and time.  
 
Although both the Capital Exchange and the Commercial Paper Co-op restricted 
participation to large higher-quality CDFIs, the benefits to the participants would likely 
extend to the larger CDFI field over time. It is analogous to a student attending college: 
once the first member of the family makes it through, it becomes easier for other family 
members to attend, as well. The analogy carries through in another way: going to college 
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is not in any way essential to leading a productive life, but it does open up additional 
avenues of opportunity.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the problems in the financial markets have temporarily 
closed out the opportunity to create an intermediary platform that achieves a rating for 
the purposes of funding CDFI organizational credit risk. The point at which this effort 
can be resumed is not ascertainable.  
 
However, this temporary roadblock does not change the need for the CDFIs to develop a 
channel to the capital markets, and it does not change the necessity of obtaining a rating 
to get there. It only means the CDFI field has to present itself directly to the ranking 
agencies at this point, rather than through a vehicle that facilitates the effort.  
 
To succeed on a direct basis, the CDFI field will need to address the issues that the rating 
agencies found most troublesome. Aside from the issue of transaction size, the two 
biggest issues are analytical: the viability of the grant revenue line and tracking cash 
flow through the various categories of net assets. Suggestions as to how these two issues 
can be systematized by the field and aligned with rating agency disciplines are set forth 
below.  
 
The	  Big	  Rating	  Agency	  Question:	  How	  Can	  We	  Be	  Sure	  You’ll	  Get	  the	  Grants?	  
 
One of the two chief differences between the financial dynamics of CDFIs and 
conventional lenders is that the operating costs of delivering loans for CDFIs are 
substantially higher. These operating expenses generally support the kind of hands-on 
assistance and rate subsidy required for forming capital in low-income communities. 
These higher levels of expenses are generally supported by community, foundation, and 
public agency grants and contributions. To properly subsidize operations, these funds 
must primarily consist of unrestricted funds.  
 
The primary challenge is that, on average, CDFIs require 20 to 40 percent of their 
funding from grants and contributions, some amount of which is restricted. At present 
there is no industry-wide mechanism for evaluating the viability or consistency of this 
line of support. The challenge of establishing such a mechanism is compounded by 
differences in the way for-profit financial institutions and CDFIs view debt and equity.  
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In corporate finance, management rarely forecasts the issuance of equity because a) 
equity is very expensive; and b) access to equity is so dependent on market conditions 
from day to day. Thus, the corporate treasurer initiates the funding decision by 
forecasting both the level of self-funding, through conversion of assets to cash in the 
normal course of business, and the level of requisite debt funding. If there is not 
sufficient cash to cover the additional debt obligations, the treasurer reviews the pricing 
and cost structures for the purpose of producing more cash and more profit. Only after 
those calculations have been run does the treasurer solve for the needed level of equity. 
At that point, the CEO establishes certain share price targets and everyone waits for 
market conditions to favor a stock issue. But while they are waiting for the right 
conditions, they do not stop conducting business.  
 
In the community development field, the tradition has generally been the reverse: the 
grant (equity) component is the predicate on which everything else is determined, 
including growth of the business. The rest of the working parts are made to suit the size, 
terms and conditions of the grant funding. As grant funding becomes less available 
and/or predictable and the need to self-fund becomes greater, the community 
development field increasingly needs to adopt the disciplines of the corporate sector. It 
is the only way to assure that the mission can be sustained in the face of a much more 
volatile environment.  
 
Given the importance of raising funds every year to cover costs, the two key questions 
the rating agency will ask CDFIs are, how successful has management been in raising 
funds, and how well does management adjust mission program activity in response to 
the money raised when and if they do not hit their fundraising targets? The rating 
agencies are, effectively, trying to determine the level of flexibility in the business model 
created to serve the mission. They are also trying to determine the capacity of 
management to manage the delicate balance between achieving mission objectives and 
keeping the doors open. How management responds to the ups and downs of the grant 
revenue line is highly informative. In the context of analyzing organizational credit risk, 
this is the “holy grail.” 
 
Data	  Points:	  A	  Proposal	  	  
The following is an outline of the analytical points of a data platform that could be used 
to answer these questions the questions that the rating agencies will have about the 
CDFI grant revenue line. The platform would not involve a stand-alone analysis but 
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serve as an adjunct to the evaluation of the CDFI’s other financial attributes.  
 
These proposed points were reviewed favorably by one of the rating agencies, in that the 
data would be more than adequate for making a reasonable assessment.  
 
1. Amount of activity funded each year by non-operating sources 
 
• Sustainability ratio (operating revenues divided by operating expenses) 
• Trend of sustainability ratio 
• Breakdown by type and size of funding source 
• Volatility of sustainability ratio and funding sources 
 
2. Nature of the funding 
 
• Breakdown by type of funding and type of restrictions 
• Historical compliance with restrictions 
 
3. Evaluation of donors 
 
• Number 
• Number of new donors 
• Size of the donor, budget for grants, etc. 
• Focus of donor, changes in focus  
• Number of years serving this focus 
• Number of years supporting applicant 
• Likelihood of continued contributions to applicant 
 
4. Fund-raising program 
 
• Structure of the CDFI program 
• Cost of the CDFI program 
• Success rate in terms of applications to receipts, ratio of cost to receipts 
 
5. Financial viability tests 
 
• Estimated discretionary cash flow (that is, how much does the program hold 
in reserve for operating expenses in the event of a loss of grant revenue?) 
• Stress test (that is, how much of a reduction in grants can the CDFI sustain?) 
• Impact of reductions on programs (that is, how many programs can be 
retained in the event of a major reduction?) 
• Steps to accommodate reduced donations (for example, other sources of 
funding) 
 
After discussing these points with one of the rating agencies, the FIR team developed a 
reporting form (Figure 7.1). The chart was intended as a draft for discussion and 
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Figure	  7.1.	  Example	  of	  a	  Grant	  Revenue	  Line	  Data	  Sheet	  for	  Rating	  Agency	  Analysis	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
GRANT	  RELIANCE	   	  	   Actual	  















	  	   	  	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	  	  
Contributions	  from	  Top	  
Grantors	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
1	  Banks	   1	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
2	  Foundations	   2	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
3	  Agencies	   3	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
4	  	  Groups	   4	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
5	  Individuals	   5	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
6	  Other	   6	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Growth	  Rate	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
1	  Banks	   7	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
2	  Foundations	   8	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
3	  Agencies	   9	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
4	  	  Groups	   10	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
5	  Individuals	   11	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
6	  Other	   12	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Percent	  to	  Total	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
1	  Banks	   13	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
2	  Foundations	   14	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
3	  Agencies	   15	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
4	  	  Groups	   16	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
5	  Individuals	   17	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
6	  Other	   18	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Grantor	  Annual	  Program	  
Dollars	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
1	  Banks	   19	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
2	  Foundations	   20	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
3	  Agencies	   21	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
4	  	  Groups	   22	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5	  Individuals	   23	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
6	  Other	   24	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Cost	  of	  Fundraising	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Compens.	  allocation	   24	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Consultants	   25	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Special	  Events	   26	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  















	   	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	  
Banks	  and	  Other	  Corporates	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Number	  Bank	  Grantors	   27	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Number	  of	  New	  Institutional	  
Grantors	   28	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Grantors	  Non-­‐Renewing	   29	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Average	  Existing	  Grant	   30	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Average	  New	  Grant	   31	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Foundations	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Number	  Foundation	  Grantors	   32	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Number	  of	  New	  Institutional	  
Grantors	   33	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Grantors	  Non-­‐Renewing	   34	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Average	  Existing	  Grant	   35	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Average	  New	  Grant	   36	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Agencies	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Number	  Institutional	  Grantors	   37	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Number	  of	  New	  Institutional	  
Grantors	   38	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Grantors	  Non-­‐Renewing	   39	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Average	  Existing	  Grant	   40	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Average	  New	  Grant	   41	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The	  Other	  Big	  Rating	  Agency	  Question:	  What	  Does	  a	  Restricted	  Asset	  Do?	  
 
One of the pioneers on the subject of the tyranny of nonprofit net assets is Clara Miller, 
the CEO of the NonProfit Finance Fund.  Here she hits the heart of the issue for CDFIs: 
 
Intermittent cash flow problems, inadequate reserves, and raided endowments 
often result from a lack of such planning. In turn, these cash flow problems lead 
to imbalances that starve discretionary areas of activity such as program 
innovations, staff benefits, or maintenance of buildings. In fact, no matter how 
good a fortuitous chunk of capital may look, some projects are simply too big 
with respect to where the organization is in its development. 
 
The stronger the restrictions on a grant or the greater the fixity of asset acquired 
with that grant or loan, the higher the risk to the organization. Be aware that any 
restricted grant creates expense for your grantee. This increases the burden to 
raise unrestricted cash to cover this expense in direct proportion to the size, 
complexity, and degree of restrictions on the granted funds.  
 
Government contracting rules and nonprofit culture discourage the development 
of operating surpluses or induce nonprofits to hide them. The irony is that a 
technique meant to control costs and document efforts on mission actually 
undermines efficiency and harms program.67 
 
Small wonder the rating agency has a concern with this fundamental fact of the 
community development sector. One CDFI interprets “permanently restricted assets” as 
an endowment and uses none of the principal, not even for making mission-based loans; 
instead, the funds are invested entirely in marketable securities and other high quality 
investments. Another CDFI interprets “permanently restricted” to mean that the funds 
can be used for making loans and absorbing loan losses. A third CDFI interprets it to 
mean that the funds can be spent on subsidizing interest rates on loans and expenditures 
on loan workout services. Thus, at one end, the first CDFI uses only the interest income 
of the permanently restricted assets to defray the costs of making loans, while the third 
CDFI can use permanently restricted assets for lending, debt service, and a big chunk of 
loan operations. The differences in interpretation are material, but they are also 
allowable under FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) rules 116 and 117. This, 
notwithstanding the fact that the third CDFI’s interpretation, for example, largely 
obviates the need for temporarily restricted funds altogether.  
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The only net assets for which there is a generally accepted definition are unrestricted net 
assets. These can be used for any purpose. These are also the hardest funds to raise. If 
lenders saw what the true cash flow and balance sheet of a CDFI looked like—for 
example, by only tracking unrestricted cash—they might be disinclined to lend. Ditto 
the donors: if they saw how much the CDFI relied on their unrestricted grants—and 
would likely continue to rely on them into the distant future—they might be inclined to 
reduce their commitment or walk away altogether.  
 
Audit	  Confusion	  
The big kicker is that, for the most part, none of the interpretations of the net asset 
account is detailed in the respective annual audit reports. There is no precise summary 
of the terms under which the temporarily restricted and permanently restricted funds 
can be released or deployed, or the process whereby such funds are reinvested in their 
respective categories as they receive payment.  
 
As a result, an analyst has no way of knowing what funds are truly available to support 
ongoing operations or what funds are truly available to repay lenders and creditors in 
liquidation – unless he or she asks management. In short, the funds could be here 
tomorrow—or not. For the rating agency, the problem is even worse. As noted, without 
benefit of the case-by-case detail on funder restrictions, the agency cannot establish 
standards that enable it to compare one CDFI with the next, a fundamental part of the 
agency’s job. 
 
The question the CDFI field must ask is this: If a secured lender cannot truly discern the 
level of cash that serves as a source of repayment on the secured loans, why would an 
unsecured lender want to fund the CDFI on the basis of organizational risk?  
 
It is not the job of the accounting profession to rectify this lack of transparency. In the 
context of a nonprofit, the job of the accountant is to make sure that all the money is in 
the correctly designated bucket at statement date. This is critical to assuring that the 
contract with the donors is in compliance. Yet as important as this is, it does not track 
where the money has been in the interim or how much is going to revolve through the 
various buckets during the course of the year. As a result, the data necessary to properly 
evaluate the business and assess management’s capacity to manage cash are simply not 
available. Equally troubling is that in the absence of historical data, it is impossible for 
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analysts and funders to generate credible forecasts of available cash in the months and 
years to come. And here is the punch line: It may be impossible for management as well.  
 
This goes to the heart of the unsecured lender’s decision, for if there is not a credible 
forecast of unrestricted cash, there is no identifiable source of repayment for an 
unsecured loan. It also goes to the heart of the secured lender’s decision, for if the cash 
available for lending operations through the various forms of restrictions cannot be 
accurately forecasted, then the level of repayment to be sourced from organizational 
cash flow cannot be identified either. In both instances, lenders must step back from 
taking organizational credit risk and tie any loans they make to the risk and maturities 
of the underlying assets, with the appropriately sized reserves or discounts enforced. In 
addition to squeezing the organization further for cash, this inevitably proves costly in 
terms of staff time, paperwork, and legal expenses.  
 
If the for-profit institutional sector were saddled with this problem, it would come to a 
halt. But it is not. In the for-profit sector, cash is cash, and the unsecured lender and the 
secured lender knows exactly where they stack up in terms of claims on assets and the 
cash flows these assets produce. This enables for-profit management to obtain debt 
much more cheaply and easily.  
 
There is another problem this absence of data presents to the CDFI field. How does the 
CDFI determine that it has the right amount of annual grant funding or net assets to 
support its operational activity? Without a firm understanding of how much cash is 
coming in from each of the various restricted and unrestricted activities, it cannot. Grant 
requests simply become broad estimates.  
 
If the CDFI field wants to obtain ratings that reflect the quality of its lending and 
operations, it will have to develop a system that provides transparency and precision in 
the budgeting of unrestricted cash.  
 
Setting	  Up	  and	  Managing	  the	  Internal	  CDFI	  Bank:	  the	  “Treasury”	  Function	  
One effort that aligns with the rating agency disciplines has been developed as part of 
the FIR and NeighborWorks America “Sustainable Mission” course.68 At the suggestion 
of several CDFIs and with a number of CDFI-structured concepts, members of the FIR 
team created the Sustainable Mission system. Among a number of other features, the 
Sustainable Mission system addresses the complexities of tracking and forecasting the 
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uses of unrestricted as well as “mission-restricted” cash. In addition to providing clear 
identification of the various kinds of restricted assets, the system tracks their 
deployment, release, and conversion to cash. The system reconciles to the financial 
audits as well, and hence can be actively used in generating the kinds of forecasts that 
the rating agencies (and prudent management!) can use to bridge the information gap.  
 
The first step of the Sustainable Mission System is to break the grant section into three 
parts: operating grants (which are unrestricted), mission-restricted (capital) grants, and 
permanent endowment grants. These represent new nomenclature chosen to produce 
clarity for analysis and forecasting. They are different from the standard nonprofit 
nomenclature—that is, unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and permanently 
restricted—because the standard nomenclature, as applied in the community 
development industry, is opaque, at best.  
 
To understand actual cash flows—and the CDFI flexibility in allocating them—the new 
categories indicate the following. 
 
• Operating (unrestricted) grants. Funds can be used for all approved purposes, 
including staff, occupancy, loan workout functions, foreclosure expense, licenses, 
taxes, and other such items.  
• Mission-restricted grants. Funds can be expended at any time for the purposes of 
pursuing mission assets; for example, making loans, building loss reserves, 
buying down interest rates, subsidizing losses on sales of assets, or any other 
standard activity associated with increasing or decreasing the principal of an 
asset. The major exception is that the funds cannot be used for operating 
purposes. In this definition, mission-restricted grants can also be used to repay 
the principal on debt incurred in the funding of the mission assets; the reason 
being that in practice, these funds are generally subordinated to creditors in 
liquidation. Funds can be released from mission-restricted asset balance as 
stipulated by the donor. 
• Permanent endowment grants. The principal cannot be used for any purpose other 
than investment in high-quality securities, and funds cannot be released. Interest 
income can be used to support operations.  
When making forecasting assumptions, the Sustainable Mission encourages 
management to simply determine which categories the existing and prospective grants 
should be placed in. The forecasts for the operating and endowment grants are very 
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simple: the operating grants will be spent, and the endowments are placed effectively in 
escrow. These are one-line entries, easy to analyze and track.  
 
To facilitate the forecasting for the mission-restricted grants, there is an internal “bank” 
for the CDFI, which is set up by type of restricted asset. The “bank” receives the mission-
restricted grants, and management deploys the proceeds of the grants in the amounts it 
chooses based on funding restrictions and what it knows of the demand for the loan 
products. The system software automatically calculates the flows of the proceeds 
through the operating statement, balance sheets, and cash flows once they are deployed 
as loans. The calculations are done by loan type so that the restrictions travel with the 
funds. Principal repayments are automatically calculated on each loan type, indicating 
how much subsidy capital, restricted to this particular loan type, is being recycled in 
each period. Management can choose how much of this will be redeployed, released, or 






































These fields are designed to enable the manager to keep track of transactions in the 
mission-restricted bank account. The assumption is that all mission-restricted grant 
funds (as opposed to earned revenues which flow through the unrestricted net asset 
account) must either be in the “bank” account or going through it at some point. 
 
• “Restricted balance deployed” represents annual deployment of the funds in the 
mission-restricted asset.  
• “Mission-restricted balance released” represents funds that can be released 
under terms of the grant during the course of the year.  
• “New mission-restricted grants” represent new restricted grants received during 
the year.  
• “Mission-restricted assets repaid” represent that part of loan repayments or 
sales, or property sales funded by mission-restricted grants.  
 
By providing a clearer sense of the runoff of subsidy in the future, this “bank” 
forecasting gives an indication of how much grant funding needs to be replenished per 
program. At the same time, because the restricted cash activity has been segregated from 
the regular movements of cash, management can determine much more precisely how 
much it needs to alter pricing, term, and volume or alternatively, raise additional 
operating grant funds for the internal bank – at the organizational level.  
 
Establishing an internal bank for the CDFI is essentially a way of building up the 
“treasury” function that is standard in the for-profit sector. This is a key step in the effort 
achieve funding parity: establishing this platform enables the treasurers at CDFIs to begin 
the process of obtaining the same kind of pricing and borrowing flexibility that 
treasurers of for-profit corporations of equivalent credit quality enjoy. A chief reason 
that corporate treasurers enjoy flexibility is that they manage their treasury function as a 
bank to the corporation as a whole, proactively budgeting and then placing funds 
throughout the corporation in alignment with the budget. In part because of donor 
restrictions and in part because of the compulsion to react to mission needs as they arise, 
many if not most CDFIs do not maintain this kind of centralized banking function. 
Subsidy goes out when and as needed along with the cash.  
 
By establishing a central banking function, CDFIs can go a long way in rectifying this 
disadvantage. They can effectively liberate themselves; they can rise above the “retail” 
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constraints of various donors and the tendency to put money out as it becomes available 
by systematizing the use of subsidy. Among other things, the process inevitably leads to 
maximizing the use of grant subsidy and reducing the risk of cash shortfalls in the 
organization as a whole.  
 
This exercise is helpful not only to management but also to analysts and funders who 
are attempting to evaluate how the lending business actually works and how effectively 
the CDFI manages its grant subsidy—and its cash. It is, perhaps, the most crucial 
component in the evaluation of management’s financial capacity, as well as the 
foundation of the organization’s true credit risk.  
 
The Sustainable Mission approach provides a structure for the retrospective analysis, 
which the rating agencies would require. CDFIs should be able to look back through 
past audit papers for these data points. A trend line analysis of these would provide 
both management and agencies a clear view of the decision-making challenges in both 
restricted and unrestricted cash flows. Covering as it does the key issues of liquidity, 
capital adequacy, and management capability, this kind of analytical approach can take 













llen Seidman, in a working paper for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
argued that all borrowers and lenders, and by extension CDFIs, should take a hard, 
objective look at a business’s fundamentals, if they are to survive in challenging times.  
 
Individual institutions must strengthen their ability to survive and prosper by 
rigors of self-examination, risk management and planning ahead. Institutions 
should focus on the critical elements of a financial intermediary: net worth, 
liquidity and net operating income. They should plan for worst-case scenarios, 
understand where the stresses lie, and plan to meet and overcome them. 
Restructurings and extensions are to be expected, but institutions should 
rigorously examine these options and move to workouts and liquidations where 
recovery cannot be expected within a reasonable period of time. Now is the time 
for intelligent but hard-headed borrower support, not sentiment. Some 
institutions are likely to fail, and the industry may be stronger for this: creative 
destruction; but an orderly process of merger and transfer is needed to avoid 
leaving communities high and dry when institutions fail.69 
 
This chapter addresses the key strengths and weaknesses of current analytical 
disciplines in the CDFI field. The purpose is to identify the gaps between the analyses 
that the CDFI field uses and the analyses the rating agencies apply. The chapter also 
outlines a framework and set of recommendations that can contribute to the CDFI 
initiatives that are already underway. Many of the recommendations incorporate ideas 
and efforts that are already being pursued by CARS (The CDFI Assessment and Rating 
System), the CDFI Fund, NeighborWorks America, Strength Matters, and others. To this 
extent, there will be some redundancy. However, a key objective is to reinforce, as well 
as inform, the field efforts to develop standards for reporting and analysis that 
accurately capture the organizational credit risk of the CDFI in a manner that serves 




In Chapter 2 we identified the essence of credit analysis and organizational credit risk as 
such:  
 
The essence of credit analysis, then, is to identify the decisions that management 
makes and to assess the quality of the implementation of these decisions in the 
context of the organizational objectives and market conditions. The issue of 
repayment of obligations incurred is secondary to, and derivative of, the 
evaluation of these factors. Hence, the best form of credit analysis is a mirror of 
management intentions, decisions, and actions. There is a logical corollary to this: 
the best form of credit analysis incorporates the same metrics used by the 
organization to manage the business of its mission. Hence, for the manager and 
the investor, organizational credit risk is one and the same. (p. 48) 
 
At present, funders in the CDFI field have generally followed the lead of the old-
fashioned banker: they tend to focus on the two sources of repayment, income and 
liquidation of assets, as indicators of a CDFI’s financial health. In evaluating income and 
outstanding obligations, these funders tend to focus on the generation of surpluses, the 
amount of cash on hand relative to monthly expenses, and the ratio of earned income to 
expenses (often called the sustainability ratio). In determining the financial strength of 
the organization, they tend to focus on the leverage ratio and the breakdown of net 
assets into unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and permanently restricted net assets.  
 
These metrics are fine as far as they go. But they do not go very far, particularly with 
CDFIs. These metrics are, essentially, after-the-fact assessments, which means that they 
tend to go from good to bad with nothing in between, and often after it’s too late to do 
anything about whatever crisis has surfaced. Because these metrics are not tied directly 
to management decisions, they are not particularly revealing, and they are certainly not 
predictive.  The rating agencies would not consider these metrics adequate. Indeed they 
can be, and often are, misleading in the context of how CDFIs actually function. 
 
This chapter offers a framework that can help evaluate organizational credit risk in ways 
that rating agencies would find predictive and dependable. A corresponding objective is 
to help CDFI management think in terms of the concepts and the metrics that they 




Five fundamental principles, developed by members of the FIR team and  
NeighborWorks America  are a good place to begin.70 The “Five Key Principles of 
Finance” for nonprofits are:  
 
1.  When it comes to subsidy, it’s a zero-sum game: You versus your constituent. 
2.  Big balance sheets mean big costs 
3.  Net assets mean nothing 
4.  You’re out of business when you run out of cash. 
5.  You don’t have to be a bank to survive.  
 
As controversial or amusing as these may appear, they are based on principles of 
corporate finance that have been at the heart of conventional lending for the last two 
decades.71 These principles are about managing the positive and negative flows of cash 
through the active design and orchestration of assets, liabilities, and staff resources. Just 
because CDFIs are mission driven not-for-profits doesn’t mean these principles do not 
apply. Indeed, it is likely that the rating agencies in their role as gatekeepers will be 
using these principles to evaluate CDFI performance. More important, as the following 
sections show, these principles can actually help CDFIs expand their mission and 
increase their sustainability on the same dollar of subsidy, without compromising the 
objectives of either priority.  
 
In the first three sections of this chapter, we introduce some of the key tools that can 
assist in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the CDFI operating statement, 
balance sheet, and cash flow. We also show how CDFIs differ from conventional lenders 
in the manner in which they function, with a focus on the advantages and disadvantages 
of both.  
 
The fourth section introduces a structure that brings the CDFI operating statement, 
balance sheet, and cash flow together into a framework that captures management 
decisions, and the impact the decisions have on organizational risk and performance. 
The formula enables management and stakeholders to map out and track the impact of 
management decisions on the CDFI’s financial condition.  
 
In the fifth section, we re-introduce a seminal corporate finance formula, the return on 
equity formula that we touched on in Chapter 1.  This formula identifies how efficiently 
corporations use capital. We convert it to use for CDFIs.  It is a formula that rating 
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agencies would likely use as part of their effort to determine the CDFI’s balance of 
sustainability and impact.  
 
Taken together, these recommendations contribute a level of financial discipline that can 
substantially improve both the analysis of organizational risk and management capacity.  
 
 
The	  First	  Bottom	  Line	  
 
When analysts look at the operating statement of financial institutions, they generally 
separate the line items into four major categories: loan revenue, operating expense, loss 
expense, and funding expense. The rule of thumb is if one can track how loan revenues 
cover the three expense categories, one has a good take on the organization’s business 
model.  
 
The community development sector often translates this into a sustainability ratio, which 
consists of operating revenues (excluding grants and nonrecurring items) divided by 
operating expenses. While the sustainability ratio is a good starting point for getting at 
the basic model of the business, it is much more useful when it is broken down into its 
four component parts: 1) earned revenues; 2) operating expenses; 3) losses; and 4) 
funding costs. We call these the “Four Major Categories.”  
 
Divining	  the	  Basic	  “Business	  Model”	  
To capture how these four categories relate to one another on an “apples to apples” 
basis, we divide them each by a common denominator—to the total average assets of the 
organization as a whole:  
Four Major Categories 
I.  Revenues to average assets;  
II.  Operating expenses to average assets 
III.  Losses to average assets;  
IV.  Funding cost to average assets.  
 
These ratios (representing the Four Major Categories) provide an outline for evaluating 
how management chooses to accomplish its mission. As such, it is a useful foundation 
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for board members, staff, and management itself, as well as funders, lenders, and the 
rating agencies to initiate the evaluation of the CDFI as an organization: 
 
I. Revenues to Average Assets: This is the yield. It shows how management prices 
its loans relative to the market and the needs of the constituencies. It is affected 
by a number of factors, including the level of cash invested in risk assets (such as 
loans) versus non-risk assets such as treasuries and money market instruments, 
loan volume, principal repayments, and the level of delinquencies and losses.  
 
II. Operating Expenses to Average Assets: This shows how much it costs the 
organization to deliver the assets to the constituencies. It is affected by factors 
such as the number of staff that are not involved in generating earning assets 
(training, for example) and the level of assets that are not generating revenues 
(for example, an owned building used for the organization’s headquarters).  
 
III. Losses to Average Assets: This shows how much risk that management is 
targeting. The key factors affecting this ratio include the level of loss to 
delinquency, the level of recovery, and the organization’s policies on rewrites, 
restructuring, and charge-offs.  
 
IV. Funding Cost to Average Assets: This is often referred to as the cost of funds. It 
shows how much the organization pays to borrow. This is affected by the 
amount of debt incurred and the rate on the debt, and provides an insight into 
the organization’s capacity to grow based on earning assets.  
 
Several associated ratios help us to better understand what these four major ratios are 
revealing, and we will get to those shortly. However, these four ratios provide a solid 
foundation for analyzing management policies and decisions about the impact and 
sustainability of the organization. When tracked over time, they can indicate key 
changes in constituent need, market conditions, and management decisions. Most 
important, they can help identify how management adjusts the balance of resources and 
constituent needs—essentially how it makes the decisions that define organizational 
credit risk.  
 
Table 8.1 offers an example of how to use these ratios. Assume that a CDFI has 
convinced a rating agency that it should be compared with banks rather than hospitals, 
universities, museums, or municipalities. Its financial analyst might begin with the four 
major categories by comparing itself with a standard bank.  
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From this summary analysis, the financial analyst can deduce the following:  
 
• The Bank: The yield on the bank’s loans of 8 percent is covering the sum of the 
operating expenses, funding costs, and losses, leaving a pretax profit of 2 
percent. For a bank that is leveraged at a ratio of 10:1, investors are getting a 
pretax return on equity of 20 percent. This is Warren Buffett territory: the bank 
gets high marks for sustainability because if it can generate these kinds of 
returns, it can always access more equity capital.  
 
 
Table	  8.1.	  Bank	  and	  CDFI	  Comparison	  
 




Operating	  expenses 3.00 7.00 
Funding	  costs 2.00 2.00 
Losses 1.00 1.00	  
 
Pretax	  net	  income	  
 
2.00 -­‐5.00 
Grants	  required -­‐-­‐ 5.00 
 
• The CDFI: The yield on the CDFI loans of 5 percent covers its funding costs and 
its losses, but not its operating expenses. To stay in business, the CDFI must raise 
5 percent of its total assets in grants every year. The analyst will necessarily ask 
why the CDFI has such a low yield on its assets, and why it has such a high level 
of operating expenses. If the CDFI can convince the analyst that these are both a 
function of the CDFI mission, the analyst will then want to know how certain the 
CDFI is that it can obtain 5 percent of its total assets in grants each and every 
year. (And there it is: the grant revenue line again.) The next question is, What 
happens if the CDFI cannot raise 5 percent every year? Does it cut expenses, cut 
growth, reduce risk, eliminate the mission?  
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Does this mean that the CDFI should become a bank? Absolutely not! If banks could 
serve CDFI’s constituencies effectively, they would be doing so. Instead, the CDFI 
should use this report card to help refine the manner in which it delivers the mission, 
should refinement be necessitated by reduced access to grants. The point is, if the CDFI 
is certain this is the right business model for its constituencies and funders, then it must 
demonstrate how the model is as sustainable as the bank’s. And CDFI’s must prove it 
using the metrics and the disciplines that the financial analyst understands.  
 
The Four Major Categories and the sustainability ratio are just the beginning of the 
process for management and credit analyst alike. In the following sections, we develop 
the logic further to get a more precise idea of what sort of production and performance 
the CDFIs will want to demonstrate going forward.  
 
The	  Obsolete	  Balance	  Sheet	  
 
“Net assets mean nothing.” This is one of the Five Key Principles of Finance for 
nonprofits. Rating agencies (and quite a few others) are confused by the distinctions 
among unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and permanently restricted net assets as 
deployed by the CDFI field. No question that when we say “net assets mean nothing” 
they are likely to agree completely.  
 
A number of funders in the CDFI field are beginning to understand the truth of this 
statement—out of necessity. The current turmoil in the credit and housing markets is 
proving a fact they have long suspected: CDFI risk assets (loans) are not worth in the 
marketplace what they are valued on the balance sheet. CDFIs, after all, make loans that 
no one else would make due to their small size or perceived credit risk, and they 
typically do not charge rates that reflect the size or the risk. Hence they are, by 
definition, “below market rate” loans. In the conventional market, these loans would not 
be made, or if they were, they would be discounted. Yet despite the below market value 
of the CDFI loans, they are carried at 100 percent of face value on the CDFI balance 
sheet, hence overstating true net assets.  
 
This is not the only problem with CDFI net assets, and why we can safely say they mean 
nothing.  The following example shows the limitations of the balance sheet capital 
indicators, and why the rating agencies would find them to be of marginal value.  
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CDFI	  versus	  Mortgage	  Lender:	  Dueling	  Net	  Assets	  
Table 8.2 shows two fictitious lending entities, a nonprofit loan fund called “Bucket” and 
a for-profit non-depository lender called ”Channel.” Let’s say both were making single-
family mortgage loans in the low-income markets prior to the mortgage meltdown in 
the summer of 2007. The interest rate for conventional mortgages was 5.5 percent, with 
conventional mortgages producing an average 0.25 percent credit loss rate.  
 









• Bucket has $3 million in debt and is leveraged at 0.43:1, meaning that debt 
represents only 43 percent of its $7 million in net assets. 
• Channel has $9 million in debt and is leveraged at 9.0:1, meaning that debt is 9 
times the value of channel’s net assets (equity for a for-profit) of $1 million.  
 
Interest Rate and Operating Expenses 
 
• Bucket makes 30-year mortgages at 4 percent. This rate is more than enough to 
cover the 2 percent social investment rate on Bucket’s $3 million in long-term 
debt (or $60,000), and the $75,000 per year in credit losses.  
• Channel makes 30-year mortgages at 6 percent but is able to change the interest 
rate after two years. Because it can change the rate in two years, Channel funds 
its lending activity with short-term debt at an average interest rate of 2 percent.  
• Bucket charges an origination fee of 1 percent, and channel charges an 





• Both Bucket and Channel target clients with an average 0.75 percent credit loss 
rate, which is 50 basis points higher than the conventional rate. The Government 
Sponsored Entities like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) are willing to 
purchase this higher-risk paper, but they want a 6 percent mortgages rate. 
Therefore, at 6 percent, there is no discount of the value of the loans for assessing 
risk. Table 8.2 summarizes these assumptions. 
 
 
Table	  8.2	  The	  Problem	  with	  Net	  Assets:	  Key	  Balance	  Sheet	  Indicators	  for	  Bucket	  and	  Channel	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   	  	   Assets	  	   	  	   Debt	  	   	  	   Net	  Assets	   	  	   Leverage	   	  	   	  	  
1	  	   Bucket	   10,000,000	   	   3,000,000	   	   7,000,000	   	   42.86%	   	   	  
2	  	   Channel	   10,000,000	   	   9,000,000	   	   1,000,000	   	   900.00%	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   Term	   	   Loan	  Rate	   	   Prem/(Disc)	   	   Loss	  Rate	   	   Discount	  
3	  	   Bucket	   30.00	   	   4.00%	   	   -­‐20.37%	   	   0.00%	   	   0.00%	  
4	  	   Channel	   2.00	   	   6.00%	   	   0.00%	   	   0.00%	   	   0.00%	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Real	  Value:	   Assets	   	   Debt	   	   Net	  Assets	   	   Leverage	   	   Gain	  (Loss)	  
5	  	   Bucket	   7,963,000	   	   3,000,000	   	   4,963,000	   	   60.45%	   	   (2,037,000)	  
6	  	   Channel	   10,000,000	   	   9,000,000	   	   1,000,000	   	   900.00%	   	   0	  
 
 
If we stop at line 2 in Table 8.2—and this is where we would normally stop given the 
information provided in the audits—we can generally run leverage ratios and 
sustainability ratios.72 We are likely to conclude that Bucket is a very strong entity, and 
much stronger than Channel. The reason: Bucket has a strong balance sheet, and 
although Channel generates nice profits, there is very little capital in the event of higher 
credit losses or higher borrowing rates.  
 
But the rating agencies shouldn’t (and won’t) stop here. Lines 3-6 reveal the assets, 
liabilities, and cash flow. For Bucket, the market value for its loans is the amount 
someone is willing to pay for them. The going rate for loans with a 0.75 percent charge-
off profile is 6 percent, but Bucket’s loans carry a 4 percent interest rate. As a result, they 
are worth 20.37 percent less than what is shown on the books. So in liquidation, the 
value of the loans that Bucket carries is $2,037,113, less than the $10 million they show 
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on the balance sheet. The true net assets for Bucket are $4,963,000, not $7 million, and the 
true leverage is 0.60:1, not 0.43:1. 
 
There is another potential problem. If conditions in the housing market or the economy 
deteriorate, the GSEs and other secondary market platforms may not wish to purchase 
loans with a 0.75 percent charge-off profile at par. It is, after all, 50 basis points higher 
than their conventional loss rate, and they may decide they want to be compensated 
more fully for this higher risk profile. This is the case in the markets currently. Hence, if 
Bucket were to sell, the buyers might require a further discount—let’s say, 50 basis 
points to cover the additional uncertainty. The present value of 50 basis points on the 
principal of the loans -- would reduce the value of Bucket’s $10 million in loans by 
another $514,462, or 5.14 percent.   
 
In total, the true value of the Bucket assets is more than 25 percent lower than what is 
shown on Bucket’s books. This translates in a drop in value for the net assets of over 35 
percent. Clearly, the net assets and the leverage ratio are not sound indicators of 
Bucket’s health. 
 
Granted, Bucket intends to hold the loans to maturity, so the market value and true 
leverage are not applicable except in liquidation. But, from a practical standpoint, from 
the standpoint of both mission impact and sustainability, this true market value places 
heavy burdens on Bucket, which can affect financial condition and mission. These 
burdens include the following: 
 
• By holding until maturity, Bucket must wait for loans to repay principal before it 
is able to make more loans.  
• If Bucket wants to borrow more to fund additional loans, the lower value of net 
assets will reduce the amount it can borrow, even if it is borrowing from social 
investors at below-market rates.  
• Bucket’s only choice is to raise additional grant or other subsidized funds to 
expand its lending activity. 
 
These three factors limit the amount that Bucket can deploy in loans to its constituency. 
These limits on availability explain, in part why people do not flock to Bucket, with its 
low interest rate loans. It is clearly a mission constraint. There is also a sustainability 
issue: By holding until maturity, Bucket is exposed to interest rate risk. If rates in the 
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marketplace rise, the value of the loans and the net assets will decrease further. If rates 
fall, the borrowers may wish to prepay. Either way, the CDFI portfolio loses value.  
 
Another way to look at this is, the minute Bucket books a loan, it loses more than 30 
percent of its subsidy. Then, as it continues to hold the loan on its balance sheet, it is 
exposed to greater, and unpredictable, losses as a result of future market conditions. The 
question arises: Will Bucket’s social investors (lenders and grantors alike) continue to 
subsidize an entity that has limited mission impact on top of a high-risk balance sheet? 
These questions go to the heart of Bucket’s ability to sustain itself over the longer term, 
questions that the rating agencies will also want to explore.  
 
And where will that exploration lead? Right back to the viability of the grant revenue 
line—and the value of restricted assets! One place it won’t end up: the book value of 
Bucket’s net assets.  
 
Now consider Channel. 
 
There is no discount associated with the sale of Channel’s loans. Channel can sell its 
loans to the GSEs at par from the standpoint of rate, so the discount can be zero. The 
only discount occurs as a result of credit risk, in the event that the appetite for high-risk 
loans in the secondary market evaporates. The discount for losses would be the same for 
Channel as they were for Bucket ($514,462), which could immediately wipe out 50 
percent of Channel’s equity (net assets).  To be sure, Channel’s risks rise considerably in 
the event of increased credit losses and/or interest rates. To mitigate the impact, 
Channel would normally charge whatever additional rate–in this case 50 basis points–to 
the interest rate the borrower pays in order to be able to sell the loans to the market at 
par. It’s a simple example of what is known as “risk-based pricing.” If Channel increases 
the rate by 50 basis points to cover the uncertainty of the higher risk profile borrowers it 
is lending to, the market won’t discount the loans when they are sold. Channel can sell 
them at par, with no deduction to its net assets.   
 
That’s where one might normally stop and draw some conclusions. But that isn’t where 
Channel stops. In fact, this is just where things start getting interesting for the for-profit 
lender.  
 
Consider how Channel finances itself. Because there is a rate change option at the end of 
year 2, Channel feels perfectly comfortable funding its portfolio with shorter-term debt. 
If interest rates go up, Channel can pass the increase on to the borrower by resetting the 
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rate. Because of this reset option, Channel can go to the capital markets and fund itself 
(in the commercial paper market, for example) at rates substantially lower than the 6 
percent it is getting on the loans it is holding (here, we are assuming a short-term 
borrowing rate of 2 percent, and, consequently, a fairly steep yield curve).  
 
The	  Mortgage	  Lender	  Hits	  the	  Street	  
Table 8.3 offers a breakout of what Bucket and Channel could do on the lending 
platforms they have respectively built. Heading into year 2 of the operation for both, it 




• In lines 3 and 4 of Table 8.3 under revenue is the $500,000 that Bucket earned in 
interest and origination fees on the $10 million in loans that it made in year 1.  
• Line 5 is the interest expense of $60,000. 
• Next to that, in the cash and surplus column is a net margin of $440,000 on the 
existing portfolio of loans. 
• In line 6 is the $500,000 in principal repayments on the loans they have made 
(this is a simple calculation assuming equal amortization over 20 years with all 
loans made day 1 of the year). This $500,000 will be re-lent during the year in 
order to make new mission-based loans.  
• The sum total in line 7 shows the total amount of cash available to Bucket for 
covering costs and relending: $940,000. 
• Lines 8 and line 9 show, respectively, the interest income and the origination fees 
on new loans made on the $500,000 that will be reinvested during the second 
year.  
• Lines 10 and 11 show the operating and loss expenses that must be covered 
during the second year. 
• Line 12 shows the surplus, in this case a deficit of $10,000, which must be made 




Table	  8.3.	  Channel	  and	  Bucket	  in	  Motion:	  Cash	  Flows	  at	  Work	  
	  	   	  	   Loans	   	  	   Debt	  	   	  	   Equity	   	  	   Leverage	   	  	   Revenues	   	  	   Interest	   Cash	  &	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   Surplus	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
1	  	   Bucket	   10,000,000	  	   	   3,000,000	  	   	   7,000,000	  	   	   42.86%	   	   	   	   	   	  
2	  	   Channel	   10,000,000	  	   	   9,000,000	  	   	   1,000,000	  	   	   900.00%	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   Bucket	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
3	  	   Loan	  Rate	   4.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   400,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
4	  	   Orig	  Fee	   1.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   100,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
5	  	   Debt	  Rate	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   60,000	  	   440,000	  	  
6	  	   Term/Rpmt	   20	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	   500,000	  	  
7	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   940,000	  	  
8	  	   New	  Interest	  Income	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   20,000	  	  
9	  	   New	  Fee	  Income	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   5,000	  	  
10	  	   (Operating	  Expenses)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (400,000)	  
11	  	   (Loss	  Expense)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (75,000)	  
12	  	   New	  Surplus	  (Profit)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (10,000)	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   Channel	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
13	  	   Loan	  Rate	   6.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   300,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
14	  	   Orig	  Fee	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   200,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
15	  	   Debt	  Rate	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   180,000	  	   320,000	  	  
16	  	   Term/Rpmt	   2	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	   5,000,000	  	  
17	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   5,320,000	  	  
18	  	   New	  Interest	  Income	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   300,000	  	  
19	  	   New	  Fee	  Income	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   100,000	  	  
20	  	   (Operating	  Expenses)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (150,000)	  
21	  	   (Loss	  Expense)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (75,000)	  




Notice the origination fees. With the origination fees and the reinvested capital, Bucket 
is now almost able to completely cover its costs without the need for additional grant 
funding. (For both Bucket and Channel, we assume for the sake of simplicity no change 





• In lines 13 and 14 in Table 8.3 under revenue is the $300,000 and $200,000 that 
Channel earned in interest and origination fees on the $10 million in loans it 
made in the first year. The interest income would be $600,000, but in this 
simplified model, Channel sells half the loans for cash at the beginning of the 
year.  
• In line 15 is the interest expense of $180,000 on the $9 million in debt. 
• Next to that, in the cash and surplus column is a net margin of $320,000 on the 
existing portfolio.  
• In line 16 is $5 million in principal payments and proceeds from loan sales on the 
loans Channel has made (again, this is a simple calculation assuming equal sale 
of all $10 million in loans over two years with all loans made day 1 of the first 
year, and $5 million sold on day 1 of the first year). This $5 million that is sold 
will be re-lent during the year.  
• The sum total in line 17 shows the total amount of cash available to Channel for 
covering costs and re-lending; $5,320,000. 
• Lines 18 and line 19 show, respectively, the interest income and the origination 
fees on new loans made on the $5,320,000 that has been reinvested during the 
second year.  
• Lines 20 and 21 show the operating and loss expenses that must be covered.  
• Line 22 shows the $495,000 surplus.  
 
Remember: this surplus is generated on only $1 million of Channel’s shareholder equity. 
This represents a 49.5 percent return on equity for Channel. This is an extremely 
attractive for investors. When investors see the profit margins that Channel is making on 
this kind of activity, they start buying Channel’s stock. If, for example, for-profit lenders 
are getting only a 20 percent return on equity for their investors, they will invest more 
cash in Channel because it generates a 49.5 percent return. In this case, it would take an 
additional $1.5 million (simple approximation) of new equity investment to bring 
Channel’s profitability back within the industry norm of 20 percent. The result is that, 
prior to the new stock issuance, the true market value of Channel’s net assets (equity) is 
almost two and a half times as high as what is shown on the books ($2.5 million instead 
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of $1.0 million), and hence, Channel’s true leverage ratio is actually lower; that is, 4:1 
instead of 9:1.  And now, Channel has net assets whose market value ($2.5 million) is 
more than 50 percent of Bucket’s true net asset value of $4.96 million.  
 
Why is the market value important? The level of profitability that Channel produces 
enables it to raise more equity and consequently, debt. Unlike Bucket, which must find 
long-term, low-cost debt among a limited number of social investors, Channel has access 
to unlimited amounts of debt as well as equity. Hence, it can bring substantially more 
cash to the constituencies that it, and Bucket, both serve. Which is exactly what Channel 
is going to do.  
The	  Mortgage	  Lender	  Accelerates	  
From the standpoint of its equity investors, Channel has just put in an excellent 
performance. So there is no reason to stop now: Whatever it is that management is 
doing, the investors want it to keep doing.  
 
After Channel gets its additional $1.5 million in new equity and raises total net assets to 
$2.5 million, Channel’s management, and its new shareholders, will want to put it all to 
work. Since the 9:1 leverage has worked so well for them in the past, they will go out 
and borrow $22.5 million.  
 
At the end of the year, Channel has produced $1.24 million in surplus on the $25 million 
in assets (top left, Table 8.4). They could now get more equity. In a 20 percent return-on-
equity environment, they could get an additional $5 million, for a total net asset base of  
$7.5 million. So now, after one year of operation, Channel’s net assets are in fact, 150 
percent of the market value of Bucket’s.  
 
But that’s not all that has happened. Of equal interest is the fact that Channel is now 
making almost $13 million of new loans a year, while Bucket is stuck way back on the 
corner, making under $500,000.  
 
This discrepancy in loan volume will not show up on the balance sheet. The balance 
sheet won’t tell us that Channel is originating over 25 times the amount of loans to low- 
income constituents that Bucket is making. Nor will the operating statement. We won’t 




8.4.	  Channel	  Issues	  and	  Then	  Leverages	  Equity	  
	   	   Loans	   	   Debt	  	   	   Equity	   	   Leverage	   	   Revenues	   	   Interest	  
Cash	  &	  
Surplus	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Channel	   25,000,000	  	   	   22,500,000	  	   	   2,500,000	  	   	   900.00%	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
13	  	   Loan	  Rate	   6.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   750,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
14	  	   Orig	  Fee	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   500,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
15	  	   Debt	  Rate	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   450,000	  	   800,000	  	  
16	  	   Term/Rpmt	   2	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	   12,500,000	  	  
17	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   13,300,000	  	  
18	  	   New	  Interest	  Income	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   750,000	  	  
19	  	   New	  Fee	  Income	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   250,000	  	  
20	  	   (Operating	  Expenses)	   	   1.00%	   	  
to	  volume	  +	  loans	  
outstanding	   	   	   	   	   (375,000)	  
21	  	   (Loss	  Expense)	   	   0.75%	   	   to	  loans	  outstanding	   	   	   	   	   (187,500)	  




This brings up one more item to examine: mission. One concern that is likely to surface 
from the rating agency analyst is: if Channel is taking the same level of risk as Bucket, 
and Channel is making money while helping 25 times the number of people, how can 
Bucket be in the lending business at all?  
 
There is a story here that someone at Bucket must be able to tell. At present, though, the 
annual audited figures don’t tell it, and the market doesn’t have the time or the incentive 
to listen. The leverage ratio and the cash-on-hand figure are mere snapshots of a point in 
time, generally irrelevant by the time they are reviewed three to four months later in the 
annual audit. The sustainability ratio, typically in the 60–70 percent range for Bucket, 
provides no comfort to the analyst, and there is nothing in the audit that explains why 
grantors keep making grants to the CDFI or whether they will continue doing it. The 
metrics for lowering high credit risk to a reasonable level through technical assistance or 
counseling for example, are nowhere to be found. In short, there is nothing in the 
reported figures or the ensuing analysis that helps the rating agency, the institutional 
lender, or anyone else understand why Bucket is doing what it is doing, or why what it 
does is better than what Channel does. The gap is widened by the fact that nobody feels 
a need to require the same level of scrutiny of Channel’s lending operations. The market 
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is quite comfortable with what it sees in the ratios of the Four Major Categories and 
what they produce on the bottom line. Those, in and of themselves, justify both debt and 
equity funding for Channel.   
 
Failure	  to	  Communicate	  
So what have Bucket and Channel taught us so far? With the benefit of clairvoyance, we 
have tracked their real operational cash flows, and we have learned the following:   
 
• The true market value of the net assets of Bucket is $4,963,000 instead of $7 
million.  
• The true market value of the net assets of Bucket will have a downward bias 
because they are illiquid, exposed to interest rate risk, additional credit losses 
and expanding operating costs. That is in addition to the fact that without grants, 
Bucket generates deficits.  
• The true market value of the equity of Channel is $7.5 million, not $1 million.  
• The true market value enables the lender to obtain greater or lesser amounts of 
debt and equity funding, which, in turn, enables it to serve a greater or lesser 
segment of its constituency.  
• The true market value of net assets can change day to day. 
 
We have also seen that neither the operating statement nor the balance sheet provides 
this information for either Channel or Bucket. In short, if the operating and balance sheet 
figures are all the industry relies on in determining financial health, it is largely 
misinformed. Such an approach again reminds us of one of the Five Key Principles of 
Nonprofit Finance: Net Assets Mean Nothing. 
 
Follow	  the	  Cash	  
 
You don’t hear investigators saying, “Follow the surplus!” or “Follow the net assets!” 
The reason they follow the cash is that the trail of cash reveals the relationships among 
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parties engaged in commerce as well as the intent. It reveals who is doing what and 
why.  
 
Before mapping the trails of cash for a CDFI, we should fill in some blanks on the 
Bucket/Channel example. Beyond the operating statements and balance sheets lies the 
reason why conventional mortgage lenders like Channel succeeded so remarkably at 
first, and why they failed so completely at last. Also in this mix we’ll find the reason 
why CDFIs like Bucket couldn’t do much to help their constituents in the interim. The 
answers become clearer once we delve more deeply into the actual cash flows.  
 
The	  Mortgage	  Lender	  Becomes	  the	  “Market	  Darling”	  
Based on the $1.24 million in surplus it produced in Table 8.5, Channel has raised the 
$3.5 million in new equity to get $6 million in net assets. It has also added $31.5 million 
in debt at 2 percent for a total of $54 million in assets. So now it is producing $2.970 
million in surplus. This means the value of its net assets (in a 20 percent return on equity 
environment) is $14.85 million, and it has the potential to raise enough new debt to reach 
a total asset level of $148.5 million. Clearly, at this point Channel is poised to run up its 
 
Table	  8.5.	  Channel	  Issues	  and	  Then	  Leverages	  Even	  More	  Equity  
  
        
	  	   	  	   Loans	   	  	   Debt	  	   	  	   Equity	   	  	   Leverage	   	  	   Revenues	   	  	   Interest	  
Cash	  &	  
Surplus	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   Channel	   60,000,000	  	   	   54,000,000	  	   	   6,000,000	  	   	   900.00%	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
13	  	   Loan	  Rate	   6.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1,800,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
14	  	   Orig	  Fee	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1,200,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
15	  	   Debt	  Rate	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   1,080,000	  	   1,920,000	  	  
16	  	   Term/Rpmt	   2.00	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	   30,000,000	  	  
17	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   31,920,000	  	  
18	  	   New	  Interest	  Income	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1,800,000	  	  
19	  	   New	  Fee	  Income	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   600,000	  	  
20	  	   (Operating	  Expenses)	   	   1.00%	   	   to	  volume	  +	  loans	  outstanding	   	   	   (900,000)	  
21	  	   (Loss	  Expense)	   	   0.75%	   	   to	  loans	  outstanding	   	   1	  	   	   	   (450,000)	  
22	  	   New	  Surplus	  (Profit)	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   2,970,000	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volume of activity, reaching the billion-dollar level perhaps within four or five more 
years.  
 
But why wait? How can Channel get to $1 billion sooner? Channel is currently turning 
its loan portfolio over once every two years. Why not speed it up?  After all, the 
commercial paper market is buying up everything Channel can originate, and within 30, 
60, 90, or 270 days, the commercial paper conduits are selling the loans off into 
mortgage-backed securities or other similar long term funding instruments. Given these 
conditions, Channel reduces the holding time for its loans to 90 days. Table 8.6 shows 





Table	  8.6.	  Channel	  Grabs	  Every	  Customer	  In	  Sight	  
	  	  
	  	   	  	   Loans	   	  	   Debt	  	   	  	   Equity	   	  	   Leverage	   	  	   Revenues	   	  	   Interest	  
Cash	  &	  
Surplus	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Channel	   60,000,000	  	   	   54,000,000	  	   	   6,000,000	  	   	   900.00%	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
13	  	   Loan	  Rate	   6.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   900,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
14	  	   Orig	  Fee	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1,200,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
15	  	   Debt	  Rate	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   1,080,000	  	   1,020,000	  	  
16	  	   Term/Rpmt	   0.25	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	   240,000,000	  	  
17	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   241,020,000	  	  
18	  	  
New	  Interest	  Income	  (Less	  loans	  sold	  of	  
50%)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2,700,000	  	  
19	  	   New	  Fee	  Income	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   4,800,000	  	  
20	  	   (Operating	  Expenses)	   	   1.00%	   	   to	  volume	  +	  loans	  outstanding	   	   	   (3,000,000)	  
21	  	   (Loss	  Expense)	   	   0.75%	   	   to	  loans	  outstanding	   	   1	  	   	   	   (450,000)	  
22	  	   New	  Surplus	  (Profit)	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   5,070,000	  	  
 
 
There are several important drivers on Channel’s emerging business model, including: 
 
• The size of the balance sheet remains the same, as does the book value of equity, 
at $6 million. 
• New loan volume (line 16, Table 8.6) increases from $30 million to $240 million. 
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• This produces a significant boost in origination fees (line 19), which now dwarf 
interest income.  
• The operating expense in line 20 increases dramatically because of the new loan 
volume, but it is entirely covered by the increase in fee income. 
• The loss expense in line 21 stays the same because it is based only on the amount 
of loans that remain on the balance sheet. Because these remain at the same $60 
million level as before (owing to the acceleration of loan sales), the loss expense 
does not increase with volume. The added losses get passed on to the investors.  
 
As we can see, the cash that is being raised and deployed on this platform generates an 
astonishing level of profitability as well as lending activity in a very short space of time.  
This is really an entirely different business model for lending than the business model 
that Bucket is using. Essentially, while Bucket remains a portfolio lender earning 
revenues by holding onto the loans it originates, Channel has moved over to the trading 
side of the lending business where revenues are earned by selling the loans for cash as 
soon as possible after they are booked.  
 
Back to the business: Channel is now producing enough surplus to create a market value 
of $25 million (net assets), which is a capital base that could support $250 million in total 
assets and loan originations of a $1 billion a year—and it is doing it on $6 million in net 
assets. At this point, any number of banks and other financial institutions are likely to 
become interested in acquiring Channel. And once they own it, they will make sure it 
keeps doing whatever it’s been doing to generate those fabulous returns.  
 
Here’s an interesting question: Is anyone in the Channel boardroom thinking about the 
loss expense of 0.75 percent, and the possibility that it might increase? Isn’t that what 
happens when one has to lower lending standards to produce higher loan volume?  Yes, 
but why should the board worry?  For the 90 days or so that Channel holds the loans, 
they are secured by hard assets, and at present, the value of those assets is going up, 
with no end in sight. 
 
Well, then, should anyone worry about the cost of funds at 2 percent? What? Are you 
nuts? (say the board members). 
 
In 2003, Asset Backed Commercial Paper outstanding was a little over $600 billion. By 
2007, it had nearly doubled to $1.2 trillion. And things were looking up. Wall Street was 
desperate for loan products to fill those commercial paper conduits, mortgage-backed 
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securities, CDOs, and other housing-related securities. There was absolutely no reason 
to worry about Channel’s cheap short-term funding. The interest and fees that were 
being generated on the high volume of loans were so far in excess of credit loss and 
funding expenses that these expenses were, in the minds of Channel management, 
irrelevant. As (now former) Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince said of the buyout climate, “As 
long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”73  
 
There is a problem though. Even as Channel grows, exponentially, more investors want 
to enjoy these kinds of returns on their equity. Indeed, they invest with the expectation 
they will get them. Lenders to Channel also like the deals they are getting. Channel has 
no choice but to keep increasing the volume. So much for rational expectations. 
 
The	  Mortgage	  Lender	  Has	  to	  Work	  Hard	  to	  Find	  Enough	  Deals.	  Any	  Deals	  
At some point, Channel will face the fact that it cannot find enough good deals, a 
phenomenon economists call “diminishing returns.” One of the distinguishing features 
of the lending business—virtually all of the lending business—is that the real cost of bad 
decision-making may take two, three, or even four years to surface. Conversely, 
earnings are front-loaded in fees. Even when the accounting rules require the fees to be 
accrued and taken into revenue over the life of the loan, the fact is, the fee payments still 
show up in cash at the front end of the transaction. It takes a while for the impact of bad 
loans to be felt. But sure enough, there comes a point when the “diminishing returns” 
begin to appear in the loss rate. Somebody finds a way to lend to Ms. Zabau Shepard, 
the family dog (see Chapter 1), and the immediate returns are sufficient to entice others 
into making loans to the new class of borrowers.  
 
In Table 8.7, Channel’s target loss rate of 0.75 percent is multiplied five times as credit 
conditions erode. But, amazingly enough, this is not a big problem for Channel; the 
company is still generating returns on equity in excess of 50 percent. In fact, given the 
high volume and low cost of debt, Channel can experience more than a 1,000 percent 
increase of loan losses on its portfolio and not be concerned, as we see in Table 8.8.  
 
Although Channel doesn’t like seeing its loss rate (line 21) rise from $450,000 in Table 8.6 
to $4.5 million, interestingly, this increase still doesn’t kill the business. With the loss 
expense rising as a result of the defaults, profits decline from the $5 million range in 
Table 8.6 to the $1 million range in Table 8.8. Yet Channel is still earning $1 million on 
net assets of $6 million, a respectable return.  
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Table	  8.7.	  Channel	  Experiences	  Increasing	  Losses	  -­‐-­‐	  But	  So	  What?	  	  	  
	  	  
	  	   	  	   Loans	   	  	   Debt	  	   	  	   Equity	   	  	   Leverage	   	  	   Revenues	   	  	   Interest	  
Cash	  &	  
Surplus	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Channel	   60,000,000	  	   	   54,000,000	  	   	   6,000,000	  	   	   900.00%	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
13	  	   Loan	  Rate	   6.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   900,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
14	  	   Orig	  Fee	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1,200,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
15	  	   Debt	  Rate	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   1,080,000	  	   1,020,000	  	  
16	  	   Term/Rpmt	   0.25	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	   240,000,000	  	  
17	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   241,020,000	  	  
18	  	  
New	  Interest	  Income	  (Less	  loans	  sold	  of	  
50%)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2,700,000	  	  
19	  	   New	  Fee	  Income	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   4,800,000	  	  
20	  	   (Operating	  Expenses)	   	   1.00%	   	   to	  volume	  +	  loans	  outstanding	   	   	   (3,000,000)	  
21	  	   (Loss	  Expense)	   	   0.75%	   	   to	  loans	  outstanding	   	   5	  	   	   	   (2,250,000)	  
22	  	   New	  Surplus	  (Profit)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   3,270,000	  	  
 
 
Table	  8.8.	  Channel	  Can	  Withstand	  a	  1000	  Percent	  Increase	  in	  Losses	  	  	  
	  	  
	  	   	  	   Loans	   	  	   Debt	  	   	  	   Equity	   	  	   Leverage	   	  	   Revenues	   	  	   Interest	   Cash	  &	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Surplus	  
	   Channel	   60,000,000	  	   	   54,000,000	  	   	   6,000,000	  	   	   900%	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
13	  	   Loan	  Rate	   6.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   900,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
14	  	   Orig	  Fee	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1,200,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
15	  	   Debt	  Rate	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   1,080,000	  	   1,020,000	  	  
16	  	   Term/Rpmt	   0.25	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	   240,000,000	  	  
17	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   241,020,000	  	  
18	  	  
New	  Interest	  Income	  (Less	  loans	  sold	  of	  
50%)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2,700,000	  	  
19	  	   New	  Fee	  Income	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   4,800,000	  	  
20	  	   (Operating	  Expenses)	   	   1.00%	   	   to	  volume	  +	  loans	  outstanding	   	   	   (3,000,000)	  
21	  	   (Loss	  Expense)	   	   0.75%	   	   to	  loans	  outstanding	   	   10	  	   	   	   (4,500,000)	  
22	  	   New	  Surplus	  (Profit)	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   1,020,000	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Except there’s a problem. The long-term investors holding the mortgages in mortgage-backed 
securities and collateralized debt obligation packages are beginning to detect those rising losses as 
well. They are also picking up on the higher operating costs they have to pay on the 
portfolios of defaulting loans that they own. They are increasingly discouraged to find 
that the default rates do not meet the projections on which the mortgage backed security 
and collateralized debt obligation packages were written. This comes as an unpleasant 
surprise to these investors, something they feel that the rating agencies should have 
anticipated and vetted on their behalf.  
 
In a very short space of time, the long-term investors lose interest in buying these assets 
from the short-term funders. So the short-term funders (mostly commercial paper 
conduits) start slowing down their funding of the loans that the Channel’s of the nation 
are selling them. They are interested in funding these mortgages, but only as long as 
someone is committed to buying them. If the long-term investor is no longer interested, 
it’s time for the short-term funder and the short-term funder’s investors to get out of the 
market too. If, in fact, it isn’t too late.  
 
But, as it turns out, it is too late. Suddenly Channel cannot find the kind of financing it 
enjoyed in the commercial paper market. That $240 million in new loan originations it 
has been generating is suddenly stuck on Channel’s $60 million balance sheet, the very 
same balance sheet in Table 8.6 with the $6 million in net assets. Those loans that cannot 
be sold to through the commercial paper conduits to the long term investors will be on 
Channel’s balance sheet for the next 30 years as they slowly pay off.  It’s convincing 
proof of the second of the Five Principles of Finance: “Big Balance Sheets mean Big 
Costs.” 
How	  the	  Mortgage	  Lender	  Stops	  Lending	  
At this point, the only source of funding for the mortgages that Channel now holds is 
banks. The banks had provided credit enhancements and liquidity facilities that enabled 
Channel to gain access to the commercial paper markets. The banks must now lend 
Channel the money; if Channel goes out of business, those assets end up on the banks’ 
books. The banks may be forced to lend, but they are not going to be charging 2 percent 
for their money. They are charging 12 percent. They charge this rate not only because the 
loans that Channel is originating aren’t turning out very well but because of the risk that 
Channel will go under. And then again, the banks are facing another problem of their 
own:  because everyone views the banks as risky too, their cost of funds (i.e., LIBOR) has 
gone off the charts.  
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And with that, it’s all over for Channel, as Table 8.9 reveals. Table 8.9 shows the increase 
in the debt rate (line 15) and, even more devastating, the decrease in the term of the asset 
repayment (line 16). Although the $5 million increase in the interest expense is tough, it 
is the decline in new loan volume—from $240 million to the $2 million that actually 
wrecks the Channel business. There is no new interest income. There is no new fee 
income. The operating expenses remain high, and the loss rates (a lagging indicator) are 
about to explode—Case IV from Chapter 3 all over again. 
 
The music abruptly stops playing for Channel and the dance ends. If the credit losses on 
bad loans increase to 1,000 percent, as shown above, Channel’s loss rises to $6.6 million  
 
 
Table	  8.9.	  No	  Debt	  Means	  No	  Lending	  Which	  Means	  No	  Profit	  Which	  Means	  No	  Return	  on	  Equity	  
	  	   	  	   Loans	   	  	   Debt	  	   	  	   Equity	   	  	   Leverage	   	  	   Revenues	   	  	   Interest	  
Cash	  &	  
Surplus	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Surplus	  
	  	   Channel	   60,000,000	  	   	   54,000,000	  	   	   6,000,000	  	   	   900%	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
13	  	   Loan	  Rate	   6.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   3,600,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
14	  	   Orig	  Fee	   2.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1,200,000	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
15	  	   Debt	  Rate	   12.00%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   6,480,000	  	   (1,680,000)	  
16	  	   Term/Rpmt	   30.00	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	   2,000,000	  	  
17	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   320,000	  	  
18	  	  
New	  Interest	  Income	  (Less	  loans	  sold	  of	  
50%)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   120,000	  	  
19	  	   New	  Fee	  Income	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   40,000	  	  
20	  	   (Operating	  Expenses)	   	   1.00%	   	   to	  volume	  +	  loans	  outstanding	   	   	   (620,000)	  
21	  	   (Loss	  Expense)	   	   0.75%	   	   to	  loans	  outstanding	   	   10	  	   	   	   (4,500,000)	  
22	  	   New	  Surplus	  (Profit)	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   (6,640,000)	  
 
and wipes out net assets entirely. The market value of Channel’s equity slides below 
book value on its way down to zero. Proof positive of the fourth Key Principle of 
Finance for Nonprofits: “You’re out of business when you run out of cash.” 
 
Of course, as noted earlier, we have all seen how the Channels of the market pushed 
lending products beyond the boundaries of credulity, and effectively removed all the 
chairs well before the music stopped. But here’s the catch: their breathless myopia does 
not undercut the logic and the value of the financial strategies they employed. If nothing 
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else, the Channels of the home mortgage market also proved that they could provide 
low-cost funding to constituencies once reached only by CDFIs. And they could do it on 
a massive scale. Had they been willing to stick with 30- or 40-year fixed rate 
instruments, for example, they still could have helped the CDFI constituencies without a 
collapse, although, certainly, they would not have produced the same impressive level 
of instantaneous profit. 
 
Collateral	  Damage	  
And where does that leave Bucket? Because Bucket is not selling loans, one might think 
it escapes unscathed. But this is not the case. The market does not distinguish between 
Bucket and Channel in terms of their respective loans to the 0.75 percent loss profile 
constituent. The collapse of the conventional secondary markets in home mortgages—
the colossal loss of liquidity—that erodes the market value of Channel’s holdings --
erodes the market value of Bucket’s holdings as well. The sheer volume of cash that 
Channel puts into the market is what pushes up housing prices. When the volume of 
cash chasing deals evaporates, the value of the houses that underlie all deals evaporates 
too.  
 
Thus, even though Bucket didn’t get a dime from the capital markets or generate a 
dollar of surplus, the collapse of Channel’s activities takes down Bucket’s portfolio of 
loans as well. And even though Bucket’s social investing funders understand that 
Bucket is supposed to take risk, they will step back and wonder whether it makes sense 
to keep funding Bucket’s lending in this kind of environment. And that’s just the social 
investors who still have money to invest; many, including a number of banks and 
foundations have to curtail grants and other subsidized facilities because the collapse of 
the market has reduced their revenue.  So Bucket, too, ends up with less money to work 
with, even as demand for low-cost fixed rate mortgages accelerates among low-income 
and higher-risk constituents, who cannot seem to find anyone, now, who wants to make 
them a loan. So, once again, just when Bucket’s lending capacity is needed the most, it 
has even less capacity to achieve its mission objectives. The only consolation in all of this 
is that Bucket is still alive. Events have clearly demonstrated the fifth of the Five Key 
Principles of Finance for nonprofits: “You don’t have to be a bank to survive.” 
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Where	  Was	  This	  All	  Reported?	  	  
One thing for sure, we won’t find it on the balance sheet for Bucket or, for that matter, 
Channel. Not to beat a dead horse, but here is another opportunity to make the point 
about balance sheets: because of the speed and liquidity of the lending business, the 
book value of Channel’s net assets in Table 8.6 ($6 million) is just above the total annual 
surplus ($5 million) being generated. Hence, this net asset figure is not only misleading, 
it is, from the standpoint of valuing loan assets, a virtual impossibility. Take it a step 
further: with the evaporation of cheap funding and new loan volume, the same net asset 
figure in Table 8.9 ($6 million) is really zero. Or less, as the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program has, in some cases, found. Does any of this volatility in valuation show up on 
the balance sheet? Yes, certain clues will surface, but only after—typically long after—
the battle’s been lost, and everyone’s moved on.  
 
Yes, at the end of the period, the operating statement showed losses, as declining loan 
volume ceased covering the operating, funding, and loss expenses. And yes, the year-
end balance sheet provided a snapshot of the carnage: a ballooning portfolio of 
mortgages against a battery of maturing obligations, before Channel had to file Chapter 
7. But for Channel, the action was all in the selling of loans; consequently, the proper 
monitoring, prediction, and assessment of risk was all happening in the cash flows 
associated with the origination, funding and selling of loans. Bucket’s activity was all in 
the cash flows as well. The big difference was that Bucket’s cash flows stayed the same 
size. And here we come to the issue: the biggest contrast between Bucket and Channel 
from the standpoint of the business model is the difference between how much money 
they can put out in loans on the street per year (that is, $240 million versus $500,000). 
This also makes cash flow the biggest difference between the two from the standpoint of 
community impact.  
 
Bucket wishes to distinguish its business model and its community impact from 
Channel on the basis of the quality of lending. The difference in the quality of lending, 
however, is invisible for two, three years, or four years, which is how long it generally 
takes for the financial reports to pick up, conclusively, the differential in loan losses. But 
even when we can see the difference in the quality of lending, it is of marginal value: 
notwithstanding its prudence, discipline and fairness, Bucket’s business model was of 
insufficient scale to assist its constituencies when they get abandoned by Channel.  
 
Bucket has survived. But Bucket has another big challenge facing it: Bucket still must 
explain to its philanthropic and social investment funders (the ones who still have cash 
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to provide) how it will justify the much needed social investment, when Channel has 
just demonstrated that it can deliver 100+ times the dollar amount of mortgages to 
constituents with the (original) 0.75 percent charge-off profile, with no subsidy at all. 
Bucket should respond to such inquiries by demonstrating the manner in which its staff 
and resources are tailored to the development of successful borrowers. Bucket should 
provide its social investors with a matrix, for example, which shows such items as the 
following: 
 
• Function: origination, underwriting, approval, counseling, servicing, etc. 
• Loans approved 
• Number of staff by function 
• Cost of staff by function 
• Functions performed (and cost of function) 
• Number of loans, loan modifications, loan modifications out of delinquency, 
refinancings 
• Delinquency, charge-off, and recovery rates 
• Success rates per counseled borrower 
• Cost per loan of each function 
 
These are the types of metrics Bucket can use to distinguish its lending from Channel’s 
well before the difference between the two shows up in the loss rates. Unfortunately, in 
the CDFI field today, this information is all company prepared or anecdotal. None of 
this information shows up on the balance sheet. In fact, almost none of it shows up in the 
audit (the delinquency and charge-off rates being the exception). Therefore, the 
difference we see in the cash flows remains the defining characteristic. 
 
The struggles and opportunities of Channel and Bucket illustrate an important lesson. 
They show how to identify and monitor what the respective managements are thinking 
and doing. Virtually none of the risk is explained on the balance sheet, because the field 
of battle is all on the cash flow. To the extent we are not there with them, we cannot 
know what is really at risk.  
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CDFIs	  Proceed	  at	  Their	  Own	  Risk	  
 
This chapter began by showing how critical the budgeting and tracking of cash is for 
both CDFI management and the credit analyst. Along the way, the arithmetic that 
caused the crash in the credit markets became apparent: Channel’s pressure to grow 
exponentially in order to continue generating returns to investors took it simultaneously 
up the road to high leverage and down the road to bad credit.  
 
In the absence of comprehending how the math worked for the Channel’s of the world, 
the CDFI sector was doubly disadvantaged: it had no modern weapons to defend its low 
income borrowers, nor any knowledge of how quickly modern weapons could help the 
enemy make off with the borrowers that the CDFIs were trying to defend. Under the 
circumstances, how could the neighborhood be protected from the predatory fringe of 
the conventional sector? The field may not agree on the extent to which it should adopt 
these modern weapons. But at the very least, it must understand how these weapons 
work, and how they are likely to be deployed once again in their neighborhoods when 
the markets return to normal.  
 
The illustration of Channel’s progress is important not only to illustrate what happened 
on a broad scale, but also to show how dangerous the single-family mortgage lending 
business has become, because of this broad scale. CDFIs that continue to lend in this sector 
must proceed at their own risk. 
 
Going forward, CDFIs must keep in mind that in managing any kind of lending entity  
(as with managing one’s personal finances), cash is by far the most important thing the 
organization can have, either cash itself, access to cash, or assets that can be readily 
converted to cash. Channel failed because it ran out of cash. Bucket survived primarily 
because it never had access to much cash in the first place. Hence, it was not overly 
aggressive in its reach and, consequently, it was not overextended when the credit 
markets collapsed.  
 
To be sure, Bucket’s capacity to achieve its mission is severely circumscribed. But the 
lesson is the same either way: cash is king. It the key determinant of how well 
management can adapt to the changing needs of their constituents and changing 
conditions in the marketplace. Cash is also the key to adapting to adversity, whether in 
losses, funding sources, or anything else. What management does with cash is the key to 
sustainability over the long-term, as well as to the achievement of the mission.  
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Although cash is king, it does not mean that the balance sheet and the operating 
statement should be ignored. Indeed, it is extremely important to understand how the 
decisions that show up in the cash flow play out in the line items on the balance sheet 
and operating statement, and how these collectively inform the analyst, as well as 
management, of the condition and direction of the organization. The following two 
sections propose ways to align the CDFI balance sheet and operating statement with the 
dynamics of the CDFI cash flow. They show how, properly balanced, these financial 
indicators help both management and the credit analyst evaluate the history and the 
prospects of the lending entity.  
 
A	  Double	  Book-­‐Entry	  Opera	  
 
“For every nonprofit organization, there is a tension between the pursuit of mission on 
the one hand and the maintenance of financial viability on the other,” writes Clara 
Miller in An Introduction to Nonprofit Capitalization. “This concern exerts pressure on the 
day-to-day operations and decision-making of every nonprofit, and quite often, it seems 
as though one must be chosen in favor of the other. We would like to propose, however, 
that they must be weighed together. In fact, an organization’s mission and capital 
structure, as well as its organizational capacity, must all be kept in balance, both as 
individual areas of concern and, on a larger scale, in relation to one another. The very 
health of the organization depends on it.”74 
 
The double-book entry “Opera” is all about the connectivity of the many parts and the 
maintenance of the balance Miller describes. With double-book entry accounting, for 
every asset, there is a matching liability or net asset; for every cash inflow there is a cash 
outflow that is directly associated with an asset and the matching liability. Double-book 
entry accounting provides management and analysts alike a marvelously tight system in 
which every event or decision can be viewed from a range of critical positions. We have 
stressed the importance of studying the flows of cash, but in order to understand the 
whole picture and present it effectively as a proper representation of the CDFI’s 
performance of its mission, CDFIs need to be able to manage the whole discipline.  
 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, the essence of credit analysis is to identify the 
decisions that management makes, and to assess how well those decisions were 
implemented in the context of the organizational objectives and market conditions. 
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Hence, the best form of credit analysis is a mirror of management intentions, decisions, 
and actions. The logical corollary is: the best form of credit analysis uses the same 
metrics that the organization uses to manage the business of the mission.  
 
What follows draws from the path blazed by NeighborWorks America’s course on the 
Sustainable Mission.75 The chief operating methodology that the course proposes is 
simple: reduce every major line item to a series of cash flows and order them, reorder 
them, and reorder them again in terms of their priority relative to the achievement of 
mission and sustainability. Integrate them with the most recent audited figures, run 
budgets, and raise debt and grant funding in accordance with what is needed to make 
the whole operation balance. 
 
Breaking all line items down into cash flows sounds like it could produce a mountain of 
unworkable data. Not so. The Sustainable Mission Course provides a list of the 21 key 
financial decisions CDFI management makes (including five decisions involving real 
estate activity for those CDFIs that are also in the real estate development or real estate 
management lines of business). These decisions are also presented as the key items that 
the credit analyst must identify and track. 
 
For the purposes of simplicity, the course organizes these 21 decisions within the Four 
Major Categories introduced in Chapter 1 and recapped above: I. Earned revenue; II. 
Operating expenses; III. Losses; and IV. Funding costs.  The 21 key decisions have the 
most impact in driving the lending operations.  
 
I. Earned Revenues 
 
Lending Assets (New Order) 
1. Increase/decrease interest rates on loans 
2. Expand/contract weighted average life (term) of loans 
3. Expand/contract size of loans 
4. Structure and then increase/decrease fees on loans 
5. Sell loans 
6. Increase/decrease volume 
Real Estate Assets 
7. Increase/decrease sales or rents 
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8. Increase/decrease fees on development 
9. Increase/decrease size of development  
10. Expand/contract time on the balance sheet – e.g., amount of time it is held. 
11. Increase/decrease number of developments (volume) 
Asset Allocation 
12. Investment rate 
13. Higher versus lower cash and investment on hand 
 
II. Operating Expenses 
 
Staff Resources  
14. Optimize workload 
15. To provide or not provide the service 




Credit Risk  
17. Raising and lowering lending risk: charge-offs, recoveries, and work-outs 
Property Risk 
18. Raising and lowering development risk: vacancy 
 
IV. Funding Costs 
 
Debt 
19. Raise/lower cost of debt 
20. Extend the maturity of the debt 
Grants 
21. Allocation of subsidy 
 
The Sustainable Mission course offers a chart (Chart 8.10) that codes the four major 
categories in shades of gray and tracks the 21 key decisions through the operating 
statement, balance sheet, and cash flows together:   
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Chart 8.10 also illustrates the major areas of management decision-making (in shades of 
gray): the design of assets (medium gray), the allocation of assets (very light gray), the 
design of the funding platform including debt and other liabilities (dark gray), 
fundraising capacity (white), and finally, the timing and pricing decisions associated 
with all of these. The gray color-coding shows how the 21 key decisions that 
management makes in each of the four major categories are components of these.  
 
The following is a brief summary of how these work: 
 
I. Revenues (Light Gray, Medium Gray, White) Loan and Real Estate Revenues (medium 
gray) are driven by decisions about the design of the mission assets (loans and/or real 
estate), for example, number of projects, size of loans, interest rate, fees, maturity, sale, 
loan volume, and the like. The design of the asset is the seminal part of both the credit 
analysis and management strategies for two reasons: 1) the asset design represents the 
intersection of the needs of the constituents with the capacity of the organization, 
effectively the organization’s contract with the customer; and 2) it defines the business 
model for the CDFI, and exerts the greatest impact on the organization’s financial 
condition. 
 
• Investment Income (light gray) is driven by asset allocation. This refers to 
management’s decision to have more or less of its total assets dedicated to cash 
and investments versus mission assets. The investment income rises or falls on 
the level of interest rates and yields as well, but asset allocation is one thing 
management has significant control over.  
• Surplus (white). Surplus is a desirable goal. It represents a series of pricing, 
volume, and timing decisions by management (essentially all of the 21 key 
decisions) that allow revenue (including grants) to cover costs. Small though it 
may be, the level of surplus or deficit should never be viewed as an accident. 
 
II. Operating Expenses (Medium Gray)  
 
• Operating expenses are—or at least should be—primarily a function of the design 
of the mission assets, with a focus on the proposed as well as existing activity. 
Loan volume, origination, property development, property services, and the like 
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are the chief determinants of the number of staff, the nature of the skill sets, and 
the nature and amount of other resources needed. 
 
III. Loss Expense and Charge-offs (Medium Gray)  
 
Again, as with mission assets and operating expenses, charge-offs/loss expenses are a 
function of asset design. Management must choose its own target constituency, and with 
the choice comes all of the various aspects of asset design: underwriting, product 
structure, and pricing standards, as well as the configuration of workout, remediation 
and property management staff.  
 
BALANCE SHEET CASH FLOW
Accounts MONEY MONEY 









Mission Assets: Loan OPERATING STATEMENT
Loan Principal Sales 
MONEY MONEY 
 GOING OUT COMING IN
Property
New Sales Investment




Mission Assets: Operating Revenue




Net Assets Repayments Capital Grants Charge-offs 
(True Capital) Surplus
CDFI's Capacity to Manage Assets and Resources
Asset Allocation Asset/Liability Match
Other Assets Asset Design/Pricing Cost of Debt
Asset Management Capacity to Repay
Portfolio Management Availability of Grants
Chart 8.10. The Double-Book Entry Opera Score
From: Advanced Financial Analysis for a Sustainable Mission: Pricing, Funding and Management of Loans and Development Assets.
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IV. Funding Cost/Interest Expense (Dark Gray for Debt, White for Grants) 
 
• Interest Expense (dark gray) is the product of decisions management makes not 
only about the rates it is willing to pay, but also the source of funding, the term 
and the amounts.  
• Operating and Capital Grants (white), fall between funding platform and asset 
design. They are included in the Four Major Categories under the funding 
decision, but they are a very different form of funding. They are essential to 
minimizing debt and interest expense, and to maximizing surplus. From the 
standpoint of financial discipline, the grants should always be viewed as the last 
decision to be made, after all of the other items have been decided. (This 
discipline is not, however, particularly common; the CDFI field has tended to 
build the asset design around the interest of funders.) 
 
Chart 8.10 shows the major working parts of the CDFI financial statements—the major 
sources and uses of cash associated with active management decisions and how they 
play out on the financial statements. The chart highlights several important facts that are 
of considerable importance to the analyst as well as management:   
 
• Each asset class on the balance sheet is directly linked to some liability or net asset 
funding; 
• Each asset class on the balance sheet and each liability or net asset account is directly 
linked to a cash inflow or outflow on the cash flow statement; 
• Each asset and liability class generates its own streams of incoming and outgoing 
cash on both the cash flow and the operating statement. 
 
Chart 8.10 confirms another important fact: the relative size of the impact of the 
decisions that are made. For more efficient CDFIs, the sizes of the items are, in a very 
general way, proportional to the importance they play in determining the financial 
health of the entity and its sustainability. One of the more striking items, for example, is 
how small the accounts on the operating statement are relative to everything else. Loan 
and real estate revenues and operating, charge-off and funding expenses are relatively 
small items. The surplus, after operating grants are added, is also very small. Yet these 
are often the operating statement items over which management spends many sleepless 
nights. While from time to time they should be, it is the movement of cash through the 
cash flow, as we have seen, that really determines how the operating statement accounts 
turn out.  
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The chart sets the stage for establishing a protocol of analytical ratios that combine all 
the financial statements to get at the two critical questions management must track and 
analysts must evaluate: 
 
• How quickly can I get my cash back to redeploy?   
• How does improving my cash flow give me the margin of error I need to operate? 
 
Table 8.11 is one approach that, although parallel to the CAMEL ratings the regulators 
use for depositories, also provides room for the wider latitude that CDFIs require. 
 
A	  Theory	  of	  Efficiency	  for	  CDFIs	  
 
None of the analytical techniques for evaluating organizational risk and management 
capacity discussed above are new.76 The banks, Wall Street, rating agencies, and large 
corporations have been using them for decades. The big question that many in the 
community development field (appropriately) ask is: If I apply these techniques to my 
organization, will I lose my mission? Will I become like a bank? 
 
Once again, the answer must be an emphatic no. The real point of managing and 
analyzing the organization in terms of these techniques is to make better use of grant 
subsidy. The objective is to reduce the costs and decisions that erode subsidy while 
producing minimal benefit, and to conserve as much subsidy as possible for the long- 
term. In fact, the CDFI field can use these techniques to serve its existing constituencies 
with much greater efficiency and impact. One of the chief tools for demonstrating this is 





Table	  8.11.	  	  Key	  Financial	  Ratios	  for	  Evaluating	  a	  CDFI/CDC	  	  
(from	  Advanced	  Financial	  Analysis	  for	  a	  Sustainable	  Mission)	  
	   	  
Yield	   Losses	  
Loans:	  Interest	  Revenue	   Charge-­‐offs	  to	  Provision	  
Loans:	  Fee	  Income	   Provision	  to	  Loss	  Reserve	  
Loans:	  Total	  Yield	   Charge-­‐offs	  to	  Avg.	  Loans	  
Yield	  on	  Cash	  and	  Investments	   Charge-­‐offs	  to	  Avg.	  Assets	  
Property	  Revenue	  to	  Property	  Book	  Value	   	  
Developer	  Fees	  to	  Property	  Book	  Value	   	  
Property:	  NOI	  to	  Book	  Value	   	  
Total	  Assets:	  Gross	  Operating	  Yield	   	  
Total	  Assets:	  Net	  Operating	  Yield	   	  
Gain(Loss)	  on	  Loan	  Sales/	  Avg.	  Assets	   	  
Gain(Loss)	  on	  Prop	  Sales/	  Avg.	  Assets	   	  




Interest	  Rate	  on	  Debt	   Cash/Unrestr.Invests	  to	  ST	  Liabs	  
Interest	  Expense	  on	  Investments	   Cash/Unrestr.Invests	  to	  Total	  Assets	  
Net	  Interest	  Margin	  on	  Investments	   Cash/Unrestr.Invests	  to	  Op	  Exp	  
Investment	  Rate	  versus	  Debt	  Rate	   Cash/Unrestr.Invests	  Months	  on	  Hand	  
Investment	  Cost	  of	  Funds	   Target	  Cash/Investments	  Month	  on	  Hand	  
Interest	  Expense	  on	  Loans	   	  	  	  Cash	  Needed	  to	  Meet	  Cash	  Target	  
Net	  Interest	  Margin	  on	  Loans*	   Repayments/Loan	  Volume	  
Loan	  Rate	  versus	  Debt	  Rate	   Repayments/Loans	  O/S	  
Loan	  Cost	  of	  Funds	   Loan	  Sales/Loan	  Volume	  
Interest	  Expense	  on	  Real	  Estate	   Loan	  Sales/Loan	  O/S	  
Cost	  of	  Funds	  on	  Real	  Estate	   Op	  Sources	  to	  Op	  Uses	  
Cost	  of	  Funds	  (to	  Average	  Assets)	   	  
Interest	  Rate	  Reduced	  by	  Net	  Assets	   	  
	  	  	  Amount	  of	  Interest	  Exp	  subsidized	   	  
	   	  
Expenses	   Capital	  
Operating	  Expense/Avg.	  Assets	   Total	  Liabilities/Net	  Assets	  
Ongoing	  Mission	  Revenue/Total	  Exp	   Target	  Liabilities/Net	  Assets	  
Sustainability	  Ratio:	  All	  Op	  Rev/All	  Exp	   	  	  	  Equity	  Needed	  to	  Meet	  Leverage	  Target	  
Operating	  Costs	  for	  Lending	   Free	  Cash	  Flow	  to	  Debt	  
	  	  	  Percent	  to	  Average	  Loans	   	  	  	  Years	  to	  Repay	  Debt	  
Op	  Cost	  per	  Loan	  (Gr.Cum)	   C/offs	  to	  Reserves+Net	  Assets	  
Rental	  Property	  NOI	   Rental	  property	  market	  value	  less	  debt	  
Property	  Debt	  Service	  as	  %	  of	  EGI	   	  
Property	  Debt	  Coverage	  Ratio	   	  
Corporate	  Property	  Mgmt	  Cost	  Per	  Unit	   	  
Average	  Rental	  Property	  OpEx	  PUPY	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As we discussed in Chapter 1, the traditional formula that all for-profit entities 
ultimately manage from is: 
 
 
The elements of this formula are: 
 
• Return on Equity: This is a summary of the changes on the balance sheet, cash 
flow, and operating statement that measure the efficiency in the use of equity. 
Investors are very keen on this ratio because they want to see how much their 
dollars are earning. 
• Leverage: This expresses the relationship between assets and the financing 
support provided by net worth versus the financing support provided by debt 
and other liabilities. A key issue is: it is very difficult to build leverage without a 
corresponding increase in the return on sales. The “return” part of the return on 
sales (i.e., profitability) is a key component in debt repayment. 
• Return on Sales: This expresses the relationship between net profits and sales; that 
is, how much money is made on each product or service. For these purposes, a 
useful way to look at this is, the higher the return on sales, the higher the cost to 
the consumer. For example, a 20 percent return means that the consumer is 
paying 20 percent more than the cost of the product or service in order to 
purchase it. (It is not coincidental that this ratio is related to the relationship of 
the four major categories and what they convey about the business model.) 
• Asset Turnover: This is an indication of the company’s efficiency in using the 
assets it owns. It measures the relationship between revenues and the total asset 
level. Assets that stay on the balance sheet for long periods consume more debt 
and equity than assets that revolve off the balance sheet quickly. 
 
One of the reasons that this set of calculations is so valuable is that it brings all three 
forms of financial statement together and provides the following: 
 
• The leverage ratio provides a quick read on the balance sheet and the level of 
creditor claims built into the assets 
Return on Equity = Leverage X Return on Sales X Asset Turnover
Net Profit Total Assets Net Profit Revenues
Net Worth = Net Worth X Revenues X Total Assets
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• The return on sales provides a quick read on the operating statement and the 
profitability built into the assets 
• The asset turnover ratio provides a quick read on the cash flow and the efficiency 
that is built into the assets 
 
When combined, they produce a single grade for evaluating all business models, and the 
success of both management and investor: the return on equity invested. Although this 
formula is not in itself adequate to judge risk and performance, it closes the loop opened 
with the four major categories by bringing in the indicator of how cash converts to assets 
and back. It is an excellent report card on management performance and a superb 
starting point for the serious financial analyst.  
 
The	  Same	  Formula	  But	  Applied	  to	  CDFIs	  
Although these ratios mean the same things for nonprofit organizations, the following 




We have changed net profit to surplus and net worth to net assets. In the same way that 
a corporation’s net worth is the hardest money to come by, so is the nonprofit’s net 
assets. Because net assets are created almost exclusively by grants and other subsidized 
funds, we change the ratio from return on equity to return on subsidy. 
 
How exactly can this be useful to CDFIs? 
 
As grant funding has tightened in recent years, the community development industry 
has pursued a range of solutions. Perhaps the most common effort has been to boost 
leverage—borrowing on a short-term basis from banks to fund everything from 
predevelopment loans to operating expenses. Another common effort has been to boost 
The Return on Equity Formula for CDCs and CDFIs
Return on Subsidy = Leverage X Return on Revenues X Asset Turnover
Surplus Total Assets Surplus RevenuesSurplus
Net Assets = Net Assets X Revenues X Total Assets
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the return on sales by cutting costs or raising fees, although both have proved 
problematic and prompted considerable soul-searching. More recently, CDCs and CDFIs 
have become committed to the asset turnover option: finding ways to turn assets over 
more rapidly through participations, pledging, and sale. The effort to gain access to the 
capital markets through the Mini-Fed, Capital Exchange, and the Commercial Paper Co-
op was a result of the recognition that this was the optimal way to solve the problem of 
mission impact and sustainability.   
 
Table 8.12 outlines three cases to show how and why this is the case. Comparing the 
three cases in Table 8.12 shows how to achieve the same return on subsidy with widely 
differing organizations and financial strategies. 
 
Case 1: The strategy is to raise the level of debt to fund one’s mission (300 percent total 
assets to net assets). The approach garners a reasonable return on revenue (10 percent). 
This CDFI tends to hold its assets for a long time upwards of 7.5 years on average (One 
hundred divided by 13.33 equals 7.5). There’s a problem though. In order to keep these 
assets on the balance sheet, the Case 1 CDFI has to borrow money and leverage itself. As 
a result, this CDFI has a low level of surplus relative to the amount of debt outstanding: 
even though the 10 percent return on revenues is pretty good by itself, it is very small 
relative to the $10 million in debt that is being used to fund the organization. It raises a 
serious question of whether the Case 1 CDFI actually can amortize its debt without 
increasing its return on revenues, or selling assets (increasing asset turnover). 
 
Case 2. In this case, the CDFIs level of earnings per dollar of revenue rises to 20 percent. 
Again, another way to look at this return on revenues is that the consumer must pay a 
premium of 20 percent over the cost of the product or service. This is one reason why 
boosting the return on revenues is controversial in the nonprofit sector. There is another 
problem with the Case 2 CDFI: size. At this level of activity it isn’t hitting a very large 
constituent sector.  
 
Case 3. There are two ways to boost the asset turnover ratio: raise revenue through price 
increases or reduce the level of assets needed to produce the same dollar of revenue. The 
reason to focus on the latter is that it is the one financial strategy for achieving 




Table	  8.12.	  Which	  Case	  Gets	  the	  High	  Marks	  on	  Both	  Mission	  and	  Sustainability?	  	  
       
Ret	  on	  Subsidy	   =	   Leverage	   X	   Return	  on	  Revs	   X	   Asset	  Turnover	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
Surplus	   	   Total	  Assets	   	   Surplus	   	   Revenues	  
Net	  Assets	   =	   Net	  Assets	   X	   Revenues	   X	   Total	  Assets	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  CASE	  1	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
200,000	  	   	  	   15,000,000	  	   	  	   200,000	  	   	  	   2,000,000	  	  
	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	  	  
5,000,000	  	   =	   5,000,000	  	   X	   2,000,000	  	   X	   15,000,000	  	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
4.00%	   	  	   300.00%	   	  	   10.00%	   	  	   13.33%	  
Problem:	  higher	  leverage	  requires	  higher	  surplus	  to	  repay	  debt	  
	   	   	  
CASE	  2	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
60,000	  	   	  	   1,500,000	  	   	  	   60,000	  	   	  	   300,000	  	  
	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	  	  
1,500,000	  	   =	   1,500,000	  	   X	   300,000	  	   X	   1,500,000	  	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
4.00%	   	  	   100.00%	   	  	   20.00%	   	  	   20.00%	  
Problem:	  higher	  surplus	  raises	  cost	  to	  consumer	  
	   	   	   	   	  
CASE	  3	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
120,000	  	   	  	   5,000,000	  	   	  	   120,000	  	   	  	   5,000,000	  	  
	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	  	  
3,000,000	  	   =	   3,000,000	  	   X	   5,000,000	  	   X	   5,000,000	  	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
4.00%	   	  	   166.67%	   	  	   2.40%	   	  	   100.00%	  
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
 
 
The comparison shows that the raising or lowering of interest rates, rents, prices, 
operating expenses, and credit losses is proportionally modest compared with the 
increasing or decreasing of assets on the balance sheet and through the cash flow. This is 
the key feature of the sustainable mission: that an effective management of the asset 
turnover ratio (cash flow again) can achieve sustainability without hardship to the 
consumer or damage to the mission.  
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There is one caveat with this ratio: because we are not including the cash flow in this 
equation, it is possible that we are not capturing the true efficiency of each of the cases. It 
is possible, for example, that the CDFI in Case 2 is actively selling loans and thereby 
generating a much higher asset turnover than would be shown in its annual audit. But 
that is an event the disciplined analyst would quickly discover, and in any event, 
reinforces the point that a rising asset turnover is a key to achieving a balance between 
sustainability and impact for CDFIs.  
 
The achievement of this balance is why CDFIs are increasingly interested in finding 
secondary markets for the full range of loans—and organizational obligations. It is not 
only the access to capital and lower-cost debt they are obtaining, but also the freeing up 
of scarce resources for redeployment to benefit the constituency. Holding onto large 
amounts of assets affects everything else in the organization, mostly adversely.  
Return	  on	  Subsidy	  for	  CDFIs	  vs.	  Return	  on	  Equity	  for	  Shareholders	  
There is, however, a serious challenge in all of this. One of the dogmas of the community 
development field is that to protect the integrity of the asset, the CDFI must retain 
control of it over the course of its life. This is not true for such community development 
assets as for-sale housing, of course. It is also becoming less of an issue for home 
mortgages and small business loans. But for some kinds of community development 
assets, such development loans, community facilities, and rental housing, holding the 
asset for its full life remains a dogma, if not, in fact, a legal and economic necessity.  
 
One of the key values of the return on subsidy ratio for CDFIs is that it enables them to 
obtain a rough idea of the trade-offs between this necessity and the need for low-priced 
services and/or the ability to incur debt. To have a large number of rental housing units, 
for example, the CDFI must generate a higher level of surplus and/or a higher level of 
leverage to produce a reasonable, or even positive, return on subsidy. The slower the 
asset turnover (i.e., holding assets for a longer period of time), the higher level of debt or 
higher levels of profit or subsidy required. It’s simple arithmetic: once again, proof 
positive of the one of the Five Key Principles of Finance: Big Balance Sheet Means Big 
Cost. 
 




• CDFIs want to provide their constituents with the greatest number of loans, 
which minimizes CDFI cash. 
• They want to charge the lowest possible rate, which minimizes revenues.  
• If minimizing revenues, then CDFIs necessarily must minimize loans on the 
books. 
• If they minimize revenue without also minimizing book loans, then they are 
forced to: a) reduce staff, which reduces the ability to deliver service, b) reduce 
debt; or c) reduce risk (the Four Major Categories again). 
• Therefore, if CDFIs do not minimize loans that they hold on the books, they end 
up providing fewer loans with lower risk at higher rates.  
 
In short, by holding onto the loans, CDFIs may achieve the opposite of what they intend. 
Thus, we arrive at another one of the Five Key Principles of Finance: When it comes to 
allocating grant subsidy, it’s a zero sum game: you versus your constituency.  
 
Going back to the comparison of CDFIs to banks: banks maximize leverage, profitability, 
and asset turnover to maximize the return to shareholders. For them, almost always, the 
higher the ratio, the better. For nonprofit CDFIs, this is not the case. CDFIs do not have 
to make payments to equity investors, so they have, in fact, much more discretion over 
the nature of the balance they wish to target in each component of the Return on 
Subsidy formula. Generating a high return on subsidy is not always the best thing for 
CDFIs. Indeed, it can be contrary to the mission—for those engaged in affordable 
rentals, for example. This is the critical advantage that the nonprofit has over the for-
profit lender: the CDFI can alter the components of the formula to suit the needs of its 
constituent, while the bank is really constrained by its obligations to shareholders.  It is 
at the heart of why CDFIs are not only justified, but necessary. It also highlights, once 
again, another of the Five Key Principles of Finance for nonprofits: You don’t have to be 
a bank to survive. 
 
With the return on subsidy formula for CDFIs, there is one final consideration to 
address. The surplus for a CDFI includes grants. If the surplus were reduced by the 
amount of grants, the whole formula would go negative for virtually all CDFIs. Of 
course, the grant funder is not expecting a return on the grant awards in the same way 
shareholders expect a return on investments. What the grant funder is looking for is how 
effectively its money helps accomplish a particular social mission. Therefore, the return 
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on subsidy for the grantor functions very differently from the return on equity for the 
shareholder.  
 
The key value of the return on subsidy formula is that it helps the funder, as well as the 
analyst and the management of the CDFI, draw a bead on what it takes to make the 
mission successful. Unlike the shareholder’s return on equity, there is no “right” number 
that people can look to and say “wow!” or “how sad!” There is no platform or logic to be 
established that compares a 20 percent return on subsidy in personal loans with a 0.1 
percent return on subsidy in the development of community facilities. The need to own 
and manage affordable rental housing, to revisit that example, will have a very different 
return on subsidy than the need to originate and sell mortgage loans, for the following 
reasons:  
 
• Rental housing involves high operating costs and low revenues and it remains on 
the balance sheet in perpetuity. Return on revenues and the asset turnover are 
both low, so the leverage must be high to generate a positive return on subsidy. 
Of course, high leverage requires a higher level of surplus to cover the debt. As a 
result, a CDFI that also focuses on building new rental housing must raise 
proportionately more subsidy.  
• Originating and selling loans involves relatively low costs, relatively low 
revenue, and minimal balance sheet, since the bulk of the loans are sold. From 
the standpoint of the formula, the return on revenue can be moderately high, the 
asset turnover can be very high, and the leverage can be very low. As a result, 
the need for grant support can be proportionately less.  
 
There is nothing in the formula that should indicate a preference for one or the other of 
these two lines of business. But it does break down the nature of each business into three 
strategic financial components that management can address individually, and then 
collectively determine the right pricing of the products and services, the right volume of 
activity, the right timing of investment, optimal staffing, and the right balance of the 
businesses. Hence the “right” number for the return on subsidy formula is a number 
that enables all three formula components to be in a strategic balance while the mission 
is being served, whatever that mission happens to be. The number is simply the 
condensation of a range of market, constituent, and organizational factors into the three 
formula components specific to the organization. Having said this, the return on subsidy 
formula can guide funders in determining which CDFIs are making the best use of 
resources in each discreet line of business; over time it can assist the community 
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development field as a whole identify not only best practices in arranging strategic 
balances for each line of business, but also optimal financial designs for funding new 
lines of business.  
One	  More	  Step	  in	  the	  Analysis	  
There is another difference between the return on equity and the return on subsidy: the 
return for the return on equity is all earned from the operation of the business (“earned 
revenue”), while the return for the return on subsidy will almost always include grant 
funding. Management, the funder, and the analyst must all determine how much annual 
grant funding is needed to make the return-on-subsidy formula work for the specific 
CDFI. Basically, one must determine how much additional “gas” is needed to achieve 
the mission.   
 
After using the return on subsidy formula and determining whether there is a 
sustainable balance among the three component formulas (leverage, profitability, and 
asset turnover), one must calculate how much of the surplus is derived from grants. One 
can calculate the grants to net assets or the grants to total assets. With that calculation, 
the return-on-subsidy formula reveals how much the CDFI needs in grant funding to 
make the return-on-subsidy formula balance out. If the balance among the three 
components of the formula is unsustainable, the CDFI can calculate how much more 
grant funding is needed to make the formula work, and then determine the extent to 
which the social investors are willing to provide it. 
 
To be sure, management will want to take it further than this. What works historically is 
not necessarily what works going forward. Management should regularly ask the 
following questions and evaluate the answers in terms of the return on subsidy formula: 
• What are the market conditions and what do the constituents need now? 
• Do the formulas need to be adjusted via the 21 decisions? For example, should 
there be a change in pricing or in staffing, a change in volume of activity or asset 
design or a change in debt financing in order to accommodate changes in the 
market conditions and constituent needs?  
• What is the realistic level of grant support now and in the future?  
By working through the formula, management has a quick and easy tool to understand 
what is and is not feasible. Using the example of Case 3 above, for example, the logic 
might go like this (we’ll make up some additional numbers to fill the case out): 
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• To achieve the 4 percent return on subsidy, grant contributions of 10 percent of 
net assets each year are required, or $300,000. 
• If we are able to contribute $500,000 this year and are happy with the 4 percent 
return, where would we want it spent: paying down debt, lowering prices to 
constituents, increasing staff, taking more risk, or making longer-term loans? 
• If our constituents need us to make higher-risk loans that we can’t sell, but must 
hold on the balance sheet, will our $500,000 be enough, and if so, for how much 
in the way of higher risk loans should we be making?  
• If we are able to put in only $100,000 in grants, how do we revise the decisions 
we just made?   
• Do we need to have a 4 percent return on subsidy target? Will the three 
components work as well together at 2 percent?  
 
Management will ask questions such as these as they work through numerous scenarios, 
and adjust return on subsidy formulas to various market conditions, constituent needs, 
and grant availability. To be sure, this view is from 50,000 feet up, but the final decisions 
they make are highly revealing. The formulas capture, in rapid and abbreviated form, 
the essence of how management allocates not only subsidy, but all pertinent resources of 
the organization in the pursuit of the mission.  
 
The decisions around the return on subsidy formula are strategic. But the effect of these 
decisions does not remain at 50,000 feet. To bring the issue down to street level (and to 
loop back to the recommended internal subsidy bank in Chapter 7), the return on 
subsidy formula should serve as a guideline for the development, management, and 
efficient allocation of grant and other subsidies in the ongoing pursuit of the mission. 
Through this “bank,” the return on subsidy formula becomes integrally engaged in the 
day-to-day decision-making of the CDFI. Hence, it serves as both a guideline for 
management and, longer term, as a sound indicator of management capacity.  
 
This discussion of the return on subsidy formula brings together two of the biggest 
hurdles for the community development field in getting to the capital markets: efficient 
use of resources and measurable performance: 
 
• Efficient use of resources. The asset turnover ratio pulls the key ratios of the 
operating statement and balance sheet together with the cash flow and 
demonstrates the velocity of cash in the pursuit of the mission. The higher the 
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velocity (e.g., the conversion of cash to assets and back again to cash for a repeat 
of the cycle), the greater the volume of mission activity.  
• Measurable performance. By pulling the key ratios of the financials together the 
analyst gets a clear picture of the preferences and decisions of management in 
allocating resources among the various uses:  mission activity, staff, debt 
repayment, and risk. The return on subsidy formula closes the loop. 
 
Once again, it is easy to see why CDFIs are increasingly interested in finding secondary 
markets. Increasing the velocity of cash while minimizing the size of the balance sheet 
improves both mission impact and sustainability. These are, in fact, the central 
justification for all efforts associated with the Mini-Fed, the Capital Exchange, the 
Commercial Paper Co-op, and all of the other efforts to gain access to the capital 
markets. They are not only about gaining access to almost infinite amounts of money at 
very low cost, but also about minimizing the cost and the risk to the organization as a 
whole, while maximizing mission impact. 
 
It is also apparent from this discussion why the Mini-Fed, the Capital Exchange, and 
other efforts to introduce CDFI organizational risk to the capital markets have not yet 
achieved their objective. Even some of the most fundamental disciplines, such as the 
return on equity formula, that the rating agencies, banks, and investors use to evaluate 
the credit risk and management capacity of other enterprises have not been widely 
scrutinized or deployed in the community development field.  
 
Clearly, if the community development field wants the capital markets to fund 
organizational risk for CDFIs, then the field must meet the capital markets halfway. This 
does not mean CDFIs must meet halfway by compromising their mission. Instead, they 
must come halfway in their willingness to disclose decision-making via metrics that are 
consistent and common to all, and in welcoming the financial disciplines that best 
capture organizational risk and management capacity for the rating agencies and the 
ultimate investors. As we shall discuss in Chapter 10, several efforts are advancing 
resolutely in this direction, including CARS, the CDFI Data Project, the CDFI Fund’s 
CIIS, the Nonprofit Finance Fund with its NBA, Strength Matters, the NeighborWorks 
America’s PROMPT platform, and Sustainable Mission to name a few. Can we bring 
these together and take the community development sector over the mountain? The goal 
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he Sustainable Mission Course offers two comments about financial reporting:  
 
In performing a credit analysis of a CDFI, the key is to find the answer to two 
basic questions: how much financial room does management have to do its job 
on a year to year basis; and how well do they manage it?   
 
The chief objective of the CDFI auditor is to make sure all the cash got put in the 
right buckets at the end of the year.77  
 
The quotes may be oversimplifications, but they do point to one of the biggest problems 
in the CDFI field: the audited figures do not convey or even reflect the actual conduct of 
the community development lending business.  
 
At present, the accounting protocols in the nonprofit sector as a whole are geared to 
documenting how money was spent and if it was spent in accordance with donor 
stipulations. These protocols do not capture many of the data points needed to properly 
assess a CDFI’s condition or performance in its various lines of business; in particular, 
the protocols are weak on revealing the volume and design of assets, cost of funds, cost 
per product or service delivered, liquidity, market value of net assets, and the quality of 
management decision making.  
 
By contrast, for the institutions and corporations that participate in the capital markets, 
comprehensive and accurate disclosure is a rule enforced by detailed regulation, as well 
as investor interest: an organization’s audited financial reporting is intended to provide 
the basis for all analysis, management, lenders, investors and regulatory entities alike. 
The notable failures in adequate disclosure (Enron comes to mind) are notable because, 
among other things, they prove the necessity of generating rules about transparency and 




As introduced in Chapter 2, and reiterated at the beginning of Chapter 8, “the essence of 
credit analysis is to identify the decisions that management makes, and to assess the 
quality of the implementation of these decisions in the context of the organizational 
objectives and market conditions. The issue of repayment of obligations incurred is 
secondary to, and derivative of, this evaluation. Hence, the best form of credit analysis is 
a mirror of management intentions, decisions, and actions. The logical corollary to this 
is, the best form of credit analysis incorporates the same metrics the organization uses to 
manage the business of its mission. Hence, organizational credit risk is one and the same 
for the manager and the investor.”  
 
In Chapter 7, we revealed how grant revenues and the various forms of restricted net 
assets were impediments to the rating agencies. The two were essentially indecipherable 
for the rating agency analyst. The chapter focused on methods to overcome these 
impediments in the context of rating agency disciplines. However, for CDFIs, the 
problems with the rating agencies do not end there. There are two additional elements, 
common to all lending entities that also present serious impediments to analysis because 
of the difference in how CDFIs manage them. These two additional impediments are the 
loan portfolio and operating expenses. Although the information needed to understand 
the grant revenue line and the various restrictions on net assets is rarely if ever disclosed 
in the CDFI audit, information on the loan portfolio and operating expenses is reported 
as a matter of protocol. The problem is, the information provided is not particularly 
informative, nor reflective of the CDFI mission.  
 
Rating agencies are well versed in the metrics of both loan portfolios and operating 
expenses as they relate to financial institutions, and they are familiar with the 
operational and lending benchmarks that these metrics produce. Because the mission 
and the methods for delivering credit are markedly different from those of conventional 
lenders, CDFI benchmarks for lending and operating expenses look very different from 
what the rating agencies are accustomed to. To the extent that they can be analyzed, 
benchmarks tend to put CDFIs at a critical disadvantage to other lenders in the view of 
the rating agency and funder alike. 
 
At a time when the benchmarks of the conventional lender have proved so porous, it is incumbent 
upon CDFIs to reverse the disadvantage by establishing a platform of hard data that supports the 




These two elements, the configuration of the loans and loan portfolio, and the structure 
of the operating expenses, define the relationship between the CDFI and its constituents. 
They are essentially the “contract” with the CDFIs’ constituents. As such, they are the 
central moving parts that serve to justify the CDFI mission and, as a result, its funding. 
Both elements can be evaluated using financial metrics. To begin narrowing the gap 
between the value of these attributes and conventional analysis, we consider two ways 
they can be bridged:  
 
• Loan design and loan portfolio configuration: Both CDFI loans and their loan 
portfolios are directed to filling a gap that the conventional lender does not fill, 
and both require some form of subsidy. In terms of origination, underwriting, 
approval, processing, and servicing procedures, however, the bulk of the lending 
activity conducted by CDFIs parallels that of conventional institutions. Hence, 
although such attributes as size, term, pricing, cost, and risk parameters of 
community development loans differ from their conventional counterparts, the 
metrics by which the activity is assessed are very much the same (such as net 
interest margin, collateral coverage, debt service coverage, delinquency rate, cost 
of delivery, etc.) In theory, the metrics developed by the regulatory agencies, and 
the form of analysis devised to interpret these metrics (such as CAMEL ratings) 
should be applicable to the bulk of CDFI lending activity, once the issues of grant 
revenue and net assets are addressed. This is, in fact, the case for depository 
CDFIs as we discuss below. However, to date, it is not the case for loan funds 
and other nondepository forms of CDFIs. 
• Operating expenses. The resources that the CDFI brings to bear on behalf of the 
constituents in the form of staff, staff skill sets, location, training, programmatic 
initiatives, and the like are an essential part of the mission. CDFIs provide 
services that the conventional sector does not provide, and these services also 
require a subsidy. As with the loans, the metrics for evaluating these line items 
are similar to those in the conventional sector, but again, the difference in 
mission and cost put these beyond the norms with which the rating agencies and 
other analysts are comfortable. At present, the value and the dynamics of these 
elements are not supported by the data commonly reported in the community 
development field or the analytical frameworks. This is not just a problem for the 
rating agencies; it is problem also for the Office of Management and Budget, 
Congress, and public agencies, all of whom lack the familiarity with CDFIs that 
banks and foundations enjoy.  
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To make the mission and the business of the mission accessible and comprehensible to 
the rating agency analyst, or any analyst for that matter, a more precise and descriptive 
set of data points for both the loan portfolio and the operating expense structure must be 
provided. The analytical procedures set forth in Chapter 8 will not be helpful without 
them.  
 
In the three sections that follow, we present the current shortcomings in reporting on 
these critical elements (Section 1), and then make recommendations for capturing data 
that justify both the loans (Section 2) and the operating expenses (Section 3) in terms that 
are compatible with rating agency disciplines. These recommendations are not made in 
a vacuum. As further detailed below, several solid initiatives across the CDFI field are 
leading the effort to produce meaningful data and standardized financial reporting. 
These recommendations are made to augment and promote those efforts as a critical 
priority for CDFIs at large.   
 
 
It’s	  12/31:	  Do	  You	  Know	  Where	  Your	  Assets	  Are?	  
 
During the efforts to assemble the Capital Exchange presented in Chapter 5, the FIR 
team reviewed eight different nonprofit entities engaged in community development 
lending and investing. Below are ten of the most common flaws we found in their 
reporting, together with the reasons these flaws are distressing:   
 
1. There is no gross loan volume figure in the cash flow. Instead, the audit shows loan 
volume net of principal repayments and loan sales. Therefore, loan volume—the 
chief measure of mission impact and the chief justification for being in business—is 
not reported.  
2. There is no distinction between interest generated by loans and that generated by cash and 
investments. Audits often combine interest earned on investments and interest earned 
on loans. As a result, it is impossible to identify and evaluate a number of crucial 
management decisions, including relation of the loan product pricing to market; the 
related benefit or relevance of the loan pricing to the constituency; the trade-off 
between investing and making loans in terms of overall cost; and management’s 
ability to invest cash efficiently. 
266	  
3. There are few distinctions between fee revenue or fee income, or where there is such a 
distinction, the audit is silent on whether they are loan related. With CDFIs, the 
interest earned on loans is rarely adequate to cover operating costs. The extent to 
which transactional or annual fees help cover the cost is a crucial indicator or 
management’s position on pricing and staffing. The number is critical in indicating 
the nature of management’s commitment to retaining or outsourcing key functions 
in the lending business.  
4. There is no indication of the loan maturities, loan repayments, loan sales, or average life of 
the loan portfolio. The absence of these numbers makes it impossible to determine 
how much self-funding management has been able to engineer, the extent of 
management’s options for managing liquidity, the price/benefit ratio of holding 
versus selling loans, and, again, the benefits/relevance of the loans to the needs of 
the constituents. 
5. There is no information on the number of loans in the portfolio. The unit volume is critical 
to measuring impact as well as cost per unit, changes in loan type, and risk 
concentration.   
6. There is no distinction between off-balance-sheet obligations and the cash flows and 
obligations between the organization and its investments and partnerships. The claims of 
secondary market entities and public agencies in particular are necessary for making 
an accurate assessment of liquidity, and management’s options for maximizing it.  
7. There is no itemization of interest expense. Interest expense on debt is often combined 
with other items, including taxes, fees and the like. This makes it difficult to calculate 
a true cost of debt and funds, crucial items in evaluating the business model of the 
mission.  
8. There is no evidence of the operating expenses required for originating, underwriting, 
servicing, and providing technical assistance or counseling to borrowers. Without a listing 
of the cost to deliver by product or service line, it is impossible to identify the true 
cost of delivering the mission to the constituents, or how management might alter 
the delivery in response to changes in constituent and market conditions. 
9. There are no debt maturities or weighted average maturity and cost of debt. This 
information is crucial to evaluating liquidity and management’s capacity to manage 
the asset/liability challenges.   
10. There is no reconciliation of nonperforming loans to delinquencies or delinquencies to charge-
offs and recoveries, nor is there information on rewrites and restructurings.  One of the 
greatest mission objectives of CDFIs is to reduce the risk of nonconventional loans 
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via counseling and other forms of support, and manage it to a modest level of loss. 
Success in doing so is a distinguishing feature of the CDFI, and justifies the 
investment. However, in the absence of this data, there is no way to assess the 
CDFI’s capacity to deliver on this mission objective.   
 
These are only ten examples of the shortcomings in the audited financial reporting for 
CDFIs. Clearly, with this dearth of critical information, it is impossible to determine how 
much financial room management has to do its job every year, or how well they manage 
it. It is also impossible to determine how well the organization achieves its mission and 
generates an impact.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the FIR team’s effort to obtain capital market funding for 
unsecured CDFI organizational risk collapsed around the issue of financial reporting. 
The manner in which CDFIs report their operations, assets, liabilities, and cash flows is 
diverse and often idiosyncratic, if not opaque. Each organization must explain the 
meaning of its chart of accounts and how the financial dynamics of its lending and other 
program activities are reflected in them. The level of interpretation this produces 
seriously impedes the process of evaluating financial condition and performance. It also 
renders comparative analysis, such as that required for the establishment of 
industrywide ratings, both expensive and vulnerable to challenge. It is the reason that 
trend line analysis and early warning structures like that of the Quad (Appendix C) are 
not feasible for use across the CDFI field. 
 
As noted earlier, there is an exception: regulated depositories. Because of the 
standardization of reporting—including chart of accounts, definitions, formats, and 
reporting schedules—depository CDFIs have access to unsecured funding, often at the 
lowest rates in the market. This funding is primarily short-term in the form of fed funds 
and deposits. But it can also be longer term, for example, in the form of advances from 
the Federal Home Loan Banks (in the event they are members). Under normal 
circumstances, these same depositories have loan to deposit ratios of under 100 percent, 
which means that deposits are funding some aspect of the business (such as working 
capital, for example) that involve a high degree of organizational risk. Of course, the 
basis for this access to unsecured organizational risk is the federal guarantee of deposits. 
But the key issue is: this guarantee would not be provided without the standardized 
reporting and the adherence to regulatory guidelines.  
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Non-depository CDFIs derive their funding from banks, social investors, public 
agencies, and foundations. The funds are typically granted to the non-depository CDFIs 
for specific purposes. These purposes, and the terms and conditions that govern the use 
of the grant proceeds, vary from one CDFI to the next, often considerably. As a result, 
the chief objective of the organization’s auditor, as the quotation above suggests, is to 
ensure that the money is in the right “bucket” at the end of the year. There is much less 
emphasis on where the money went during the course of the year—how it was deployed 
or expended and how it was recouped at year’s end. There is only limited disclosure and 
virtually no evaluation associated with the design of the assets, the manner in which the 
money converts into mission assets and services, the volume of transactions, or the 
actual component costs associated with the delivery of those assets. Essentially the audit 
provides a static view of the organization at one point in time, with very limited 
information on the business of promoting the mission, or on the performance of 
management in pursuing it.  
 
Clearly, it is difficult under these circumstances to provide a proper assessment of 
management’s capacity and the financial health of the entity without considerable time 
and effort (expended generally onsite).  The notion of working up industry comparables 
also takes considerable time and effort, and an automated approach to either, or both, 
remains impossible in the absence of meaningful and standardized reporting.  
 
Could non-depository CDFIs develop a system of reporting like that required of 
community development banks and credit unions? The answer is yes. Would they have 
to be regulated to do so? No. So why isn’t financial reporting for the non-depositories 
standardized and meaningful?  
 
There are two major obstacles: 
 
• The cost of the audit. The chief challenge facing the CDFI field in terms of 
improved reporting is the cost of qualified auditors. With operating funds hard 
to come by, the notion of spending as little $10,000 on an outside accountant can 
be problematic: obtaining a good accountant starts to conflict with the need for 
staff resources. Yet, a CDFI may need to pay considerably more if it is to provide 
even a good static view of its financial condition, including such items as 
compliance with funding requirements, the value of loans, 501(c)3 status, and 
cash controls. 
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• The content of the audit. Most funders require an audit. The big question is, how 
comprehensive should the audit be? Some accounting firms specialize in CDFI 
accounting and can provide an accurate and useful assessment of the CDFI’s 
financial condition. These firms can also opine on a range of management issues, 
and reference comparative data. Among other things, they understand that 
CDFIs are a unique hybrid between financial institutions and nonprofits, and 
hence, occupy a unique space. However, these firms are limited in number. 
Many accountants who audit CDFIs will assume they have sufficient expertise in 
the CDFI field because they have other nonprofit clients. This is not the case, and 
often leads to on-the-job training. In the absence of widespread standards for 
reporting and analysis of CDFIs, it is unclear that the organization will get the 
information it needs, even if it ends up paying substantially for the audit.  
 
These two obstacles are alone sufficient to slow the (non-depository) CDFI field’s 
progress toward the capital markets. But there is another, less obvious, obstacle as well: 
the absence of an incentive to improve reporting. During the work on the Quad for the 
Capital Exchange, the FIR team heard the question, “Why would we want to improve 
our reporting?”  
 
For several of the organizations that the FIR screened for the Capital Exchange, lack of 
disclosure was viewed as a positive. They noted, separately but similarly, that opacity 
was necessary to achieve sustainability. The reason: funders prefer to finance program 
assets rather than operating costs. The result of this preference is that organizations are 
perennially depleting their unrestricted accounts and running short of cash for ongoing 
operations. Too often, in their view, the funders leave it to other funders to provide the 
operating support that is essential to achieving the asset goals they all set. The lack of 
financial disclosure enables management to use or store funds for operating purposes 
that would otherwise be confined to the restricted “bucket” activity that represents the 
funder’s priorities. To stay on top of the movements of cash, these managers essentially 
keep their own more detailed notations, keeping tabs on where cash is and how it is, in 
fact, being used. So long as the funds are where they should be at statement date (there 
it is again), there isn’t a problem.  
 
Although not universal, this approach is by no means uncommon. At statement date, 
funders will often find deficits in restricted accounts—the “buckets.” They find deficits 
because the organizations have lent restricted funds to the unrestricted accounts for 
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operating purposes. In these instances, management has not, for whatever reason, been 
able to get the money back to where it belongs in time to close the books for the year. 
 
This tension between the operating needs of the organization and the mission goals of 
the funder will not disappear any time soon. As funders call for greater impact per 
dollar given, CDFIs are tasked further to demonstrate the real costs of delivering the 
mission goals. Until a reasonable balance can be established between the goals and the 
costs to achieve them, any motivation to improve reporting is likely to languish. 
Consequently, credibility with the rating agencies will be slow to develop, and access to 
the capital markets is likely to remain impaired.  
 
This state of affairs is in the interest of neither funders nor the CDFI field. The latter has 
overwhelming needs arising from their mission challenges, and the former have limited 
funds. The CDFI field requires access to more money and the capital markets have it.  
 
But there’s a bigger issue than access to the capital markets. In general, CDFIs exert 
considerable discipline at street level in the pursuit of their mission. Conditions require 
it: for a low-income constituent to succeed in business, homeownership, construction, 
and the like, the challenges are greater, the work is harder, and a higher level of 
discipline is a necessity. It should not be a stretch to assert that the management of the 
assets and services that support this constituent should require at least as much 
discipline. It also should not be a stretch to assert that the demonstration of management 
discipline should be the key to attracting more funds from both the capital markets and 
the social investor. In particular, such a demonstration would serve as the platform by 
which management is evaluated and the willingness to provide unsecured debt to the 
organization is justified.  However, notwithstanding a number of efforts such as CARS, 
NeighborWorks America, and Strength Matters, funders to the CDFI field have not, to 
date, collectively enforced such demonstration. Reporting across the CDFI field remains 
idiosyncratic, fragmentary, and inadequate. 
 
In theory, the ideal solution would be for the accounting profession to establish 
standards for disclosure in the annual audits. This would eliminate the inevitable 
conflicts among specific interests within the field and provide an objective platform on 
which rating agencies, creditors, lenders, and investors could depend. In effect, that is 
what the regulators have done for the depository CDFIs. But this is not a practical 
solution. The amount of time it would take to adjust Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles, where necessary, to conform to the CDFI conduct of business, would push 
outcomes out a number of years, perhaps decades. It is also uncertain whether the CDFI 
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field is of sufficient size to warrant such an effort. What is needed is a low cost, but 
authoritative approach to filling the information gap.  
 
 
What’s	  the	  Big	  Deal?	  
 
A statement from the Carsey Institute course on sustainable mission focuses on the 
challenge of bringing the right information forward: 
 
 Our fate is wrapped up—almost entirely—in the design and the allocation of the 
assets. The assets—financial and staff assets—embody the contract with the 
constituent. It is only after we know exactly what that contract is and what those 
assets are that we begin to solve for how we plan to fund it all.78 
 
There are no current protocols in the standard CDFI audit for providing the data points 
that shed light on either the design or the allocation of the assets. There is, in effect, no 
way to get at the deal, or why funders think it is important to subsidize it.  
 
This must change. There are alternatives to taking on the extraordinary task of forcing a 
change in the way auditors interpret and represent CDFIs. NeighborWorks America 
explored one option that has worked particularly well. To get at the true dynamics of the 
loans and the lending activity of one of its grantees, NeighborWorks America required a 
supplement to the annual audit of one of its grantees that asked for the following 
information as a precondition of disbursing future grants:  
 
1. Interest revenue from investments 
 
2. Interest revenue from loans 
 
3. Loans outstanding at FYE (by dollar amount and number), including total loans 
on and off balance sheet 
 
4. Loan principal payments, including prepayments (by dollar amount) for total 
loans on and off the balance sheet 
 
5. Income from loan fees on origination and servicing 
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6. Loan fees paid for packaging/underwriting fees; servicing fees; counseling/other 
fees  
 
7. Loan sales by (by dollar amount and number) for: 
• home mortgages 
• rehabilitation loans 
• construction loans 
• commercial mortgages 
• business loans 
 
8. Loan volume by type (by dollar amount, number, and average interest rate), 
including: 
• home mortgages 
• rehabilitation loans 
• construction loans 
• commercial mortgages 
• business loans. 
 
NeighborWorks America requested these data points because they would: a) show 
broad flows of cash by type of mission asset that the audit did not show; and b) 
demonstrate the efforts by management to achieve their various mission goals. Notably, 
the rating agencies and the regulators would be very familiar with these data points. 
They are some of the data points the agencies and regulators use to evaluate the 
management and institutional risk for the lenders they track. An additional benefit to 
incorporating these supplemental data points in the audit is they would all be reconciled 
to the audited figures. Reconciliation to the audited figures would a) tie the mission 
accomplishments to actual flows of cash; and b) provide a platform for more accurate 
monthly and/or quarterly reports prepared by the organization.  
 
The grantee complied, and the data points were included as a supplement at the back of 
the audit. There was minimal additional cost since these data points had already been 
created in the work papers that served as the basis for the audit. The information 
significantly improved NeighborWork’s understanding of the operations, the trends and 
the mission accomplishments of the grantee.  
 
Other data points that can shed light on the design and allocation of a CDFI’s lending 
assets include the following. Most of these can also be drawn from the audit work 
papers, and can and should also be appended in the audit supplement:  
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• The dollar and number of loan applications by loan type 
• The dollar and number of loans being serviced by the organization, broken down 
between current, delinquent, and workout 
• The dollar and number of loans delinquent per aging schedule 
• The dollar and number of loans charged off in whole or in part during the period 
• The dollar and number of loans renewed or restructured during the period 
• The number of new borrowing clients and the number of clients who are no 
longer borrowing by loan type 
• The average term of each loan type (e.g., the average life of a 30-year mortgage is 
in the nine-year range) 
• The amount of interest forgone owing to delinquency 
• The risk ratings and loss reserve allocations for the loan portfolio as a whole 
• The number of staff performing origination, underwriting, and servicing and 
their cost (see Section 3 in this chapter). 
 
This is not intended as a complete list. There are additional data points that are 
produced in the normal course of an audit that can also prove helpful to the analysis. 
But these can provide a fairly clear picture of the nature of the mission, the quality of the 
lending, and the capacity of management.  
 
 
Again, these are data points that would be familiar to, if not expected by, the rating 
agencies and the regulators. This is not to say that the resulting numbers should be the 
same as those for conventional lenders; indeed they cannot be. By definition, the CDFI 
mission would not allow for it. But the tools can be the same: the hammer that’s used to 
build a castle is the same that is used to build the cabin. While building a different kind 
of house, these tools enable the CDFI lender to build the cabin just as strongly.  
 
Why does the rating agency need to know all this? For the very same reason 
management of the CDFI needs to know it. They must answer the question: Is the CDFI 
hitting the target market and does it have the wherewithal to deliver in a sustainable 
manner over time?  
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It is, ultimately, the express obligation of the funder to require reporting that provides 
the kind of data that helps the CDFI achieve its mission goals. Given the need to 
maximize resources in the current environment, it is a good time to start enforcing 
standards. At the same time, the CDFI field must demonstrate to funders what the 
mission goals require in terms of operational funding. The use of the supplemental 
pages of the audit, with mutually acceptable definitions of terms and metrics, is a 
prudent and disciplined way to initiate the effort. 
 
 
The	  Nuclear	  Option	  
 
The greatest error a CDFI can make is to abandon its constituents. The next greatest 
error is to abandon its staff. It is a common observation in the community development 
field that cutting staff is the single hardest decision for management. Talented and 
skilled people dedicated to the mission are hard to come by, particularly given the 
workload and generally modest compensation. Yet it happens all the time: a change in 
economic conditions, a rise in interest rates, a loss of a key donor are some of the events 
that occur which prompt CDFIs to suddenly cut staff, and services. And it often happens 
seemingly out of the blue. One day, just before the electricity is turned off, management 
starts reluctantly cutting staff. The situation can be chalked up to a combination of 
management optimism and the reluctance to lose good people.  
 
At the same time, it is neither prudent nor fair to subject staff members and their 
functions to the size of the constituent’s wallet. Nor is it fair or prudent to subject staff 
members and their functions to the success of the annual fund-raising effort. Subjecting 
borrowers and donors to this kind of choice is likewise unfair and imprudent; the impact 
can be devastating to staff member, constituent and the organization alike. Of all the 
possible ways in which CDFI management can fail, the need to fire staff on a moment’s 
notice due to inadequate funds is among the most inexcusable. It is also the most 
unnecessary. It’s the nuclear option, and it speaks very poorly of management. It is an 
indication that management has been unable to maintain the balance among the various 
moving parts of the organization with the return on subsidy formula. What 
management does to avoid this kind of event—the strategy, budgeting, allocation and 
deployment of resources—is exactly the kind of decision-making that analysts want to 
capture and evaluate on their way to an assessment of both management capacity and 
the CDFI financial condition. 
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How does a failure to maintain mission and staff occur, and why? The explanation is 
almost always the same: the CDFI is waiting on this grant or that to come through. 
Understandable to be sure, but here is the catch: operating expenses are almost always 
the largest item on the operating statement—even greater than earned revenues—and 
staff is almost always the greatest operating expense. Under adverse conditions, grants 
become less certain and cutting staff becomes inevitable. Optimism is never a good 
excuse; and blaming the funders who do not come through is not a professional 
response. If the mission is important enough to justify grants, there must be a way to 
ensure that it continues regardless of external factors, including, if necessary, the loss of 
grants.  
 
One of the organizations the team evaluated during the Capital Exchange phase had an 
impeccable record in making breakthrough loans to difficult borrowers, with minimal 
losses. In terms of hitting the mission, it was right on target. After reviewing the costs on 
a per-unit basis, it was discovered they were spending approximately $5,000 for each 
loan they originated and $1,000 a year for servicing the loans every year thereafter.  The 
average size of the loans was $30,000. Therefore, it cost 17 percent of the principal to 
originate and 3 percent of principal a year for servicing. If the loan were outstanding for 
10 years on the balance sheet, the CDFI would have expended about 50 percent of the 
principal on operating costs to support the loan. If the loan were on the balance sheet for 
20 years, the amount expended would exceed 90 percent of loan principal. And this was 
before taking into account the cost of financing the loans, which was in the 5 percent 
range per year (slightly higher than the rate they charged). Net result: on a $30,000, 20-
year loan with a 12-year average life, the cost to the CDFI would be about $31,000, or 111 
percent of principal.  
 
The question arose: wouldn’t it make more sense from both a financial and a mission 
standpoint to simply grant the full amount to the borrower? Of course it would. And 
there would be money left over that would free up scarce social investment to be put to 
use elsewhere. This takes us back, once again, to one of the Five Key Principles of 
Finance for nonprofits discussed in Chapter 8:  “When it comes to allocating subsidy, it’s 
a zero sum game between you and your constituency.”  
 
This led to the next question: Should we close down the lending business? As with many 
if not most CDFIs, the staff-heavy operating expenses of this CDFI represented the 
largest expenses on its operating statement, larger often than funding and credit losses 
combined. What was interesting about this case was that, once the CDFI investigated the 
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reason for the high cost, it found that more than two-thirds of origination costs were not 
associated with the direct making of loans. A similar ratio held true for servicing. The 
bulk of the costs was associated with fundraising, managing debt, accounting, office 
space, and marketing. The CDFI also spent considerable time and money on applicants 
who ended up getting loans elsewhere. As a result, the CDFI found itself facing not just 
a simple decision about whether to close out the lending activity, but whether to 
completely revise its structure and operations (its “business model”).  
 
This raised the final question: How does a CDFI capture the data necessary to make 
informed decisions about maximizing the efficiency of its staff and operations and 
reducing its consumption of subsidy?  Is there an objective way to approach the issue of 
setting the right balance of talent, resources, capacity, and mission?  
 
The rating agencies are looking for the management’s ability to anticipate challenges 
and to manage the organization with consistency and stability in the face of them. There 
is always a balance of revenues and expenses, of staff and constituent needs, that can be 
adjusted to changes in the environment, with moderation. Management’s ability to 
establish this balance is a fundamental part of the evaluation of their capacity.  
 
The notion is not as foreign as it may sound. CDFIs are, by and large, conversant with 
the series of management decisions associated with loan portfolio risk: risk ratings, risk-
weighting, establishing loss reserve targets, and providing reserves. They routinely 
adjust each of these, monthly, quarterly, or annually to suit the conditions in the 
marketplace as they see them. The notion of establishing a wider balance—one that 
incorporates all the operational expenses—simply expands on the discipline (e.g., setting 
aside cash or cash flow in the event of possible disruptions, or alterations to staff activity 
and workloads). Doing so can and should be as much a part of risk management as 
providing for losses.  
 
More than a decade ago, the World Bank and the World Council of Credit Unions 
(WOCCU) teamed up to provide $5,000 grants to credit unions and micro-credit 
organizations worldwide for conducting a program of activity-based costing. 
Organizations applied for the grants and implemented the programs on a widespread 
basis. Many of them applied out of a compelling need. Very few of these organizations 
had access to grants or other forms of philanthropy or subsidy. As a result, they were 
financed by earnings on the loans they made to the poor.  Clearly, it was essential to 
understand all the costs associated with lending because the zero sum game was right 
there, up front, at the point of the transaction with the borrower. Although $5,000 wasn’t 
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much money for an exercise of this variety and delicacy, the World Bank and WOCCU 
viewed the effort as a solid success. In the end, a number of very small organizations 
around the world adopted activity-based-costing, and the knowledge about how to 
manage their costs of operation contributed to their ability to survive.  
 
It would be a mistake to connect this effort directly to the fact that the international 
micro-lending field has built the capacity to obtain ratings and issue bonds. There is no 
data that tie this effort and others like it directly to that capacity. On the other hand, it 
would be perfectly reasonable to assert that the disciplines associated with an 
understanding of one’s costs, and the ability to identify how and why these costs 
translate into the need for revenue from the borrower or subsidy from the donor, is 
crucial to establishing credibility with the rating agencies, the banks, and the other 
institutional players in the capital markets. It is a critical indicator of management 
capacity in the same way that managing loan portfolio risk is a critical indicator—only at 
several magnitudes in terms of the complexity and, for the most part, impact.  
 
Although many organizations choose to purchase activity-based costing systems, the 
effort to differentiate and manage operating costs need not be an expensive proposition. 
Much of what occurs can be accomplished by simply observing what happens in each 
function over a set period of time in the context of already established job descriptions, 
objectives, action plans, outputs and outcomes. Although the results may be imprecise, a 
reasonable level of observation, performed in a consistent manner, will generally 
produce valuable results for strategic planning. 
 
Chart 9.1 is an example of data matrix that a large CDFI developed, which helped it 
determine how much of what type of lending it could afford to pursue. The CDFI was 
already familiar with the notion of portfolio diversification relative to credit risk. But 
this activity-based-costing discipline provided an added understanding of the need to 
diversify the portfolio in terms of operating cost by type of loan being made. By 
concentrating just on a loan type with high operating costs, for example, small changes 
in the marketplace—interest rates, new competitors, new loan structures —could have a 
much larger impact on the ability to cover the CDFIs costs than they would otherwise 
exert. In the end, the CDFI was able to use the information on cost per loan type to 
determine how much of which type of loan it could afford to originate (and service), 






As valuable as this information is in planning budgets and strategies, the real benefits 
kick in when the other three of the Four Major Categories (Chapter 8)—identifying 
expected revenue, interest costs, and losses by loan type—are applied by loan type and 
compared with the operating costs on the same matrix.  This comparison allows 
management to fully comprehend the claim of each loan type on the CDFI resources, 
and to modulate such things as term, pricing, and volume accordingly.  The comparison 
also provides a platform for adjusting budgets and strategies for changes in market 
conditions. Managing these sources and uses is not only essential to maximizing 
efficiency and the use of subsidy for the CDFI, but it is also a key indicator of 
management capability. It will be one of the key criteria that rating agencies look to 
when determining the strength of a CDFIs unsecured debt obligation.  
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Data:	  Buckets	  or	  Pipelines	  
 
The big challenge for the management of the CDFI is calibrating the skill sets and cash 
flows of the organization simultaneously to the needs of the CDFI borrowers and the 
maintenance of the CDFIs long-term financial condition. As noted, it is the job of the 
CDFI auditor to make sure that all the cash was expended for the right purpose and 
ended up in the designated bucket at the end of the year. The CDFIs grant funders need 
to know this. But this is just a bucket of data covering a single day of the year, and it 
does not say much about what the calibration the CDFI management sweats through 
every day of the year. Nor does it provide much of anything that rating agencies and the 
capital markets need to know.  
 
At the beginning of the chapter, we said:  
 
The design of the loans and the configuration of the loan portfolio, together with 
the deployment of operating expenses, are, in effect, the “contract” that the CDFI 
makes with its constituents. As such, they also define the CDFIs overall mission 
in financial terms. 
 
The rating agencies want to watch the CDFI in motion, with all the key components 
connected. What they need is a flow of information, a channel that shows how cash is 
structured and deployed during the course of the year. The unfamiliarity of the rating 
agencies with what CDFIs do and how they do it was a consistent obstacle across the 
efforts of the FIR team. So long as the CDFI field is dealing with buckets of idiosyncratic 
data, the obstacles to funding organizational risk will remain.  
 
As we have seen, however, certain numbers can take us to the real story. Some numbers 
tell us what the CDFI is selling (type, term, rate, risk), what services it is providing 
(staff), how the customer is responding (loan volume), what the competition is doing (all 
of the above), how much the CDFI needs to borrow, how much debt goes to fund the 
borrower’s needs, how much goes to fund operations, and so forth. These numbers 
reflect what the CDFI does on a day-to-day basis, what decisions management is 
making, and ultimately, why it is in business. These numbers fit the description at the 
top of the Chapter:  
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The essence of credit analysis, then, is to identify the decisions that management 
makes, and to assess the implementation of these decisions in the context of the 
organizational objectives and market conditions. The loan design and operating 
expenses go the heart of what the rating agencies are seeking because those 
numbers go to the heart of what management is doing. Supplemental schedules 
to the audit, combined with company-prepared quarterly statements that 
reconcile to the audit can provide this information at minimal additional 
expense. By providing the critical lending and operating expense in frameworks 
similar to those shown above, CDFIs can overcome the barriers to 
understanding, and open up the analytical avenues to the capital markets. And, 
as a parallel benefit, they can use these same numbers to maximize impact and 
efficiency in the use of their resources.  
 
The CDFI sector recognizes the need to determine the essential data points that best 
reflect the values and dynamics of CDFIs. And there is ample evidence that this 
recognition is widely shared across the CDFI field, together with the recognition that the 
effort must be pursued on a collective basis. While the FIR team was working on the 
Capital Exchange, the CDFI Fund announced and pursued its CIIS project, which 
targeted the development of a detailed data base:  
 
CIIS is comprised of the Institution Level Report (ILR) and the Transaction Level 
Report (TLR). The ILR captures organizational data, including the CDFI or CDE 
(Community Development Entity) background information, financial position, 
lending and investing activities, community development outputs, and development 
services. The CDFI program awardees are required to submit an ILR annually for 
two or three years, and NMTC (New Market Tax Credit) allocates are required to 
submit an ILR annually for the life of their NMTC investments.79 
 
This intention of the CIIS to capture what CDFIs actually did from a transactional 
standpoint was exactly the kind of work that needed to be done to elevate the 
transparency and demonstrate the mission and discipline in the CDFI sector. There were 
groups initiating attempts to fill in the data blanks as well. NeighborWorks America 
with its Key Performance Indicators, and the CDFI Data Project were moving resolutely 
ahead in collecting standardized data on CDFI lending, and advancing forms of analysis 
for organizational risk. The work of the Strength Matters collective, which focuses on the 
multifamily real estate development in the community development field, was also 
initiated during the period that the FIR team was working on the Capital Exchange. 
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And, of course, there was the work that the Opportunity Finance Network was doing 
through CARS.  
 
Although these efforts have not reached the point of collective agreement on protocols 
for data points, they likely will. They have the benefit of looking to the successes the 
CDFI field has already seen in encouraging rating agencies to evaluate community 
development loans and place them in the capital markets. Two of the more notable 
breakthroughs include the work of the Community Reinvestment Fund on SBA loans for 
its CRF-17 securitization, and Neighborhood Housing Services of America on its AA-
rated bond issue for affordable home mortgages. To understand how the community 
development sector has advanced the collection and management of capital market 
compatible data, one need only look to the new system, E-Tran, instituted at the SBA. As 
Thomas Stanton reported in 2005, “the SBA provides lenders with several electronic 
options, including: 
 
• A web page where lenders can enter loan information for single loans. 
• A secure website capable of accepting multiple applications simultaneously via 
an XML (Extensible Markup Language) file transfer 
• Access to software intermediaries that include E-Tran loan submission capability 
in the services that they provide to lenders.”  
 
“One hundred and fifty-five lenders currently have signed on to originate loans via E-
Tran.” According to Thomas Stanton, “Many of these lenders have reported 
enthusiastically back to SBA on the benefits of the new process, especially because of the 
ability they gained from E-Tran to originate SBA loans quickly and to increase their 
volume of SBA lending without increasing labor costs.”80 
 
“The SBA program demonstrates that data collection can be comprehensive while 
simultaneously reducing costs dramatically for all involved. Also of critical importance 
to the SBA’s successful launch of E-Tran has been the need for common, standardized 
definitions. Doing so will allow SBA to better pull lender data from E-Tran into its larger 
portfolios monitoring system without worrying about data quality complications that 
stems from input from many different users.”  
 
The impact of these efforts to make the work of the CDFI field transparent is outlined in 
Laura Choi’s informative report, “Creating a Marketplace: Information Exchange and 
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the Secondary Market for Community Development Loans.”81 She demonstrates that 
disclosing the right data is essential to improving the prospects for CDFI growth.  
 
What the CDFI field must do next is to raise the level of precision and disclosure 
described by Stanton and Choi to the next level of complexity; that is, it must frame the 
risk of the unsecured obligations of CDFIs as organizations. Although all the lenders to 
the industry have their own data on credit loss performance at the organizational risk 
level, there is no common industry data available to capture a collective experience. 
Ample anecdotal evidence suggests that losses on organizational risk-based loans are 
exceptionally low; however, there is no conclusive body of data that proves the case.  
 
To achieve the level of market compatibility that CRF, NHSA and the SBA have 
achieved on specific classes of loans, the CDFI sector should establish a consortium that 
identifies the right data points for the purpose, collects data, cleanses it to ensure 
comparability, and reconstitutes it so that no one lender’s experience is discernible. 
Moreover, the identification of the data points should include more than just lending; a 
number of large CDFIs also engage in real estate development, real estate management, 
individual development accounts, venture capital, deposit taking, and a wide range of 
other services, including homeownership and enterprise counseling, financial literacy, 
and tax preparation. These are all part of the mission of the CDFI, and all are activities 
that must find ways to be sustained. And again, not to be too emphatic, very little if any 
of this shows up in the annual audits.  
 
We end this chapter with these ideas from the Milken Institute:  
 
[We] recommend taking this collaborative approach of combining existing data 
sources. A central database, populated by multiple entities and managed by a 
third party, would make the data accessible to a number of people. Contributors 
would agree to a standard set of definitions and reformat their data to these 
standards to enable comparison across databases. In exchange for contributing 
data, members of these “data consortiums” would gain access to the contents of 













an CDFIs access unlimited amounts of low-cost unsecured short- and long-term 
funding from the capital markets based on their organizational credit risk? Can 
they receive pricing, flexibility, and procedural parity with for-profit corporations of 
equivalent credit risk? That is, can mission-driven nonprofits serving the poor compete 
successfully with, for example, predatory lenders for cheap funding?  
 
CDFIs can, if they have the same tools.  But they do not. This is in part because they are 
too small and in part because they are misunderstood. There is no reason for this state of 
affairs to continue. As the FIR team demonstrated, CDFIs can address the issue of size 
by using one or more of a variety of platforms to aggregate community development 
risk. As for unfamiliarity, the current state of reporting and analytical protocols is a 
function primarily of CDFI choice. It is entirely within the capacity of the CDFI field to 
establish standardized approaches to financial reporting and analysis that are 
compatible with the both disciplines of the capital markets and the community 
development mission. There is no reason to await the return of normalcy to the capital 
markets. The solutions to these problems can be initiated now.  
 
These issues should not be viewed as a low priority. We have discussed in earlier 
chapters how entities of much lower credit quality (and without a public mission) can 
fund themselves at a material advantage. In Chapter 2, we showed how Brand X, a real 
predatory lender with a large SEC settlement to prove it, was able to enjoy this 
advantage.  Once the markets stabilize, the same entities (or new entities with the same 
attributes) will be poised to return to the communities with irresponsible financing 
options and leave the CDFIs once again on the sidelines. Positioning CDFIs to be at the 




The following sections summarize the steps needed to position CDFIs for “funding 
parity” while the markets stabilize. These steps are the product of the FIR team’s eight-
year effort to open up the capital markets to CDFI organizational credit risk, and 
introduce them to the wholesale sides of the banks.  
 
Many of the recommendations are not new. Others in the industry have arrived at 
similar conclusions over the past decade—conclusions that aided the FIR team in its 
work. Their work is summarized in the acknowledgements section in this book. 
However, it is important to pull all these recommendations, new and old, together to 
address the single key issue we have been discussing: how to gain conventional 
unsecured funding based on CDFI organizational credit risk. Our view is that although 
various obstacles and events have impeded CDFIs in the past, there is no reason to let 
them block the way now or in the future. 
 
CDFI	  Industry	  Data	  
For rating agencies, banks, and investors to build a capital-market platform for CDFI 
organizational risk, much more precise and authoritative data on the industry are 
needed. 
As Mary Tingerthal, who was instrumental in the CRF-17 securitization, says: 
At its heart, better data means that more institutional investors get to see how 
well these loans perform and what it means to have their dollars supporting 
minority-owned business, charter schools, health care centers, and job creation. ... 
There seem to be a limitless number of tasks that need to be performed to get a 
clearer data picture going forward. Other efforts might focus on cataloguing 
what is currently being collected by the CDFI Fund, the Small Business 
Administration, the Opportunity Finance Network’s CARS program, and the 
like. And on the other side, there is a long way to go to find out exactly what 
investors want. Fannie Mae, for example, collects a tremendous amount of data 
but tends to focus on a few key variables when it makes its assessment of 
investment worthiness. Perhaps institutional or capital-markets investors could 
identify what their key variables are? They might also shed new light on what 
proxy variables [as used in the CRF-17 transaction] might be the most useful for 
making performance predictions on new asset classes (for example, charter 
schools).83 
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This is an excellent introduction to the notion that the common ground between CDFIs 
and the capital markets lies in the provision of data that satisfies both the needs of the 
funder and the funded.  
In Chapters 7, 8, and 9, we conveyed what the rating agencies, and as a consequence, 
institutional investors, are looking for. We now turn to what the CDFIs themselves 
should provide, and how they might wish to provide it.  
Key	  Data	  on	  CDFI	  Organizational	  Risk	  
The information needed for the capital markets includes the following: 
• Number of CDFIs and size of their loan portfolios and balance sheets. CDFI portfolio 
size by asset type provides the markets with an understanding of the size and 
need of the mission. This is essential in demonstrating that there are likely 
economies of scale to be found in developing financing vehicles to serve the 
mission.  
• Volume of lending by loan type, size, and rate. The design and volume of assets 
enable the financial engineer to devise financing solutions for a range of asset 
classes that may be more efficient and flexible than those CDFIs currently 
employ. Such items as due-on-sale, non-amortizing, or deferred loans, which 
likely number in the hundreds of millions of dollars, are a classic example of an 
asset class that could benefit from a more detailed and penetrating collection of 
data. At present, they are generally not valued or even carried on the balance 
sheet.  
• Loan portfolio performance. Hard data on loan portfolio performance is a critical 
factor, not only in terms of documenting the value of the CDFI mission, but also 
in establishing the kinds of reserves needed to take the assets to market. 
• Operating expense by function, program and staff allocation. To comprehend the 
comparatively high cost of delivering loans through the CDFI platform, the work 
must be identified, quantified, and differentiated by way of the outcomes.   
• Grant support by source. The quality, depth, and consistency of foundation, 
agency, and bank grant support is a critical element in determining the viability 
of individual CDFIs as well as the CDFI industry as a whole. As all CDFIs rely to 
some degree on grants, both historically and prospectively, an analysis of the 
programs that provide grants and the extent to which CDFIs diversify their 
sources is critical to rating of risk.  
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• Performance of loans based on organizational risk. Foundations, social investors, 
trade groups, federal agencies, and banks have all provided unsecured and 
secured loans to CDFIs based on their organizational risk. The performance of 
these loans helps identify the attributes of successful CDFIs and can provide 
benchmarks that enable the markets to segment the field according to risk. These 
benchmarks are essential in establishing the kind of comparative analysis that 
validates risk ratings.  
 
All these points need to be reconciled to CDFI audits and tracked over a period of at 
least seven years.  
 
Key	  Data	  Sources	  
Sources for information on CDFIs include the following: 
 
• CDFI audits. As valuable as surveys are, risk rating requires hard numbers. 
Although CDFI audits suffer from certain gaps in critical information, they 
nevertheless provide some of the data noted above, particularly in the areas of 
unrestricted cash, loan portfolio size, delinquency, and financing needs.  
• Data from the newly implemented supplements to the audits. To the extent CDFIs can 
begin providing supplements to their annual audits that include the data points 
discussed in Chapters 7, 8, and 9, the quality and quantity of data needed for 
accurate analysis with improve greatly.  
• Lending data from foundations and social investors. Program-related investments, 
equity-equivalent investments, and other forms of debt financing provide 
insights into the capacity of CDFIs to manage their cash. The same holds true for 
working capital loans provided by a variety of social investors. How these 
instruments are requested, deployed, and repaid can be a highly informative 
indicator of management capability and risk.  
• Lending data from agencies. The CDFI Fund, NeighborWorks America, USDA, 
SBA, Ginnie Mae, and HUD all have substantial experience with CDFIs. They 
also have documentary evidence of their performance over time, documentation 
critical to the effort to establish risk. The SBA’s Office of Lender Oversight has 
won recognition from both the GAO and OMB for its methodologies, as has 
Ginnie Mae. These provide not only great information but also great models.  
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• Lending data from banks. Documentation of the working capital and short- and 
long- term loans made to CDFIs across the field may well be the most critical 
source of performance data. This is because regulatory requirements as well as 
standard practice enforce a high level of documentation of credit extension at 
inception as well as over the course of the loan. Moreover, the data points 
conform to rating agency standards. 
 
Assembling industry-performance data to prove the credit quality of CDFIs is key to 
opening up the market for top-quality pricing. But it is also valuable for advancing 
current efforts in the CDFI field among existing lenders and funders. A prime 
beneficiary of this data would be CARS, whose ratings would carry more weight with 
the benefit of market-compatible comparative analysis. The same holds true for the 
NeighborWorks American PROMPT program, which would benefit from more 
penetrating data from across the sector.  
 
The	  Data	  Bank	  
The development, organization, cleaning, and management of industry data requires a 
considerable amount of work. It also requires independence and data security. Laura 
Choi offers an excellent suggestion for the data platform the CDFI field needs:  
 
The platform host can play a significant role in implementing this online 
information-sharing tool. Some important consideration for implementation 
includes: 
 
• The platform host should be a highly credible and neutral third party.  
• Access to the online tool should be limited, requiring that participants be 
involved in the financing of community development activities.  
• The online platform should have a strong educational component. 
• The beginning focus should be on whole loan sales as opposed to 
securitization.  
• A mix of strategies should be used to attract participants and encourage 
continued involvement. 
• Enforceable policies must be introduced to keep the data current.84 
 
Other practitioners in the CDFI field (such as Ellen Seidman, Glen Yago, and Betsy Zeidman) 
also recommend establishing a consortium of stakeholders to provide this data. The question is, 
what is the optimal platform for receiving, segmenting, and analyzing this data?  
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The CDFI Data Project presents an excellent platform from which to start. Segmentation is 
already in place, and the CDFI industry is both familiar and comfortable with the effort. Other 
potential platforms include one or more of the following: 
 
• The CDFI Fund with its CIIS program 
• The NeighborWorks America Organizational Assessment Division’s PROMPT 
Plus program. 
• Opportunity Finance Network’s CARS.  
• The “Strength Matters” initiative, convened by NeighborWorks America and the 
MacArthur Foundation, which includes the Enterprise Foundation, ShoreBank, 
Local Initiatives Support Corporation, Calvert Foundation, National Cooperative 
Bank Capital Impact, the Reinvestment Fund, and others. 
• National intermediaries such as National Cooperative Bank Capital Impact, 
Local Initiatives Support Corporation, and the Enterprise Foundation. 
• The Milken Institute’s Emerging Domestic Market database. 
• Any large CDFI, such as the Reinvestment Fund, Boston Community Capital, the 
Low Income Investment Fund, or the Community Reinvestment Fund. 
• Banks that have substantial experience with the community development 
industry.  
 
In establishing this data bank, there would have to be an appropriate emphasis on an arms-
length relationship to the CDFI sector; agencies and banks may feel the need for a more secure 
and confidential platform if they are to contribute sensitive borrower data. Various industries 
(retailing and insurance, for example) build discreet and secure databanks for precisely this 
purpose. It is possible to reconfigure the CDFI Data Project or any of the above options to suit, 
but this will have to be determined.  
 
Recommendation 1. Assemble key lenders and investors to sort through the various 
options for providing data and arranging the appropriate platform.   
 
Recommendation 2. Funders should make future funding conditional upon participation 




Community development credit unions and community development banks enjoy a 
significant advantage over CDFI loan funds: they can fund their short-term needs and 
some medium-term needs at the best rates in the money (for our purposes “capital”) 
markets. Of course their deposits, for the most part, are federally guaranteed. Yet their 
advantage is more than that. In return for the guarantee, they are required to file annual 
and quarterly financial statements in a standardized format, which includes essential if 
not comprehensive detail on their assets, liabilities, operations, and cash flows. Because 
these reports are focused on the business of the depository’s CDFIs mission, they are 
much more valuable than the annual audits for the purposes of evaluating 
organizational risk. The information enables the regulators to rate them, and the 
regulatory rating criteria are compatible with rating agency standards.  
 
From the standpoint of reporting and analysis, CDFI banks and credit unions are poised 
to take further steps into the capital markets on the basis of unsecured organizational 
risk. This positioning and the consistency and ease of access associated with these 
annual and quarterly reports (which can be accessed on the Internet) can serve as a 
guidepost for CDFI loan funds. In fact, mission-driven CDFIs provide regular reports 
involving standardized and consistent data, and the reports do not compromise their 
respective missions. Again, just because reporting is standardized for nondepository 
CDFIs does not mean that a regulatory function must be established.  
 
The reasons for taking the loan funds in the direction of standardized reporting goes far 
beyond the issue of providing standardized data to the rating agencies and gaining 
access to low-cost funding. There are two imperatives associated with standardized 
reporting, and they go directly to the viability of the CDFIs and the CDFI sector: 
 
• Management of CDFIs. The best management in the CDFI field is also the best 
informed, with the highest capacity to inform their staff and boards of their 
organizations’ true financial status and direction. Conversely, the largest failures 
in the CDFI field are those in which financial information is neither consistent 
nor transparent to management, board members, or staff.  
• Funders. There is a limited amount of grant funding and below-market-rate 
funding in the community development field. As such, it is essential that funders 
prioritize and allocate scarce resources in accordance with the ever-evolving 
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needs of their constituencies and the capacities of CDFIs to deliver products and 
services with efficiency and impact.  
 
Standardized financial reporting is not the only step that addresses these needs, but it is 
the first and most crucial step.  
 
Recommendation 1. CDFI loan funds should review the reporting requirements for 
CDFI banks and credit unions to determine which data points should be provided on an 
annual and quarterly basis to present the best insight into the business aspects of the 
loan fund’s mission.  
 
Recommendation 2. CDFI loan funds should determine the optimal framework for 
establishing the new report requirements. At present, supplemental schedules that 
reconcile to the audits appear to be the easiest and least expensive format, but a Web-
based system may be optimal.  
 
Recommendation 3. Financial reporting should be automated and provide both annual 
and quarterly data that reconciles to the audits. The data should be accessible under 
certain security protocols on the Internet.  
 
Recommendation 4. Funders should make future funding conditional upon participation 
in this effort.  
 
Financial	  Disciplines	  
On the subject of financial disciplines, it’s worth revisiting Douglas Winn’s remarks 
from Chapter 3: 
 
“We believe that a targeted series of trainings on these skills for CDFIs would be 
valuable to the industry and could play an important role in increasing the 
number of organizations ready for the capital markets. A series of such training 
sessions might include: 
 
• Building financial infrastructure (tracking loans, decreasing cycle 
times, and developing a system to manage liquidity) … 
• Interest-rate risk management …  
• Loan pricing … 
• The basics of securitization …”85 
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There are certain traditional policies that prevent CDFIs from expanding their 
constituencies and their impact. The same policies also impede the efficient use of 
grants, below-market-rate loans, and other forms of subsidy. Although many of these 
policies are time-tested and prudent, they can also prove expensive, if not entirely 
counterproductive. Indeed, the results can be to confine the CDFI to the wishes of 
funders and leave them vulnerable to losing their constituencies altogether. It is not an 
idle concern, as the recent experience with the CDFI home-buying public attests.  
 
The tools introduced into the conventional sector over the past 20 years have 
revolutionized the lending decision and also the funding arrangements associated with 
it. Although many CDFIs have adopted or otherwise adjusted to these developments, 
others remain wedded to tools and policies that will only, over time, further marginalize 
them. The following are some of the biggest challenges. 
 
• Orientation to the grant funder. For-profits tend to identify the needs of the 
customer base and then go about raising the funding necessary—often at 
whatever it costs—to grow the business. Nonprofits tend to look for the grant 
funding source before initiating growth and then tailor the product or service to 
the interests of the funder. CDFIs are in the position of knowing their customer 
better than their funders do; hence, they need to liberate themselves from the 
constraints that funders routinely exert. The only way to do this is to establish a 
platform that generates unrestricted cash either through the development of 
business lines that generate regular surpluses and/or to borrow from 
conventional sources of funding at conventional rates. The development of an 
industrywide understanding of the need for an internal “bank” for subsidy at 
each CDFI is an integral part of this development.  
• Conventional borrowing. Some CDFIs choose to forgo expansion altogether if they 
cannot borrow money at below-market rates. This is illogical in terms of both 
mission and finance. As to mission, if there is a financial need in the community, 
it is the job of the CDFI to find a way to address it. Moreover, borrowing from 
conventional sources is not restricted. As to the cost of conventional financing, it 
is essential for the CDFI to consider two realities: 1) the cost of borrowing at 
conventional rates must be blended with the cost of other funds the CDFI 
obtains, including grants in order to comprehend the true cost of funds; and 2) 
the cost of conventional financing is typically much less than the operating costs 
of the organization, whether viewed on a blended basis or not. Thus, if the CDFI 
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is cost constrained in its pursuit of the mission, the first place to look for 
reductions is operating expenses. Borrowing from conventional sources of 
funding can also bring more cash to the table because those sources have much 
more cash to provide than the social investor. It may be expensive over the short 
run, but over the long run, expanding conventional sources of funding is better 
for both the CDFI and the constituent.  
• Matched funding. CDFIs traditionally match the term of the liability to the term of 
the asset. This is prudent. Yet in light of strategies and tools the entire financial 
market (and much of the corporate market) has developed to mitigate the risk of 
the mismatch, continued commitment to this traditional approach leaves CDFIs 
at a distinct disadvantage in flexibility and cost of debt. This is not to suggest that 
CDFIs should mismatch assets and liabilities “in the comfort of their own home.” 
As necessary as it is to compete in the financial markets, running an asset-
liability mismatch is both complex and risky, and CDFIs must acquire ways to 
proceed with expertise. A collective effort among CDFIs, working in partnership 
with an entity that performs the asset/liability mismatch for a living is a viable 
option. Working with one or more of the Federal Home Loan Banks, for example, 
would be a prudent and inexpensive way to proceed down this path.  
• Loan pricing. Several CDFIs view the interest rate on a loan as the key indicator of 
achieving mission. They suggest the interest rate on a loan to a low-income (and 
low-credit-score) individual, for example, must be below that on a similar loan to 
the highest-quality borrower. This raises two issues: 1) what is important to the 
borrower is not the rate but the payment (as was discovered during the recent 
housing crisis), and 2) providing a loan at the best rate to the low-credit-score 
borrower is in fact making a loan at a “below market rate.” Understanding these 
two distinctions is absolutely critical to a CDFI’s ability to compete with the 
conventional lender’s range of less-prudent options. It is also crucial to funding 
itself either through warehousing lines or secondary market vehicles. 
• Manual loan origination and servicing. Arguably the most important technological 
innovations for lenders in the past two decades have been credit scoring and 
automated underwriting. These have reduced the costs of origination of 
individual and business loans by 60 to 95 percent. Simultaneously, developments 
in loan servicing have automated all the functions except workout (which for all 
intents and purposes will remain appropriately manual). Even loan closings have 
become automated. The benefits of handling these functions manually must be 
weighed against the availability of subsidy to support them as well as the time it 
consumes. One thing is certain: the conventional sector has entered the low-
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income market, and it will return, taking full advantage of the financial benefits 
these tools provide. With a low cost of entry and unlimited funds, they will have 
much more flexibility with loan pricing than CDFIs. Can the relationship with 
the borrower be maintained in a world where automation governs origination as 
well as servicing? Of course. But the map must be drawn and best practices 
disseminated.  
• Investment policy. Investment policies in the private sector typically allow 
corporations to invest in highly rated (high-quality) commercial paper and 
bonds. Effectively, with their idle cash, corporations can lend to each other. 
Except for investment in guaranteed deposits, CDFIs cannot do this. On an 
aggregated basis, the CDFI sector has significant amounts of cash and 
investments on hand. This is a collective asset that has considerable power in the 
capital markets if it is aggregated in a market-compatible framework. However, 
many CDFIs restrict investment of idle cash to government and government-
guaranteed investments. This, for the most part, precludes them from investing 
in instruments that could promote the community development mission either 
locally or nationally. We have seen how aggregation of community development 
assets, including assets based on organizational risk, can be structured as high-
quality securities. Although it would be imprudent to open up policies to a full 
range of investments, allowing investment in top-quality commercial paper and 
bonds would allow CDFIs to invest in high-quality securities that fund their own 
mission on a broader basis, once they have access to the capital markets.  
 
These policy obstacles involve more than just a principled conflict over prudent 
management of a lending platform. Because of a range of specific technical 
developments like credit scoring, automated underwriting, portfolio management, and 
asset/liability management, traditional approaches no longer represent the most 
effective or the most efficient way to lend prudently to the low income constituency. 
Prudence in lending is not just about the quality of the loan and the success of the 
borrower, it is also about the value of that loan to the community, and sustainability of 
the lending platform itself. If a CDFI can make only one loan in a neighborhood that 
needs the CDFI to make ten loans, the value of that one loan is compromised by the 
inability of neighboring homes to get refinanced, rehabbed, or purchased. By the same 
token, a CDFI that makes excellent loans but cannot maintain a set of programs or staff 
with any consistency is a CDFI that can neither promote nor protect the less advantaged 
members of its community over time.  
 
294	  
The technical developments that have superseded the traditional approaches to 
managing a lending platform have been called into question by the recent crisis in the 
housing and credit markets. But to the extent these developments advanced the crises, it 
was because they were abused, as we showed in Chapter 8. Notwithstanding the abuse 
and the collapse, these technologies are here to stay in one form or another, and if CDFIs 
are to have wider impact in their communities and to keep the staff intact while making 
successful borrowers, then they will have to adapt. If they don’t then they will be giving 
advantage to conventional lenders and lenders who do not necessarily have the low-
income customer’s interest at heart. Each of these issues requires knowledge of technical 
details, which need to be learned. The Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC) have initiated programs that start up the learning curve with 
events such as “Orientation to the Capital Markets,” “Getting to Scale,” and the regular 
conferences on secondary markets. 
 
Convening the industry around these issues is a good way to start more widespread 
adoption of the new technologies. Alternatively, or in collaboration with the regulators, 
the next step would be for organizations such as Opportunity Finance Network, the 
National Federation of Community Development Credit Unions, the Corporation for 
Enterprise Development, and NeighborWorks America to inject these new disciplines 
(among them the disciplines that Douglas Winn recommends above) into their 
classrooms and conferences. Ultimately, though, it will be the leading CDFIs themselves 
who establish the best practices and leadership in getting beyond these policy 
obstacles—and they will need funding to assist them in the effort.  
 
Recommendation 1. Continue to convene leading CDFI groups, to teach advanced as 
well as basic strategies associated with investment policies, credit scoring, loan design 
and pricing, portfolio management, lending infrastructure, interest rate risk 
management and asset/liability management. Accelerate and fund the effort to establish 
which of these issues is a priority for the industry and in what order; and determine the 
optimal platform for informing the field and piloting the remedies.  
 
Financial	  Analysis	  
Again, the notion of evaluating organizational credit risk introduced in Chapter 2 
applies:   
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The essence of credit analysis, then, is to identify the decisions that management 
makes and assess the quality of the implementation of these decisions in the 
context of the organizational objectives and market conditions. The issue of 
repayment of obligations incurred is secondary to—and derivative of—the 
evaluation of these factors. Hence, the best form of credit analysis is a mirror of 
management intentions, decisions, and actions. 
 
Nancy Andrews, of the Low Income Investment Fund, offers one of the best examples of 
how the CDFI field can begin to establish a reporting and analytical framework that 
achieves this level of clarity. Because of its applicability, we quote it at some length: 
 
Now is the time, as well, to begin stress testing at the organizational level. How 
much of a revenue decrease can the organization withstand? What would 
happen if grant support declined by half? What happens if 10 percent of the 
organization’s portfolio is nonperforming? Liquidity, sufficient liquidity requires 
CDFIs to manage cash to ensure enough on hand to cover at least one year of 
upcoming liabilities. Although management textbooks say the ratio should be 
two to one, for CDFIs, one to one is a must. Keep 90 days of operating expenses 
in cash as well. ...  
 
Other best practices [include] full-cost accounting; “know when to hold ’em 
know when to fold ’em.” Full-cost accounting aligns the expenses attributable to 
an activity or program with the revenue the program generates. It requires 
properly allocating management and general costs (overhead). Full-cost 
accounting is the basis for understanding which activities cover their costs, 
which created surpluses, and which require discretionary resources. This allows 
management to make rational and deliberate decisions about which activities to 
expand and which to shrink. ...  
 
Scenario planning: create high-, medium-, and low-risk scenarios for each annual 
planning cycle. This can seem like make-work, but it is crucial. If nothing else, 
scenario planning forces planners to think about the assumptions beneath annual 
plans, and programs are stronger for it. Moreover, the financial aspect of scenario 
planning can reveal weakness and assumptions that alert management to issues 
they must tackle. Using worst-case scenarios in the present climate is also a 
cleansing experience; it coerces us past our natural denial and disbelief. In the 
end, worst-case planning can spark new ways of looking at an organization and 
point at creative solutions to existing problems. … Ongoing projections of fiscal 
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performance: a discipline often overlooked is preparing year-end projections 
with each financial statement. Similarly, multiyear scenarios (three to five years) 
should be refreshed annually as part of the planning cycle.86 
 
As we have discussed, the ability to evaluate organizational credit risk in the CDFI field 
remains intensive in terms of time, talent, and cost. Current financial data address only a 
portion of the risk, the capacity for predictive analysis is limited, and onsite reviews are 
a requisite. From the standpoint of those involved in the capital markets, the prospective 
volume of activity cannot justify the cost. The advent of regular reporting of 
standardized data can go a long way in rectifying this situation. However, the methods 
of analysis must also be improved. Organizational risk is first and foremost a function of 
operations as a going concern, not of assets in liquidation. Funders and investors, as well 
as management, must be able to track organizational performance through the financial 
indicators that highlight management decisions, and they need to track them over time.  
 
Together with the funders of the CDFI field, CDFIs should develop analytical 
methodologies that make the best use of the standardized data points being collected. A 
good example of how this can work for the CDFI industry is the Standard & Poor’s 
Small Business Portfolio Model, which was discussed in Chapter 5. Another example of 
developing analytical methodologies comes from the SBA, which developed 
benchmarks that enable the agency to make conclusions about the lending capacity of 
participating lenders. As Thomas Stanton reported in his analysis of the SBA in 1999 : 
 
OLO [Office of Lender Oversight] monitors lender performance with systems at its 
headquarters and also conducts reviews that involve visits to lenders. The office has 
retained the services of a contractor to provide a commercial off-the-shelf package to 
monitor the financial risk of individual SBA loans and to score lenders according to 
the credit quality of the SBA loans that they have originated. OLO ranks the lenders 
on a five-part scale according to the credit quality of their loans. Lenders in the top 
three tiers are overseen by the SBA’s Office of Financial Assistance, which is 
responsible for promoting SBA services and loan programs to lenders. Lenders in the 
bottom two tiers—about 10 percent of the total—are shifted to direct oversight by 
OLO. These lenders are subject to more intensive reviews. The two SBA offices are 
working together to try to grant additional discretion and expedited processing to 
the highest- performing lenders in the two top tiers.87  
 
What the SBA is doing here to assess the quality of lending, the rating agencies could do 
to assess the quality of CDFI organizational performance. As noted previously, the data 
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points and analytical framework associated with assessing organizational credit risk are 
significantly more complex than those associated with evaluating a specific class of loan 
assets. There are many more moving parts, of which the loan portfolio is only a one. In 
assessing CDFI organizational risk, evaluating assets, liabilities, and net assets is just the 
beginning. To move to the next level—nearer to rating agencies’ evaluation levels—the 
CDFI field must forge a wider acceptance of trend line analysis with an emphasis on 
gleaning what the cash flows reveal. 
 
Because CDFIs are smaller than the entities rating agencies typically rate and the capital 
markets typically fund, single events can cause wider swings in performance than the 
rating agencies are accustomed to. The loss of a grant or a single change in staff can 
produce a material event for many CDFIs, and, as a consequence, the financial analysis 
might show a highly volatile performance (a material event is often interpreted to mean 
a change of more than 10 percent in a line item). This would be a correct finding if, in 
fact, the event puts the CDFI at risk. But for many CDFIs, material events are routine 
and many such events could occur in a given year in a way that would not put the 
organization at risk. Automated stress tests and predictive analysis address this 
challenge. Once there is general agreement on the data points and analytical 
methodologies, automated programs for interpreting the data can be implemented. 
Again, these should be vetted with the rating agencies for compatibility. Yet once in 
place and actively used, the cost of CDFI assessment would drop, perhaps materially, to 
a level that is sustainable both for the rating agency and social investor. There is another 
benefit as well: compiling key data points as the effort matures improves the accuracy of 
the assessment as well as its value to the management on a comparative basis. 
 
The use of automated programs for stress testing and predicting organizational risk is 
not as difficult a proposition as it may seem. Again, as shown in Appendix C, one form 
of automated analysis—the Quad—can be used immediately for mission-driven 
depositories such as the community development credit unions and the banks. The big 
difference between what non-depository CDFIs have and what the banks and credit 
unions have is a standardized charts of accounts, regular reporting, and industrywide 
protocols for analyzing management decisions and organizational financial conditions. 
 
It should not be difficult for the groups to cooperate in establishing a standard analytical 
methodology. This methodology can be discussed with the rating agencies and adjusted 
as necessary to ensure compatibility. A number of CDFI lenders are already moving 
beyond the balance sheet in their evaluation of CDFIs:  CARS and NeighborWorks 
America, for example, are incorporating predictive measures into their reviews of CDFIs 
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and CDCs. Efforts such as “Strength Matters” are sharing evaluation criteria to arrive at 
the same capabilities. Although the Strength Matters initiative has targeted the real 
estate development lines of business in particular, the effort could be expanded to 
include mutually acceptable methodologies for all lines of business relevant to the 
community development field.  
 
It may be that the CDFI field finds that the largest CDFI banking partners could provide 
the best platform for furthering these efforts. Or it may be that the best platform is the 
CDFI Fund itself; perhaps, together with the federal credit agencies, the CDFI Fund 
could assemble sufficient data and funding resources to implement a compelling 
program for assessing the organizational credit risk of CDFIs. Clearly, though, whatever 
platform is used to establish analytical tools and protocols, it must be pursued in 
coordination with the consortium that is establishing the CDFI data bank and reporting 
protocols (see CDFI Industry Data above).  
 
Recommendation 1. Assemble best practices in historical and predictive cash flow and 
trend line analysis from the CDFI sector, similar to efforts initiated by the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency in 2009. Evaluate the systems that regulatory agencies use for 
small banks and credit unions. Evaluate the systems that federal credit agencies, such as 
the CDFI Fund, SBA, and USDA, employ. Determine the extent to which the major CDFI 
sector initiatives in the evaluation of organizational risk, like the Opportunity Finance 
Network’s CARS, the NeighborWorks America’s PROMPT, the CDFI Fund’s CIIS, and 
Strength Matters, can be aligned in a collaboration (i.e., the CARS collaboration) and be 
properly funded.  
 
Recommendation 2. Through the CARS collaboration, establish a formal dialogue with 
the rating agencies on items specific to the attributes of CDFI organizational credit risk. 
Raise funds to establish a pilot involving five to ten of the top CDFIs (as rated by CARS) 
and the aligned initiatives to provide the rating agencies with a credible and disciplined 
analytical platform. The funds would pay for the rating agency analytical support as 
well as management of the effort through the CARS collaboration. Develop a licensing 
arrangement for the use of the platform by the rating agencies.  
 
Recommendation 3. Develop the capacity to conduct automated stress testing, predictive 
analysis and interim analysis of CDFIs that can be used by the CARS collaboration to 




We began Chapter 1 with a quotation from Mark Willis’ article “It’s the Rating Stupid,” 
a thorough, if provocative, analysis of the challenges facing banks in continuing to serve 
CDFIs. Since the Community Reinvestment Act departments in banks have been among 
the most important partners for the CDFI field, Willis’ analysis should be mandatory 
reading for those who rely on bank support. The following quotation speaks directly to 
the key issue:  
 
While the development of new products and markets generally requires some 
up-front expenditures, ambiguity over whether a bank is expected to continue to 
provide a product or service that loses money or earns at a rate below the banks’ 
minimum threshold has hurt both the credibility of the CRA and drained 
resources from other areas that could benefit more from the CRA. Without the 
prospect of profit, banks are unlikely to make major investments to promote and 
produce a product on a sustained basis.88 
 
Banks have been among the largest financial partners for the CDFI field over the past 
two decades. In addition to working capital lines, warehousing lines, and term loans, 
they have provided a range of subsidies to CDFIs, including equity-equivalent 
investments, low-cost deposits, and grants. The Community Reinvestment Act 
encouraged community development, and in larger banks, the bulk of their relationships 
with CDFIs has been conducted by departments that specialize in CRA vehicles. Many 
of the relationships have been symbiotic; in communities with constituents that the 
banks served, CDFIs provided products and services that improved customer 
“bankability.” In return, the banks provided a range of subsidies. Although no one 
wished to look too closely at the value proposition for either the bank or the CDFI, there 
is one conclusion that could be made: both sides were comfortable with the arrangement 
and assented to keeping the relationship located on the CRA side of the bank. Hence, 
CDFIs have received the benefit of much-needed grant capital and other forms of 
support, but also, partly as a consequence, they have not received exposure to the 
corporate or institutional (wholesale) sides of the bank.  
 
These specialized bank relationships were already going through changes prior to the 
current housing and credit crises. Consolidation in the banking industry was reducing 
the number and/or seniority of the connections between CDFIs and bank staff. 
Innovations in packaging, securitizing, and distributing CRA assets made it easier for 
many banks to participate in CRA assets without having direct contact with the clients 
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or CDFIs that handled them. Many banks found ways to achieve a satisfactory rating 
without having to stretch their normal business activity—trading loans rather than 
originating them, for example—and many considered a “satisfactory” rating more than 
adequate for CRA purposes. These developments occurred alongside other, equally 
critical developments, which Willis also details in his article:  
 
Meanwhile, the large banks have continued to expand, and competition between 
them and nonbanks has intensified, leading to constant cost cutting and 
increased scrutiny of product-by-product profitability. CRA programs in these 
large banks have likewise grown, especially in response to the new focus on 
volume. As a result, specialized production units have become increasingly 
visible internally and thus subject to new costs and constraints. These units are 
now more likely to have to fully bear the time and expense of the standard array 
of bank audit, compliance, credit, and budget processes. CRA products in 
general are more likely to be vetted based on the same profitability thresholds as 
elsewhere in the banks, and staffing levels for CRA activities are regularly 
reviewed with a focus on non-income-driving positions. Justification for those 
CRA activities that do not generate sufficient profits, or any profits at all, now 
requires a clear showing of their contribution to the bank’s CRA rating separate 
from whether they are making a difference in the community. …  
 
On the downside, the more that mainstream units have built their business 
around high-volume products, the more difficult it is to develop products or 
services expressly for the LMI [low and moderate income] marketplace. This 
reliance on mainstream business units has also complicated banks’ internal 
management of their CRA programs. Now the CRA officer must negotiate goals 
with each of their bank’s mainstream business units. Not surprisingly, the 
managers of these units resist anything that impairs profitability or undermines 
their business strategies. …  
 
Business unit managers are reluctant to develop what they perceive to be 
unprofitable local or niche products. Even with community development real 
estate loans, where each loan is separately evaluated and underwritten, 
obtaining approval for unorthodox loans often depends on experienced credit 
officers who understand, for example, how government involvement can help to 
mitigate risk. As the number of credit officers with this special expertise has 
fallen, the process of justifying the credit quality of these loans has become 
continuous and unrelenting, despite a proven track record of high credit quality. 
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As a result, loan officers migrate away from complicated, one-off deals that often 
do the most to expand access to credit.89 
 
This excellent summary of the pressures facing CRA bankers within their own banks, 
suggests that while the below market rate loans and other forms of subsidy are likely to 
diminish, the ability to get the advantage of other market-rate products in the bank will 
not increase. The cost of the CRA business and the CDFI’s association with it becomes an 
obstacle. Although this development strongly favors the conclusion that the CDFI sector 
can expect a diminution of support—particularly in the form of grants—over the coming 
years, many CDFIs have continued to rely on the bank CRA divisions, and to resist the 
notion of changing the relationship.  
 
The current crisis may well accelerate the diminution of bank support, just at a time 
when CDFIs and their constituencies need bank relationships the most. Although it is 
possible that CDFIs will come out of the crisis with an expanded CRA and a wider range 
of institutions that are encouraged to participate, a strategy for liquidity and 
capitalization based on this assumption is not particularly prudent. 
 
Perhaps the biggest breakthrough of the FIR team was the recognition that it was 
possible to break out of the old-fashioned relationship with the bank, with its 
corresponding overlay of charity, simplicity, restraint, and subsidy. With the 
Commercial Paper Co-op, the team could see the inner workings of a bank via the 
window of risk-based capital. The team could see how to gain access to the wholesale 
side of the bank, and craft an arrangement that was a clear win for both sides. One of the 
seminal attributes of this success was that the team was liberating the participating 
CDFIs from the traditional bank relationship and moving them into the mainstream of a 
bank’s normal business. Out the door went the place-based, inflexible, higher-cost, and 
ultimately, parochial relationship. Yes, there was no subsidy. Yet look what was to be 
gained! 
 
CDFIs, generally, are not in a position to walk away from the traditional relationship 
developed in the context of CRA. There have been too many successes, and subsidy is 
necessary. However, it is also important to recognize that by confining themselves to the 
charitable side of the bank, CDFIs are limiting their growth—and their relationship with 
the bank and its wider financing capabilities.  
 
The need for a new relationship with banks, one that is on the same footing as for-profits 
of equal credit quality, is not just a matter of having access to better funding choices. As 
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we go through the current crisis, we are encountering weakness in a range of 
community development asset classes. Most of these assets are funded, at least in part, 
by banks. The banks are acutely aware of the potential for impairment, and regardless of 
how they feel about their civic responsibilities, charity ends when the prospects of  
excessive cost or asset impairment are realized. The reason for this goes beyond the 
traditional relationship with the CDFI. The dialogue is between the bank and the 
regulator, and the owner of the asset or the mission for which it was intended is no 
longer relevant when impairment or loss becomes imminent. Because of the traditional 
relationship, and also because there have been virtually no economic crises since 1991 
which have tested it, the CDFI field has limited knowledge of how the banks currently 
think, what they need, and the best steps to take to preserve value. Indeed, there are 
quite a number of steps that CDFIs can take to ameliorate difficult situations. As with 
the need to improve funding choices, developing a new and more comprehensive 
relationship with banks in terms of preserving assets—outside of the context of CRA—is 
an imperative.  
 
Recommendation 1. The CDFI field should work with the regulatory agencies and key 
banks to establish an understanding of the wholesale sides of the banks and what 
opportunities exist there.  
 
Recommendation 2. The CDFI field should work with the regulatory agencies and key 
banks to develop a mechanism for identification of assets that are headed for trouble, 
and best practices in collaborative remediation. 
 
Recommendation 3. Once the markets stabilize, the CDFI field should approach several 
key banks and determine the circumstances under which they will, with external grant 
support, establish a conduit for the issuance of commercial paper against unsecured 
obligations of a limited number of CARS-rated, top-quality CDFIs.  
  
Capital	  Market	  Vehicles	  
Following a 2006 conference of community development leaders that the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors convened, Ellen Seidman summarized that: 
 
Conference participants reached four major recommendations about how better 
to match CDFIs and investors: 
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• Establish some sort of dynamic information exchange. ... 
• Improve the financial capacity of the most capital-markets-ready CDFIs. ... 
• Find the successor to the equity-equivalent investment [alternative forms 
of grants or equity] ... 
• Consider development of mechanisms, such as some sort of insurance or 
wrap product or an industrywide interest-swap mechanism, that would 
make the CDFI–investor relationship more like that of other sellers in to 
the capital markets. ...90 
 
Four years later, the capital markets are in disarray. New efforts involving such elements 
as special-purpose vehicles and securities based on the organizational credit risk of 
CDFIs, are unlikely to be accommodated. Nevertheless, the markets will come back, and 
although the benchmarks are likely to be more prudent for a time, the essential 
framework, the vehicles, and most of the mechanisms will return with them.  
 
The CDFI field should continue to identify and review the various mechanisms (such as 
credit scoring, letters of credit) and vehicles (such as special-purpose vehicles and 
bonds) that may be available to help CDFIs receive the funding they need to grow and 
compete. CDFIs should continue to track interest rates on various forms of long- and 
short-term securities. The CDFI field should engage with the banks and the regulatory 
agencies on the subject of capital requirements; ultimately, CDFIs will arrive at funding 
parity because the banks can achieve a better return on capital by assisting them in getting to the 
capital markets.  
 
But to gain access to the capital markets, the most important steps that CDFIs must take 
are both unilateral and achievable. They must first put their reporting and analytical 
protocols in line with the rating agencies, as outlined above. And then they must 
address the issue of size: how do they collaborate with one another to aggregate risk and 
generally maximize economies of scale. If CDFIs cannot master the challenge of size, 
they cannot get to any of the next steps. 
 
Whether it’s the bank, the rating agency, the law firm, or the conduit, the amount of debt 
being placed must cover costs. Although some CDFIs have the capacity to generate 
loans or other assets that can be bundled at the requisite scale for securitization, no CDFI 
at present has organizational needs of that size. As a result, it is essential for the CDFI 
industry to support a cooperative or other form of partnership that achieves the scale 
necessary to satisfy the economics of securitization.  
 
Recommendation 1. Identify five or six high-quality CDFIs with well-defined short- and 
medium-term organizational financing needs for the purposes of forming a partnership. 
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Establish a collective portfolio, together with the diversification, credit support, and 
liquidity support that presents a volume and risk profile superior to conventional 
alternatives. This kind of structure, as envisioned with the Commercial Paper Co-op, can 
be the platform that demonstrates the superior performance of the CDFI business model 
in the context of its mission, and sets the stage for wider access of the community 
development field to low-cost funding in virtually unlimited supply.  
 
Preparing	  for	  the	  Inevitable	  
 
In December 2008, two months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the coinciding 
collapse of the markets, Business Week’s cover article was about former subprime lenders 
taking over the new FHA lending programs. In February 2009, four months after the 
collapse of the markets, Business Week ran a feature article on former subprime lenders 
taking over the appraisal-delivery system. The notion, so popular at the time, that low-
income constituencies caused the housing crisis did not seem much of a deterrent. Since 
then, debt-counseling entities have emerged, some of which charge fees well before the 
service is completed or even provided. Profit-generating enterprises have built 
businesses around foreclosure counseling. For the CDFI field, it is almost immaterial 
whether these enterprises gain a district attorney’s attention or not. It is clear that during 
the housing boom, a range of private-sector interests discovered that they could make a 
lot of money by gaming low-income families. It is safe to conclude that, still now, 
competitors who do not share the CDFIs’ mission are digging further into the CDFI low-
income constituencies—carving out room for themselves in hopes of a bigger harvest 
when the markets return.  
 
It is also clear that, if history is any indication, the trading function described in Chapter 
1 will continue to dominate the lending function, whether there is “skin in the game” or 
not. This means that these new competitors will be deploying tools that the CDFI field 
has only begun to comprehend. This scenario differs dramatically from the conditions 
under which the Community Reinvestment Act was signed into law. It is no longer an 
issue of too little money providing opportunity for low-income constituencies, but 
rather of too much money creating opportunity for those who do not have the interests 
of the community at heart. What was once a quantity problem is now a quality problem. 
What we have discovered is that building a community is not just about providing 
credit, it is also about protecting the community and preserving the good work that’s 
been done.  
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As they emerge from the housing and credit crises, CDFIs will face choices in how they 
will meet the challenges. To defend the objectives of community development means 
that, for CDFIs, using the tools that the competitors use to advantage will become a 






Commercial	  Paper	  	  
	  
	  
What	  is	  Commercial	  Paper	  and	  why	  would	  CDFIs	  want	  to	  use	  it?	  
	  
Commercial	  paper	  is	  a	  short-­‐term	  unsecured	  promissory	  note	  issued	  by	  a	  corporate	  or	  institutional	  
borrower	  either	  directly	  or	  through	  a	  dealer	  to	  the	  investing	  public.	  The	  funds	  are	  used	  to	  finance,	  among	  
other	  things,	  working	  capital	  needs	  (inventory	  and	  receivables),	  short	  term	  assets	  like	  loans	  held	  for	  
resale,	  and	  construction	  loans.	  The	  paper	  is	  mostly	  governed	  by	  Section	  3(a)(3)	  of	  the	  1933	  Act	  which	  
enables	  them	  to	  be	  exempt	  from	  SEC	  registration	  due	  to	  several	  distinctive	  characteristics.	  The	  key	  
distinctions	  are:	  	  	  
	  
• The	  paper	  cannot	  mature	  later	  than	  270	  days.	  Issuers	  tend	  to	  borrow	  for	  30	  days,	  thereby	  
achieving	  the	  lowest	  rates	  in	  most	  conditions.	  They	  also	  tend	  to	  roll	  the	  notes	  over	  at	  
maturity.	  	  
• The	  denominations	  are	  generally	  large,	  $100k	  or	  more,	  with	  typical	  face	  amounts	  in	  the	  
$1million	  range.	  	  
• Proceeds	  of	  the	  issue	  must	  be	  invested	  in	  current	  transactions.	  Current	  transactions	  include	  
operating	  expenses	  as	  well	  as	  short-­‐term	  assets.	  Current	  transactions	  can	  also	  include	  
longer-­‐term	  assets	  as	  long	  as	  it	  can	  be	  determined	  that	  they	  are	  liquid,	  for	  example,	  	  
mortgages	  held	  for	  resale.	  	  
	  
A	  range	  of	  business	  entities	  use	  commercial	  paper,	  including	  corporations,	  bank	  holding	  companies,	  
finance	  companies,	  and	  governmental	  bodies.	  There	  is	  no	  SEC	  registration	  required,	  and	  issuers	  find	  the	  
process	  both	  inexpensive	  and	  flexible.	  It	  is	  a	  proven	  way	  to	  raise	  large	  quantities	  of	  money	  quickly.	  	  
	  
Commercial	  paper	  is	  generally	  cheaper	  than	  bank	  debt,	  except	  when	  the	  capital	  markets	  are	  in	  disarray	  
(although	  as	  we	  discuss	  further	  below,	  that	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  the	  current	  crisis).	  The	  commercial	  paper	  
rate	  tends	  to	  track	  Fed	  Funds	  and	  is	  has	  generally	  been	  about	  10	  basis	  points	  under	  LIBOR	  –	  the	  cost	  at	  
which	  banks	  lend	  to	  each	  other.	  Along	  with	  the	  flexibility,	  this	  low	  cost	  has	  made	  the	  commercial	  paper	  
market	  the	  vehicle	  of	  choice	  for	  borrowers	  who	  can	  gain	  access	  to	  it.	  	  
	  
The	  rates	  are	  attractive	  to	  investors	  as	  well.	  Even	  though	  lower	  than	  Eurodollar	  deposits	  and	  domestic	  
CDs,	  the	  flexibility,	  the	  minimum	  size	  of	  the	  draw	  (minimum	  $100k),	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  regulatory	  costs	  
make	  up	  the	  difference.	  Mutual	  Funds	  are	  major	  investors	  in	  commercial	  paper.	  	  
	  
Investors	  require	  commercial	  paper	  to	  have	  a	  rating	  and	  most	  issuers	  seek	  to	  have	  a	  top	  rating	  –	  e.g.,	  A-­‐
1/P-­‐1.	  However,	  a	  corporation	  or	  institution	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  large	  and	  highly	  rated	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  
access.	  Many	  smaller	  entities	  of	  lesser	  credit	  quality	  –	  indeed,	  unrated	  entities	  –	  can	  gain	  access	  under	  
certain	  terms	  and	  conditions.	  	  
	  
To	  build	  a	  credit	  profile	  that	  enables	  access	  to	  the	  commercial	  paper	  market,	  smaller	  entities	  will	  arrange	  
to	  issue	  through	  some	  form	  of	  conduit	  to	  the	  commercial	  paper	  market.	  There	  are	  over	  300	  major	  
conduits,	  many	  owned	  and/or	  managed	  by	  banks.	  In	  order	  to	  get	  a	  place	  with	  one	  of	  the	  conduits,	  the	  
borrowing	  entity	  must	  arrange:	  (l)	  a	  credit	  enhancement	  of	  some	  sort	  that	  improves	  the	  likelihood	  of	  full	  
repayment	  of	  the	  notes;	  and	  (2)	  a	  liquidity	  facility	  that	  guarantees	  investors	  of	  immediate	  repayment	  at	  
 N: G
e  IdaCImh   snc Imr C  ttm r aPuC   Iv  tCf dC CIm i  CtCIm iPa   ce  tt i  6  s   cPe  ICe  c6  tcP r aPuC   Iv 
 a  CI  s v s   e  s I6 iPa   cPe  1 v I t a	    a i  h

 v  a cdtI Pi Iv c   IIa  ICPs c Cc Iv I  Pe e  a C t r  r  a v c    Pe     e  oPa cPda   Pi ids  Cs 	    Cs  Iv 
e  an Ir t   h  v  e  an I e   cda c Cs Iv  IaCttCPs c   6 ds ICt 7: : Q6 i a  B       Iv   Pe e  a C t  s  
 Pda  g     a t   c au   P a  Pi  Pu as Pach  A
   P s    I   I ICcIC cg   t  c c  s   	 CcIPaC  t   I h

Cs  dcIaC t tP s c Ps  Iv   PPnc Pi Iv    snc  c Iv   v aI cvP1 ch  PI  tm6 Iv   v aI cvP1 c  e  I aC t  aPr 
Pi i Cs   Pe e  a C t r  r  a Cs  Iv  7: : QT7: : G m  ac 8 s   tCn tm   i 1  m  ac IP  Pe  lh  v a  Cc   a  cPs g Iv 
 vC i aCcn Cs  Iv   Pe e  a C t r  r  a e an I Cc Iv I Cs u cIPac 	    I  Ps   as      PdI Iv    CtCIm IP 	    I a r  C 
 s   cIPr  Cs u cICs 	   h  v  a cdtI Cc Iv I  PaaP1  ac   s 3I a iCs  s    1 v s  Iv Ca r  r  a e  Ida c  I Iv   s   Pi
IvCaIm6 cCBIm Pa sCs  Im   mch  vCc v c P  daa   c u a t ICe  c Cs  Iv  t cI IvCaIm m  ac-­‐    s s    s Ia t Cs  0Ow: 6
Iv  a   ccCPs  Pi 0OO06  s    Ps 	      ae    r CI t   s 	    e  s I Cs  0OOGh  v  Ce r   I Pi u aCPdc  a  CI  aCc c
Pu a Iv  r  cI 7:  m  ac   s     c  s  Cs  Iv   v aI   tP1 h
 N: O
Pda  g     a t   c au   P a  Pi  Pu as Pac

 c   a cdtI Pi Iv c   Pe e  a C t r  r  a e  an I  Ptt r c c6 e PcI Cccd ac  tcP s  	   PIC I    tCs   Pi  a  CIPr ICPs 
 c r  aI Pi Iv Ca  Pe e  a C t r  r  a  a  CI  s v s   e  s I Pa tCf dC CIm i  CtCIC ch  vCc tCs   Pi  a  CI6 r a    Pii Pi
 aCe  6  
   6 Pa      ds  c6  cda c Iv e  Iv I Iv m   s   Ps ICs d  IP  PaaP1  iPa cvPa  I ae  s    c  u s  Ci
Iv   Pe e  a C t r  r  a e  an I  Cc r r   ac  s ICa tmh  P    cda 6 Iv   PcI Cc vC	   v a6  dI vC	   v a  PcI Cc s Pae  t
1 v s  Iv a  Cc   e  an I  CctP  ICPs h  v s  Iv   aCcCc vCI Iv       e  an I Cs  7: : Q6   snc Iv I r aPuC    Iv 
tCf dC CIm  s    a  CI cdr r PaI  s     dr  v uCs 	    IP I n  Iv   cc Ic Iv I v      s  ids        n Ps IP Iv Ca
  t s    cv  Ich 	  s    1 vCt  Iv   e Pds I   Cs 	    ids      m  Pe e  a C t r  r  a    tCs    r a  Cr CIPdctm6 Iv 
 e Pds I Iv I   s nc 1  a  ids  Cs 	    iPa C tm Cs a  c  h  Cs     s  Cs   I ae Cs I  e Pds I Pi Iv   cc Ic Iv I Iv 
  s nc v   IP I n     n 1  a  IPBC 6 Iv    s nc 1  a  i     1 CIv  PIv Iv  s     IP a Cc    r CI t iPa  l    C	   	    a
  t s    cv  I  s    l    C	   	    a 1 aCI T P1 s  Pi  cc Ich

  iPa  1   e Pu  Ps 6 IvPd	   v6 Iv a  Cc Ps    s Pe  tm Cs Iv   v aI  Pu Iv I e dcI 1   cvPdt  I n  s PI  Pig
1 vm Cc CI Iv I  Pe e  a C t r  r  a  Pe  c IP  PcI cP e d v t cc Iv s   
     Cs  Iv  e  an I  Ptt r c  Pi 7: : GR
 vPdt s 3I    Iv  PIv a 1  m  aPds  R    1 Ctt  Pe      n IP IvCc Cs    e Pe  s Ih

 v  u td  Pi Iv   Pe e  a C t r  r  a Cs cIade  s I IP  PaaP1  ac  s   Iv   ii  I Pi Iv   a  CI  aCcCc   s     c  s 
Cs  Iv   v aI   tP1 h  v   v aI cvP1 c Iv  a t ICPs cvCr   e Ps 	     Pe e  a C t r  r  a6  
     s   0:  m  a   
Ia  cdaC ch  
     Cc Iv   PcI  I 1 vC v   snc t s   IP    v PIv a  c au c  c Iv  Cs   B iPa e PcI   s n
t s  Cs 	   h   v   Cii a s      I1   s  Iv  a I c Ps  Iv  cvPaI I ae  Cs cIade  s Ic 8 Pe e  a C t r  r  a  s    
    l
 s   Iv  tPs 	    I ae  Cs cIade  s I6 Iv  I s  m  a     a  cdam6 iPa e d v Pi Iv  r  aCP 6   e Ps cIa I c Iv  a  cPs
 N0: 
Iv I e  sm Ci s PI e PcI  Par Pa ICPs c  s   Cs cICIdICPs c ids   tPs 	    I ae   cc Ic Cs  Iv   Pe e  a C t r  r  a
e  an Ih  tcP s PI  t  Cs  IvCc  v aIg 1     s  c   Iv I  Pe e  a C t r  r  a a I c  a  ctC	   vItm   tP1   
     8Iv 
 Ps  Ps  
 s I a  sn  PaaP1 Cs 	      I l iPa e PcI Pi Iv  I1        c6 1 CIv   cC	   s CiC  s I  Cu a	    s    Cs  7: : G6  d 
IP Iv  tPcc Pi  Ps iC  s    Cs    snc 	    s  a ttm6  s   Iv   
     Cs   B CIc tih 7: : G e  m    Iv  Ps tm ICe   Cs  Iv 
t cI b:  m  ac 1 v s   Pe e  a C t r  r  a   Id ttm r  aiPae      II a Iv s   
      daCs 	       aCcCc Cs  Iv   e  an Ich 
	  a   	    Cs  1   c   Iv   s Pe  tm 1   s PI     Pu g iPa Ps     daCs 	      e  an I  aCcCc6 Iv   Pe e  a C t r  r  a
a I  Cc tP1  a 8 a e  IC  ttml Iv s   
    h  v a   a  I1 P a  cPs cg

0h 
 s I au s ICPs  Pi Iv  	   Pu as e  s I Cs IP Iv   Pe e  a C t r  r  a e  an I Cs    IP  a 7: :G6 IP r a u s I  
 Ptt r c M
7h   I aCPa ICPs  Pi   s n iCs  s  C t  Ps  CICPs  8 PIv a  t  s   r  a  Cu  l  d  IP Iv   ccde r ICPs  Pi
IPBC   cc Ic    n Ps IP Iv Ca   t s    cv  Ic-­‐   s   Iv   Ps c f d s I  aPcCPs  Pi  Ps iC  s    Cs  Iv 
   da  m Pi Iv   
     Cs   B  c  s  Cs  C  IPa Pi Iv  Iad   PcI Pi Cs I a  sn ids  Cs 	  
 
 v  i  I Iv I Iv  a I c Cs  Iv   Pe e  a C t r  r  a e  an I a e  Cs    II a Iv s   
    6 vP1  u a6 e  cnc   n m
i  IPag Iv  uCaId t IPI t   c s    Pi  cc I    n    Pe e  a C t   r  ah      Cccd s    aPc  iaPe    PdI D0Q
 CttCPs  Cs 7: : 0 IP   PdI DOQ7  CttCPs  Cs    iPa  CI i tth  v Iv a CI 1 Ctt e  n     Pe     n Pa s PI   r  s  c Ps 
Iv    ICPs c Pi Iv  a 	   dt IPac  s   Iv  Csu cICs 	    r d tC h  C	   vI s P1 6  c Iv  iPttP1 Cs 	     v aI   c   Ps  iPa   cIc




NeighborWorks	  Capital	  Exchange	  (NWACX)	  
	  
	  
The	  NWACX,	  proposed	  internally	  at	  NeighborWorks	  America	  (NWA)	  in	  2007,	  was	  designed	  to	  expand	  the	  
types	  of	  loans	  and	  the	  range	  of	  risk	  that	  could	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  secondary	  market	  platform.	  The	  concept	  
originally	  surfaced	  in	  discussions	  with	  Neighborhood	  Housing	  Services	  of	  America	  (NHSA)	  over	  the	  issue	  of	  
how	  to	  help	  NWA’s	  230	  chartered	  Community	  Development	  Corporations	  (NWOs)	  make	  better	  use	  of	  all	  
of	  the	  below	  market	  rate	  loans	  in	  their	  portfolios.	  NHSA,	  the	  secondary	  market	  for	  the	  NWA	  Network,	  had	  
begun	  work	  on	  a	  “loan	  pool”	  concept	  that	  advanced	  money	  to	  NWOs	  who	  had	  portfolios	  of	  below	  market	  
rate	  mortgages	  that	  couldn’t	  be	  sold	  without	  a	  substantial	  discount.	  Each	  loan	  to	  a	  member	  NWO	  would	  
be	  matched	  to	  the	  specific	  repayment	  schedule	  on	  the	  below	  market	  rate	  and	  would	  be	  secured	  by	  the	  
loan	  and	  a	  10	  percent	  pledge	  of	  cash	  or	  additional	  assets.	  In	  theory,	  the	  loans	  could	  be	  for	  as	  long	  as	  30	  
years.	  	  The	  rate	  was	  approximately	  6	  percent.	  The	  problem	  was:	  what	  sort	  of	  investor	  would	  invest	  in	  
these	  pools?	  	  The	  NWACX	  provided	  the	  answer:	  the	  230	  NWOs	  of	  the	  NWA	  Network	  would	  invest	  in	  
themselves.	  The	  concept	  was	  a	  true	  capital	  exchange:	  member	  NWOs	  would	  deposit	  surplus	  funds	  into	  a	  
credit	  enhanced	  account,	  and	  the	  credit	  enhanced	  account	  would	  raise	  money	  that	  would	  be	  used	  to	  fund	  
long	  term	  low	  rate	  loans	  to	  NWOs,	  secured	  by	  below	  market	  rate	  single	  family	  mortgages.	  	  
	  
There	  was	  some	  history	  in	  this	  concept.	  First	  there	  was	  the	  Mini-­‐Fed,	  which	  was	  developed	  by	  the	  
Financial	  Innovations	  Roundtable	  between	  2001	  and	  2003	  (Chapter	  Three).	  The	  Mini-­‐Fed	  used	  surplus	  
cash	  in	  the	  CDFI	  system	  to	  fund	  the	  borrowing	  needs	  –	  especially	  long	  term	  borrowing	  needs	  –	  of	  	  CDFIs.	  	  
In	  2005,	  the	  National	  Federation	  of	  Community	  Development	  Credit	  Unions	  (“Federation”),	  together	  with	  
the	  Credit	  Union	  National	  Association	  (“CUNA”),	  came	  out	  with	  a	  concept	  of	  a	  mutual	  fund	  that	  took	  
surplus	  cash	  from	  credit	  unions	  and	  invested	  it	  in	  a	  pool	  of	  90	  percent	  single-­‐family	  mortgage	  
participations.	  This	  was	  a	  particularly	  brilliant	  concept	  –	  arguably	  the	  best	  that’s	  come	  forward	  in	  the	  
community	  development	  field	  relative	  to	  secondary	  markets.	  The	  original	  Mini-­‐Fed	  was	  attempting	  to	  go	  
down	  the	  same	  path	  –	  but	  the	  reasons	  the	  concept	  could	  work	  better	  for	  the	  credit	  unions	  was	  that	  a)	  
they	  were	  regulated	  entities	  with	  standardized	  analytical	  and	  financial	  reporting	  requirements;	  and	  b)	  
their	  assets	  as	  well	  as	  their	  liabilities	  tended	  to	  be	  of	  a	  shorter	  term	  nature.	  Because	  the	  NeighborWorks	  
network	  provides	  the	  closest	  thing	  in	  the	  CDFI	  world	  to	  the	  “closed	  system”	  of	  the	  credit	  unions,	  the	  
NWACX	  drew	  heavily	  on	  the	  Federation/CUNA	  model:	  	  
	  
• NWA	  creates	  a	  mutual	  fund	  with	  capital	  and	  operating	  grants	  
• Chartered	  NWOs	  and	  NeighborWorks	  affiliates	  invest	  funds	  in	  the	  mutual	  fund,	  which	  is	  
highly	  rated;	  
• Chartered	  NWOs	  originate	  and	  service	  non-­‐conforming	  mortgages,	  which	  they	  sell	  to	  the	  
mutual	  fund;	  
• NWA	  performs	  organizational	  and	  business	  line	  assessment	  of	  each	  chartered	  NWO	  under	  
its	  comprehensive	  standardized	  (“Prompt”)	  format,	  reinforcing	  as	  well	  as	  monitoring	  the	  
quality	  of	  the	  portfolio;	  	  
• NWA	  deploys	  its	  grant-­‐making	  capacity	  to	  assist	  both	  the	  borrowing	  NWOs	  and	  the	  mutual	  
fund	  in	  the	  event	  of	  higher	  than	  anticipated	  losses;	  	  
• Everyone	  knows	  everyone	  pretty	  well	  –	  thereby	  taking	  the	  perception	  of	  risk	  and	  
consequent	  cost	  of	  the	  risk	  premium	  out	  of	  the	  transaction.	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One	  of	  the	  chief	  benefits	  of	  this	  structure	  was	  that	  nonprofit	  entities	  that	  would	  not,	  under	  any	  other	  
circumstances,	  qualify	  for	  long-­‐term	  debt,	  could	  get	  access	  to	  low	  capital	  rate	  funding.	  The	  NWOs	  
targeted	  by	  NWACX	  were	  strong,	  but	  many	  were	  in	  the	  $1-­‐5mm	  a	  total	  asset	  range.	  Hence,	  while	  a	  
Commercial	  Paper	  Co-­‐op	  would	  target	  the	  high	  end	  of	  the	  CDFI	  field,	  NWACX	  would	  be	  prepared	  to	  fund	  –	  
and	  thereby	  demonstrate	  the	  capacity	  of	  –	  the	  low	  end.	  	  
	  
Ultimately,	  the	  proposal	  was	  not	  pursued	  due	  to	  adverse	  developments	  in	  the	  marketplace	  and	  the	  
allocation	  of	  funding	  to	  items	  that	  were	  of	  a	  more	  immediate	  and	  critical	  nature	  –	  e.g.,	  foreclosure,	  and	  
loss	  mitigation.	  Nevertheless,	  until	  such	  time	  as	  the	  CDFI	  field	  has	  working	  relations	  with	  the	  rating	  
agencies,	  the	  capital	  markets	  and	  the	  wholesale	  sides	  of	  their	  banks,	  the	  structure	  is	  both	  relevant	  and	  
attractive.	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  is	  worth	  walking	  through	  an	  example	  of	  how	  a	  form	  of	  Mini-­‐Fed	  could	  work	  




The	  purpose	  of	  the	  NWACX	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  range	  of	  liquidity	  instruments	  for	  borrowing	  and	  investing	  that	  
are	  common	  in	  the	  institutional	  field,	  but	  not	  presently	  available	  to	  NWOS.	  	  
	  
1. Summary	  of	  the	  Proposal	  
	  
The	  NWACX	  is	  a	  true	  capital	  exchange	  in	  which	  affiliates	  and	  member	  NWOs	  deposit	  surplus	  funds	  into	  a	  
credit	  enhanced	  mutual	  fund	  at	  market	  rates.	  Proceeds	  from	  the	  mutual	  fund	  are	  used,	  in	  part,	  to	  fund	  
the	  short,	  medium	  and	  long	  term	  funding	  needs	  of	  NWOs	  on	  both	  a	  secured	  and	  unsecured	  basis.	  	  
	  
2. Summary	  of	  the	  Benefits	  
	  
• NWOs	  can	  invest	  in	  high	  quality	  instruments	  at	  market	  rates	  that	  are	  used	  exclusively	  to	  
fund	  the	  NWA	  Network	  mission	  
• Short,	  medium	  term	  and	  long	  term	  loans	  are	  provided	  at	  a	  substantial	  reduction	  to	  the	  
interest	  rates	  they	  would	  be	  able	  to	  get	  from	  conventional	  lenders	  and	  investors.	  	  
• NWOs	  can	  benefit	  from	  the	  transfer	  of	  servicing	  of	  their	  pledged	  assets	  to	  NHSA,	  an	  affiliate	  
of	  NWA.	  	  
• NWOs	  have	  a	  governing	  role	  relative	  to	  setting	  rates	  and	  mission	  targets.	  As	  a	  result,	  NWOs	  
can	  determine	  the	  balance	  of	  risk	  and	  return	  in	  the	  portfolio,	  and	  adjust	  investment	  rates,	  
lending	  rates,	  portfolio	  mix	  and	  risk	  parameters	  in	  accordance	  with	  market	  conditions.	  	  
	  
3. Potential	  Participants	  
	  
All	  NWOs	  and	  NWA	  affiliates	  are	  eligible	  to	  make	  deposits.	  All	  NWOs	  that	  are	  rated	  “exemplary”	  or	  




The	  three	  types	  of	  loans	  that	  will	  be	  made	  to	  exemplary	  or	  strong	  NWOS	  are:	  
	  
• Unsecured	  short	  term	  advances	  of	  up	  to	  270	  days	  in	  amounts	  not	  to	  exceed	  $250,000.	  The	  loans	  
may	  be	  used	  for	  general	  purposes.	  
• Credit	  lines	  of	  up	  to	  3	  years	  secured	  by	  first	  and	  second	  mortgages	  in	  amounts	  not	  to	  exceed	  
$500,000.	  The	  loans	  may	  be	  used	  for	  warehousing	  and	  development	  purposes.	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• Long	  term	  loans	  secured	  by	  below	  market	  rate	  single	  family	  first	  and	  second	  mortgages.	  In	  




NWA	  and	  NHSA	  establish	  a	  bankruptcy	  remote	  LLC	  which	  issues	  the	  mutual	  fund	  equivalent	  of	  
“certificates	  of	  deposit”	  for	  short	  as	  well	  as	  extended	  maturities	  based	  on	  the	  rates	  of	  major	  money	  
center	  banks.	  NWA	  and	  NHSA	  arrange	  a	  100	  percent	  letter	  of	  credit	  for	  up	  to	  $75mm	  from	  a	  syndicate	  of	  
banks,	  which	  provide	  “AAA”	  liquidity	  support	  to	  the	  certificates	  issued	  by	  the	  LLC.	  Total	  Assets	  for	  the	  
NWACX	  are	  not	  to	  exceed	  $75mm.	  The	  credit	  enhancement	  will	  be	  provided	  by	  NWA	  in	  the	  form	  of	  grants	  
and	  will	  not	  be	  less	  than	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  assets.	  Actual	  loans	  to	  NWOs	  will	  not	  exceed	  $60mm.	  The	  




NHSA	  has,	  at	  present	  over	  $60mm	  in	  cash	  on	  its	  balance	  sheet,	  of	  which	  over	  $35mm	  is	  contractual	  and	  
invested	  in	  long	  term	  AAA	  instruments.	  Although	  there	  aren’t	  specific	  figures,	  NWOs	  in	  the	  NWA	  network	  
have	  over	  $400mm	  in	  assets	  of	  which	  anywhere	  from	  10	  percent	  to	  30	  percent	  may	  be	  in	  cash	  and	  
investments,	  restricted	  and	  otherwise,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  between	  $40	  and	  $120mm.	  NHSA,	  the	  NWOs	  and	  
other	  social	  investors	  with	  investments	  in	  CDs	  and	  Treasuries	  can	  replace	  them	  with	  these	  certificates	  as	  
they	  mature.	  The	  deposits	  that	  these	  entities	  can	  make	  in	  NWACX	  will	  approximate	  market	  rates	  for	  high	  
quality	  commercial	  paper	  of	  equivalent	  maturities.	  	  
	  
The	  deposits	  will	  be	  augmented	  by	  up	  to	  $50mm	  in	  low	  cost	  bank	  and	  institutional	  debt,	  as	  needed.	  The	  
NWACX	  will	  access	  short	  term	  bank	  debt	  at	  a	  low	  spread	  over	  cost.	  The	  long	  term	  debt	  will	  be	  at	  the	  cost	  
of	  funds	  plus	  a	  minor	  spread	  and	  will	  be	  drawn	  down	  in	  	  over	  a	  period	  of	  5	  to	  7	  years.	  The	  rates	  will	  be	  
fixed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  drawdown	  and	  the	  loan	  rates	  will	  be	  adjusted,	  to	  assure	  profitability	  for	  the	  Fund.	  
	  
NWA	  will	  provide	  $10mm	  in	  equity	  funds	  to	  the	  LLC	  initially,	  raising	  it	  to	  a	  cumulative	  total	  of	  $15mm	  in	  
capital	  invested	  over	  time.	  NWA	  will	  contribute	  additional	  capital	  to	  the	  Fund	  as	  needed.	  	  
	  
7. Financial	  Objectives	  
	  
• No	  default	  on	  obligations;	  
• Minimal	  operating	  cost	  on	  origination	  and	  servicing;	  
• Minimal	  cost	  on	  credit	  monitoring,	  includes	  full	  use	  of	  Organizational	  Assessment	  Division	  
analyses,	  and	  stress-­‐testing;	  
• Self-­‐sufficiency	  after	  the	  first	  $10mm	  invested;	  




The	  portfolio	  will	  have	  the	  following	  risk-­‐mitigating	  attributes:	  
	  
• A	  minimum	  of	  15	  percent	  of	  total	  assets	  will	  be	  invested	  in	  high	  quality	  marketable	  securities	  
with	  an	  average	  term	  of	  4	  years;	  
• Loss	  reserves	  will	  be	  provided	  at	  4x	  the	  rate	  of	  net	  charge-­‐offs;	  
• A	  minimum	  principal	  repayment	  to	  new	  loan	  volume	  ratio	  of	  50	  percent	  after	  stabilization;	  
• A	  maximum	  exposure	  to	  unsecured	  advances	  of	  $15mm	  
• A	  recourse	  provision	  for	  pledged	  loans	  to	  assure	  currency	  
 314	  
• Servicing	  on	  all	  pledged	  loans	  performed	  by	  NHSA	  
• Restrictions	  on	  geography	  and	  credit	  concentration	  
• Participants	  must	  be	  rated	  exemplary	  or	  strong	  by	  the	  NWA	  Organizational	  Assessment	  
Division	  and	  maintain	  minimum	  cash	  and	  investment	  targets	  
	  
Key	  functions	  will	  be	  performed	  by	  entities	  that	  already	  provide	  them:	  
	  
• NWA’s	  Organizational	  Assessment	  Division	  provides	  oversight	  of	  the	  participating	  NWOs	  and	  
assures	  that	  those	  who	  participate	  are	  “exemplary”	  or	  “strong.”	  
• NHSA	  can	  purchase	  longer	  term	  loans	  from	  the	  Fund	  as	  they	  are	  seasoned.	  
• NHSA	  manages	  the	  recourse	  portfolio,	  including	  pledging	  procedures,	  loan	  performance	  
data,	  substitutions	  of	  collateral,	  and	  servicing.	  
• NWA	  can	  add	  grants	  at	  the	  NWACX	  or	  NWO	  level	  to	  assure	  currency	  of	  payment	  and/or	  
adequate	  levels	  of	  credit	  support.	  
	  
Scenario	  1	  for	  the	  NWACX	  is	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  
	  
KEY INDICATORS AND FUNDING CHOICES 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
(THE CONTROL ROOM) NWACX SCENARIO 1 Chart 1
The Four Categories:
Total Assets: Gross Operating Yield 263 6.819% 6.113% 6.222% 5.970% 5.990% 6.022% 5.971%
Operating Expense/Avg. Assets 264 6.191% 2.587% 1.748% 1.372% 1.247% 1.166% 1.103%
Cost of Funds (to Average Assets) 265 1.010% 1.424% 2.449% 3.000% 3.118% 3.243% 3.358%
Charge-offs to Avg. Assets 266 0.227% 0.238% 0.287% 0.299% 0.323% 0.347% 0.363%
Key Asset Diagnostic Indicators
Loans: Total Yield 267 12.63% 8.58% 7.76% 6.94% 6.71% 6.60% 6.42%
Loan Rate versus Debt Rate 268 5.92% 3.73% 2.63% 1.96% 1.92% 1.81% 1.64%
Property Revenue to Property Value 269 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Property: Net Operating Rev to Value* 270 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Loan Portfolio 271 4,758,769 12,214,305 22,215,678 30,825,410 37,044,794 43,788,915 50,053,928
Real Estate Properties (Owned) 272 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Total Assets 273 14,857,641 23,058,861 37,380,336 45,409,596 51,245,531 57,596,371 63,496,339
Off Balance Sheet Loans 274 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Gain or (Loss) on Loan Sales 275 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Gain or (Loss) on Real Estate Sales 276 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mission Restricted Net Assets 277 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000
   Total Net Assets 278 9,857,641 10,058,861 10,380,336 10,742,930 11,245,531 11,796,371 12,363,005
Staff Stress
   Total Loan Volume/Staff 279 4.50 8.50 13.00 15.00 15.00 16.00 16.00
   Total Projects Volume/Staff 280 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Total Loans Outstanding/Staff 281 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Total Projects per Property Staff 282 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trip Wires
Total Debt 283 5,000,000 13,000,000 27,000,000 34,666,667 40,000,000 45,800,000 51,133,333
Total Liabilities/Net Assets 284 0.51 1.29 2.60 3.23 3.56 3.88 4.14
Target Liabilities/Net Assets 285 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
   Equity Needed to Meet Leverage Target 286 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unrestricted Investments 287 0 800,000 5,100,000 4,500,000 4,100,000 3,700,000 3,400,000
Mission Restricted Investments 288 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000
Cash Reserve Requirement 289 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loan Reserve Requirement 290 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Target Cash/Investments Month on Hand 291 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
   Cash Needed to Meet Cash Target 292 34,856 0 0 0 0 0 0
The Bottom Line
Net Surplus (Deficit) 293 9,857,641 201,220 321,475 362,594 502,601 550,840 566,635
Ending Cash 294 98,873 44,556 64,657 84,186 100,737 107,456 42,411
   Years to Repay Debt 295 0 7 6 5 4 5 5
Incr/Decr Unrestricted Investments 296 (800,000) (4,300,000) 600,000 400,000 400,000 300,000
Short Term Debt 297 5,000,000 8,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000
Long Term Debt 298 15,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 8,000,000 7,000,000
Operating Grants per Year ($) 299 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mission Asset Restricted Grants per Year 300 10,000,000 0 0 0 0 0 0
Permanent Endowment Grants per Year 301 0 0 0 0 0 0 0






OPERATING STATEMENT 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Investment Income 368 200,000 416,000 518,000 592,000 572,000 556,000 542,000
Loan Interest Income 369 216,538 582,921 1,112,276 1,619,382 2,062,865 2,441,269 2,793,047
   Less Cost of Delinquency 370 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operating Grants 371 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Mission Restricted Grants 372 10,000,000 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Permanent Endowment Grants 373 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Originating Fees 374 90,000 160,000 250,000 260,000 260,000 280,000 280,000
Servicing Fees Received 375 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rental Income 376 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Less Vacancy Cost 377 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asset Management Fees 378 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Development Fees 379 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Partnership Income 380 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Revenues 381 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Total Revenues 382 10,506,538 1,158,921 1,880,276 2,471,382 2,894,865 3,277,269 3,615,047
Operating Expense 383 453,200 466,796 480,800 495,224 510,081 525,383 541,145
Servicing Fees Paid 384 6,716 23,623 47,304 72,555 92,445 109,411 126,515
Property Operating Costs 385 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maintenance/Reserves 386 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest Expense 387 75,000 270,000 740,000 1,241,667 1,506,667 1,765,000 2,033,333
Loss Expense 388 113,981 197,282 290,698 299,342 283,072 326,635 347,419
   Total Expenses 389 648,897 957,701 1,558,802 2,108,788 2,392,264 2,726,429 3,048,412
Gain or (Loss) on Loan Sales 390 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gain or (Loss) on Real Estate Sales 391 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Surplus (Deficit) 392 9,857,641 201,220 321,475 362,594 502,601 550,840 566,635
NWACX SCENARIO 1
BALANCE SHEET 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Cash 393 98,873 44,556 64,657 84,186 100,737 107,456 42,411
Unrestricted Investments 394 0 800,000 5,100,000 4,500,000 4,100,000 3,700,000 3,400,000
Mission Restricted Investments 395 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000
Permanent Endowment Investments 396 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accounts Receivable 397 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loans 398 4,855,886 12,463,576 22,669,060 31,454,500 37,800,810 44,682,567 51,075,436
   Loss Reserve 399 (97,118) (249,272) (453,381) (629,090) (756,016) (893,651) (1,021,509)
Net Loans 400 4,758,769 12,214,305 22,215,678 30,825,410 37,044,794 43,788,915 50,053,928
Real Estate Assets 401 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Assets 402 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Total Assets 403 14,857,641 23,058,861 37,380,336 45,409,596 51,245,531 57,596,371 63,496,339
Accounts Payable 404 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Short Term Debt 405 5,000,000 13,000,000 13,000,000 17,000,000 19,000,000 19,000,000 20,000,000
   Current Liabilities 406 5,000,000 13,000,000 13,000,000 17,000,000 19,000,000 19,000,000 20,000,000
Long Term Debt 407 0 0 14,000,000 17,666,667 21,000,000 26,800,000 31,133,333
Other Liabilities 408 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Total Liabilities 409 5,000,000 13,000,000 27,000,000 34,666,667 40,000,000 45,800,000 51,133,333
Unrestricted Net Assets 410 (142,359) 58,861 380,336 742,930 1,245,531 1,796,371 2,363,005
Mission Restricted Net Assets 411 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000
Permanent Endowment Net Assets 412 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Net Assets 413 9,857,641 10,058,861 10,380,336 10,742,930 11,245,531 11,796,371 12,363,005






CASH FLOW 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Beginning Cash 415 0 98,873 44,556 64,657 84,186 100,737 107,456
Net Surplus from Operations 416 9,857,641 201,220 321,475 362,594 502,601 550,840 566,635
New Mission Restricted Grants 417 (10,000,000) 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Permanent Endowment Grants 418 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mission Restricted Balance Released 419 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Provision for Losses 420 113,981 197,282 290,698 299,342 283,072 326,635 347,419
   Total Sources from Ops 421 (28,377) 398,502 612,173 661,936 785,673 877,475 914,054
New Loan Volume (Less Charge-offs) 422 (5,000,000) (9,000,000) (14,000,000) (15,000,000) (15,000,000) (16,000,000) (16,000,000)
Loan Sales (Face Value) 423 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Property Purchases/Development 424 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Property Sales at Cost - Total 425 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Property Sales at Cost - Restricted 426 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Incr/Decr Unrestricted Investments 427 0 (800,000) (4,300,000) 600,000 400,000 400,000 300,000
Mission Restricted Balance Deployed 428 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accounts Receivable 429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Assets 430 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accounts Payable 431 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Liabilities 432 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Total Uses 433 (5,000,000) (9,800,000) (18,300,000) (14,400,000) (14,600,000) (15,600,000) (15,700,000)
Net Operating Sources/Uses 434 (5,028,377) (9,401,498) (17,687,827) (13,738,064) (13,814,327) (14,722,525) (14,785,946)
Loan Principal Repayments 435 127,250 1,347,182 3,707,929 6,090,926 8,497,545 8,929,244 9,387,568
Loan Princ Repymts & Sales -Restricted 436 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Short Term Debt 437 5,000,000 8,000,000 0 4,000,000 2,000,000 0 1,000,000
Existing Long Term Debt: Amortization 438 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Long Term Debt: Amortization 439 0 0 (1,000,000) (1,333,333) (1,666,667) (2,200,000) (2,666,667)
Long Term Debt 440 0 0 15,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 8,000,000 7,000,000
   Total Financing Sources 441 5,127,250 9,347,182 17,707,929 13,757,592 13,830,878 14,729,244 14,720,902
Change in Cash 442 98,873 (54,316) 20,101 19,528 16,551 6,718 (65,045)





I(A) . THE ASSET DECISION: LOANS NWACX SCENARIO 1 Chart 1
I.  Loans
Loans: Existing Outstanding 1
   Loan Principal Repayments 2 0 0 0
   Interest Rate 3
   Number of loans 4 Avg. Size: 0
   Future Number of Loans Outstanding 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loan Type 1: 6 Loan Type 4: 
Interest Rate 7 6.00% Interest Rate
Number of Years 8 15                          Number of Years
Average Size of Loan 9 $1,000,000 ($8,438.57) Monthly Payment Average Size of Loan $0.00
# Loans over the period 10 48                          $48,000,000 Total Loans # Loans over the period -                         $0
Origination Fees 11 2.00% Origination Fees
Servicing Fees Received 12 0 Servicing Fees 0
Servicing Fees Paid 13 0.250%        Servicing Fees Paid
Percentage of Loans Sold 14 Percentage of Loans Sold ($)
Charge-off Rate 15 0.50% Charge-off Rate
Market Interest Rate 16 10.00% Market Interest Rate
Loan Type 2: 17 Loan Type 5:
Interest Rate 18 Interest Rate 5.00%
Number of Years 19 Number of Years - Interest Only 2                            
Average Size of Loan 20 $0.00 Monthly Payment Number of Years - Amortizing 1                            ($42,803.74)
# Loans over the period 21 -                         $0 Total Loans Average Size of Loan $500,000 $20,000,000
Origination Fees 22 # Loans over the period 40                          
Servicing Fees Received 23 Origination Fees 2.00%
Servicing Fees Paid 24 Servicing Fees Received 0
Percentage of Loans Sold 25        Servicing Fees Paid 0.250%
Charge-off Rate 26        Charge-off Rate 0.250%
Market Interest Rate 27 Percentage of Loans Sold ($) 0%
28 Market Interest Rate
Loan Type 3: 29 Loan Type 6: 
Interest Rate 30 Interest Rate 4.00%
Number of Years 31 Number of Years 2
Average Size of Loan 32 $0.00 Monthly Payment Average Size of Loan $250,000 ($833.33)
# Loans over the period 33 -                         $0 Total Loans # Loans over the period 88                          $22,000,000
Origination Fees 34 Origination Fees 1.00%
Servicing Fees Retained 35 Servicing Fees 0
Servicing Fees Paid 36        Servicing Fees Paid 0.375%
Percentage of Loans Sold 37 Percentage of Loans Sold ($) 0%
Charge-off Rate 38 Charge-off Rate
Market Interest Rate 39 Market Interest Rate
II. Loan Volume 40 Total Loans $90,000,000
Years 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of Loans #1 41 3                            5                            8                            8                            8                            8                            8                            
Number of Loans #2 42
Number of Loans #3 43
Number of Loans #4 44
Number of Loans #5 45 2                            4                            6                            6                            6                            8                            8                            
Number of Loans #6 46 4                            8                            12                          16                          16                          16                          16                          
Total New Loans 47 9 17 26 30 30 32 32
Total Loans Outstanding (Not Incl.Amort) 48 9 26 48 68 82 92 102








	  APPENDIX	  C	  
	  
	  
The	  Quad:	  A	  Stress	  Test	  for	  CDFIs	  
	  
	  
Developed	  by	  Charles	  Tansey	  and	  Tom	  O’Brien,	  the	  Quad	  Analysis	  objectively	  analyzes	  the	  last	  four	  years	  
of	  financial	  data	  to	  identify	  the	  credit	  union’s	  (CU)	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses.	  	  Rather	  than	  a	  prediction,	  
the	  technique	  stresses	  the	  historical	  financial	  performance	  in	  order	  to	  surface	  issues	  and	  influences	  that	  
may	  not	  be	  easily	  ascertained	  in	  a	  straight	  analysis	  of	  the	  historical	  data.	  	  All	  financial	  data	  is	  obtained	  
from	  the	  CU	  Call	  Reports	  accessed	  through	  the	  National	  Credit	  Union	  Association	  website.	  
	  
The	  Diagnosis	  is	  based	  on	  a	  consolidation	  of	  the	  figures	  produced	  by	  four	  separate	  and	  distinct	  sets	  of	  
analyses	  (hence	  Quad).	  	  The	  analyses	  are	  automatically	  generated	  when	  the	  numbers	  from	  the	  annual	  
NCUA	  5300	  filing	  are	  input	  into	  the	  model.	  The	  analyses	  all	  have	  the	  same	  key	  drivers,	  which	  are	  
identified	  in	  yellow	  in	  the	  Diagnostic.	  The	  biggest	  drivers	  are	  loan	  volume	  and	  share/deposit	  growth,	  but	  
yields,	  operating	  ratios,	  interest	  expense	  and	  credit	  losses	  are	  also	  drivers.	  	  The	  first	  forecast	  (Average	  
Annual	  Performance)	  simply	  averages	  the	  drivers	  over	  the	  last	  3	  years	  and	  applies	  them	  to	  each	  year	  
going	  forward.	  	  The	  second	  forecast	  (Straight	  line	  off	  of	  Most	  Recent	  Year)	  takes	  the	  drivers	  from	  the	  most	  
recent	  year	  (2005)	  and	  straight-­‐lines	  them	  out.	  	  The	  third	  forecast	  (Cyclical)	  takes	  the	  drivers	  from	  the	  
most	  recent	  year	  and	  stresses	  them	  –	  with	  rising	  expenses	  and	  lower	  growth	  in	  the	  middle	  years.	  	  Finally,	  
the	  “Trend-­‐line	  Analysis”	  takes	  the	  drivers	  exactly	  as	  they	  were,	  starting	  in	  the	  third	  previous	  year	  and	  
applies	  them	  going	  forward	  in	  the	  same	  order.	  The	  first,	  second	  and	  fourth	  forecasting	  forms	  are	  
traditional	  methodologies	  drawn	  from	  trend	  line	  analysis	  techniques	  utilized	  at	  the	  former	  Chase	  
Manhattan	  Bank.	  The	  Cyclical	  forecast	  is	  a	  variable	  methodology	  designed	  to	  introduce	  non-­‐linear,	  more	  
realistic	  strains	  on	  the	  subject’s	  performance.	  The	  timing	  and	  magnitude	  of	  the	  stress	  points	  is	  arbitrary,	  
but	  tends	  to	  produce	  a	  slightly	  negative	  affect.	  	  
	  
The	  Quad	  is	  different	  from	  a	  management	  forecast,	  a	  comparative	  financial	  analysis	  or	  an	  NCUA	  
examination.	  The	  Quad	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  establish	  financial	  condition,	  evaluate	  management	  decisions,	  or	  
predict	  what	  is	  likely	  to	  happen.	  It	  is	  a	  stress	  test	  with	  a	  negative	  bias.	  In	  addition	  to	  incorporating	  a	  
cyclical	  forecast	  with	  attributes	  typical	  of	  an	  economic	  downturn,	  the	  Quad	  integrates	  grants	  and	  
contributions	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  year.	  Because	  the	  historical	  data	  and	  trends	  are	  put	  to	  this	  
kind	  of	  stress,	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  it	  identifies	  may	  show	  as	  more	  extreme	  than	  would	  be	  likely	  
under	  normal	  conditions.	  Moreover,	  because	  the	  stress	  is	  automatically	  applied,	  management	  responses	  
to	  evolving	  conditions	  are	  not	  incorporated	  into	  the	  test.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  set	  of	  numbers	  and	  ratios	  that	  
show	  what	  could	  happen	  under	  extreme	  conditions	  –	  if	  nothing	  is	  done	  by	  Board	  or	  Staff	  to	  address	  the	  
challenges.	  The	  key	  objective	  of	  the	  Quad	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  potential	  consolidation	  or	  merger,	  is	  to	  use	  
these	  extremes	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  identifying	  potential	  points	  of	  connection	  as	  well	  as	  conflict	  among	  


















Rules	  on	  Risk-­‐Based	  Capital	  Allocation	  
	  
	  
Why	  do	  banks	  charge	  the	  rates	  they	  charge	  on	  loans	  to	  CDFIs?	  	  Clearly,	  the	  issues	  of	  loan	  size,	  complexity,	  
fragmentary	  reporting,	  the	  absence	  of	  analytical	  standards,	  and	  simple	  perception	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  and/or	  
community	  development	  sector	  are	  relevant.	  But	  none	  of	  them	  individually,	  nor	  all	  of	  them	  collectively,	  
provide	  the	  chief	  reason	  for	  the	  generally	  higher	  pricing	  that	  CDFIs	  receive.	  The	  chief	  determinant	  resides	  
with	  the	  concept	  of	  return	  on	  capital,	  and	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  proper	  return	  on	  capital	  is	  largely	  a	  
function	  of	  simple	  math.	  In	  order	  to	  improve	  pricing	  in	  the	  CDFI	  sector,	  CDFIs	  must	  learn	  to	  negotiate	  and	  
manage	  this	  math.	  	  
	  
The	  main	  focus	  for	  the	  FIR	  team	  during	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Commercial	  Paper	  Co-­‐op	  (“Co-­‐op”)	  was	  on	  
how	  to	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  capital	  that	  a	  bank	  must	  maintain	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  supporting	  the	  
assets	  sufficiently	  to	  warrant	  a	  top	  rating.	  	  
	  
The	  issue	  boiled	  down	  to	  a	  basic	  question:	  	  how	  would	  the	  Risk	  Based	  Capital	  (“RBC”)	  guidelines	  (Basel	  I	  
with	  amendments	  in	  place	  at	  the	  time)	  have	  enhanced	  the	  Co-­‐op	  structure	  by	  reducing	  the	  risk-­‐based	  
capital	  allocation	  for	  banks,	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  capital	  these	  institutions	  had	  to	  hold	  in	  support	  of	  their	  
existing	  warehouse	  lines	  of	  credit?	  
	  
The	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  would	  determine	  three	  major	  items:	  
	  
• The	  amount	  of	  grant	  funding	  the	  Co-­‐op	  would	  have	  to	  raise	  to	  capitalize	  the	  SPV	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  loss	  reserves	  
• The	  return	  on	  capital	  –	  and	  hence	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  transaction	  –	  to	  the	  banks	  
• The	  rating	  –	  and	  hence	  the	  cost	  –	  of	  the	  commercial	  paper.	  	  
	  
The	  Co-­‐op	  had	  been	  designed	  initially	  with	  the	  banks	  providing	  both	  a	  credit	  enhancement	  facility	  and	  a	  
liquidity	  facility.	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  discussions	  with	  representatives	  at	  the	  Federal	  Reserve,	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  
this	  structure	  was	  likely	  inefficient	  and	  unnecessarily	  costly	  to	  both	  the	  Co-­‐op	  and	  the	  banks.	  The	  Co-­‐op	  
structure	  included	  10	  percent	  first	  loss	  protection	  in	  the	  form	  of	  foundation	  grants	  –	  thus	  duplicating	  the	  
role	  traditionally	  played	  by	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancement	  and	  entailing	  an	  unnecessary	  capital	  cost	  
for	  participating	  banks.	  Notably,	  an	  SPV	  that	  comes	  with	  the	  credit	  enhancement	  fully	  funded	  requires	  
only	  a	  liquidity	  facility	  from	  the	  banks.	  The	  liquidity	  facility,	  because	  it	  generally	  involves	  less	  risk	  of	  a	  loss	  
of	  principal	  than	  a	  credit	  enhancement	  facility,	  requires	  a	  lower	  capital	  allocation	  and,	  hence,	  costs	  less.	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  FIR	  team	  restructured	  the	  Co-­‐op	  to	  provide	  its	  own	  credit	  support.	  The	  banks	  would	  
provide	  only	  a	  liquidity	  facility	  that	  assures	  timely	  repayment	  of	  principal	  and	  interest	  to	  investors.	  	  	  
	  
Additional	  research	  revealed	  that	  several	  aspects	  of	  the	  Risk	  Based	  Capital	  guidelines	  currently	  in	  place	  
under	  Basel	  I	  (Basel	  II	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  implemented)	  would	  have	  made	  the	  Co-­‐op	  structure	  very	  
attractive	  to	  participating	  banks.	  	  Specifically,	  these	  banks	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  hold	  less	  capital	  
against	  this	  new	  facility	  as	  compared	  to	  what	  they	  were	  required	  to	  hold	  in	  support	  of	  their	  existing	  on-­‐
balance	  sheet	  warehouse	  lines	  of	  credit.	  In	  other	  words,	  RBC	  guidelines	  would	  have	  made	  the	  Co-­‐op	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facility	  less	  costly	  and	  therefore	  more	  attractive	  to	  bank	  participants	  than	  the	  current	  warehouse	  lines,	  
while	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  enabling	  CDFIs	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  lower	  cost	  funding	  available	  in	  the	  commercial	  
paper	  market	  (though,	  again,	  as	  noted,	  it	  was	  not	  recommended	  that	  CDFI	  participants	  cancel	  all	  of	  their	  
warehouse	  lines).	  	  
	  
The	  basis	  for	  this	  potential	  “win-­‐win”	  was	  the	  10	  percent	  loss	  reserve	  that	  would	  be	  contributed	  by	  the	  
banks	  and	  the	  foundations:	  suddenly	  there	  was	  an	  externally	  funded	  loss	  reserve	  that	  hadn’t	  been	  there	  
before	  for	  the	  banks.	  But,	  in	  addition,	  there	  were	  several	  key	  refinements	  of	  the	  RBC	  Guidelines	  that	  
made	  the	  Co-­‐op	  even	  more	  attractive:	  	  	  
	  
1. The	  Securitization	  Rule	  
	  
Below	  is	  a	  description	  of	  the	  Securitization	  Rule,	  from	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Board	  Supervisory	  Letter	  SR	  05-­‐
13.	  	  August	  4,	  2005.	  	  “Interagency	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Eligibility	  of	  Asset-­‐Backed	  Commercial	  Paper	  Program	  
Liquidity	  Facilities	  and	  the	  resulting	  Risk-­‐Based	  Capital	  Treatment:”	  
	  
In	  almost	  all	  cases,	  externally	  rated	  commercial	  paper	  issued	  out	  of	  an	  ABCP	  program	  is	  
supported	  by	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancement.	  Often	  sponsoring	  banking	  organizations	  
provide,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part,	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancement	  to	  their	  ABCP	  programs,	  which	  
may	  take	  a	  number	  of	  different	  forms,	  including	  an	  irrevocable	  loan	  facility,	  standby	  letter	  of	  
credit,	  financial	  guarantee,	  or	  subordinated	  debt.	  	  
	  
1.	  The	  Securitization	  Capital	  Rule	  permits	  a	  banking	  organization	  with	  a	  qualifying	  internal	  risk	  
rating	  system	  to	  use	  that	  system	  to	  apply	  the	  internal	  ratings	  approach	  to	  its	  unrated	  direct	  credit	  
substitutes	  provided	  to	  ABCP	  programs	  that	  it	  sponsors	  by	  mapping	  its	  internal	  risk	  ratings	  to	  
external	  ratings	  equivalents.	  	  
	  
2.	  The	  external	  credit	  rating	  equivalents	  are	  organized	  into	  three	  ratings	  categories:	  	  investment	  
grade	  credit	  risk,	  e.g.,	  BBB-­‐	  and	  above,	  high	  non-­‐investment	  grade	  credit	  risk,	  e.g.,	  BB+	  through	  
BB-­‐,	  and	  low	  non-­‐investment	  grade	  credit	  risk,	  e.g.,	  below	  BB-­‐.	  The	  rating	  categories	  are	  used	  to	  
determine	  the	  appropriate	  risk-­‐weight	  category	  or	  categories	  to	  which	  banking	  organizations	  
should	  assign	  either	  the	  entire	  notional	  amount,	  or	  portions	  thereof,	  of	  their	  direct	  credit	  
substitutes.	  The	  minimum	  risk	  weight	  available	  under	  the	  internal	  risk	  ratings	  approach	  is	  100	  
percent	  for	  an	  investment	  grade	  exposure,	  even	  if	  the	  direct	  credit	  substitute	  is	  highly	  rated	  
internally,	  e.g.,	  AAA.	  	  
	  
3.	  	  Direct	  credit	  substitutes	  internally	  rated	  high	  non-­‐investment	  grade	  would	  be	  assigned	  to	  the	  
200	  percent	  risk	  weight,	  whereas	  those	  internally	  rated	  more	  than	  one	  category	  below	  
investment	  grade	  (e.g.,	  BB-­‐)	  would	  receive	  the	  "gross-­‐up"	  treatment.	  That	  is,	  the	  banking	  
organization	  extending	  the	  direct	  credit	  substitute	  must	  maintain	  capital	  against	  the	  notional	  
amount	  of	  this	  position	  plus	  all	  more	  senior	  positions,	  subject	  to	  the	  low-­‐level	  exposure	  rule.	  	  
	  
4	  Application	  of	  "gross-­‐up"	  treatment,	  in	  many	  cases,	  will	  result	  in	  an	  effective	  dollar-­‐for-­‐dollar	  
capital	  charge	  on	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  that	  fall	  into	  the	  low	  non-­‐investment	  grade	  category.	  
The	  guidance	  introduces	  the	  "weakest	  link"	  approach	  for	  calculating	  the	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  
requirement	  applicable	  to	  a	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancement.	  This	  approach	  assumes	  that	  the	  
risk	  of	  the	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancement	  is	  directly	  dependent	  on	  the	  quality,	  i.e.,	  internal	  
rating,	  of	  the	  riskiest	  asset	  pools	  purchased	  by	  the	  ABCP	  program.	  The	  weakest	  link	  concept	  
assumes	  that	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancement	  will	  be	  drawn	  is	  equal	  to	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the	  probability	  of	  default	  of	  the	  asset	  pools	  with	  the	  weakest	  internal	  risk	  rating.	  Thus,	  in	  
accordance	  with	  current	  market	  practice,	  the	  weakest	  link	  approach	  requires	  banking	  
organization	  to	  internally	  rate	  its	  risk	  exposure	  to	  every	  asset	  pool	  purchased	  by	  its	  ABCP	  
programs	  and	  use	  those	  internal	  ratings	  to	  assign	  the	  notional	  amount	  of	  the	  program-­‐wide	  
credit	  enhancement	  to	  risk	  weight	  categories,	  as	  appropriate.	  	  
	  
The	  weakest	  link	  approach	  assigns	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  against	  the	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  
enhancement	  in	  rank	  order	  of	  the	  internal	  ratings	  starting	  with	  the	  lowest	  internally	  rated	  asset	  
pools	  supported	  by	  the	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancement.	  Accordingly,	  if	  all	  of	  the	  positions	  
supported	  by	  the	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancement	  are	  internally	  rated	  investment	  grade,	  then	  
sponsoring	  banking	  organizations	  would	  risk-­‐weight	  the	  notional	  amount	  of	  their	  program-­‐wide	  
credit	  enhancements	  at	  100	  percent.	  For	  asset	  pools	  supported	  by	  the	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  
enhancement	  that	  are	  non-­‐investment	  grade,	  banking	  organizations	  would	  have	  to	  maintain	  
higher	  amounts	  of	  risk-­‐based	  capital.	  The	  use	  of	  internal	  risk	  ratings	  under	  the	  Securitization	  
Capital	  Rule	  is	  limited	  to	  determining	  the	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  charge	  for	  unrated	  direct	  credit	  
substitutes	  that	  banking	  organizations	  provide	  to	  ABCP	  programs.	  Thus,	  banking	  organizations	  
may	  not	  utilize	  the	  internal	  ratings	  approach	  to	  derive	  the	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  requirement	  for	  
unrated	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  extended	  to	  other	  transactions.	  	  
	  
On	  November	  29,	  2001,	  the	  four	  bank	  regulatory	  agencies	  (the	  "Agencies")	  amended	  their	  RBC	  standards	  
by	  adopting	  a	  new	  capital	  framework	  for	  banking	  organizations	  engaged	  in	  securitization	  activities.	  It	  was	  
known	  as	  the	  “Securitization	  Capital	  Rule.”91	  	  	  
This	  final	  rule	  (which	  became	  effective	  as	  of	  January	  1,	  2002)	  did	  the	  following	  three	  things:	  	  	  
	  
1. Treated	  recourse	  obligations92	  and	  direct	  credit	  substitutes93	  more	  consistently	  than	  had	  been	  
the	  case	  under	  the	  existing	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  (“RBC”)	  standards;	  
2. Added	  new	  standards	  for	  the	  treatment	  of	  residual	  interests94;	  and	  
3. Allows	  the	  agencies	  to	  use	  credit	  ratings	  and	  other	  approaches	  to	  match	  the	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  
requirements	  more	  closely	  to	  the	  actual	  risk	  of	  loss	  for	  various	  positions	  in	  asset	  securitizations.	  
	  
There	  had	  been	  three	  earlier	  efforts	  to	  address	  various	  aspects	  of	  this	  rule	  beginning	  as	  early	  as	  1994	  
when	  the	  agencies	  published	  a	  proposal	  to	  more	  closely	  align	  the	  RBC	  treatment	  of	  direct	  credit	  
substitutes	  and	  recourse	  obligations.	  	  (Note	  that	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  are	  essentially	  guarantees	  which	  
are	  used	  to	  credit	  enhance	  Asset	  Backed	  Commercial	  Paper	  programs.)	  	  	  
	  
The	  agencies	  never	  issued	  a	  final	  regulation	  and	  in	  1997,	  they	  published	  a	  second	  proposal	  that	  dealt	  with	  
many	  of	  the	  same	  issues.	  	  A	  third	  notice	  of	  proposed	  rulemaking	  was	  published	  in	  2000	  that	  made	  a	  
number	  of	  changes	  from	  the	  earlier	  two	  proposals.	  	  Meanwhile	  the	  Basel	  Committee	  on	  Banking	  
Supervision	  issued	  a	  consultative	  paper	  in	  January	  2001.	  	  The	  final	  securitization	  rule	  published	  in	  
November	  of	  2001	  borrows	  several	  approaches	  included	  in	  the	  Basel	  paper	  including	  the	  capital	  
treatment	  of	  asset	  securitizations.	  	  	  
	  
This	  rule	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  the	  regulators’	  efforts	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  asset	  securitization	  
and	  other	  off-­‐balance	  sheet	  risks	  that	  had	  not	  been	  captured	  in	  the	  original	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  rules	  –	  also	  
know	  as	  the	  Basel	  Capital	  Accord.	  The	  rule	  dealt	  with	  a	  number	  of	  complex	  issues,	  but	  in	  simplest	  form,	  it	  
focused	  on	  more	  clearly	  defining	  and	  more	  accurately	  reflecting	  the	  risks	  in	  recourse	  arrangements,	  
residual	  interests	  and	  direct	  credit	  substitutes.	  	  The	  latter	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  Asset-­‐backed	  
commercial	  paper	  (“ABCP”)	  conduits.	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One	  of	  the	  key	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  RBC	  standards	  before	  this	  rule	  was	  implemented	  was	  the	  different	  
treatment	  accorded	  to	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  (guarantees)	  and	  recourse	  obligations.	  	  Under	  the	  old	  
system,	  off-­‐balance	  sheet	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  (DCS),	  such	  as	  standby	  letters	  of	  credit	  provided	  for	  
third-­‐party	  assets,	  carried	  a	  100	  percent	  credit	  conversion	  factor95.	  	  However,	  only	  the	  face	  amount	  of	  the	  
direct	  credit	  substitute	  is	  converted	  into	  an	  on-­‐balance	  sheet	  credit	  equivalent	  amount.	  	  So	  if	  a	  bank	  is	  
providing	  a	  guarantee	  for	  40	  percent	  of	  a	  pool	  of	  assets	  then	  capital	  is	  held	  only	  against	  the	  40	  percent	  
face	  amount	  of	  the	  DCS.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  capital	  requirement	  for	  recourse	  arrangements	  is	  based	  
on	  the	  full	  amount	  –	  e.g.,	  100	  percent	  –	  of	  the	  assets	  enhanced.	  	  So	  if	  a	  DCS	  covers	  less	  than	  100	  percent	  
of	  the	  potential	  losses	  on	  the	  assets	  enhanced,	  the	  capital	  charge	  for	  a	  direct	  credit	  substitute	  would	  have	  
been	  less	  than	  that	  for	  a	  comparable	  recourse	  arrangement,	  prior	  to	  the	  changes	  made	  under	  this	  rule.96	  	  	  
	  
This	  inconsistent	  treatment	  of	  DCS	  and	  recourse	  arrangements	  involving	  similar	  credit	  risks	  raised	  serious	  
concerns	  about	  the	  possible	  exploitation	  by	  banking	  organizations	  of	  this	  RBC	  anomaly.	  	  The	  final	  rule	  
eliminated	  this	  inconsistent	  treatment	  and	  the	  opportunity	  for	  banks	  to	  arbitrage	  the	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  
regulations	  by	  providing	  credit	  in	  the	  form	  that	  requires	  the	  lowest	  capital	  charges.	  	  
	  
Broadly	  speaking,	  the	  rule	  made	  the	  following	  changes	  to	  the	  RBC	  guidelines:	  
	  
• Defines	  the	  terms	  recourse,	  residual	  interest,	  and	  related	  terms,	  and	  revises	  the	  definition	  of	  
direct	  credit	  substitute;	  
• Aligns	  the	  RBC	  treatment	  of	  recourse	  obligations	  and	  direct	  credit	  substitutes;	  	  
• Sets	  different	  capital	  requirements	  for	  different	  positions	  within	  securitization	  transactions	  
based	  on	  relative	  risk	  exposure	  as	  reflected	  in	  credit	  ratings;	  	  
• Permits	  the	  limited	  use	  of	  a	  bank’s	  own	  internal	  risk	  rating	  system	  to	  determine	  capital	  
requirement	  for	  unrated	  DCS;	  	  
• Permits	  the	  limited	  use	  of	  rating	  agency’s	  review	  of	  credit	  risk	  of	  positions	  in	  structured	  
programs	  and	  qualifying	  software	  to	  determine	  the	  capital	  requirement	  for	  unrated	  DCS	  and	  
recourse	  assets;	  
• Sets	  concentration	  limits	  and	  adjusts	  Tier	  I	  capital	  to	  a	  bank’s	  holdings	  of	  credit	  enhancing	  IO	  
strips	  in	  excess	  of	  25	  percent	  of	  Tier	  I	  capital;	  	  
• Sets	  the	  capital	  requirement	  at	  the	  face	  amount	  for	  residual	  interests	  that	  do	  not	  qualify	  for	  
the	  ratings	  based	  approach;	  	  
• Permits	  each	  agency	  to	  modify	  state	  risk-­‐weight,	  credit	  conversion	  factor	  or	  credit	  
equivalent	  amount	  as	  needed	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  	  	  
	  
The	  issues	  that	  were	  of	  particular	  importance	  to	  the	  FIR	  team	  effort	  on	  the	  Commercial	  Paper	  Co-­‐op	  
included	  the	  following:	  
	  
• Ratings	  Based	  Approach	  to	  determining	  RBC:	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  Securitization	  Capital	  Rule	  
permitted	  the	  use	  of	  a	  ratings-­‐based	  approach	  to	  better	  address	  the	  different	  risks	  (and	  the	  
required	  capital)	  associated	  with	  loss	  positions	  in	  an	  asset	  securitization	  structure	  and	  
specifies	  when	  this	  approach	  can	  be	  used.	  	  Under	  this	  approach	  credit	  ratings	  from	  the	  
rating	  agencies	  are	  used	  to	  measure	  relative	  exposure	  to	  credit	  risk	  and	  determine	  the	  
appropriate	  RBC	  requirement.	  	  The	  Rule	  also	  addressed	  the	  capital	  treatment	  of	  unrated	  
positions	  of	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  discussed	  below.	  The	  reason	  this	  was	  such	  a	  crucial	  
issue	  for	  the	  FIR	  team	  is	  that	  it	  underscored	  the	  importance	  of	  rating	  agency	  analytical	  
standards	  in	  determining	  RBC	  –	  and	  profitability	  –	  for	  banks.	  In	  short,	  complying	  with	  rating	  
agency	  credit	  standards	  would	  be	  critical	  not	  only	  for	  gaining	  access	  to	  the	  capital	  markets,	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but	  also	  for	  gaining	  access	  to	  the	  wholesale	  side	  of	  the	  bank,	  and	  pricing	  of	  all	  bank	  credit	  
facilities	  to	  CDFIs,	  whether	  the	  CDFIs	  went	  to	  the	  capital	  markets,	  the	  wholesale	  side	  of	  the	  
bank,	  or	  stayed	  in	  the	  CRA	  division.	  	  	  
• Traded	  and	  Untraded	  Positions	  –	  the	  original	  RBC	  rules	  did	  not	  vary	  the	  capital	  requirements	  
for	  different	  credit	  enhancements	  or	  loss	  positions	  in	  an	  asset	  securitization	  structure	  or	  
security.	  	  The	  Securitization	  Rule	  put	  in	  place	  a	  multi-­‐level,	  ratings-­‐based	  approach	  to	  assess	  
the	  capital	  requirements	  on	  recourse	  obligations,	  residual	  interests,	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  
and	  senior	  and	  subordinated	  securities	  in	  asset	  securitizations	  –	  based	  on	  relative	  exposure	  
to	  credit	  risk.	  	  This	  approach	  used	  rating	  agency	  credit	  ratings	  to	  measure	  credit	  risk	  and	  
determine	  the	  appropriate	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  requirement	  for	  traded	  and	  untraded	  positions	  
held	  by	  banks.	  	  The	  rule	  also	  provided	  a	  methodology	  for	  calculating	  the	  RBC	  required,	  based	  
on	  a	  system	  of	  “mapping”	  the	  ratings	  (assigned	  by	  the	  agencies)	  to	  specific	  risk	  weights.	  The	  
rule	  also	  clarified	  how	  positions	  that	  were	  not	  eligible	  for	  the	  ratings-­‐based	  approach	  were	  
treated	  for	  RBC	  purposes	  –	  under	  the	  “gross-­‐up	  treatment”,	  dollar-­‐for-­‐dollar	  treatment,	  or	  
unrated	  positions	  that	  are	  treated	  as	  rated	  positions	  under	  certain	  circumstances.	  Loans	  to	  
CDFIs	  based	  on	  organizational	  credit	  risk	  would	  inevitably	  fall	  into	  the	  unrated	  category,	  
which	  under	  these	  rules,	  would	  result	  in	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  RBC	  required	  whether	  the	  
loans	  were	  on	  the	  books	  of	  a	  bank	  or	  in	  an	  SPV	  supported	  by	  the	  bank.	  Consequently,	  CDFIs	  
could	  expect	  a	  higher	  spread	  or	  fee	  charged	  to	  cover	  the	  higher	  capital	  requirement,	  unless,	  
of	  course,	  they	  found	  a	  way	  to	  be	  deemed	  ratable!	  
• Unrated	  Direct	  Credit	  Substitutes	  Used	  in	  Asset-­‐Backed	  CP	  Programs.	  The	  Securitization	  Rule	  
allowed	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  issued	  in	  connection	  with	  asset-­‐backed	  commercial	  paper	  
programs	  to	  use	  the	  internal	  ratings-­‐based	  approach	  to	  qualify	  for	  beneficial	  or	  lower	  risk-­‐
weighting	  (i.e.	  beneficial	  RBC	  treatment),	  something	  that	  the	  Co-­‐op	  was	  seeking	  to	  achieve.	  	  
Additional	  guidance	  on	  this	  issue	  was	  provided	  in	  Supervisory	  Letter	  05-­‐6	  entitled	  Risk	  Based	  
Capital	  Treatment	  for	  Unrated	  Direct	  Credit	  Substitutes	  (guarantees)	  Extended	  to	  Asset	  
Backed	  Commercial	  Paper	  Programs	  (see	  below).	  	  The	  Rule	  permitted	  banking	  organizations	  
with	  a	  qualifying	  internal	  risk	  rating	  system	  to	  use	  that	  system	  to	  apply	  the	  ratings-­‐based	  
approach	  to	  their	  unrated	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  in	  asset-­‐backed	  commercial	  paper	  
programs.	  	  Internal	  risk	  ratings	  could	  be	  used	  to	  qualify	  such	  a	  credit	  enhancement	  for	  a	  risk	  
weight	  of	  100	  percent	  or	  200	  percent	  under	  the	  ratings-­‐based	  approach,	  but	  not	  for	  a	  risk	  
weight	  of	  less	  than	  100	  percent.	  Although	  limited,	  this	  use	  of	  internal	  risk	  ratings	  for	  risk-­‐
based	  capital	  purposes	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  step	  toward	  potential	  adoption	  of	  a	  broader	  use	  of	  
internal	  risk	  ratings	  as	  discussed	  in	  several	  consultative	  papers	  on	  the	  new	  Basel	  Capital	  
Accord.	  	  
• The	  absence	  of	  an	  internal	  risk	  rating.	  The	  credit	  enhancements	  that	  sponsors	  obtained	  for	  
their	  commercial	  paper	  conduits	  were	  rarely	  rated	  or	  traded.	  If	  an	  internal	  risk	  ratings	  
approach	  were	  not	  available	  for	  these	  unrated	  credit	  enhancements,	  the	  provider	  of	  the	  
enhancement	  would	  have	  to	  obtain	  two	  ratings	  solely	  to	  avoid	  the	  gross-­‐up	  treatment	  that	  
would	  otherwise	  apply	  to	  non-­‐traded	  positions	  in	  asset	  securitizations	  for	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  
purposes.	  The	  gross-­‐up	  treatment	  could	  result	  in	  capital	  allocations	  well	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  
norm.	  However,	  before	  a	  provider	  of	  an	  enhancement	  decided	  whether	  to	  provide	  a	  credit	  
enhancement	  for	  a	  particular	  transaction	  (and	  at	  what	  price),	  the	  provider	  would	  generally	  
perform	  its	  own	  analysis	  of	  the	  transaction	  to	  evaluate	  the	  amount	  of	  risk	  associated	  with	  
the	  enhancement.	  This	  approach	  was	  particularly	  attractive	  to	  banks	  because	  allowing	  them	  
to	  use	  internal	  credit	  ratings	  harnessed	  information	  and	  analyses	  that	  they	  already	  
generated	  rather	  than	  requiring	  them	  to	  obtain	  independent	  but	  potentially	  redundant	  
ratings	  from	  outside	  rating	  agencies.	  An	  internal	  risk	  ratings	  approach	  therefore	  could	  be	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less	  costly	  than	  a	  ratings-­‐based	  approach	  that	  relied	  exclusively	  on	  ratings	  by	  the	  rating	  
agencies	  for	  the	  risk-­‐weighting	  of	  these	  positions.	  
• Potential	  for	  moral	  hazard.	  The	  use	  of	  an	  internal	  ratings-­‐based	  approach	  allowed	  the	  bank	  
to	  differentiate	  the	  riskiness	  of	  various	  unrated	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  in	  asset-­‐backed	  
commercial	  paper	  programs	  based	  on	  credit	  risk	  by	  the	  mapping	  of	  ratings	  to	  risk-­‐weight	  
categories	  under	  the	  agencies'	  capital	  standards.	  	  However,	  the	  use	  of	  internal	  risk	  ratings	  
raised	  concerns	  about	  the	  accuracy	  and	  consistency	  of	  the	  ratings,	  especially	  because	  the	  
mapping	  of	  ratings	  to	  risk-­‐weight	  categories	  would	  give	  banks	  an	  incentive	  to	  rate	  their	  risk	  
exposures	  in	  a	  way	  that	  minimized	  the	  effective	  capital	  requirement.	  A	  bank	  engaged	  in	  
asset-­‐backed	  commercial	  paper	  securitization	  activities	  that	  wished	  to	  use	  the	  internal	  risk	  
ratings	  approach	  had	  to	  demonstrate	  to	  its	  primary	  regulator,	  that	  it	  had	  an	  adequate	  risk	  
rating	  system.	  Under	  the	  Securitization	  Capital	  Rule	  banks	  could	  use	  internal	  risk	  ratings	  to	  
determine	  the	  RBC	  charge	  for	  unrated	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  (guarantees)	  that	  they	  
provided	  to	  ABCP	  programs,	  but	  not	  to	  determine	  the	  RBC	  requirement	  for	  guarantees	  
extended	  to	  other	  transactions.	  	  
	  
The	  development	  of	  a	  different	  risk	  based	  capital	  allocation	  for	  off-­‐balance	  sheet	  assets	  was	  logical	  and	  
justifiable	  for	  all	  the	  reasons	  listed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  Section	  1,	  and	  need	  not	  be	  reiterated	  here.	  But	  
essentially,	  these	  guidelines	  enabled	  the	  banks	  supporting	  the	  Co-­‐op	  –	  or	  the	  CDFI	  pools	  of	  assets	  –	  to	  
minimize	  the	  amount	  of	  risk	  based	  capital	  backing	  the	  bank	  facility,	  and	  consequently	  to	  maximize	  the	  
return	  to	  the	  bank.	  This	  was	  the	  key	  moving	  piece	  that	  made	  what	  we	  said	  above	  work:	  “RBC	  guidelines	  
would	  have	  made	  the	  Co-­‐op	  facility	  less	  costly	  and	  therefore	  more	  attractive	  to	  bank	  participants	  than	  the	  
current	  warehouse	  lines,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  enabling	  CDFIs	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  lower	  cost	  funding	  
available	  in	  the	  commercial	  paper	  market.”	  Essentially,	  these	  new	  positions	  enabled	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  
CDFI	  over	  time	  to	  speak	  for	  itself,	  while	  reducing	  the	  cost	  to	  the	  CDFI	  of	  market	  unfamiliarity	  with	  the	  risk.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  step	  towards	  greater	  market	  liquidity	  and	  access	  to	  capital,	  the	  regulators	  were	  relying	  very	  heavily	  
on	  the	  rating	  agencies	  to	  ensure	  proper	  evaluation	  of	  credit	  risk,	  sufficient	  transparency	  for	  the	  investors,	  
and,	  hence,	  continued	  uninterrupted	  functioning	  of	  the	  market.	  But	  they	  were	  also	  leaving	  room	  for	  the	  
banks	  with	  a	  qualifying	  internal	  rating	  system	  to	  set	  the	  appropriate	  RBC	  allocations.	  The	  possibility	  that	  
the	  bank’s	  own	  risk	  rating	  system	  could	  be	  used	  to	  establish	  the	  appropriate	  RBC	  allocation	  and	  
consequent	  pricing	  of	  the	  loans	  was	  a	  positive,	  given	  the	  excellent	  performance	  of	  CDFIs	  relative	  to	  
organizational	  risk	  over	  time.	  There	  was	  a	  challenge,	  though:	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  competing	  sources	  of	  
funding	  for	  CDFI	  organizational	  risk,	  what	  could	  possibly	  motivate	  a	  bank	  to	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  reducing	  
the	  pricing	  on	  its	  loans?	  Essentially,	  this	  challenge	  paralleled	  the	  regulatory	  concern	  about	  moral	  hazard	  in	  
the	  use	  of	  internal	  ratings,	  which	  reinforced	  the	  need	  for	  the	  Co-­‐op	  –	  and	  CDFIs	  generally	  –	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  
get	  rated.	  
	  
The	  Asset	  Backed	  Commercial	  Paper	  Program	  Rule	  	  
	  
The	  primary	  function	  of	  an	  eligible	  ABCP	  liquidity	  facility	  should	  be	  to	  provide	  liquidity	  –	  not	  credit	  
enhancement.	  An	  eligible	  liquidity	  facility	  must	  have	  an	  asset	  quality	  test	  that	  precludes	  funding	  against	  
assets	  that	  are	  90	  days	  or	  more	  past	  due,	  in	  default	  or	  below	  investment	  grade,	  which	  implies	  that	  the	  
institutions	  providing	  the	  ABCP	  liquidity	  facility	  should	  not	  be	  exposed	  to	  the	  credit	  risk	  associated	  with	  
such	  assets.	  An	  ABCP	  liquidity	  facility	  will	  meet	  the	  asset	  quality	  test	  if,	  at	  all	  times	  through	  the	  
transaction,	  (i)	  the	  liquidity	  provider	  has	  access	  to	  certain	  types	  of	  acceptable	  credit	  enhancements	  that	  
support	  the	  liquidity	  facility	  and	  (ii)	  the	  notional	  amount	  of	  such	  credit	  enhancements	  exceeds	  the	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amount	  of	  underlying	  assets	  that	  are	  90	  days	  or	  more	  past	  due,	  defaulted	  or	  below	  investment	  grade	  that	  
the	  liquidity	  provider	  may	  be	  obligated	  to	  fund	  under	  the	  facility.	  
	  
Banking	  agencies	  published	  a	  final	  rule	  on	  Asset	  Backed	  Commercial	  Paper	  programs	  on	  
July	  28,	  2004.97	  	  This	  rule	  addressed	  the	  issue	  of	  consolidating	  or	  bringing	  Asset-­‐Backed	  	  
Commercial	  Paper	  programs	  on	  to	  the	  balance	  sheet	  of	  banking	  organizations	  and	  
instituted	  a	  new	  capital	  charge	  for	  ABCP	  liquidity	  facilities.	  Asset-­‐Backed	  Commercial	  
Paper	  programs	  were	  typically	  supported	  by	  liquidity	  facilities	  that	  ensured	  timely	  payment	  of	  principal	  
and	  interest	  to	  commercial	  paper	  investors	  either	  by	  lending	  to	  or	  purchasing	  assets	  from	  the	  ABCP	  
program.	  	  Liquidity	  facilities	  that	  also	  provided	  funding	  for	  assets	  in	  the	  program	  that	  deteriorate	  (e.g.,	  
facilities	  that	  provided	  credit	  support	  or	  enhancement	  as	  well	  as	  liquidity)	  exposed	  the	  banking	  
organization	  to	  credit	  risk	  –	  and	  were	  to	  be	  treated	  differently	  for	  purposes	  of	  risk-­‐based	  capital.	  This	  rule	  
clarified	  the	  RBC	  treatment	  for	  two	  types	  of	  liquidity	  facilities	  –	  eligible	  and	  ineligible	  –	  and	  distinguished	  
this	  capital	  treatment	  from	  that	  which	  is	  applied	  to	  bank	  sponsored	  credit	  enhancement	  facilities	  applied	  
to	  ABCP	  programs.	  The	  rule	  also	  discussed	  the	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  requirements	  for	  banks	  that	  provided	  
both	  liquidity	  facilities	  and	  credit	  enhancements	  to	  asset-­‐backed	  commercial	  paper	  programs.	  Key	  
elements	  of	  the	  rule	  are	  as	  follows:	  
	  
• The	  final	  rule	  permanently	  excluded	  ABCP	  program	  assets	  from	  risk-­‐weighted	  assets	  of	  
banks	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  calculating	  the	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  ratios	  –	  e.g.,	  the	  full	  face	  value	  of	  
the	  assets	  being	  financed	  off	  balance	  sheet	  would	  not	  be	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  need	  for	  
risk-­‐based	  capital	  or	  the	  RBC	  calculation.	  The	  agencies	  generally	  felt	  that	  the	  banks	  faced	  
limited	  risks	  in	  these	  ABCP	  Programs	  and	  that	  the	  risks	  were	  confined	  to	  the	  credit	  
enhancements	  and	  liquidity	  facility	  arrangements	  that	  they	  provided.	  	  	  
• In	  order	  to	  ensure	  consistency	  among	  regulators,	  the	  final	  rule	  also	  defined	  an	  “ABCP”	  
program	  to	  be	  a	  program	  that	  primarily	  issued	  (more	  than	  50	  percent)	  externally	  rated	  
commercial	  paper	  backed	  by	  assets	  or	  other	  exposures	  held	  in	  a	  bankruptcy	  remote,	  special	  
purpose	  entity.	  	  Under	  the	  final	  rule,	  banks	  could	  only	  exclude	  the	  assets	  of	  programs	  that	  
met	  the	  definition	  of	  an	  “ABCP”	  program	  from	  its	  risk-­‐weighted	  assets.	  Thus	  a	  bank	  
sponsoring	  a	  program	  that	  did	  not	  meet	  the	  definition	  had	  to	  continue	  to	  include	  the	  
program’s	  assets	  in	  its	  risk-­‐weighted	  asset	  base	  –	  e.g.,	  the	  equivalent	  of	  being	  “on	  balance	  
sheet.”	  	  	  
• With	  regard	  to	  Liquidity	  Facilities	  Supporting	  ABCP	  programs	  –	  the	  final	  rule	  made	  two	  key	  
distinctions	  among	  such	  facilities	  for	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  purposes.	  	  	  
(i)	  	  First,	  the	  rule	  distinguished	  between	  short-­‐term	  (an	  original	  maturity	  of	  one	  year	  or	  
less)	  and	  long-­‐term	  (an	  original	  maturity	  of	  more	  than	  one	  year)	  liquidity	  facilities:	  	  
a)	  	  Short-­‐term	  liquidity	  facilities	  were	  to	  be	  converted	  to	  an	  on-­‐balance	  sheet	  
credit	  equivalent	  amount	  using	  a	  10	  percent	  credit	  conversion	  factor;	  	  	  
b)	  	  Long-­‐term	  liquidity	  facilities	  were	  converted	  using	  a	  50	  percent	  credit	  
conversion	  factor.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  These	  conversion	  factors	  applied	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  program	  met	  
the	  definition	  of	  an	  ABCP	  program	  under	  the	  rule.	  	  	  
(ii)	  	  Second,	  the	  rule	  distinguished	  between	  what	  it	  called	  “eligible”	  and	  “ineligible”	  
ABCP	  liquidity	  facility:	  	  
a)	  	  	  An	  “eligible”	  facility	  is	  one	  that	  meets	  a	  reasonable	  asset	  quality	  test	  that	  
precludes	  funding	  assets	  that	  are	  60	  days	  or	  more	  past	  due	  or	  in	  default	  –	  
i.e.	  assets	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  credit	  risk	  such	  as	  those	  which	  are	  
delinquent,	  defaulting	  or	  below	  investment	  grade.	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b)	  	  	  An	  “ineligible”	  facility	  was	  one	  that	  that	  did	  not	  meet	  this	  asset	  quality	  test	  
and	  therefore	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  a	  recourse	  obligation	  or	  direct	  credit	  
substitute	  and	  would	  be	  converted	  to	  an	  on-­‐balance	  sheet	  credit	  
equivalent	  amount	  using	  a	  100	  percent	  credit	  conversion	  factor	  rather	  
than	  a	  10	  percent	  or	  50	  percent	  conversion	  factor.	  	  	  
The	  rule	  did	  not	  apply	  the	  asset	  quality	  test	  to	  assets	  that	  were	  guaranteed	  
by	  the	  US	  government	  or	  OECD	  countries.	  	  	  
	  
• The	  rule	  also	  provided	  guidance	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  overlapping	  exposures	  to	  an	  ABCP	  program.	  	  
If	  a	  bank	  had	  multiple	  exposures	  to	  a	  single	  ABCP	  program	  –	  i.e.	  both	  a	  credit	  enhancement	  
and	  a	  liquidity	  facility	  –	  the	  bank	  was	  not	  required	  to	  hold	  duplicative	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  
against	  such	  exposures	  on	  the	  same	  pool	  of	  assets.	  	  The	  bank	  must	  hold	  capital	  only	  once	  
and	  where	  overlapping	  exposures	  were	  subject	  to	  different	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  requirements	  
–	  the	  bank	  must	  apply	  the	  highest	  capital	  charge	  to	  the	  overlapping	  portion	  of	  the	  
exposures.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
All	  of	  these	  guidelines	  were	  of	  tremendous	  benefit	  to	  the	  Co-­‐op.	  Indeed	  they	  would	  be	  of	  tremendous	  
benefit	  to	  any	  pool	  of	  assets	  coming	  out	  of	  the	  community	  development	  finance	  sector.	  The	  rule	  also	  
included	  some	  important	  benchmarks	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Co-­‐op:	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  Co-­‐op	  
should	  focus	  on	  a)	  a	  short	  term	  assets	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  achieving	  the	  lowest	  conversion	  factor;	  and	  b)	  
incorporate	  strict	  stop-­‐issuance	  triggers	  in	  order	  to	  assure	  that	  all	  assets	  being	  funded	  were	  “eligible.”	  
	  
	  
Supervisory	  Letter	  05-­‐6	  Risk	  Based	  Capital	  Treatment	  for	  Unrated	  Direct	  Credit	  Substitutes	  Extended	  to	  
Asset	  Backed	  Commercial	  Paper	  Programs.	  	  
	  
Supervisory	  Letter	  05-­‐6,	  promulgated	  on	  March	  30,	  2005	  by	  Board	  of	  Governors	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  
System,	  Division	  of	  Banking,	  Supervision	  and	  Regulation	  the	  	  clarified	  how	  banking	  organizations	  could	  use	  
internal	  ratings	  that	  they	  assigned	  to	  asset	  pools	  purchased	  by	  their	  asset-­‐backed	  commercial	  paper	  
(ABCP)	  programs	  to	  appropriately	  risk	  weight	  any	  direct	  credit	  substitutes,	  e.g.,	  guarantees,	  extended	  to	  
such	  programs.	  The	  guidance	  provided	  an	  analytical	  framework	  for	  assessing	  the	  risk	  characteristics	  of	  
direct	  credit	  substitutes	  that	  a	  bank	  provided	  to	  an	  ABCP	  program	  it	  sponsored	  and	  described	  how	  to	  
evaluate	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  issued	  in	  the	  form	  of	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancements	  (an	  irrevocable	  
loan	  facility,	  a	  standby	  letter	  of	  credit,	  a	  financial	  guarantee,	  or	  subordinated	  debt).	  	  It	  also	  provided	  a	  
means	  for	  supervisors	  to	  determine	  the	  risk	  based	  capital	  charges	  associated	  with	  direct	  credit	  substitutes	  
such	  as	  these	  enhancements.	  	  	  
	  
This	  Supervisory	  Letter	  also	  introduced	  the	  "weakest	  link"	  approach	  for	  calculating	  the	  RBC	  requirement	  
applicable	  to	  a	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancement.	  This	  approach	  assumed	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  program-­‐
wide	  credit	  enhancement	  was	  directly	  dependent	  on	  the	  quality,	  i.e.,	  internal	  rating,	  of	  the	  riskiest	  asset	  
pools	  purchased	  by	  the	  ABCP	  program	  and	  therefore	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  
enhancement	  would	  be	  drawn	  was	  equal	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  default	  of	  the	  asset	  pools	  with	  the	  weakest	  
internal	  risk	  rating.	  Under	  the	  weakest	  link	  approach	  a	  bank	  would	  internally	  rate	  its	  risk	  exposure	  to	  
every	  asset	  pool	  purchased	  by	  its	  ABCP	  programs	  and	  use	  those	  internal	  ratings	  to	  determine	  how	  much	  
of	  the	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancement	  to	  assign	  to	  each	  risk	  weight	  category.	  The	  weakest	  link	  
approach	  assigned	  risk-­‐based	  capital	  against	  the	  program-­‐wide	  credit	  enhancement	  in	  rank	  order	  of	  the	  
internal	  ratings,	  starting	  with	  the	  lowest	  internally	  rated	  asset	  pools	  supported	  by	  the	  program-­‐wide	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credit	  enhancement.	  This	  was	  a	  crucial	  component	  in	  the	  structuring	  of	  the	  FIR	  team’s	  Commercial	  Paper	  
Co-­‐op.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  clear	  ratability	  on	  the	  notes	  issued	  by	  the	  CDFIs	  to	  the	  Co-­‐op,	  combined	  with	  the	  
recognition	  that	  the	  security	  for	  these	  notes	  included	  both	  ratable	  and	  unratable	  assets,	  the	  FIR	  team	  
established	  two	  predicates:	  a)	  that	  the	  Co-­‐op	  had	  to	  establish	  it’s	  own	  program	  wide	  credit	  enhancement	  
–	  primarily	  through	  high	  capitalization;	  and	  b)	  the	  level	  of	  unratable	  assets	  securing	  the	  facility	  would	  
have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  both	  the	  capital	  required	  at	  the	  Co-­‐op	  level	  and/or	  at	  the	  banks	  providing	  the	  
liquidity	  facility.	  	  
	  
The	  chief	  victim	  of	  the	  “weakest	  link”	  clause	  was	  the	  option	  to	  include	  unsecured	  working	  capital	  
obligations	  of	  the	  Co-­‐op	  participants	  under	  a	  sublimit	  in	  the	  borrowing	  base.	  Because	  there	  was	  (and	  is)	  
no	  common	  agreement	  on	  the	  metrics	  and	  methodologies	  for	  assessing	  unsecured	  organizational	  CDFI	  
credit	  risk,	  any	  exposure	  of	  the	  Co-­‐op	  to	  this	  asset	  class	  could	  force	  a	  material	  increase	  in	  both	  the	  capital	  
requirement	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  bank	  support.	  This	  was	  yet	  another	  compelling	  argument	  for	  CDFIs	  finding	  a	  
way	  to	  get	  rated.	  	  
	  
As	  we	  now	  know,	  the	  rating	  agencies	  erred	  in	  their	  evaluations	  of	  many	  of	  the	  off-­‐balance	  sheet	  vehicles,	  
and	  the	  investors,	  spooked	  by	  unanticipated	  levels	  of	  delinquency	  and	  foreclosure,	  abandoned	  the	  
commercial	  paper	  market	  virtually	  overnight.	  This	  was	  the	  proper	  response	  given	  the	  toxic	  nature	  of	  the	  
assets	  being	  funded.	  The	  tragedy	  is	  that	  high	  quality	  assets	  –	  such	  as	  those	  in	  the	  community	  development	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The route to the capital markets is not as perilous a journey as that, for example, which 
Lewis & Clark embarked upon. On the other hand, it already has taken quite a bit longer 
—and we still haven’t reached the objective: the ocean of credit. Fortunately our trip 
hasn’t been lonely. We have received a lot of help, both from those who have blazed the 
trail before us, and those who are blazing it alongside. Also, fortunate: we know where 
the ocean is, because the corporate sector got there more than two decades ago. The big 
question is: Can we, as a group, do it—and do it better? The answer that we find in this 
effort comes out as a resounding, Yes!  And we have a lot of people to thank for their 
leadership and their assistance in this effort, and the affirmation: 
• First of all: many many thanks to Cheryl Fitzgerald and Kevin Smith of the former 
Fannie Mae Foundation, whose insights, guidance and divine patience, as well as 
their grant funding, supported much of the earlier work on this project;  
• Greg Stanton, founder of Wall Street Without Walls, whose exhortations kept this 
project moving along—often out of sheer rage—when every shred of financial 
and political logic indicated that any kind of capital markets access was 
impossible;  
• Frank Altman, Mary Tingerthal and Scott Young (Community Reinvestment Fund), 
Bob Schall (Self-Help), Annie Donovan and Jeff Brenner (National Cooperative Bank 
Capital Impact), Judd Levy and Warren Horvath (CDT), and  Brian Cosgrove and Paul 
Ng (NHSA-Just Price Solutions) for their creativity, knowledge, contributions and 
unflinching support of this effort in every phase. Also crucial to the effort was 
the interest, support and contribution of Juliana Eades of the New Hampshire 
Community Loan Fund Dan Sheehy of Impact Capital, Dan Liebsohn (formerly 
LIIF) and Jeannine Jacokes (Partners for the Common Good and Community 
Development Bankers). 
• Sandy Braunstein of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and her team of 
Carolyn Wells and Angelyque Campbell were crucial supporters. They initiated the 
“Orientation to the Capital Markets” conferences, which provided much of the 
platform for this effort, as well as the initial stage for NeighborWorks America’s 
course: Sustainable Mission: Advanced Financial Analysis for a Sustainable Mission: 
Pricing, Funding and Management of Loans and Development Assets. The conferences 
established by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco have also been critical 
in the development and advancement of the effort; much gratitude is due to Fred 
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Mendez who helped start it all and John Olson, David Erickson and Ian Galloway 
who have built it into a major information exchange for the CDFI sector. Also at 
the Federal Reserve Board: it was Tom Boemio who was crucial in developing the 
best technical structure for accessing the capital markets.  
• Our efforts received valuable assistance from members of other governmental 
bodies as well: Linda Davenport and Donna Fabiani (both former CDFI Fund), 
William Shear at the General Accounting Office, Sylvia Martinez (Federal Housing 
Finance Agency), Barry Wides (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) and 
Dan Nuxoll of the FDIC.  
• In the context of advancing financial reporting, analysis and technology for the 
community development field, our effort benefited tremendously from the 
breakthrough work of Clara Miller (Nonprofit Facilities Fund), Kathy Stearns 
(former Opportunity Finance Network), again, Dan Nuxoll (FDIC), Janet Tasker 
(SBA), Ellen Seidman (Shorebank and New America Foundation), Luther Ragin 
(Heron Foundation), Tom Stanton (National Academy of Public Administration), 
Francie Ferguson, and Harold Nassau of NeighborWorks and Strength Matters; 
Andrea Levere (CFED), Ron Johnston and John Hoadley of NeighborWorks 
America’s Organizational Assessment Division, Debra Schwartz of MacArthur 
and Strength Matters, Ignacio Esteban (Florida Community Loan Fund) Adina 
Abramowitz (former Opportunity Finance Network), Heidi Kaplan (former CDFI 
Fund, now Federal Reserve) and Glenn Yago and Betsy Zeidman of the Milken 
Institute. Essential to mastering the financial analytics for both CDFIs and CDCs, 
was the Sustainable Mission team of Kristin Faust, Jack Northrup, Eric Hangen, and 
Alan Okagaki. 
• In the context of CDFI access to the capital markets, the work of Amy Domini 
(Domini Funds), and Judd Levy (CDT) stands out, as does the work of Shari 
Berenbach, Elizabeth Glenshaw and Lisa Hall at the Calvert Foundation, Wayne 
Marsden (former Wall Street Without Walls), Elyse Cherry, Dick Jones and Betsy 
Regan (Boston Community Capital), Mike Crist (The Reinvestment Fund), Mary 
Tingerthal (Community Reinvestment Fund and Housing Partnership Network), 
Dan Sheehy (Impact Capital), David Sand (Access Capital Strategies), Peter 
Humphreys (McDermott, Will and Emery), and again, Frank Altman, Bob Schall 
and Tom Boemio. 
• Bankers whose assistance was critical to the development of the various phases 
include: Cathy Dolan (Wachovia), David Leopold (Bank of America), Ruth Salzman, 
Dudley Benoit, and Dan Letendre (JP Morgan Chase, Letendre now BoA), Terri 
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Nissenbaum (former HSBC, now Goldman), Andrew Peisch (former Deutsche 
Bank), Michael Sternberg (Morgan Stanley) and Tom Deutsch at the American 
Securitization Forum. Of particular importance to the effort has been Mark Willis 
(former JP Morgan Chase) whose perspective, key portions of which are quoted 
in the work, has perhaps the most penetrating insights into the fundamental 
issues facing the CDFIs relative to bank financing. In order to move ahead, the 
community development field must find ways to address the critical issues he 
surfaces.  
• We found our visits to the rating agencies to be extremely informative, and are 
particularly thankful to: Everett Rutan, Navneet Agarwal, and Jonathan Polansky of 
Moody’s, Deborah Seife and Darryl Osojniak of Fitch, and Winston Chang, Mary 
Peloquin Dodd, Martin Arrick, and Valerie White of Standard and Poors.  
• Throughout the effort we relied on an informal “Brain Trust” to get the technical 
and policy issues right. It included Shelby Chodos, adjunct professor of public 
finance at the Kennedy School, Austin McClintock of North Run Capital, Elaine 
Francolino of Moodys, Thomas O’Brien (OB Investments), Steve Davidson, 
(formerly of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Assocation), Douglas 
Criscitello of PriceWaterhouse Coopers, Howard Banker (Fair Mortgage 
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(Graves and Horton LLC), Lee Higgins of NeighborWorks America, Fred Cooper, 
Michael Schaaf (Community Investment Associates), Bill Myers (Aspen Institute) 
and again, Peter Humphreys of McDermott, Will and Emery.   
This entire effort has been geared to developing solutions for a specific part of the 
community development field. As a consequence, it is entirely dependent for its 
importance as well as its success upon individuals who are attempting to tackle the 
challenges of the community development field across a much broader front. Leaders 
whose work is formative and essential in the effort to access the capital markets and to 
build the capacity for the field generally: Donna Gambrell (CDFI Fund), Mark Pinsky 
(Opportunity Finance Network ), Cliff Rosenthal (Federation), Jeremy Nowak (The 
Reinvestment Fund), Nancy Andrews (Low Income Investment Fund), Jim King (FAHE), 
and George McCarthy at Ford. Also, again: Kirsten Moy, Clara Miller, Luther Ragin, Debra 
Schwartz, Andrea Levere, Elyse Cherry, Ellen Seidman, Saurabh Narain, Juliana Eades, Dan 
Leibsohn, and Jeannine Jacokes. 
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